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ABSTRACT 
Parapsychology, or psychical research, continues to 
be viewed by many scientists and laypeople as a pursuit 
characterized by occult beliefs and pseudoscientific 
approaches, despite the longstanding efforts of its lead- 
ers to operate within the framework of modern scientific 
methods. This thesis represents an attempt, by examining 
the 19th-century origins of psychical research, both to 
understand more fully the reasons for the continued 
rejection of parapsychology as science and also to define 
the aim of parapsychology and its potential role in or 
contribution to modern science in general and psychology 
in particular. Modern science progressed by rejecting 
the concept of mental, or "spiritual", causality as a 
vestige of supernaturalistic, teleological thinking. 
Scientific psychology was built on the foundation of this 
rejection of mental causality as an inherently 
unscientific notion, and as a result psychologists 
abandoned the field's most basic theoretical problems. 
Psychical research developed explicitly as an attempt to 
keep alive, and to develop empirical approaches to, fun- 
damental questions about the nature of mind and its rela- 
tionship to physical processes, at a time when most 
psychologists were abandoning such questions as 
metaphysical or religious problems outside the scope of 
scientific inquiry. 
Part I attempts to demonstrate that scientific 
psychology had its roots in the assumption that mind is a 
secondary phenomenon derived from matter. In particular, 
it examines ideas about the relationship of mind and mat- 
ter in the writings of 11 scientists who were influential 
in the development of scientific psychology during its 
formative period, the last half of the 19th century. The 
essential failure of such scientists to address empiri- 
cally the problem of the relationship between mental and 
physical phenomena only further entrenched, and did 
nothing to resolve, the rift between mind and matter that 
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had led to the rejection of dualism by modern scientists. 
Part II examines the aims and purposes of 19th- 
century psychical research, as represented by its primary 
spokesman, Frederic W. H. Myers. In contrast to most 
other scientists, Myers believed that empirical research 
on the mind-matter problem is not only possible but is 
the primary task of and challenge to scientific psychol- 
ogy. Chapters in Part II examine the basic purposes and 
principles behind Myers's work, the theoretical framework 
and model of mind that he proposed for psychology, and 
the phenomena and empirical studies that he thought would 
be most useful in attacking psychology's basic problems. 
Scientists and others who reject parapsychology do so 
because they believe that parapsychology represents a 
reversion to supernaturalistic thinking and would thus 
undermine the foundations of modern science. Parapsy- 
chology, however, undermines not science but the long- 
standing assumption behind modern science and scientific 
psychology that mental causality is a supernatural, not 
scientific, concept. In attempting to examine the 
assumption that matter is the primary, and mind a sec- 
ondary, derivative, characteristic of nature, parapsy- 
chology reminds scientists that science is most fundamen- 
tally a method and not a particular set of assumptions. 
Myers's primary belief was that that method could be used 
to push our understanding of mind-matter relations beyond 
both dualism and materialism toward some new, more com- 
prehensive conception. 
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SCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGY, AND PSYCHICAL RESEARCH 
It is hardly necessary to explain to most educated 
persons that psychical research (or, to use its more 
modern designation, parapsychologyl) has throughout its 
history operated at the fringes of modern science, dis- 
missed by many scientists as a deplorable persistence of 
occult, irrational, mystical, primitive, superstitious 
supernaturalism. Parapsychology, its critics say, is a 
"pseudo-science" characterized by "magico-religious 
belief" and "irrationality" or even "anti-rationality" 
(Alcock, 1981). It is symptomatic of "the urge towards 
mysticism, the occult and the supernatural.... [It is] 
modern occultism... whether it takes the form of crude 
supernaturalism or the application of pseudo-scientific 
methods to outworn superstitions refined and elaborated 
into speculative metaphysical theories" (Rawcliffe, 1959, 
8,12). Its persistence leaves some observers "with a 
big question mark about the rationality of mankind" 
(Marks & Kammann, 1980,200). Moreover, many scientists 
believe that, if its claims were accepted, parapsychology 
would undermine most or all of Western science: 
Paranormal phenomena... are intrinsically 
unacceptable -- there is no way to make them com- 
patible with the total accumulated body of 
scientific knowledge.... The problem lies... in the 
body of knowledge and theory which must be abandoned 
or radically modified in order to accept it. 
(Brody, 1979,72-73) 
Parapsychology, in other words, threatens to undermine 
the hard-won intellectual progress of humanity: "It has 
taken a very long time to overcome the myriad metaphysi- 
cal explanations for natural phenomena that grew out of 
the ignorance and magic of our ancestors" (Alcock, 1981, 
144), and parapsychology threatens to return us to the 
superstitious belief in "the operation of 'hidden, ' 
'mysterious, ' or 'occult' forces in the universe" (Kurtz, 
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1985,505). 
Since its formal inception in 1882 as an organized 
field, however, psychical research has been dominated and 
led by persons who have taken their stand with those who 
recognize science as humanity's greatest tool of knowl- 
edge, and firmly against the defenders of theological 
authority or a supernaturalistic world view. Moreover, 
they have also since the beginning of the field's history 
taken great pains to adopt and develop the best 
scientific methods available at the time2. As even its 
most severe critics sometimes acknowledge, 
professional parapsychologists are for the most part 
dedicated to the principles and methods of science, 
and in many ways professional parapsychology 
operates in much the same manner as any other dis- 
cipline that wears or aspires to wear the mantle of 
Science. (Alcock, 1985,538) 
Yet despite these longstanding efforts to operate within 
the framework of acceptable scientific methods, parapsy- 
chology has continued to be derisively labelled as 
occultistic pseudoscience and has in general received 
little more than a "chilly reception in the halls of 
science" (Alcock, 1985,538). 
The debate over the status of parapsychology con- 
tinues (see, for example, Rao, Palmer, Alcock, et al., 
1987); but the arguments advanced on either side have 
changed little in kind through the years, and "steady- 
state rejection has been the fate of the field for 
decades" (Pinch, 1987,604). If there is ever to be a 
resolution to the problem of whether parapsychology is 
the occultism it is widely perceived to be by many 
scientists, or the science that most parapsychologists 
perceive it to be, it seems unlikely that this will come 
through continued confrontations by the antagonists. It 
may be more useful, instead, to try to increase our 
understanding of the roots and origins of these dis- 
crepant positions. 
It has become a commonplace -- indeed, one might say, 
a platitude -- to attribute the origins of psychical 
research to the mid-Victorian phenomenon of Spiritualism 
and, more generally, to the 19th-century malaise brought 
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on as the religious world view was rapidly superseded by 
the mechanistic, materialistic, impersonal world view 
portrayed by science (e. g., Cerullo, 1982; Gauld, 1968; 
Moore, 1977; Oppenheim, 1985; Turner, 1974a). Whether 
among those who deride and dismiss parapsychology as a 
vestige of primitive supernaturalism; among those who 
wish to purge parapsychology of all its associations with 
Spiritualistic psychical research and establish it firmly 
as a modern, sophisticated science; or among those who 
argue that psychical research should return to the 
original topics and approaches from which it was regret- 
tably diverted -- few would argue with the claim that 
unmet religious, spiritual, or emotional needs provided 
much of the original impetus for psychical research. As 
with most truisms, however, this one has served more as 
an act of closure than as an opening to new thought, 
lulling us into thinking we understand all we really need 
to know about the foundations of psychical research, 
rather than stimulating us to see gaps in our present 
perspective and the potential in those gaps for new 
knowledge and understanding. The roots of psychical 
research, in fact, are far more extensive than those 
usually described, and the issues therefore posed by 
psychical research are far more basic to modern science 
than is usually acknowledged. I will argue in this 
thesis that the most fundamental origins of parapsychol- 
ogy lie in major intellectual problems that became par- 
ticularly acute when, as the last major campaign of the 
scientific revolution, 19th-century scientists undertook 
the transformation of psychology from philosophy to 
science. I will argue in particular that psychical 
research arose to challenge the abandonment by 19th- 
century scientists of psychology's most basic theoretical 
questions. 
The attempt to transform psychology into a science 
raised some unique problems. The phenomena of psychology 
are unlike those of any of the physical sciences in that 
they are, above all else, mental. At the theoretical 
heart of psychology, therefore, are the questions, What 
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are mental phenomena and what is their relation to physi- 
cal phenomena? Is mind as primary and fundamental a 
characteristic of nature as matter is; or is it a sec- 
ondary characteristic, an evolved, emergent, or 
epiphenomenal characteristic of matter? As William James 
put it, is mind or personality a "product" or a "princi- 
ple" of nature (James, 1898/1906, vi)? Is it "an 
elementary force in nature" or the "resultant of the 
really elementary forces" (James, 1902/1958,105)? Of 
particular theoretical importance for psychology is the 
question of mental causality, or volition, or "teleologi- 
cal causation" (Beloff, 1990, especially 88-99): Do men- 
tal phenomena initiate changes in the physical world? If 
so, what are the parameters and laws of such mental 
causality, and what do they imply about the question of 
whether mind is a fundamental or a derivative aspect of 
nature? Again, James succinctly summarized the basic 
problem: Are "personal forces.. . the starting-point of 
new effects, " or is the world "a strictly impersonal 
world" (James, 1897/1961,47)? Is mind, in short, caused 
or causal? 
The rest of science, however, had found no need to 
ask such questions. The physical sciences had progres- 
sed, in fact, specifically by rejecting mental or 
"spiritual113 causality as operative in nature. With the 
growth of the modern physical sciences, therefore, the 
assumption that all phenomena of nature are the result of 
physical causes, and that the notion of mental causality 
is a vestige of primitive "supernatural" ways of think- 
ing, became firmly entrenched. As I hope to show in the 
rest of this thesis, scientists instrumental in the 
development of scientific psychology chose to accept this 
assumption rather than question its adequacy, and as a 
result psychology abandoned its own most basic theoreti- 
cal questions. Psychical research, in contrast, arose to 
fill the void left when psychologists failed to address 
these problems. Psychical research thus also confronted 
scientists with the question, lurking behind psychology, 
of whether a field whose phenomena are characterized 
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largely by volition, or mental causality, can be science 
when physical causality is assumed to be the essence of 
science. As one of parapsychology's most vocal critics 
has asked, "How can a science of the spirit exist, given 
that science is by its very nature materialistic? " 
(Alcock, 1985,562). For more than a century, that ques- 
tion has been aimed at parapsychology; but in fact it 
applies to any psychology that confronts, and does not 
avoid, basic theoretical questions about the problem of 
volition, the relation of mental and physical phenomena, 
and the nature of mind. In short, the problem of whether 
parapsychology is science derives directly from the 
never-resolved problem of whether psychology is science. 
Science and Psychology 
Modern Science 
Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, psychology 
could be readily defined as that aspect of moral 
philosophy that attempts to understand mind, or con- 
sciousness (that is, the subjective experience of aware- 
ness), and all the mental processes associated with the 
functioning of mind, especially volition (the ability of 
one's conscious self to initiate and execute freely pur- 
poseful behavior) and reason (the apparently unique capa- 
city of human minds to think logically and abstractly). 
The basis for a clear conceptual distinction between nat- 
ural philosophy (or the physical sciences) on the one 
hand and moral philosophy (or the mental sciences) on the 
other had been laid in the early years of the scientific 
revolution by two of its key figures, Descartes and 
Galileo. Descartes' distinction between extended matter 
and unextended mind, as well as between the involuntary 
activity of the former and the voluntary activity of the 
latter, became the point from which nearly all subsequent 
Western philosophy began; and, although much of Des- 
cartes' own philosophy and science had been directed 
toward understanding the relationship and connections 
between these two aspects of experience, the overwhelming 
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tendency in those who followed him was to emphasize the 
qualitative differences between physical and mental 
phenomena and thus to treat them as autonomous and inde- 
pendent processes. 
Descartes' contemporary, Galileo, had made a similar 
distinction that became as fundamental to the development 
of the physical sciences as Descartes' and that, more- 
over, served to reinforce the Cartesian dichotomy of 
material and mental phenomena. Galileo said that the 
perceived properties of objects could be divided into 
primary and secondary qualities. The primary qualities, 
such as weight, extension, and motion, were those 
measurable properties that Galileo considered to be 
inherent in the objects themselves because they could be 
conceived as existing independently of a perceiver. On 
the other hand, secondary qualities, such as color, 
taste, or heat, existed only in the presence of a per- 
ceiver and thus, in a sense, only in the mind of that 
perceiver. Moreover, Galileo had used this mathematical 
distinction to identify those perceptions that could be 
considered reliable and consistent and thus suitable as 
the basis for a valid, empirical science of physics. 
Thus, unlike Descartes' differentiation of mind and mat- 
ter, Galileo's differentiation of primary and secondary 
qualities implied that the primary qualities were more 
real and somehow scientifically superior to the secondary 
qualities; and 
the secondary qualities, and by extension any other 
aspects of life or experience that could not be 
assimilated to a mathematico-physical view of 
nature, came more and more to be considered as sepa- 
rate and apart from the physical world. (Mackenzie & 
Mackenzie, 1980,140) 
Thus launched with some clear guidelines for both 
their content and their method, the physical sciences 
took off. Over the next two centuries, science's 
impressive and growing list of accomplishments had the 
effect not only of increasing knowledge and improving 
technology, but also of altering in important ways views 
about the very nature of the cosmos. Perhaps the single 
most important foundation on which the scientific revolu- 
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tion has been built was the principle of mechanistic 
determinism, that is, that the physical universe operates 
according to a uniform and unvarying system of impersonal 
causes and effects. The assumption that a particular 
sequence of cause and effect was unvarying, and that 
scientists could identify and describe such sequences, or 
natural laws, and thus predict future events, was what 
made science so immensely successful; and every new suc- 
cess in turn confirmed the principle of mechanistic 
determinism. Closely related to mechanism was the prin- 
ciple of atomistic reductionism, or the assumption that 
physical systems could be understood in terms of the 
actions and reactions of their parts. A major goal of 
science was therefore to identify and describe with ever 
greater precision the basic elements and processes from 
which a physical system was built. 
The world thus being revealed by the physical 
sciences was quite a different place from the one 
previously known. The universe had earlier been perceived 
as above all else a personal one: Events were the result 
of some personal agency (human or otherwise), directed 
toward personal ends and overseen by some absolute per- 
sonal agency. The world was thus seen as an unpredict- 
able, often capricious place, buffeted by the interplay 
of conflicting wills and forces. During the 17th and 18th 
centuries, however, the natural sciences began to portray 
a physical universe that was above all else an impersonal 
one: Events were the fixed result of mechanistic, 
impersonal laws governed not so much from above as from 
below, by the individual elements leading up to and con- 
stituting the event in question. Although belief in some 
absolute or ultimate personal agency coexisted 
harmoniously well into the 19th century with the new pic- 
ture painted by science, this agency more and more took 
the form of a first cause that had little to do with the 
subsequent operation of the physical world. 
By the 19th century, however, the very success of the 
physical sciences was beginning to undermine one of the 
foundations on which they had been built. Distinctions 
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such as Descartes had made between involuntary or 
determined physical processes and voluntary mental ones, 
and such as Galileo had made between measurable proper- 
ties and unquantifiable ones, had helped give natural 
philosophy the conceptual and methodological clarity it 
needed to become empirical science. As the various 
physical sciences progressed, however, one principle 
began to emerge from the rest as the most fundamental of 
all, and that was the principle of continuity. According 
to this principle, the universe is a unitary phenomenon: 
The parts are not only all inextricably interrelated, but 
they all function according to the same basic principles 
and are all, in the final analysis, of the same basic 
essence or nature. 
Several factors contributed importantly to the devel- 
opment of this view of the universe. The assumption that 
the physical world is a vast mechanism, and the discovery 
and elaboration of universal laws of physics that 
described the unvarying operation of that mechanism, 
played perhaps the most important role. The study of the 
structure of both organic and inorganic systems streng- 
thened the view that there are basic particles, or build- 
ing blocks, from which all complex phenomena are derived. 
Major philosophical movements as diverse as late 18th- 
century Enlightenment and early 19th-century Natur- 
philosophie emphasized the unity of nature or the notion 
of a universal system and overarching principles that 
could provide continuity to all branches of knowledge. 
Two 19th-century scientific doctrines emerged, however, 
as the most important specific factors in establishing 
belief in the continuity of the universe. First was the 
formulation of the principle of the conservation of 
energy, introduced to the general scientific world 
primarily through Helmholtz's famous 1847 paper. This 
law stated that all forms of energy are convertible into 
each other, that the total sum of energy in the universe 
is constant, and that there is a continuous transforma- 
tion of energy from one kind to another. The law thus 
became the specific foundation for belief in the unity of 
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all nature in a closed, causal system. Second was Dar- 
win's theory that all biological organisms have evolved 
through the mechanism of natural selection; this theory 
was the culmination of a growing movement of evolutionary 
thinking in the 18th and 19th centuries, to which Dar- 
win's grandfather Erasmus Darwin, Chambers, Lamarck, and 
many others had contributed. With the application of 
evolutionary ideas to biology, not only were all forms of 
life shown to be subject to the same universal 
mechanisms, but, more importantly, all forms of life 
could be seen as having developed from the same 
elementary organisms. 
A corollary of this belief in continuity was the 
growing conviction that, if the world is ultimately a 
unity, it must all be subject to the same tools of knowl- 
edge and that these tools must be the methods of science 
that had already proved so successful. These methods 
consisted in essence of observation (whether of naturally 
occurring or experimentally induced phenomena), the com- 
plete description of those observations, and then the 
application of experimentation, reason, and logic to dis- 
cover the general laws and principles behind the 
phenomena. Because the scientific method relied so com- 
pletely on observation, it followed that only observable 
phenomena could provide the contents of science and, 
hence, of knowledge. 
The Problem of Scientific Psychology 
The belief in the continuity and unity of nature and 
faith in the efficacy of the scientific method had 
profound implications for the old distinction between 
natural and moral philosophy, and specifically for 
psychology. Among those increasing numbers of people who 
understood the power of scientific inquiry and felt the 
impact of its accomplishments, there arose the conviction 
that the principle of continuity demanded the unity of 
the psychophysical organism, that mental phenomena, like 
physical ones, are natural phenomena, and thus that 
psychology could be subjected to the same empirical meth- 
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ods that had so revolutionized other branches of natural 
philosophy and transformed them into science. Throughout 
much of the 19th century, therefore, it became 
increasingly controversial to think in terms of two bran- 
ches of knowledge (natural philosophy and moral 
philosophy) or two substances differing in nature (matter 
and mind) or two methods of knowledge (science and 
philosophy) or, especially, two worlds (the natural, 
material world and the supernatural, spiritual one). The 
resulting intellectual turmoil of the 19th century, 
however, was more basic than a conflict between an old, 
dying order and a new, more advanced one, or even, as it 
is so often portrayed, between Religion and Science. It 
was, in essence, a conflict between experience and knowl- 
edge: Individual experience suggested one kind of world 
-- one of personal agency -- but the cumulative knowledge 
produced by science was suggesting quite a different 
world -- one of impersonal agency; and scientific 
psychology became the point at which those two world 
views collided, thus presenting science with the most 
serious challenge to the strength and sufficiency of its 
assumptions, principles, and methods. 
Chadwick (1975,204-205) has argued that the problem 
of free will versus determinism was the central issue in 
19th- century thought. By the 19th century, the com- 
monsense view that there are essentially two modes of 
being -- one determined or caused, the other free or 
uncaused -- had come into direct conflict with the 
scientific view that the world is a unitary, lawful 
order. Nowhere was this conflict more apparent than in 
the proposal that the phenomena of mind be subjected to 
that ultimate tool of knowledge, science. As Daston 
(1978,1982) has described, this attempt to make psychol- 
ogy scientific brought the apparent essence of human 
experience -- volitional activity -- into direct conflict 
with the apparent essence of science -- mechanistic 
determinism. If mind is, as experience tells us it is, a 
causal, volitional agent whose activities cannot be 
predicted ahead of time but only (perhaps) be explained 
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afterward, then how can the study of mind be science, 
whose power lies in the predictability of lawful, regu- 
lar, deterministic phenomena? 
For some, the answer was that it could not: 
"Scientific psychology, " like "physical mind, " was a non- 
sensical concept. For them, the subject matter of 
psychology -- Descartes' unextended substance, Galileo's 
secondary properties -- is antithetical to the subject 
matter of science -- Descartes' extended substance, 
Galileo's primary qualities. The methods of science and 
the model of Nature that had developed in conjunction 
with science were applicable, therefore, only to the 
physical world and not to psychology. 
For many others in the 19th century, however, the 
success of the physical sciences had demonstrated that 
empirical science was the only means of attaining knowl- 
edge, and the ultimate rationality of the cosmos depended 
on science's principle of unity or continuity: "Perhaps 
the most important development in nineteenth-century 
intellectual history was the extension of scientific 
assumptions and methods from the physical world to the 
whole life of man" (Houghton, 1957,32). J. S. Mill, in 
his System of Logic in particular, was the leading 
spokesman for the increasingly accepted view that "the 
methods that promised total mastery of the physical 
environment" could be extended to psychological and 
social phenomena as well (Altick, 1973,108,234). For 
Mill and his many influential followers, knowledge about 
the phenomena subsumed under the word mind could only be 
attained to the extent that psychology could be trans- 
formed into science. 
The potential incorporation of psychology into 
science, however, presented a threat to both. If the 
anomaly of mind, or nonmaterial, volitional, teleologi- 
cal, subjective phenomena, was to be reconciled with the 
otherwise increasingly uniform picture painted by Western 
science of mechanistic, atomistic, physical determinism, 
then either the concept of psychology or the concept of 
science would have to be altered. Psychologists could 
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redefine, or reconceptualize, psychology in such a way 
that it excluded what did not fit the framework of the 
physical sciences -- such as consciousness or volitional 
agency; or they could use the phenomena of psychology to 
test and, if necessary, modify the present model of 
science that limited causal agency to physical 
determinism. Psychologists could either accept the 
Galilean distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities and the derived conclusions that the physical, 
measurable world is the only "real" world, the rest being 
derivative; or they could challenge the assumption that 
psychological phenomena are secondary and derivative and 
that psychology could become a science only by studying 
the primary (that is, physical and measurable) phenomena 
from which secondary psychological phenomena are assumed 
to derive. They could either subscribe to the positivist 
hierarchy of sciences, in which mathematics and physics 
are the patriarchs and the other sciences are strung 
below in a line of descent; or they could challenge that 
hierarchy and the assumption of physical primacy from 
which it derived. They could, in short, either narrow 
psychology to fit science, or expand science to accom- 
modate psychology. 
Psychology, the newest claimant to the title of 
science, did not challenge its elders. The history of 
psychology in the 19th century, therefore -- the story of 
the transformation of psychology from philosophy to 
science -- is essentially the story of the nearly unani- 
mous choice of the former course, of attempting to recon- 
ceptualize psychology to fit the definition of science as 
physical science, rather than threaten science with the 
possibility that it might have to be reconceptualized to 
accommodate mental phenomena and causality on an equal 
footing with physical phenomena and causality. As Boring 
(1933,6,8) succinctly stated years later: "His- 
torically science is physical science. Psychology, if it 
is to be a science, must be like physics... . The ultimate 
abandonment of dualism leaves us the physical world as 
the only reality. Consciousness will ultimately be 
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measured in physical dimensions. " 
The Dichotomization of 19th-Century Thought 
General trends in 19th-century thought practically 
ensured that no serious challenge to the adequacy of the 
scientific model would be tolerated. There was, above 
all else in the 19th century, an increasing dichotomiza- 
tion of thought as the old world view collided with the 
new, a dichotomy that essentially resolved into that of 
naturalism versus supernaturalism. Jacyna (1981), for 
example, has described how the immensely influential 
group of Liberal thinkers at Cambridge in the 1860s 
pitted Enlightenment rationalism and naturalism against 
any form of dualism or Theism. As they saw it, at issue 
was a stark choice between the unity, the lawful self- 
regulation, and the self-sufficiency of nature on the one 
hand, and on the other hand belief in some order or law- 
giver external to nature: For them, as for their 18th- 
century forebears, among "the important features of the 
wrong and harmful type of thinking [were] belief in God, 
in spiritual forces of any kind, in a nonmaterial element 
of man, in free will or any other exceptions to natural 
regularity" (Gellner, 1964,284-285). 
Because of this strictly maintained dichotomy of 
thought, any suggestion that mental phenomena might be 
primary, causal, or of equal status in the universe with 
physical phenomena was automatically construed as a 
return to the supernatural, theological side. As at 
least one psychologist complained (Ladd, 1892), no 
psychologist could suggest such a thing without being 
branded an unscientific supernaturalist, and so this 
polarization of thought precluded any contribution 
psychologists might have made toward moving beyond the 
dichotomy and forging new ways of thinking about the 
problem of the place of mind in nature. 
Another reason the naturalism-supernaturalism 
dichotomy became so rigidly polarized, as Turner (1974a, 
1974b, 1975,1978) has argued, was that at issue also was 
whether science would continue to be subordinate to reli- 
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gion, to be viewed as a tool to serve religious ends, or 
whether science would become an autonomous discipline, 
setting its own agenda and serving its own ends. At 
stake was not only intellectual autonomy, but the 
intellectual leadership of society at large. Scientists 
and other Liberal thinkers of the mid-19th century 
increasingly viewed religion as a primitive approach to 
knowledge, and they sought to undermine the control 
clerical authorities had over social, political, and 
educational institutions and to place the leadership of 
society in the hands of those committed to a more modern 
world view. 
All attempts at reconciliation between these two 
world views failed. The most visible and representative 
effort was that of the Metaphysical Society, founded in 
London in 1869 by James Knowles as an arena in which 
major intellectual figures of widely varying views could 
discuss their differences, try to find some common 
grounds of agreement, and thus arrive at "a philosophic 
reconciliation of theologians and scientists, 
intuitionists and empiricists" (Brown, 1947,89). The 
effort failed, however, and the result was an increasing 
polarization of views, with scientists in particular 
rejecting anything resembling or even hinting at old 
theological, dualistic, anthropomorphic, teleological, or 
supernatural world views. 
The Metaphysical Society, however, composed of so 
many key figures in 19th-century intellectual life, is 
illustrative not only of the impasse in 19th-century 
thought that had been reached, but also of the subsequent 
direction taken. As the attempt at reconciliation of 
thought failed and the differences deepened, many members 
became convinced that the different positions were in 
fact unreconcilable because they represented distinct 
realms of discourse that lacked common ground by their 
very definition (Brown, 1947). The failure of the 
Metaphysical Society, therefore, led to an epistemologi- 
cal pluralism: Members agreed that they would call a 
truce, carefully draw the boundaries separating the dif- 
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ferent approaches to knowledge and experience, and hence- 
forth pursue knowledge from their own chosen position, 
unencumbered by conflicting perspectives or experiences. 
The conceptual basis for this bifurcation that came 
to permeate late 19th-century thought had been particu- 
larly articulated by Kant (see, e. g., Patrick, 1911; 
Ward, 1904). In an attempt to resolve the conflict 
between scientific mechanism and free will, Kant had dis- 
tinguished between phenomena and noumena. Phenomena are 
things as they appear to an observer, filtered through 
the observer's perception, whereas noumena are things as 
they really are. Phenomena, according to Kant, are sub- 
ject to causality, and, because they constitute the world 
of sensory experience, they are the only objects about 
which humans can have empirical knowledge. Noumena, in 
contrast, are entirely free, but because they are things 
as they ultimately and really are, they are beyond the 
categories of finite experience and are unknowable except 
by intuition. Carlyle's concept of Nescience, Spencer's 
concept of the Unknowable, and Huxley's Agnosticism were 
similar expressions of "mankind's inability to discover 
or to articulate the answers to ultimate questions" 
(Turner, 1975,336). 
A common theme among late 19th-century scientists and 
psychologists, therefore, concerned the limits of 
science, or knowledge, and most agreed that the domain of 
science consisted of observable, and thus ultimately 
physical, phenomena, all else being relegated to entirely 
separate realms of thought, notably metaphysics, ethics, 
or religion. Such categorization, however, was essen- 
tially an attempt to deal with paradoxes of human experi- 
ence, not by resolving them, but by segregating conflict- 
ing aspects of experience into separate categories of 
thought. Out of such compartmentalization grew 
the perilous dissociation of the modern scientist 
having two different thoughts, one for his 
laboratory and his research, the other for his 
interhuman relations, his attitude toward life and 
death, health and disease, his concept of man's 
place on earth and in the universe. (Riese, 1954, 
337) 
22 
In sum, in contrast with the early optimistic years 
of the century, when unity of knowledge was the ideal, by 
the end of the century the apparently intractable con- 
flicts in human thought and experience had led many 
people to consider the differences permanently 
unreconcilable and to begin segregating aspects of human 
experience as belonging to different realms of discourse 
or categories of thought (Annan, 1959). In the broadest 
terms, this meant the separation of science and religion, 
or science and metaphysics. Scientists had rejected the 
old dualism because it introduced discontinuity in nature 
by postulating two substances different in kind and by 
exempting mind (that is, consciousness, reason, and voli- 
tion) from the rule of mechanistic physical determinism. 
The old dualism had been an ontological one; the new 
dualism was a conceptual one -- the separation, not of 
two substances (mind and matter) but of two categories of 
thought (physical categories and mental or conceptual 
ones). Discontinuity was as prominent in the new dualism 
as in the old; but whereas the old dualism had confronted 
the problems inherent in the dual nature of experience 
and had attempted to resolve them with the hypothesis of 
the interaction of mind and matter, the new dualism 
simply avoided the problems. 
Parallelistic Psychology 
The new conceptual dualism, therefore, allowed one to 
maintain belief in the ultimate continuity and 
intelligibility of the universe by claiming that such 
antinomies as mind and matter, volition and determinism, 
or science and religion belong to different conceptual 
realms of discourse and that the apparent paradoxes or 
conflicting positions to which they led simply reflected 
the limits beyond which human understanding could not go. 
Conceptual and methodological purity demanded that dif- 
ferent realms or categories of thought not be confused. 
Commitment to science, therefore, as the only valid 
method of knowledge required commitment also to the 
assumptions and principles, as well as the methods, on 
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which science was based -- that is, to the world view of 
determinism, continuity, reductionism, and naturalism to 
which it had led. Many influential mid- and late-19th- 
century naturalists and scientists -- such as those I 
will discuss in Chapters 3 and 4 --insisted on the 
"banishment of religious purposes and categories from 
scientific work" and thus on a "thoroughly naturalistic 
science according to which theological, teleological, and 
metaphysical concerns stood banned both as matters for 
investigation and as principles of explanation" (Turner, 
1978,365). For these scientists, therefore, if 
psychologists were to be scientists, they had to purge 
from psychology all the old dualistic and teleological 
associations. The suggestion that science might have to 
be modified to accommodate psychological phenomena con- 
stituted a regression to old, unscientific ways of think- 
ing or a confusion of distinct conceptual categories. 
This conceptual dualism made it extremely difficult 
for psychologists to challenge the adequacy of a 
scientific model based only on physical phenomena; but it 
also provided the rationale by which many 19th-century 
psychologists thought that they could resolve the 
paradoxes and problems inherent in the notion of a 
scientific psychology. First, it allowed psychologists 
to distinguish, as conceptually distinct categories, 
those psychological phenomena that could be translated 
into observable, objective, measurable, or deterministic 
terms from those that could not. Thus, physiology and 
behavior were empirical phenomena suitable for scientific 
study; mind, consciousness, soul, or volition were 
noumenal categories suitable only for metaphysical 
speculation. Second, it also allowed psychologists to 
distinguish, as conceptually distinct categories, mental 
and physical phenomena, and thus it enabled psychology to 
develop as, not just a science, but an autonomous science 
-- that is, one with its own uniquely defined phenomena 
-- rather than as a mere sub-discipline of neurology or 
medicine. As I hope to show in Part I, 19th-century 
psychologists and other scientists increasingly embraced, 
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irrespective of their views on the ontological status of 
mind and matter, the methodological parallelism that had 
been so clearly enunciated by Hughlings Jackson (Jackson, 
1931-1932,2: 72; see also Angel, 1961; Engelhardt, 1975; 
Levin, 1961; Riese, 1954; Stengel, 1963). According to 
Jackson's doctrine of concomitance, states of conscious- 
ness are different in kind from nervous states; the two 
occur together, that is, in correlation; but there is no 
interaction or interference between the two. Mental 
phenomena and physiological phenomena, in other words, 
constitute two parallel, completely closed, yet somehow 
correlated causal chains; but the relationship between 
the two chains, the nature of the concomitance, is a 
metaphysical problem beyond the limits of human 
understanding. 
This psychophysical parallelism seemed conceptually 
and methodologically neat, and as a result it became 
increasingly influential -- as a methodological, if not 
an ontological, position -- as 19th-century psychology 
developed. 4 But it was neat because it avoided, rather 
than confronted, basic and troublesome theoretical ques- 
tions. Even after adopting the position that mind and 
matter are two conceptual categories that need to be kept 
distinct, rather than two substances that interact, 
psychologists were still left with the paradox of two 
apparently contradictory sets of observations. On the 
one hand, there was the observed dependence of mental 
processes on the physical substratum, a dependence that 
became ever more certain an axiom throughout the 19th 
century as neurology, biology (especially evolutionary 
theory), and psychiatry advanced and added empirical data 
confirming it. On the other hand, there was the observed 
-- and experienced -- efficacy of mind as an active, 
volitional agent that seemed able to exert control over 
many physical processes. Parallelism allowed 
psychologists to accept both sets of observations without 
forcing them to reconcile the apparent paradox in a 
larger theoretical framework addressing the relationship 
of mental and physical processes. 
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William James, for one, was acutely aware that paral- 
lelism, or the Jacksonian doctrine of concomitance, 
avoided, and did nothing to help resolve, the basic prob- 
lems of mental causality inherent in psychology. He 
first quoted a colleague's injunction to psychologists to 
adopt the position of psychophysical parallelism: 
Having firmly and tenaciously grasped these two 
notions, of the absolute separateness of mind and 
matter, and of the invariable concomitance of a men- 
tal change with a bodily change, the student will 
enter on the study of psychology with half his dif- 
ficulties surmounted. (James, 1890b, 1: 136, quoting 
Charles Mercier) 
James replied: "Half his difficulties ignored, I should 
prefer to say. For this 'concomitance' in the midst of 
'absolute separateness' is an utterly irrational notion" 
(ibid. ). 
Moreover, in thus avoiding the basic theoretical 
questions of psychology, psychologists were also backing 
away from some basic questions psychology raised about 
the nature and essence of science. Daston (1982) has 
described the various ways in which psychology threatened 
the model of science that had been built up since the 
17th century, perhaps the most important of which was the 
threat to the assumption of an orderly, causally 
determined, lawful universe posed by the "glaring anom- 
aly" of volition. She has also pointed out that this 
"impasse of mind versus science, " or of volition versus 
determinism, "revealed a contradiction between the paired 
precepts of universal causation and empiricism that had 
jointly guided scientific naturalism" (111). This con- 
tradiction, according to Daston, eventually led some 
scientists, such as Clerk Maxwell, to re-examine and re- 
evaluate the nature of science in general. Ironically, 
however, most 19th-century psychologists chose not to use 
the problems of psychology as an occasion to question or 
test the received scientific model. Instead, they re- 
affirmed the principles of unity, mechanistic 
determinism, and atomistic reductionism, embraced 
approaches such as psychophysiology that posed no threat 
to these principles, and excluded from scientific 
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psychology whatever phenomena violated those principles 
(Daston, 1982). 
In more general terms, the important question with 
which psychology should have confronted science was that 
of whether science is fundamentally a method or whether 
it is fundamentally a set of principles. Is it, in other 
words, most basically a particular means of attaining 
knowledge, or a particular world view? Should science be 
defined by its methods of empirical observation, experi- 
mental manipulation of these observations, and the logi- 
cal ordering of them by an interactive process of induc- 
tive and deductive reasoning? Or should science be 
defined by its principles of continuity, physical 
determinism, and reductionism? When observations seem to 
conflict with principles, should a scientist's allegiance 
be to the methods of science and to the faith that the 
methods will ultimately be reliable, even if they lead to 
the modification or limitation of one or more scientific 
principles? Or should a scientist's allegiance be to the 
principles on which science has been based and to the 
faith that ultimately observations will uphold these 
principles, even if they now seem to conflict? Are the 
limits of science determined by which aspects of experi- 
ence can or cannot be translated into publicly available 
observations? Or are they determined by defining which 
aspects of experience do or do not fit the model of pre- 
sent scientific principles? 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I will present some examples 
showing that, when confronted with such questions about 
the nature of psychology and the nature of science, 
scientists influential in the development of 19th-century 
psychology in general chose to define science not as a 
method with which to confront even contradictory aspects 
of human experience, but as a world view to which 
psychology, if it was to be a science, had to be made to 
conform. Psychologists had, therefore, in essence opted 
for a rationalist view of science rather than an empiri- 
cal one, choosing to conform to, rather than risk chal- 
lenging, certain theoretical foundations of science. 
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Because 19th-century psychologists refused to question or 
even critically examine the assumptions of the physical 
sciences and the world view derived from them, and thus 
avoided theoretical problems that psychological phenomena 
alone raised, those assumptions, world view, and pattern 
of avoiding basic theoretical issues became the founda- 
tion upon which modern psychology was built. During its 
subsequent history, psychology, despite its broad expan- 
sion in the 20th century, has for the most part remained 
within that framework. As Koch (1961) summarized it: 
Ever since its stipulation into existence as an 
independent science, psychology has been far more 
concerned with being a science than with courageous 
and self-determining confrontations with its his- 
torically constituted subject matter. Its history 
has been largely a matter of emulating the methods, 
forms, symbols of the established sciences, espe- 
cially physics. In so doing, there has been an 
inevitable tendency to retreat from broad and 
intensely significant ranges of its subject matter, 
and to form rationales for so doing which could only 
invite further retreat. (629-630) 
Science and Psychical Research 
Psychical research originated in direct opposition to 
the view, expressed by W. K. Clifford, that fundamental 
questions about the nature of mind and its relation to 
matter "have ceased to be open questions, because Science 
has had her word to say about them" (Clifford, 1874, 
715). Nowhere is this underlying theme of resistance to 
closing psychology's basic questions more evident than in 
the writings of Frederic W. H. Myers (1843-1901). As the 
person who contributed more papers to the publications of 
the (British) Society for Psychical Research (SPR) during 
its first two decades (1882-1900) than any other single 
person; as the person who wrote about a broader range of 
topics than any Other psychical researcher, summarizing 
and incorporating nearly all the early research of his 
colleagues; and, most importantly, as the person who 
wrote the most comprehensive, well-developed, psychologi- 
cally oriented, and widely read theoretical contributions 
to come out of the field during its formative decades, 
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Myers must certainly be the focus of attention for anyone 
wishing to understand the theoretical foundations, pur- 
poses, and goals of psychical research. Throughout 
Myers's writings, the one overriding question that he 
posed was whether it was valid to assume, as most 
psychologists did (and do), that physical phenomena are 
ultimately the primary and causal factors in the universe 
and that psychological phenomena are secondary and 
derivative ones; and the one overriding response he made 
was that this assumption can and should be made the pri- 
mary and central aim of empirical psychological research. 
The Empirical Study of the Mind-Matter Problem 
Nearly all psychologists since the mid-19th century 
have adopted one of two attitudes toward the so-called 
mind-matter problem, that is, the nature of mental 
phenomena and their relation to physical phenomena. Some 
have taken the positivistic position that it is a 
meaningless metaphysical debate, outside the domain of 
science, concerning the niceties of abstract concepts of 
no practical interest or concern to anyone except profes- 
sional philosophers. Others have argued that the mind- 
matter problem is of practical concern to working 
scientists, but as a conceptual and terminological prob- 
lem, not an empirical one: "The question of the exist- 
ence, nature and relation of mind and body is now com- 
monly thought not to be resolvable by empirical science, 
for it involves the meaning and clarity of the conceptual 
categories of science" (R. Smith, 1981,269). These 
psychologists have seen the importance of differentiating 
between the mind-matter problem as an ontological one and 
as a conceptual one (Beloff, 1973,242-243). 
5 They have 
recognized that as an ontological question, the ultimate 
nature of mind and matter is unanswerable; but as working 
scientists they have adopted the position of conceptual 
dualism or parallelism that had become the guiding char- 
acteristic of mid- to late-19th-century thought. 
The 19th-century faith in the principle of continuity 
had demanded the rejection of the old dualism, the belief 
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"that there are two orders of phenomena, the physical and 
the mental, two series which are so qualitatively dif- 
ferent that the passage from one to the other is unthink- 
able" (Hart, n. d., 116). The undeniable fact that there 
are two orders of experience, however, had led to the 
view that, whereas the underlying, Unknowable "Reality" 
is somehow unified, the phenomena of human experience 
reflect "more than one mode of conceiving the same 
things" (Hart, n. d., 115). Thus, "when he [the modern 
scientist] distinguishes between the mental and the 
material... he means two different modes of conceiving 
human experience" (Hart, n. d., 117). Conceptual clarity, 
moreover, requires that "there must be no jumping from 
one mode of conception to another" (Hart, n. d., 118). 
Hart's discussion of this conceptual dualism was a 
restatement of the position Hughlings Jackson had argued 
for in his doctrine of concomitance (Jackson, 1931-1932, 
2: 72), and many 19th-century scientists influential in 
the shaping of modern psychology took a similar position. 
Taine, for example, adopted in his writings on psychology 
"a grudging dualism ... of the linguistic sort, " admit- 
ting "that the language of neurophysiology and the lan- 
guage of consciousness are not meaningfully interchange- 
able" (Robinson, 1978,59). Although much of 20th-century 
psychology has been dominated by psychologists who 
preferred to ignore the mind-matter problem as a 
metaphysical question, in recent years some psychologists 
and neuroscientists have again called attention to the 
need for a conceptual dualism (e. g., Engelhardt, 1975; 
Robinson, 1978,1982). 
On the other hand, although most psychologists agreed 
with Hart (n. d., 115) that "neither of these modes is 
more true than the other, " many of them did share the 
Galilean assumption underlying modern science that one of 
these modes is more real than the other. Thus, 
underneath Taine's linguistic dualism was his conviction 
that "only a single (and physical) process is at the root 
of all mental phenomena" (Robinson, 1978,59). Although 
19th- (and 20th-) century psychologists professed a wide 
30 
range of metaphysical positions on the ontological nature 
of the mind-matter relationship, as scientists most of 
them assumed the primacy of physical phenomena, an 
assumption perhaps deriving, in part, like Galileo's dis- 
tinction between primary and secondary qualities, from 
the ease with which we can conceive physical phenomena as 
existing without mind and the difficulty that many people 
have of conceiving mental phenomena as existing without 
matter (see, e. g., Stewart & Tait, 1875/1876,73-74). 
Myers concurred with his colleagues that ontologi- 
cally the mind-matter problem was beyond the limits of 
phenomenal experience, and hence of human intellect and 
science, but that conceptually experience must be ordered 
according to the dual categories of the mental and the 
physical: 
The physical explanation cannot be substituted for 
the mental one, because it applies to a different 
category of facts. The two sets may indeed be 
diverse aspects of the same essential fact, but for 
practical purposes we have to regard them as dis- 
tinct and treat them separately. (Myers, 1903, 
1: 13n) 
What he did not concur with was the belief that the mind- 
matter problem was limited to being a metaphysical or 
conceptual one. In his view, the mind-matter problem was 
also an empirical one -- the basic theoretical question 
at the heart of psychology, since psychology is uniquely 
the point at which mental phenomena and their physiologi- 
cal substratum come together. 
The major point of contention was over the adequacy 
of the principle of concomitance, or correlation, which 
stated that "for every mental state there is a correla- 
tive nervous state" (Jackson, 1931-1932,2: 72). This 
principle was simply a statement that the psychophysical 
organism is in some sense a unity, manifesting two states 
that are invariably parallel, although qualitatively dif- 
ferent. Beyond this bare statement of concomitance, 
however, the principle was neutral and allowed for a wide 
variety of metaphysical positions. As Myers put it, 
"accompanying the mental phenomena - states of conscious- 
ness, there are physical phenomena - brain changes; but 
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no knowledge of the one throws any light on the other" 
(Myers, 1903,1: 13n). For most psychologists, this 
neutral statement of correlation was as far as science 
could go on the subject: 
The issue is not experimental at all, but con- 
ceptual. And it is because of this that the 
extraordinary achievements of the past century in 
the field of physiological psychology -- and in the 
neural sciences as a whole -- have had no effect 
whatever on the philosophical status of the 
MIND/BODY problem. (Robinson, 1978,506) 
For Myers, on the other hand, the correlation was 
precisely what most needed observation and testing. The 
principle of concomitance was the starting-point, not the 
end-point, for empirical psychological research. The 
bare principle of concomitance, and the associated belief 
that the mind-body problem is conceptual, were not wrong; 
they were simply uninformative. 
If the neurosciences had failed to shed any further 
light on the mind-matter problem, this was because 
scientific observations concerning the relation of mental 
and physical processes had been limited to those in 
which, essentially, brain was the independent variable 
and mind the dependent one. Some 19th-century scientists 
did claim that they were empirically studying the func- 
tional relationship of mind and body, in studies, for 
example, derived from Fechner's psychophysics or in 
neurological research. This was a misleading claim, 
however, because such studies were automatically limited 
by the assumption, which Fechner had adopted, that physi- 
cal processes are the independent variables and mental 
processes are the dependent variables. It was a mislead- 
ing claim, in other words, because in such studies 
certain details of the relationship were being studied, 
but the basic nature of the relationship was already 
assumed. 
Robinson (1978,507-508) has claimed that even today 
the only empirical methods available for studying the 
mind-matter problem are: the clinical observation of the 
relationship "between neuropathological states and 
psychological deficits" and experimental neurosurgery, 
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including "the severing or sectioning of major [neural] 
pathways"; "the surgical destruction or removal of 
anatomically defined structures within the brain"; and 
the electrical stimulation of neural cells. All such 
techniques, however, in essence simply confirm in more 
specific detail what has been known generally for 
centuries -- that mental functioning is closely dependent 
on "the integrity and general health of the nervous 
system" (Robinson, 1978,506) -- because they are all 
based on the same general procedure: The observer 
creates or looks for a condition of damage or alteration 
to the nervous system and then describes the effects on 
mental functioning. Such a procedure, designed in prin- 
ciple with the brain as the independent, initially 
altered variable, is guaranteed to confirm the view that 
mind is dependent on brain; and as a result such a 
limited perspective is almost guaranteed not to advance 
the problem of the mind-matter relationship in any 
appreciable way. 
Such essentially one-sided observations of the rela- 
tion of mental and physical processes were, in Myers's 
view, bound to lead to inadequate conclusions. When, he 
said, we look at a partially illuminated globe, the 
result is a 
familiar optical illusion. When we see half of some 
body strongly illuminated, and half of it feebly 
illuminated, it is hard to believe that the bril- 
liant moiety is not the larger of the two. And, 
similarly, it is the increased definiteness of our 
conception of the physical side of our mental opera- 
tions which seems to increase its relative impor- 
tance, -- to give it a kind of priority over the 
psychical aspect of the same processes. (Myers, 
1886b, 1: xl) 
Balancing the one-sided approach to the problem of 
mind-body concomitance requires a thoroughgoing empirical 
study of the problem of volition, or mental efficacy -- 
that is, the study of all phenomena suggesting that a 
change in mental state (conscious or subconscious) has 
produced some change in a physiological or physical 
state. Such phenomena fall into three broad categories, 
which seem to differ primarily in how common they are and 
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thus in how well accepted they are. First, there are the 
normal, expected volitional effects of a person's mind on 
his or her own body, in which some action seems to have 
been initiated by a mental state. Second, there are the 
less common, and therefore more puzzling, volitional 
effects of a person's mind on his or her own body, such 
as placebo effects, effects of mental state on health, or 
physiological effects associated with hypnosis, sugges- 
tion, multiple personality, or hysteria. And, finally, 
volitional phenomena include the rare and highly con- 
troversial events suggesting that mental processes have 
produced changes in matter other than the person's own 
body, or even directly in other minds. 
In principle, the three types of phenomena are 
theoretically no different: Behind all of them -- say, 
my thought about a book that I want, resulting in my 
reaching for it; my thought about the crucifixion of 
Christ, resulting in a bleeding palm; and my thought6 
about the number "6, " resulting in a significantly large 
number of sixes appearing in a series of dice throws -- 
is the unanswered question of the relation of a mental 
event to a physical event. With phenomena of the first 
group, and even with phenomena of the second group, it is 
easy for psychologists to avoid this unanswered question 
by assuming mental states to be brain states in another 
guise. With phenomena of the third group, the question 
is more difficult to avoid, because of the spatial sepa- 
ration of, say, the brain and the dice; and for this 
reason, psychical researchers have for the most part 
studied phenomena falling into the third group. 
Psychical research was, however, in essence founded 
to keep alive the general problem of mental efficacy and 
the implications of mental efficacy for an understanding 
of the nature of mind. In Myers's view, therefore, 
psychical research had to address all phenomena relating 
to these general questions: Is mind a causal agent, in 
the sense that changes in mental state lead to changes in 
some physical or physiological system? If so, is the 
operation of mind as a causal agency limited to specific 
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physiological or spatiotemporal conditions or boundaries? 
Finally, is a particular individual personality, or set 
of mental phenomena, dependent for its existence on a 
particular biological organism, terminating when the lat- 
ter does? 
Myers believed that a field of study was just open- 
ing up that had enormous potential for increasing 
scientific knowledge about the relationship of mental and 
physical processes -- namely, the study of subconscious 
phenomena in all their myriad forms and varieties. Janet 
(n. d. ) argued that subconscious phenomena should not be 
the starting point for speculations about mind-body rela- 
tions because we have too little knowledge about men- 
tal/cerebral concomitance. Myers believed that it was 
precisely to remedy that deficiency in our knowledge that 
subconscious phenomena should be the starting-point, not 
for unsupported speculations, but for research specifi- 
cally intended to attack that deficiency. Janet also 
argued that there was no reason why subconscious 
phenomena should be the focus of mind-body discussion and 
speculation, any more than any other psychological 
phenomena. Myers, however, believed that subconscious 
phenomena were especially important for psychological 
research because many of them involve mental and physical 
processes operating in unaccustomed and unusual ways -- 
with, as Myers put it, the normal equilibrium between 
them upset; and many of them thus suggested that the con- 
comitance of mind and brain was not so straightforward as 
it appeared under normal circumstances. In particular, 
as I will describe in some detail in Part II, Myers 
believed that subconscious phenomena were especially 
important theoretically because they sometimes seemed to 
reveal latent mental processes or abilities not apparent 
in the context of normal psychophysiological functioning. 
The study of subconscious phenomena, which was expanding 
rapidly during the last decades of the 19th century, 
increasingly turned up phenomena difficult to reconcile 
with the prevailing physiological, mechanistic theory of 
mind. For example, psychosomatic phenomena such as those 
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associated with hypnosis or hysteria suggested that 
alterations in mental processes could have an immediate 
and real effect on physiological processes; and such 
phenomena thus indicated the possibility of experi- 
mentally manipulating mental states as the causal vari- 
able and observing the effects on physical processes. 
Moreover, many subconscious phenomena, occurring in con- 
ditions where physical pathology was unlikely, nonethe- 
less resembled phenomena clearly associated with 
neuropathology. These phenomena suggested that similar 
effects might not always have similar causes; a blister, 
for example, might have a physical cause or a mental 
cause. Myers urged the importance of comparing such 
phenomena to determine whether, and under what condi- 
tions, mind may be an active initiating cause.? 
Myers's approach to subconscious phenomena was there- 
fore radically different from those of his con- 
temporaries. As I will discuss further in Chapter 2, the 
essentially parallelistic (or conceptually dualistic) 
approach that most 19th-century psychologists adopted led 
to controversies about the nature of subconscious 
phenomena, focused on the question of whether they should 
be considered physiological phenomena or psychological 
phenomena. Many scientists adopted the view that mind is 
synonymous with consciousness and thus that unconscious 
processes were by definition cerebral processes devoid of 
mentality. Others adopted the view that, because subcon- 
scious processes phenomenologically resemble conscious- 
ness, they are psychological; but, lacking the quality of 
conscious awareness, they are also inferior and, usually, 
pathological. Myers, in contrast, viewed subconscious 
processes as neither primarily physiological nor 
primarily pathological, but as psychophysical processes 
that offer the most potential for theoretical advances in 
psychology because, as deviations from normal 
psychophysiological functioning, they often reveal 
normally undetectable psychological processes. 
Myers was also influenced, though perhaps less 
intensively than by research on subconscious phenomena, 
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by advances in 19th-century physics. Psychological 
phenomena are of course mental phenomena; but they are 
also undeniably physical phenomena since mental phenomena 
take place in association with a physical substratum. It 
was this psychophysical nature of psychological phenomena 
that the doctrine of concomitance expressed; and it was 
precisely this dual nature of psychological phenomena 
that made scientific psychology such a problem for 
science and that also, in Myers's view, made psychology 
potentially so important to science. Myers accepted the 
doctrine of the concomitance of mind and matter -- in its 
neutral form -- and, though he never says so directly, 
there are indications that he probably also would not 
have argued with the belief that mind and matter are in 
some sense inseparable --that is, that mental phenomena 
always take place in the context of some kind of physical 
substratum. It is difficult to fault those who find non- 
sensical -- or at least inconceivable -- the notion that 
there could be a "disembodied" mode of existence, that 
is, that anything could exist without some phenomenal 
form and some kind of relationship to environment. As 
Penfield (1975,88) expressed it, if mind or personality 
survives the dissolution of the particular biological 
structure with which it has been associated, it "must 
establish a connection with a source of energy other than 
that of the brain. " One can, however, fault those who 
assume that "embodiment" must be of only one kind, the 
particular biological one that we currently perceive. 
Perhaps the greatest accomplishment of 19th-century 
physics was in beginning to reveal just how limited human 
sensory perception is, in comparison with the phenomenal 
universe. It was no accident or aberration that many 
prominent 19th-century physicists were interested in 
psychical research, and Myers too recognized the poten- 
tial importance to the mind-matter problem of the growing 
realization that the material universe exists in forms 
and processes undetectable by our unaided senses. 
Without being a justification for rampant speculation too 
far beyond what we do now perceive, this realization was 
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nonetheless a justification for Myers's view that the 
mind-matter problem can be approached by empirical 
research and may take on an entirely new appearance as 
knowledge about the physical world advances. 
The Nature of Science 
In sum, the normally undetectable psychological 
phenomena being revealed by the burgeoning field of so- 
called abnormal psychology and the normally undetectable 
physical phenomena being revealed by the rapid advances 
of physics combined to suggest to Myers that the con- 
comitance or correlation of mind and matter also might 
not be so straightforward as many psychologists assumed. 
Thus, Myers's work was directed toward attempting to 
identify phenomena and methods by which the mind-matter 
problem could, to a certain extent, be transformed into 
an empirical one; but his insistence that the relation of 
mental and physical processes could be studied empiri- 
cally revealed another major difference between him and 
his colleagues in psychology. The emergence of a 
scientific psychology, as I mentioned earlier, confronted 
scientists with the basic question of whether, when 
observation and theory seem to conflict, science should 
be considered most fundamentally a method or a world view 
based on certain assumptions and principles. Most 19th- 
century psychologists -- such as most of those I will 
discuss in Chapters 3 and 4 -- accepted as essential to 
science the principles of mechanistic, physical 
determinism, and they constructed scientific psychology, 
especially its methods and its contents, accordingly. 
Myers, in contrast, viewed science as first and foremost 
a method -- that of publicly available observation. Wil- 
liam James, in summarizing the contributions of psychical 
research to science, recognized this as one of the essen- 
tial differences between psychical researchers and most 
scientists: 
Science means, first of all, a certain dispassionate 
method. To suppose that it means a certain set of 
results that one should pin one's faith upon and hug 
forever is sadly to mistake its genius, and degrades 
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the scientific body to the status of a 
sect.... Although in its essence science only stands 
for a method and for no fixed belief, yet as 
habitually taken, both by its votaries and out- 
siders, it is identified with a certain fixed belief 
-- the belief that the hidden order of nature is 
mechanical exclusively, and that non-mechanical 
categories are irrational ways of conceiving and 
explaining even such things as human life. 
(1897/1961,41,44-45) 
Myers objected specifically to the assumption, enunciated 
later by Boring (1933,6,8), that "science is physical 
science" and "the physical world [is] the only reality, " 
and thus, by extension, that the phenomena of psychology, 
such as consciousness, purpose, and volition, are somehow 
secondary. He believed that this assumption was as sub- 
ject to examination and, if necessary, alteration as any 
other; and he believed that if psychologists developed 
appropriate methods for transforming the phenomena of 
psychology -- all its phenomena -- into observable terms, 
rather than whittling them down to fit a framework 
developed in response solely to physical phenomena, then 
science would be likely to be altered and expanded to 
include principles additional to those so far identified. 
Such an expansion, in his view, would ultimately streng- 
then, and not weaken, science. 
This divergence between Myers and his colleagues in 
psychology was, of course, the classic distinction 
between observational empiricalism and deductive 
rationalism: whether one makes phenomena and their obser- 
vation fundamental, such that one derives general princi- 
ples from specific phenomena, or whether one makes 
previously derived principles fundamental and interprets 
specific phenomena in light of those principles. It is 
now a truism to say that both approaches are involved in 
science; but problems arise when phenomena that are dif- 
ferent in kind are treated as if they are the same and 
thus subject to the same principles. Boring's remarks 
betrayed an assumption that psychological phenomena and 
physical phenomena are, in some ultimate sense, com- 
parable; and the modelling of psychology on the physical 
sciences betrays a similar assumption among all 
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psychologists who adopted this model. If phenomena are 
similar in kind, then a rationalistic approach is war- 
ranted; if they are not -- or if it is unknown whether or 
not they are similar in kind -- then an empirical 
approach is mandatory. Assuming that psychological 
phenomena are subject only to the same principles that 
define the physical sciences is like assuming that, 
because all animals absorb oxygen and produce carbon 
dioxide, then all living organisms do likewise. This 
assumption, and the resulting failure to undertake fur- 
ther observations, would result in a failure to learn 
that there are in fact two classes of living organisms 
differing (in this respect) in kind: one that absorbs 
oxygen and produces carbon dioxide, and one that absorbs 
carbon dioxide and produces oxygen. There is every 
reason to believe, as all but the exceedingly rare rigid 
materialist will acknowledge when confronted with the 
issue, that psychological phenomena are different in kind 
from physical phenomena. Myers, however, was one of the 
few psychologists to come down clearly on the side of 
empiricalism, 8 believing that there may be major princi- 
ples and laws of nature -- different not only in detail, 
but even in kind from those identified by the physical 
sciences -- still to be discovered. The importance of 
psychology, he argued, was that it was the area of 
science whose job it was to attempt to discover these; 
and the failure of psychologists to take up this chal- 
lenge, as well as their failure to question the adequacy 
of the world view derived from the physical sciences, was 
what led directly to the founding of psychical research. 
The disagreement between those for whom the world 
view of modern science was primary and those for whom the 
method was primary also reflected a tendency among the 
former to view science more as a utilitarian tool than as 
an avenue to knowledge, to favor the view of science as 
(in the terms so commonly used today) applied rather than 
pure. Most scientists (and psychologists) insisted on 
the principle of physical determinism and excluded from 
science all phenomena that seemed to violate this princi- 
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ple, relegating them instead to the domain of one or 
another branch of the humanities. This principle became 
the defining characteristic of science because 
scientists, as a whole, were becoming more interested in 
predictable phenomena that could lead to the development 
of practical and reliable tools and technologies, than in 
such theoretical questions as whether in fact nature is 
wholly deterministic and theoretically predictable from 
physical laws, or whether volition, or psychological 
determinism, or even indeterminism may not also be char- 
acteristics of nature and, if so, under what circum- 
stances. Psychologists embraced this utilitarian, func- 
tional approach to science, perhaps even more exclusively 
than other scientists did, and the principle of 
impersonal, mechanistic, physical determinism became a 
major foundation upon which modern psychology was built. 
Because of his views on the fundamental nature of 
science as a method, Myers also, not surprisingly, had a 
conception of "scientific naturalism" that differed from 
that of most 19th-century scientists. In its most gen- 
eral form, naturalism entailed the belief that science is 
the only means of knowledge; that natural laws are 
universal and unvarying in their operation; and that 
reality consists of one order (phenomenal nature) and not 
two (the physical world and a spiritual, or supernatural, 
realm) (Barnes & Shapin, 1979,93-94; Turner, 1974a, 
1974b, 1975). Myers accepted all of the fundamental 
axioms of naturalism: the reliance, for knowledge, on 
science and its method of publicly verifiable observa- 
tion; the belief in the constancy or lawfulness of the 
order of nature; and the belief in the principle of the 
continuity or unity of nature. Where he differed with 
most 19th-century scientific naturalists was on the ques- 
tion of whether "Nature" should be assumed to be 
synonymous with "Matter, " and therefore on the extent to 
which "the order of nature" or "the laws of nature" are 
known. G. H. Lewes, for example, expressed the view of 
the scientific naturalists that "there is one great Mat- 
ter, " of which Mind is one of Matter's "Modes, " that is, 
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one of Matter's "great diversities in the complication of 
its elements" (Lewes, 1893,4). Although all scientific 
naturalists routinely acknowledged their ignorance and 
expressed humility in the face of the limits of human 
knowledge compared with the vast complexity of the 
universe, they nonetheless used the model of nature as 
fundamentally physical as a yardstick by which to judge 
-- and even exclude -- a given phenomenon or observation. 
They did in fact operate as if the general nature, if not 
all the details, of the universe were understood in prin- 
ciple. Thus, as Turner (1974a) has pointed out, the natu- 
ralists, believing that there is only one nature, deduced 
their views about the nature of man and mind from what 
they had learned about the physical world. Myers, 
equally believing that there is only one nature of which 
mind is a part, thought instead that the concept of 
nature and natural law would have to be expanded to 
include principles suggested by the nature of mind and 
additional to those demonstrated by the physical 
sciences. If a phenomenon appeared to conflict with the 
known laws of nature, accepting it as a valid observation 
did not constitute a retreat to the old view of divine or 
supernatural influence on the order of nature; it did, 
however, require one to consider that the phenomenon 
might correspond with an unrecognized law, or principle, 
of nature, perhaps even different in kind from the known 
ones. Determinism was thus as prominent a feature in 
Myers's naturalism as it was in that of the scientific 
naturalists. He was by no means attacking determinism 
per se, but only the particular conception of determinism 
that limited primary causal factors to physical 
processes. 
As Turner (1978) has also shown, the naturalists' 
exclusion of principles or views other than those derived 
from the physical sciences had motivations other than 
purely scientific or empirical considerations. The 
development and professionalization of science in the 
19th century involved the scientific naturalists in an 
open and hostile confrontation with clerical authorities 
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and religion in general: If science were to become an 
autonomous, self-determining discipline, the subordina- 
tion of science to religion in the guise of "natural 
religion" had to be ended; and if scientists were to gain 
authority as the intellectual leaders of society, the old 
authority of the clergy had to be undermined. Any ties 
between science and religion, in short, had to be totally 
severed. Although the stated objection by scientists was 
to the alternate, primitive, pre-scientific claim to 
knowledge by religious authorities, naturalists in fact 
would not allow any encroachment by religion into 
scientific territory, on any terms. They defined science 
as excluding not only religious answers but also reli- 
gious questions: Science had to be a "thoroughly natu- 
ralistic science according to which theological, 
teleological, and metaphysical concerns stood banned both 
as matters for investigation and as principles of 
explanation" (Turner, 1978,365). 
Thus, the scientific naturalists who rapidly 
dominated 19th-century science were committed to a con- 
cept of science as defined by a particular world view, 
because this world view or set of assumptions, princi- 
ples, questions, and answers was one that scientists 
themselves, and not theologians or lay persons, had 
developed. To be committed instead, as Myers was, to a 
view of science as a method alone, which might con- 
ceivably (though not necessarily) be used to examine 
problems or even demonstrate the validity of views and 
principles different from those laid down by the physical 
scientists, was seen by the naturalists as threatening to 
the autonomy and prerogative of professional scientists 
to regulate and determine the nature and activities of 
science. Religion could not only not play its old role 
in science; it, and everything associated with it, were 
excluded from playing any role whatever. 
Myers did not see the relationship between science 
and religion in such starkly polarized terms. He was 
challenging the power and authority of scientists -- but 
only in a limited sense. He did not challenge, and in 
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fact was a strong and vocal advocate of, the prerogative 
of trained scientists to conceive and execute the 
research necessary to produce knowledge about natural 
phenomena. What he did challenge was the right of 
scientists to limit scientific inquiry -- notably, 
psychology -- in ways explicitly derived from their 
vested interest in upholding a world view. In choosing 
to limit science to a particular world view, the 
scientific naturalists began a process that could only 
lead to the segregation of science from important areas 
of human experience; and a science that addresses only 
limited aspects of human experience would seem in danger 
not only of proving dissatisfying and thus losing its 
central position in human life and society, but also of 
proving itself wrong, as partial knowledge so often does. 
In insisting on science as a method, Myers envisaged 
instead a psychology that could provide a framework for 
understanding human experience as a whole and its place 
in the natural order. For him, defining science solely 
as a method meant that science provides the tools of 
knowledge, religion and philosophy the direction. In 
other words, religion, philosophy, emotion, intuition 
must ask the questions if research is to be worth doing; 
science, intellect, reason must do the work if the 
results are to be worth having. 
Psychical Research and "Tertium Quid" 
Underlying Myers's attempt to reconcile what many in 
the 19th century found so utterly unreconcilable -- 
science and religion -- was what was perhaps the most 
important premise on which psychical research was 
founded. In the introduction to a two-volume collection 
of some of his essays, Myers's fellow psychical 
researcher, Edmund Gurney, wrote: 
Most of the papers deal with matters of contemporary 
controversy, as to which two antagonistic opinions 
have been strongly entertained and enforced.... In 
most of these questions I am conscious of 'a great 
deal to be said on both sides',... [and] the truer 
view seems to me... not one that would extenuate dif- 
ferences... [but one whose] immediate tendency, on 
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the contrary, is rather to make each of the duels 
triangular. In short, it is a tertium quid. (1887, 
v-vii) 
Gurney's words could have stood as the manifesto of 
the then newly developing field of psychical research. 
Gurney, Myers, Henry Sidgwick, and many others of the 
early psychical researchers believed that conflicts 
between ideas or points of view are settled not by con- 
tentious debate but by increased knowledge, and that 
knowledge advances not by the interminable clashing of 
old antagonists but by the application of both new meth- 
ods and new perspectives to old problems. Echoing 
Gurney, the philosopher F. C. S. Schiller (1894, xi) 
noted that, in late 19th-century thought in general, 
the shock of diametrically opposed views is gener- 
ating in many thoughtful minds, the conviction that 
their common ground and reconciliation must be 
sought deeper down than has been the fashion. 
Behind much of the early psychical research, therefore, 
was the conscious attempt of its leaders to move beyond 
the increasingly polarized, dichotomous positions of 
19th-century thought and seek different, broader perspec- 
tives in which aspects of both (or all) sides may have a 
place. 
The polarities of thought that Myers addressed, and 
tried to move beyond, were numerous. He rejected, for 
example, the idea that physicalistic naturalism and 
supernaturalism exhausted the possible views on the 
nature of the world -- that the choices were limited 
either to the assumption that nature consists entirely of 
what we can now see, perceive, or otherwise infer from 
our present understanding of matter, or to the assumption 
that the universe is essentially lawless and capricious, 
liable to disruption by whim or vagary. Implicit in this 
rejection of the natural/supernatural dichotomy was a 
rejection of the assumption on which the new scientific 
psychology foundered, that there could be no intermediate 
position between a rigidly mechanical determinism and 
volition. Implicit also (as noted above) was a rejection 
of the complete separation of science and religion, of 
the view that any attempt to bring one to bear on the 
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other was a violation of a categorical distinction 
between them. 
Myers also attempted to bridge the gap between the 
old, philosophical, mentalistic psychology and the new, 
experimental, physiological psychology. Scientists who 
argued that "Myers' conclusions9 may be in harmony with 
the old psychology; they can not be reconciled with the 
new" (Hurd, 1898,353) completely missed Myers's point 
that, because both the old and the new psychology had 
merits, psychology needed to be reconceptualized in such 
a way that the old and the new psychologies would be seen 
to be complementary and not contradictory. For example, 
among the most fundamental, and most controversial, of 
the distinctions between the two psychologies was the 
conception of human personality associated with them. 
Proponents of the old psychology had held the commonsense 
view of the self as a subjective, conscious, irreducible 
unity. Proponents of the new psychology adopted a view 
of the self derived from reductionistic physiology and 
associationist philosophy, and argued that the self is an 
evolved aggregate of innumerable psychophysiological ele- 
ments. In a sense, the 19th century had seen psychology 
shift from a "wave" view of mind to a "particle" view of 
mind. Sensitive to the strengths and inadequacies of 
both positions, Myers tried to push psychologists beyond 
the impasse of these two positions and toward "the recon- 
cilement of the two opposing systems in a profounder 
synthesis" (Myers, 1903,1: 11). 
Perhaps the most far-reaching dichotomy that Myers 
questioned, however, was that of mind and matter. New 
knowledge in both physics and abnormal psychology sug- 
gested that neither matter nor mind were quite what they 
had long been assumed to be; and Myers responded to this 
new awareness by suggesting that perhaps old ideas about 
the relationship between the two, monistic as well as 
dualistic, were likewise inadequate. He believed that 
"it is no longer safe to assume any sharply-defined dis- 
tinction of mind and matter" (Myers, 1886d, 179). H. H. 
Price (1959/1978,384) later elaborated: 
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The hypothesis of a tertium quid which is inter- 
mediate between mind and matter as traditionally 
conceived, and has some of the properties of both -- 
something which is extended in space (or in some 
sort of space) and yet also has mental or quasi- 
mental properties... has been suggested... at various 
times from the seventeenth century to the present 
day... [and] deserve[s] serious discussion.... [I]t is 
utterly different from ordinary materialism, and it 
would be misleading to call it a materialistic 
theory at all. For the whole point of it is to sug- 
gest that the traditional disjunction between 
"materialistic" and "anti-materialistic" theories is 
not exhaustive, and that there is a third alterna- 
tive between the two. 
Without pretending that he had that third alternative to 
offer, Myers nevertheless attempted to offer some new 
empirical approaches that might ultimately lead to new 
conceptual advances toward understanding the place and 
role of consciousness, mind, and human personality in the 
natural order. 
Purpose of Thesis 
In the remainder of this thesis, I will attempt to 
demonstrate in more detail the arguments I have outlined 
in this introductory chapter -- namely, that psychical 
research, as represented by Frederic Myers, was in 
essence an attempt to recall scientific psychology to its 
basic theoretical problems when most scientists seemed to 
be abandoning them. In Part I, I hope to show that 
scientific psychology had its roots in the assumption 
that mind is a secondary, derivative phenomenon and in 
the dichotomization of thought that resulted from its 
avoidance of its own basic theoretical questions. After 
a brief survey in Chapter 2 of some of the important fac- 
tors influencing the development of scientific psychology 
in the 19th century, I will describe in Chapters 3 and 4 
some ideas about the nature of scientific psychology and 
of mind expressed by 11 physiologists, psychologists, and 
other scientists who were among those instrumental in the 
latter half of the 19th century in defining the direction 
in which psychology developed. These 11 scientists were 
chosen for examination, not only because they were 
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influential figures in the development of 19th-century 
scientific psychology, but also because most of them, to 
a greater or lesser degree, addressed the question of the 
nature and meaning of subconscious phenomena. The dis- 
covery of the subconscious as an important psychological 
phenomenon coincided with the development of scientific 
psychology; and it was a watershed in the history of 
psychology between the old philosophical psychology and 
the new scientific psychology, because, unlike any other 
psychological phenomena, subconscious phenomena chal- 
lenged assumptions about the nature of mind on which the 
old psychology had been based. Scientists who addressed 
the problem of the subconscious were particularly likely 
to be aware of the nature of the conceptual and meth- 
odological problems facing psychologists; and their views 
on the nature of subconscious phenomena were often par- 
ticularly revealing of their views on the nature of mind 
in general. 
In Part II I hope to show that psychical research -- 
as represented by its key spokesman, Myers -- challenged 
the assumption that mind is a secondary phenomenon and 
thus attempted to recall psychology to its basic 
theoretical problems of the nature of mind and its rela- 
tion to physical phenomena. In Chapter 5I will describe 
the basic purposes for which psychical research was 
founded and, especially, the principles under which Myers 
operated. In Chapter 6I will describe the theoretical 
framework that Myers proposed for psychology. Finally, 
in Chapter 7I will describe the phenomena and the 
empirical methods that Myers thought would be particu- 
larly useful to psychology in beginning to address its 
primary problem, the nature of the causal relationship of 
mental and physical processes. 
My purpose in this thesis has not been to examine and 
evaluate the vast philosophical literature on the mind- 
matter problem or the numerous philosophical positions on 
the problem that have been advanced, defended, and 
denounced. I have avoided this aspect of the problem 
because, in spite of what some of its critics allege, 
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psychical research is not and never was a defense of any 
particular philosophical position. Myers himself seemed 
to be leaning, not toward the form of dualism as it is 
routinely (and misleadingly) portrayed and abhorred by 
most scientists (see, e. g., Churchland, 1986; Smith & 
Jones, 1986), but toward the idea that neither mind nor 
matter may be limited to the forms that we perceive and 
therefore that psychophysical entities -- such as human 
personalities -- may also not be so limited. Neverthe- 
less, although individual psychical researchers may have 
leaned toward or even openly advocated a particular 
philosophical position as the one that best accounts for 
the phenomena, psychical research itself -- like all 
science -- should be considered a method for approaching 
particular questions, not an apologetic for a particular 
philosophical answer. Although psychical research would 
never have been established if its founders had not 
suspected that the physicalistic world view was 
inadequate, it was nonetheless primarily an attempt to 
find empirical approaches pertinent to the mind-matter 
problem, in the hope that the knowledge thus produced 
would eventually help advance our philosophical 
understanding of the problem. 
This thesis is also not an attempt to judge whether 
psychical research -- as represented by Myers -- suc- 
ceeded or failed in its goals, or even whether those 
goals were reasonable ones. It seems premature to ask 
how well Myers -- and, by extension, psychical research 
-- succeeded in what they were doing, or whether they 
were on the right track, until we understand exactly what 
it was that they were in fact trying to do. My purpose 
therefore has not been to try to evaluate either Myers or 
psychical research, but the more modest (although per- 
haps, given the widespread misconceptions of both, at 
present the more important) task of trying to clarify 
their purposes and basic principles. 
Nevertheless, I hope this examination of Myers's 
ideas in the context of those of some of his con- 
temporaries will contribute something toward an eventual 
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adequate assessment of psychical research. His- 
toriography has traditionally been of two basic kinds, 
described by Stocking (1965) as "presentism" and "his- 
toricism, " or, in Butterfield's (1931,16) terms, the 
study of "the past for the sake of the present" and the 
study of "the past for the sake of the past. " Scientists 
studying the history of science have generally adopted 
the presentist approach. Because most scientists "take 
it for granted that the development of science is a 
cumulative ever-upward progress in rationality" (Stock- 
ing, 1965,213), most scientist-historians study history 
to seek the antecedents of modern ideas and thus identify 
those elements of the past that were on the "right" track 
because they were consonant with the present. Historians, 
on the other hand, have increasingly adopted the his- 
toricist approach, rejecting the presentist approach as a 
parochial imposition of modern standards or perspectives 
on those of the past. Instead, such historians seek to 
understand the past on its own terms and to show how 
ideas and actions in the past made sense within the con- 
text in which they occurred, even if they seem 
unreasonable or misguided from the perspective of the 
present. 
Stocking, however, has argued that neither of these 
approaches is completely adequate for the history of 
science. Since he sees the history of the growth of 
scientific knowledge "as a complex process of emergence 
rather than a simple linear sequence, " he proposes 
instead an "enlightened presentism" (Stocking, 1965, 
215). Traditional presentism provides too limited and 
even distorted a view of the past by editing it in terms 
of the present; historicism tends to cut the past off 
from the present by regarding it as a self-contained 
whole. By combining the two approaches, however, an 
enlightened presentism can broaden and improve science by 
making modern scientists aware of different perspectives 
that were either lost or distorted in the transition from 
the past to the present. The ultimate goal of such an 
approach is to make judgments, as presentist historians 
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do, about the value of particular ideas in science, but 
to do so from a broad historical perspective and not a 
limited one of the present. 
McVaugh and Mauskopf (1974) complained that most his- 
tories of psychical research up to that time had been 
written by persons concerned to demonstrate either the 
truth or the error in psychical research. Since then, 
historians writing about psychical research and related 
areas have frequently claimed to be unconcerned about 
assessing the field as science and have instead studied 
it entirely within its own historical context, usually as 
a social phenomenon (e. g., Cerullo, 1982; Kenny, 1986; 
Oppenheim, 1985; Owen, 1988; Shortt, 1984; Williams, 
1985; Wynne, 1979). In attempting to understand Myers's 
place within the history of psychology, my purpose has 
been neither to pit the past and the present against one 
another and argue for one as the ultimate victor, nor to 
study the past in isolation from the present. Stocking's 
account of an enlightened presentism best expresses the 
perspective from which I have approached my study of 
Myers, because I believe that the primary purpose of his- 
torical studies of science should be to contribute to the 
assessment of the value both of past scientific 
endeavours and of present ones. 
Huxley, lamenting that science was progressing so 
fast that scientists were less and less able to study 
their history, warned that this was detrimental to the 
progress of science. He introduced his paper describing 
Descartes' physiological studies by urging scientists to 
study their field's history because 
there is assuredly no more effectual method of 
clearing up one's own mind on any subject than by 
talking it over, so to speak, with men of real power 
and grasp, who have considered it from a totally 
different point of view. (Huxley, 1874,556) 
Many modern scientists have, unfortunately, ignored Hux- 
ley's advice and rejected older points of view as dis- 
credited. Writing about anthropology and its too- 
frequent neglect of its history, Hymes (1963,60) made 
51 
observations that could be extended generally to other 
sciences: 
Our most recent, still continuing, period has been 
dominated by reaction against an earlier perspective 
considered too sweeping, too ambitious in scope, too 
weak in data and method. 
The result has been a narrowing of perspective: "The 
devolution from generalizations of bold scope has been 
first to drop the generalizations, and then the scope" 
(Hymes, 1963,60-61). Moreover, historians who emphasize 
the study of the history of science within the context of 
a particular period of time and "with relatively little 
concern about ultimate judgments of 'truth, "' (McVaugh and 
Mauskopf, 1974,312) contribute indirectly to the entren- 
chment of present perspectives in science by failing to 
encourage any judgment of scientific ideas -- either past 
or present -- within a broader perspective. Both "pre- 
sentist" scientists and "historicist" historians, there- 
fore, have contributed to the isolation of modern science 
from one of its greatest potential sources of new 
insights and progress; and this isolation has perhaps 
been most detrimental to psychology and the behavioral 
sciences, where it remains far from certain which ques- 
tions should be closed and which should remain open: 
Because they have on the whole such notoriously 
short historical memories, the behavioral sciences 
of the present have very little awareness that their 
predecessors were in many instances asking questions 
and offering answers about problems which have by no 
means been closed. (Stocking, 1965,216) 
Myers himself believed that the most important con- 
tribution of his work would be to keep alive in science 
questions and problems which have by no means been 
closed. Historical studies 
enabl[e] us to put in full perspective many of our 
problems and assumptions,... to renew earlier periods 
by renewing attention to problems posed in them. 
Ideally, the fresh start will harness the technical 












broad sense of scope and relevance of its predeces- 
sors. (Hymes, 1963,61) 
The purpose of this thesis, therefore, has been to pro- 
vide some further understanding of the past, not for the 
sake of the past or for the sake of the present, but for 
the sake of the future: If we understand better the per- 
spectives of the past, we may see more clearly the 
limitations of our present perspective and thus be able 
to judge more reliably what from the past, as well as 
what from the present, we should take with us into the 
future. An examination of the historical roots of 
psychology and psychical research suggests that the con- 
tinuing conflict between psychical research and the rest 
of modern science essentially concerns the issue of 
whether mind as a primary causal factor in nature is an 
open or a closed question. In addition, the conflict 
concerns the issue of whether the idea that mental 
causality is equal in status to physical causality can be 
brought within the scientific framework, or whether it is 
a "supernatural, " inherently unscientific notion. A bet- 
ter understanding of the origins of this conflict, there- 
fore, may help scientists decide whether future science 





1A distinction is sometime made between the terms 
"psychical research" and "parapsychology, " the former 
being the older term and often used to imply the study of 
spontaneous parapsychological phenomena, the latter being 
used in a "narrower sense, referring to the experimental 
and technical parts of psychical research, " especially as 
it has developed since the early experimental work of the 
Rhines in the 1930s (Grattan-Guinness, 1983,281; Thal- 
bourne, 281). I think the distinction is more apparent 
than real -- especially since it underestimates the 
importance that the early psychical researchers gave to 
experimental methods. Both terms, in my view, refer to 
the field of science that should be defined as the study 
of mental causality. This definition implies no a priori 
metaphysical position; on the contrary, as I shall argue 
in the rest of this thesis, at the crux of this defini- 
tion is the major, still unresolved theoretical problem 
of whether mental causality -- or volition -- implies 
that mental phenomena are as fundamental and primary to 
nature as physical phenomena, or whether mental causality 
and all psychological phenomena are derivative, emergent. 
or epiphenomenal characteristics of matter. 
2 The extent to which these statements are true can only 
be judged by studying at first hand the enormous serious 
literature of the field. Reliable surveys and histories 
include Edge, Morris, Palmer, & Rush, 1986; Gauld, 1968; 
Krippner, 1977-1990; Mauskopf & McVaugh, 1980; and Wol- 
man, 1977. 
3 Some may argue that words such as "spirit" and "soul" 
imply the theological assumption that some aspect of 
human beings exists apart from the physical body, whereas 
words such as "mind, " "mental, " or "psychological" refer 
to functional, psychophysiological processes. Such dis- 
tinctions, in my view, beg the basic theoretical ques- 
tions. In the context of this thesis, at any rate, the 
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important distinction is simply between mind or con- 
sciousness in its broadest sense, and matter in its 
broadest sense. 
4 Young (1970,196n) has urged that there be "a more gen- 
eral study of the central role psychophysical parallelism 
has played in the history of neurology, psychiatry, and 
psychoanalysis. " 
5I have referred here to Beloff because he has stated 
most clearly the need to distinguish between the 
ontological problem and the conceptual problem of mind- 
matter relations; but Beloff himself most certainly does 
not limit the mind-matter problem to being either an 
ontological or a conceptual one. He has instead argued 
repeatedly that the mind-matter problem can be addressed 
by empirical research (see, e. g., Beloff, 1990). 
6 Some people may think that I am using the word 
"thought" in too broad a manner, since my thought about 
reaching for the book is conscious, whereas my "thought" 
about Christ or about "6" may be less than fully con- 
scious, or even totally unconscious. This distinction 
becomes less clear, however, when one recalls that the 
volitional impetus behind such ordinary actions as reach- 
ing for a book may, on numerous occasions, be as uncon- 
scious as the ideational state apparently precipitating 
stigmatization or psychokinesis. By "thought, " there- 
fore, I mean here simply a mental state, conscious or 
subconscious. Similarly, as I shall discuss in Chapter 
6, Myers suggested that the words "volition, " "inten- 
tion, " and "consciousness" should not be confined to the 
state of conscious awareness, but are more properly con- 
sidered functions of mind in general, conscious as well 
as unconscious. 
7 More recently the neurologist Critchley noted that 
similar symptoms develop in different physiological con- 
ditions and, conversely, that the same physiological con- 
dition may give rise to different symptoms; and he sug- 
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gested that this phenomenon "deserves closer attention" 
(Critchley, 1979,12). 
8I have deliberately used the word "empiricalism" here, 
rather than "empiricism, " to emphasize that I am refer- 
ring generally to the epistemological approach of obser- 
vation and experiment, not specifically to the 
philosophical doctrine of empiricism derived from this 
approach. 
9 Hurd did not specify exactly which "conclusions" he was 
referring to. Nevertheless, from the rest of his com- 
ments, one can infer that he probably meant generally 
Myers's belief that mind is as fundamental and primary to 
nature as matter. 
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PART I: THE CONTEXT - LIMITING PSYCHOLOGY 
CHAPTER 2 
FROM THE OLD PSYCHOLOGY TO THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY 
Houghton (1957) has described the Victorian era as, 
above all else, an age of transition. The distinctive 
characteristics of Victorian thought and behavior -- many 
of them apparently contradictory -- were the direct 
result, as Houghton so well illustrates, of the turmoil 
that resulted when long-established philosophical assump- 
tions, as well as social, political, and economic 
institutions, were challenged by a rapid spread of new 
ideas, new perspectives, and new knowledge. Politically, 
socially, and economically the Victorians fell between 
medieval feudalism and modern democracy, between the "old 
system of fixed regulations... [and] fixed social rela- 
tions" and a new system based on capitalist laissez-faire 
and universal suffrage (Houghton, 1957,5). Moreover, 
they lived in an age of dramatic transition in views not 
only about the social order but also about the cosmic 
order, and they themselves recognized clearly "that the 
old certitudes are certain no longer and that a 
reconstruction of thought is now a prime necessity" 
(Houghton, 1957,9). 
Houghton has also described (in his Chapter 7) three 
approaches, or types of thinking that appeared, particu- 
larly in connection with the intellectual shift from the 
previously dominant old world view, rooted in Christian 
theology, to the rapidly emerging new world view, rooted 
in modern science. Although Houghton himself does not 
identify each type with a particular historical period, 
they seem to represent different stages in the develop- 
ment of 19th-century thought. The three stages over- 
lapped chronologically to a great extent, and indeed ele- 
ments of all three could be found throughout the 19th 
century, but in a general sense the three stages cor- 
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responded to the early, middle, and late Victorian peri- 
ods. The early stage was characterized by a marked and 
intense partisanship, when, as Mill put it, the "wisdom 
of the ancestors, and the march of intellect" seemed to 
be colliding and conflicting (Mill, 1831/1942,1-2). Dur- 
ing this stage, there was a strong tendency to see con- 
flicts in stark black-and-white terms, and, because "the 
stability of society" seemed to be at stake (Houghton, 
1957,162-163), there was also "little sympathy with 
neutrality or compromise" and "the strongest pressure to 
choose between two extremes" (Houghton, 1957,169). More- 
over, the tendency toward unilateral, rigid views was 
exacerbated by a "new note of acrimony, so potent in its 
power to widen the gap between the two camps and fix 
their respective positions more extremely" (Houghton, 
1957,166). 
The second type, or stage, of thought was that of the 
mid-century liberal thinkers who, despite the danger of 
being "crushed between the right and the left, " nonethe- 
less "tried to follow a middle course" (Houghton, 1957, 
170). As the 19th-century conflicts and controversies 
escalated, more and more people realized the complexity 
of the problems and thought it unlikely that one side had 
a monopoly on truth. J. S. Mill, according to Houghton, 
exemplified this position, with "his fine capacity to 
appreciate ancient wisdom and the weak sides of modern 
thought, and his readiness to examine opposing arguments 
on every question" (Houghton, 1957,168). Houghton has 
explained how Mill, influenced by Coleridge and the 
German idea of the dialectical method, came to believe 
"that truth lies in a mediation between opposing doc- 
trines, both of which are partly true, and that therefore 
the progress of truth depends on the synthesis of oppo- 
sites" (Houghton, 1957,178). For Mill and other like- 
minded Victorians, the cause of knowledge is best served, 
not by partisans, but by "those who take something from 
both sides of the great controversies, and make out that 
neither extreme is right, nor wholly wrong" (Mill, 1910, 
2: 360). 
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According to Houghton, mill and other open-minded 
liberals maintained a conviction that knowledge about the 
contested issues was ultimately possible, however far 
from it one may now appear to be. In the later Victorian 
period, however, a new conviction began to emerge -- the 
belief that knowledge is only relative and subjective, 
never absolute or objective. This new skepticism about 
"their capacity to arrive at truth" and resolve con- 
flicts, coupled with a desire to avoid the violent 
clashes of the past, characterized the third stage of 
19th-century thought (Houghton, 1957,14,178-179). 
Houghton contrasted the skepticism and indecisiveness of 
this stage with the strong convictions of the earlier 
Victorians; but one could also argue that the relativism 
of this third stage had much in common with the 
dichotomization and partisanship of the first stage. 
Believing that neither the victory of one or another side 
that was sought during the early stage, nor the recon- 
ciliation of sides that was sought in the middle stage, 
was possible, during the third stage the partisans 
retreated to their own side of the fence, granted to each 
side its own undisputed territory, and pursued their sub- 
sequent courses of action from the limited perspective of 
that more narrowly defined territory. 
The 19th century was also the age of transition for 
psychology, as it underwent a major metamorphosis from 
primarily philosophy to primarily science; and the three 
stages identified by Houghton as generally characteristic 
of 19th-century thought are readily apparent in this par- 
ticular transition as well. In Part I of this thesis, I 
hope to show that, during its formative period (about 
1860-1900), scientific psychology was heavily influenced 
by the tendency toward rigid and acrimonious dichotomiza- 
tion of positions that characterized the early Victorian 
period, as well as by the movement toward conceptual 
parallelism that gained momentum during the later Vic- 
torian period. Scientific psychology, therefore, not 
only had its origins in the dichotomization of thought 
inherent in an age of transition, but, in its subsequent 
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development, it contributed importantly to a growing and 
continuing polarization. In Part II of this thesis, I 
hope to show that psychical research (as represented by 
its key spokesman, Myers) was perhaps the most important 
and sustained attempt to apply the principles of the sec- 
ond stage to psychology -- principles, that is, based on 
the belief that advances in knowledge come with the 
reconciliation of opposing positions in some new 
synthesis, or conception, or tertium quid. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I will describe first the gen- 
eral nature of the transition that occurred in psychology 
and then some of the specific developments in science and 
philosophy that influenced that transition. 
General Principles of Psychology: The Old versus the New 
The transformation of psychology from philosophy to 
science during the 19th century was a dramatic one. 
Psychology had long been considered the primarily 
philosophical study of mind, especially the metaphysical 
question of what mind is and the epistemological question 
of how mind knows. By the 19th century, mind was 
predominantly conceived to be a reified entity that 
interacts with the material world, a nonphysical sub- 
stance that both perceives the external physical world 
and also acts on it by wielding the brain as a tool. 
Particularly after Descartes, mind had become carefully 
distinguished from Nature: It was defined as an 
indivisible unity that was the subjective side of experi- 
ence, the causal, volitional agency of teleological 
events, in direct contrast to objective, divisible, 
mechanistically caused Nature. Because it was considered 
to be a substance of a fundamentally different nature 
from matter, and because its main attributes were reason 
and will, which were free, mind was considered not to be 
subject to the same laws, or mechanistic determinism, as 
matter. Moreover, mind was widely considered to be a 
uniquely human endowment, separating humans not only from 
inert matter but even from lower forms of life. It was 
synonymous with consciousness and could be known only 
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through our experience of consciousness. Thus, the anal- 
ysis of faculties of mind (such as memory, reason, or 
perception) was an important topic of study, and accor- 
dingly the introspective examination of the contents of 
consciousness was the primary method of psychology. 
Physiology, the study of mind's tool, was seen as having 
little or no relevance for an understanding of mind 
itself, or its contents, processes or laws. 
The new psychology that emerged and quickly began to 
prevail during the second half of the 19th century was in 
many respects the very antithesis of the old psychology. 
Instead of being. the philosophical analysis of subjective 
mind, psychology was becoming the scientific study of 
objective behavior. Instead of distinguishing mind from 
Nature, the new psychologists viewed mind as a part of 
Nature and emphasized the continuity of mind and Nature, 
including (and perhaps especially) the continuity of 
human and other forms of life. Mind was no longer con- 
sidered to be an autonomous entity but, rather, a func- 
tion of the nervous system by which a biological 
organism, through its sensorimotor processes, dynamically 
adapts to its environment. Instead of being an 
indivisible unity, mind was viewed primarily as an 
aggregate built up from simple psychophysiological ele- 
ments (e. g., sensations). Instead of being a causal 
agent, outside the reach of the laws of Nature, mind was 
now seen as caused, a product of the evolving complexity 
of mechanistic, material processes; instead of viewing 
the brain as a tool of the mind, many psychologists 
viewed the brain as the producer of mind. Moreover, mind 
was no longer equated with consciousness, but was 
understood by many psychologists as the psychical aspect 
of psychophysical phenomena, including psychical 
processes outside as well as within full conscious aware- 
ness. For many psychologists, mind was no longer a self- 
conscious entity but a conceptual or linguistic term 
denoting a particular set of psychical phenomena associ- 
ated with a particular biological organism. Because the 
nervous system was increasingly viewed as the generator 
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rather than the instrument of mind, physiology, instead 
of being irrelevant to psychology, was now seen to be the 
indispensable basis for an understanding of mental 
processes; and the primary method of psychology became 
the observational and experimental methods of the physi- 
cal sciences. Conversely, whereas questions about the 
nature of mind and mind-matter relations had been central 
to the old psychology, the new, positivistically oriented 
psychologists considered them metaphysical and hence not 
only totally outside the domain of a scientific psychol- 
ogy but even irrelevant to it. 
The above general descriptions of the old and the new 
psychology depict the extreme poles of the transition, 
and there were many gradations and variations in the 
views of those persons in the 19th century who either 
observed or participated directly in the transformation 
of psychology. Nevertheless, the process of transition 
was a remarkably rapid one -- occurring primarily during 
the years 1860-1900 -- as well as a remarkably complete 
one, at least among those who could be considered 
psychologists. Despite their often major disagreements 
on metaphysical and methodological issues, late 19th- 
century psychologists were nearly unanimous in their 
agreement that psychology had to be removed from the 
realm of philosophical discourse and given into the care 
of scientists. Moreover, they were nearly unanimous in 
their rejection of the general principles that had guided 
the old philosophical psychology and in their acceptance 
of the general principles -- if not all the details -- 
associated with the new psychology. The dichotomization 
of thought during psychology's age of transition was thus 
not so much among psychologists themselves as between 
psychologists on the one hand and on the other those per- 
sons in the larger scientific or lay community whose 
views on the nature of mind reflected the more tradi- 
tional views that psychologists were so united in 
rejecting. 
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The Development of the New Psychology 
The development of scientific psychology involved two 
major trends, representing not only stages in the transi- 
tion of psychology from philosophy to science, but 
representing also stages in the response of the new 
psychologists to those who opposed their radically dif- 
ferent depiction of the nature of mind. These trends 
were by no means strictly chronological, and indeed ele- 
ments of both may be found in the work of nearly every 
major psychologist even down to the present day. 
Nevertheless, the two trends may be viewed as different 
and separate stages in the developmental process, as 
psychologists sought, first, to bring psychology within 
the general domain of modern science and, second, to 
carve out a unique role and task for psychology within 
that general domain. 
The primary aim of the first stage was to demonstrate 
that mind is a part of nature, not something apart from 
nature and independent of natural law. The goal was to 
establish the legitimacy of applying scientific methods 
and principles to the study of mental phenomena. The 
emphasis, therefore, was on the continuity of mind and 
mental phenomena with physical nature, and the work con- 
sisted primarily of demonstrating the correlation or con- 
comitance of mental and physiological processes and thus 
establishing the concept of mind as a function of the 
nervous system. Psychology in this stage was, in short, 
predominantly physiological. 
This physiological psychology exemplified the first 
stage of transition described by Houghton, since nowhere 
did "the wisdom of ancestors and the march of intellect" 
(Mill, 1831/1942,1-2) conflict so sharply as over the 
nature of mind. The new physiological psychology was in 
many respects a negative undertaking, an anti-dualistic, 
anti-theological, anti-metaphysical attempt to eradicate 
old ways of thinking about and studying mind. Scientists 
increasingly identified ignorance and superstition with 
old and traditional views, progress and knowledge with 
new and scientific views. The task of transforming 
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psychology into science seemed to require scientists to 
reject questions, ideas, or theories that in any way 
resembled the old views, and people could be classified 
as obscurantist or enlightened, depending on the extent 
to which they had embraced the principles of the new 
psychology and rejected those of the old. As I hope will 
be evident in Chapters 3 and 4, scientists such as Ribot, 
Maudsley, Bain, Clifford, Huxley, and others thus 
intensified polarization of thought about the nature of 
mind: The acceptance of psychology into the halls of 
science was at stake, and any compromise or dilution of 
the new system with elements of the old was a threat, not 
to be tolerated within psychology. 
The second trend in the development of 19th-century 
psychology was not, however, long in following the first. 
It was quickly apparent that physiological psychology ran 
the danger of becoming simply a sub-discipline of 
physiology, neurology, or biology. If psychology was to 
attain, not simply scientific status, but autonomy as a 
science, psychologists had to recognize and define the 
uniqueness of mental processes. Furthermore, although 
the concomitance of mental and physical processes was 
assumed, it also was apparent that scientists were far 
too ignorant about the detailed nature of that con- 
comitance for any knowledge about physiological processes 
to shed any light on the correlated mental process. If 
knowledge about mental functioning -- the unique subject 
matter of psychology -- was to progress, psychologists 
had to study mental functioning in its own right, insofar 
as it could be observed. Behavior, therefore, or the 
external manifestation of the psychophysiological 
functioning of an organism, became the defining subject 
matter of psychology. 
As a response to some of the problems inherent in the 
physiologizing of psychology, this second major trend in 
19th-century scientific psychology epitomized the later 
stage of Victorian thought described by Houghton. As 
psychologists were keenly aware, the application of 
scientific principles to the problem of mind not only 
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left some important issues totally unresolved but even 
intensified them. Chief among these was the conflict 
between belief in human volition, or free will, and the 
scientific principle of determinism. Applying scientific 
principles, especially of continuity and determinism, to 
human mental processes and behavior led to the inevitable 
conclusion that human beings are, in essence, automata, 
the products of inexorable cause and effect. Such a con- 
clusion, however, not only seemed to be contradicted by 
the universal human experience of apparently acting voli- 
tionally; it also presented major social and ethical 
problems. If, for example, human beings are products of 
deterministic external forces, how can they be held 
accountable for their actions under any social or ethical 
codes? On the other hand, recognizing that mental 
functioning is in some sense different from physical 
functioning, that mental processes cannot -- at least in 
the present state of knowledge -- be reduced totally to 
physiological processes, and that psychology cannot 
simply be subsumed under physiology, seemed to run the 
risk of revitalizing the old dualism that insisted on 
mind's uniqueness and separation from physical nature. 
In short, the undeniably dual nature of human experience, 
together with the social and moral necessity for a belief 
in volition, presented psychologists with paradoxes and 
problems that seemed insoluble without sacrificing either 
human principles on the one hand or scientific principles 
on the other. The response in psychology, as it was in 
other arenas of late Victorian thought, was a conceptual 
parallelism, in which the conflicting elements were sepa- 
rated and isolated from one another rather than recon- 
ciled. The separation of science and religion, science 
and metaphysics, natural sciences and human sciences, 
science and values, or physical and mental functioning 
reflected the growing belief that chronic intellectual 
problems and paradoxes that had become so acute in the 
19th century were the result, not of insufficient knowl- 
edge, but of categorical confusion of concepts. The 
result, as described in Chapter 1, was a new dualism that 
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was not, like the old dualism, an ontological one but was 
instead an epistemological, methodological, conceptual 
dualism. 
The general development of psychological thought in 
the period 1860-1900 thus mirrored what Leary (1979,234) 
has described as the two stages, or shift in emphasis, in 
the work of Wilhelm Wundt from 1862 to 1896: that is, 
from a psychophysiology and psychophysics that emphasized 
demonstrating the correlation between physiological and 
psychological processes, to a more autonomous psychology 
that emphasized the internal relationship of psychologi- 
cal processes and the legitimacy of studying them inde- 
pendently, "in their own coherence" (Wundt, translated 
and quoted by Leary, 1979,234). Despite the shift in 
emphasis, however, these two stages in the development of 
scientific psychology were simply two steps toward a 
single goal: that of replacing the old supernaturalistic 
view of mind with a new naturalistic one. Perhaps the 
most important effect of the pervasive influence of 
science in the 19th century was the growing conviction 
that humanity is subject to the same principles of law 
and continuity that govern the rest of the natural order. 
As Mill had asked: "Are the actions of man, like all 
other natural events, subject to invariable laws? " (Mill, 
1843/1846, Book VI, Ch. 1, Sec. 2,521). Numerous, 
diverse developments within 19th-century science sup- 
ported an affirmative answer. 
The Naturalization of Mind 
Probably the most important basis for a scientific 
model of mind was the empiricist philosophy of associa- 
tionism, developed in the 17th and 18th centuries by 
Locke, Hume, Hartley, and others (although it had its 
precursor in Aristotle's laws of association). Associa- 
tionism was the empiricist doctrine that the mind is ini- 
tially a tabula rasa, having no innate ideas or capa- 
cities, and that all mental content derives solely from 
experience -- from the accumulation, synthesis, and 
interplay of discrete simple elements (that is, sensa- 
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tions) that bond together by lawful associative processes 
to form complex ideas. Associationism began to undermine 
the old concept of mind as an indivisible unity or sub- 
ject that experienced sensations and to replace it with 
the concept of mind as an aggregate of parts, the sum 
total of a set of sensory elements. It was thus of 
immense importance in providing a model of mind that fit 
the scientific model of the physical world. Like the 
physical sciences, psychological associationism was 
atomistic: All phenomena were combinations of simple, 
elementary "building blocks. " By providing this 
atomistic model of mind, associationism laid the founda- 
tion for much of 19th-century scientific psychology, 
which was devoted to the analysis of mental phenomena 
into their constituent elements, at the expense of study- 
ing mind as a whole (Daston, 1982). Moreover, associa- 
tionism was physical, in that those primary elements were 
sensations produced by physical stimuli; and in the 19th 
century associationism became physiological when the 
model of the nervous system and brain as a complex of 
associative nerve connections became predominant. Most 
importantly, however, associationism introduced into 
psychology the primary scientific principle of lawful 
determinism. Instead of a free, volitional agent, mind 
could now begin to be viewed as a mechanistic phenomenon, 
the product of natural laws. 
The most important direct influence on the develop- 
ment of scientific psychology, however, was certainly the 
rapid progress in the field of physiology that began 
around the turn of the 19th century. Although the brain 
had long been regarded as the seat of the mind, it was F. 
J. Gall who, in the late 18th and early 19th century, 
first suggested that the study of physiology, and specif- 
ically the structure of the brain, was a more appropriate 
method for studying mental functioning than was 
philosophical analysis (Young, 1968,1970). With his 
doctrine that cerebral structure was directly correlated 
with mental faculties, he introduced the idea that 
psychology could be scientific rather than philosophical. 
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Although he was not an anti-dualist and insisted (as 
dualists do) that the brain was the means and not the 
cause of mental functioning (Robinson, 1982,905), he 
nonetheless had introduced (as had associationism) an 
element undermining traditional dualism. With his 
phrenological theories, Gall denied the idea that mind is 
something separate and distinct from nature and that 
physiology was thus irrelevant to an understanding of 
mental processes. His most important contribution, 
therefore, was in bringing mind into the province of 
nature and hence of scientific analysis (Young, 1970). 
Moreover, he introduced the important idea of a func- 
tional psychology that studies individual differences and 
biologically significant behavior, rather than the 
abstract general principles addressed by the old 
metaphysical, introspective psychology (Young, 1970). 
Contemporaneous with Gall was Cabanis, who, in his 
lectures on physiological psychology in 1796-1797, went 
an important step further than had Gall in denying the 
categorical separation of mind from brain. He argued 
that soul (or mind) is not an entity but a faculty of the 
nervous system and that thought is the function of the 
brain. He believed that all intellectual processes 
derive ultimately from simple sensibility, a property of 
the nervous system, and thus his psychology was a reduc- 
tionistic as well as a physicalistic one. He also out- 
lined a hierarchical system of nervous functioning, and 
thus of behavior, that took on a renewed and important 
role in psychology when it was "rediscovered" by Hughl- 
ings Jackson later in the 19th century (Margetts, 1953, 
131). 
The concept that had dominated the new physiological 
psychology throughout the 19th century (and later) was 
that of the reflex, the physiological "equivalent of the 
association process" (Burnham, 1986,71). In its most 
general form, it was the deterministic notion of the 
cause-and-effect relationship between a sensory stimulus 
and a behavioral response; more specifically, it referred 
to the notion of a reflex arc through the nervous system 
68 
from sensory to motor nerves. Descartes had presented a 
model of reflex behavior in his description of the body 
(especially of "mind-less" animals) as a machine operated 
by the movement of animal spirits through the nervous 
system, activating parts of the body. Descartes' concep- 
tion of the nervous system as a hydraulic apparatus was 
replaced in the 19th century by a view of the nervous 
system as an electrical system composed of a switchboard 
(the brain) and conductor (the nervous system) (Lowry, 
1970,66) (and replaced again in the 20th century by the 
model of the nervous system as a computer); but the basic 
reflex model persisted and became the foundation for the 
new physiological psychology, precisely because it pro- 
vided a thoroughly mechanistic and deterministic (and 
hence "scientific") understanding of behavior. 
Closely tied to the notion of reflex behavior, and 
particularly important for psychology, was the growing 
knowledge about localization of function in the nervous 
system and especially the brain. Gall had introduced the 
idea that mental functions might be correlated with brain 
structure, but the details of his system, and even the 
idea that abstract psychological traits or behaviors 
could be localized, ultimately were shown to be wrong. 
Nevertheless, the study of sensorimotor reflex actions 
gradually taught physiologists that certain processes 
associated with mental functioning could be localized, 
and these discoveries set off a debate (not yet resolved) 
about whether the brain, and by extension the mind, func- 
tions primarily'as an aggregate of neuronal parts or as a 
unified whole -- the larger issue being whether an 
atomistic model of mind could adequately account for men- 
tal functioning, or whether it was necessary to retain 
some form of the old notion of mind as a unity, or 
functioning whole. 
The localization of specific nervous system functions 
began with the discovery, by Bell and Magendie, that 
nerves in the spinal column are differentiated by func- 
tion, the dorsal ones being primarily the sensory nerves, 
the ventral ones primarily motor. This work, together 
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with Helmholtz's studies of the velocity of nerve 
impulses, strengthened the model of sensorimotor behavior 
as a deterministic system of input signals, central 
processing, and output signals. Müller demonstrated fur- 
ther that individual nerves are differentiated according 
to function, a stimulus (of whatever kind) to, say, the 
optic nerve always producing a sensation of light. 
The predominant idea during much of the mid-19th 
century was that the nervous system was divided into two 
main components, the subcortical areas being devoted to 
sensorimotor reflex functioning, the cerebrum, on the 
other hand, being the sole region where thought takes 
place. Flourens had been the major proponent of this 
division of function, and he had particularly argued 
against Gall's system of localization, believing instead 
that the mind functions, in all its various modes of 
operation, throughout the cerebrum as a whole (Robinson, 
1978,498-500; Young, 1970). 
Following Flourens, Laycock and then Carpenter 
modified this view in a significant way when they 
extended the concept of reflex activity to the cerebral 
hemispheres as well as the lower nervous system. They 
both accepted Flourens's view that the cerebrum as a 
whole is the center for thought and mental activity, and 
thus they rejected Gall's system of specific localiza- 
tion; but Laycock believed that principles of law and 
continuity demanded that the same mode of functioning be 
applied to the entire nervous system: He "formulated a 
theory which stressed that the nervous system must be 
seen as one continuous series of structures obeying one 
law, that of the reflex" (Young, 1966,25). He adopted a 
view of mind as a property of the nervous system, which 
appears at a certain level of complexity of organization, 
and he conceived of the reflex activity of these higher 
levels as being purposeful and adaptive behavior, not 
mere mechanical reaction (Danziger, 1982). On the other 
hand, Carpenter (whose views I will describe in more 
detail in Chapter 3) took the more dualistic view that an 
independent principle -- Will -- interacted with the 
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cerebral centers to direct the volitional functioning of 
the organism as a whole. He elaborated on Laycock's 
views of cerebral reflex activity by describing uncon- 
scious or automatic thought and behavior as being the 
reflex functioning of the cerebral centers when the Will 
is unable to exercise its usual control over them. This 
hypothesis of "unconscious cerebration, " or the 
physiological reflex activity of the cerebral hemi- 
spheres, remained an important and influential view of 
unconscious mental functioning throughout much of the 
rest of the century. 
Physiological interpretations of mental processes 
took a new turn, however, when new studies began to 
revive Gall's general principle of localization in the 
cortex of specific mental functions. In 1861 Broca was 
able to demonstrate clinically the correlation of speech 
dysfunction with damage to an area of the left frontal 
lobe. In 1870 Fritsch and Hitzig demonstrated, with 
electrical stimulation studies, that movements of limbs 
could be localized in the cortex, and Ferrier, using 
similar techniques, mapped out the motor areas of the 
cortex in much detail. Such studies encouraged new 
theorizing about localization of mental functioning, but 
an important new approach appeared when Hughlings Jack- 
son, influenced by Laycock's theories of cerebral reflex 
functioning and Spencer's evolutionary doctrines, pro- 
duced what was, in essence, a reconciliation of the two 
diametrically opposed views of atomistic localization and 
holistic unity of mental functioning (Churchland, 1986, 
161-162). Jackson proposed that the nervous system was a 
hierarchy of levels, developed over the course of evolu- 
tion, from the oldest, which are the simplest, most 
organized, most automatic, and most stable functioning, 
to the newest, which are the most complex, least 
organized, least automatic, and least stable (Jackson, 
1884). Moreover, it was also a hierarchy of localiza- 
tion, such that the lower, older levels are the most 
localized, and the newer, more complex ones are the more 
diffuse (Prince, 1898). Evolution resulted in the addi- 
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tion of higher and more complex processes that ordinarily 
govern the organism's behavior, but dissolution could 
occur when higher levels of the nervous system were 
impaired or inhibited by disease, and lower, more stable 
levels were thereby freed to take over the organism's 
functioning. 
J. S. Mill expressed the view of most of the early 
advocates of a scientific approach to psychology when he 
said that 
no rational person can doubt the closeness of the 
connexion between the functions of the nervous 
system and the phenomena of mind, nor can think any 
exposition of the mind satisfactory, into which that 
connexion does not enter as a prominent feature. 
(Mill, 1843/1846, cited in Young, 1970,119) 
Physiological conceptions of mental functioning had 
become so predominant by the end of the century that a 
physiologist felt confident enough to say: "It is now 
known that memory is a material record" (Hurd, 1898, 
351). But physiology was not alone among the sciences in 
contributing to the naturalization of mind in the 19th 
century. Physics, as the most fundamental and advanced 
of the sciences, had established the deterministic world 
view that became the model for all other aspiring 
sciences; but, more specifically, it was the doctrine of 
the conservation of energy that had the most important 
influence on the development of the new psychology. 
Because it depicted the physical world as a completely 
closed and self-contained causal system, it became 
increasingly difficult to reconcile this doctrine with 
the old dualistic view of a nonphysical mind that 
influences, by interacting with, the physical world. The 
notion of mental causality therefore became increasingly 
intolerable to many scientists and psychologists; Hughl- 
ings Jackson expressed their views when he said that, if 
he could be convinced that mind had interacted with and 
influenced matter, he would be forced to give up neurol- 
ogy altogether, "the implication being that dualism means 
the negation of law" (Engelhardt, 1975,145). 
The doctrine of the conservation of energy not only 
helped to undermine the old conception of mind; it also 
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provided material for the new conception. The rapidly 
developing science of thermodynamics, and the resulting 
spread of the concept of energy as the motive power 
behind all physical phenomena, had an important impact on 
ideas about mind. Scientists began to view mind, not as 
an active entity, but as the energy, or motive power, 
behind an organism's functioning. In particular, the 
physicist Fechner, now often considered the founder of 
experimental psychology, introduced the concept of the 
conservation of energy into psychology. According to 
Fechner, psychophysical activity is a form of energy: 
Each person has a certain finite amount of physical 
energy, and the function of the nervous system is to 
transform this into psychophysical energy (Ellenberger, 
1956,207-208). His introduction of the quantifiable, 
experimental method into psychology, as well as the 
Weber-Fechner law of psychophysics that he developed, 
were the direct result of his attempt to demonstrate the 
relationship between the two forms of energy: a physical 
stimulus and a psychophysical sensation. Fechner's work 
thus had an important influence on the subsequent direc- 
tion of psychology, not only methodologically, but also 
conceptually: "After Fechner, the concept of 'mental 
energy' was adopted by many authors, and by the end of 
the 19th century it was current in psychology and neurop- 
sychiatry" (Ellenberger, 1956,207). Within a few years, 
an academic psychologist such as Sully would say that it 
was "proved... that the amount of mental activity possible 
at any time is limited by the quantity of disposable 
energy in the brain" (Sully, 1884,12); and a neurologist 
such as Weir Mitchell would propose that nervous disease 
was caused by a depletion of nervous energy brought on by 
too much mental work (Kenny, 1986,131). 
One of the strongest blows to the old psychology, 
however, came from biology and from Darwin's theory of 
natural selection in particular. As Murphy, in an early 
history of psychology, acknowledged, late 19th-century 
Darwinism "probably did as much as any single factor to 
shape the science [of psychology] as it exists to-day" 
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(Murphy, 1929,122); and it was especially influential in 
late 19th-century British psychology, where it was "the 
dominant tendency" (Murphy, 1929,187). Earlier evolu- 
tionary theories contributed to the general climate of 
thought undermining old ways of thinking about mind. For 
example, the uniformitarian hypothesis of Lyell and 
others in geology and the evolutionary ideas of Lamarck 
and Chambers in biology all encouraged the growing faith 
in the continuity and lawful order of nature, in opposi- 
tion to the old principle of catastrophism and its asso- 
ciated ideas of divine intervention, miracles, capri- 
ciousness, and volition. It was Darwin's massive amount 
of evidence for the transmutation of species by natural 
selection, however, that finally brought widespread con- 
viction among scientists and, also, that stimulated 
scientists to begin to view mind and mental phenomena in 
evolutionary terms. 
The primary effect of Darwinism was to call into 
serious question previous assumptions about the unique- 
ness of human minds as opposed to lower forms of life. 
Human mental processes began to be viewed as being on a 
continuum with those of other forms of life, differing 
only in degree of development, not in kind. Psychology 
began to shift from an emphasis on studying the various 
faculties of mind to studying mental phenomena as 
biological, functional processes enabling the organism to 
adapt most beneficially to its environment. Darwinism 
reinforced the move away from the introspective study of 
mind to the observational study of behavior; but it also 
initiated the expansion of scientific psychology as a 
primarily physiological science to a biological one in 
which comparative and developmental studies became promi- 
nent. Darwinism also had the important effect of 
undermining much of what remained of any teleological 
thinking among psychologists. By proposing natural 
selection as the mechanism for evolution, Darwin removed 
the need to postulate divine or even human volition as a 
driving force behind nature's processes. Because Dar- 
winism challenged the argument from design that had long 
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been cited as supporting the idea of a divine Creator, it 
"thus undermined the cooperative relationship between 
science and theology" that had existed prior to the mid- 
19th century (Mackenzie & Mackenzie, 1980,150). Before 
Darwin, psychophysiologists such as Carpenter and Laycock 
could maintain dualistic, religious, or teleological 
ideas within their scientific systems; after Darwin, 
mechanistic determinism became the only viable scientific 
option for most psychologists (Danziger, 1982,134). 
Although Darwin's contribution to the development of 
psychology is more widely recognized today, during the 
late 19th century the work of Herbert Spencer was 
equally, if not more, important in infusing psychology, 
sociology, anthropology, and other human sciences with 
evolutionary principles. Spencer adopted von Baer's 
thesis of embryonic development from a homogeneous, 
indeterminate, simple state to a heterogeneous, 
determinate, and increasingly complex and organized 
state; and he then attempted to show that the universe in 
all its many aspects is developing and progressing in 
accordance with this one overriding principle (Copleston, 
1949/1966; Young, 1970). It was an attempt to develop a 
universal, "synthetic philosophy": 
Spencer, the prophet of evolution, sought to 
encompass the behaviour of all phenomena within a 
single, grand, all-inclusive principle of rhythmic, 
relentless movement from the homogeneous to the 
heterogeneous to the homogeneous again -- Evolution 
and Dissolution. (Eisen, 1968,36) 
The concept of dissolution -- the idea that integrated 
parts of a complex system could fall apart -- made Spen- 
cer's system a cyclical one, of both progress and 
regress; but the overall direction of evolutionary devel- 
opment was assumed to be toward progress. Spencer's 
system had widespread influence, perhaps most notably on 
Hughlings Jackson, whose ideas about the evolutionary 
development and hierarchy of the nervous system, as well 
as its dissolution under pathological conditions, derived 
directly from Spencer (Jackson, 1884). 
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Unresolved Dilemmas 
By the end of the century, the attempt to apply to 
psychology the principles of scientific naturalism -- in 
other words, to establish that mind is a natural 
phenomenon, in some sense continuous with matter and not 
only subject to but also produced by the same laws of 
nature governing physical phenomena -- had been largely 
successful, at least in the eyes of most scientists. 
Scientific principles of mechanistic determinism and 
reductionistic atomism had been pitted against the old 
"commonsense" or humanistic principles of teleology, 
meaning, and volition, and the former had apparently 
emerged victorious, since psychology was now almost 
wholly physiological, biological, or clinical, experi- 
mental or observational, and positivistic and objective. 
Nevertheless, despite the immense power of science 
and its firm hold on the 19th-century mind, humanistic 
principles were not easily relinquished. Throughout much 
of the 19th century, the conflict between scientific 
determinism and human volition remained a central dilemma 
of the age (Chadwick, 1975,204-205; Daston, 1978,1982). 
The principle of continuity, together with the law of the 
conservation of energy, had led inexorably to the conclu- 
sion that humans were, like Descartes' animals, 
physiological automata: The automaton hypothesis stated 
that all physical events have a physical antecedent and 
thus that there must be an unbroken physical causal chain 
(Gray, 1968). For many 19th-century scientists, the 
introduction of volition (or any mental state) as a cause 
at any point in that chain violated the principles of 
continuity and conservation of energy, because (they 
said) it required the introduction of new energy into 
what was otherwise a closed system. Causative volition 
was therefore a nonsensical concept, according to Clif- 
ford, Huxley, Jackson, and numerous other scientists. 
Moreoever, in the eyes of many scientists, allowing for 
the concept of volition in psychology was "a back-door 
attempt to reintroduce an active ego or soul into the new 
psychology" (Daston, 1978,202). Volition became "a 
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taboo concept" because scientists thought "it would pull 
psychology back to its prescientific, mystical days" 
(Decker, 1986,52). One psychologist (Ladd, 1892,52), 
noting that a physical scientist had recently "affirmed 
the human will to be a vera causa and to originate 
changes that run throughout the entire physical 
universe, " declared that had he (Ladd), a psychologist, 
made such a statement, he would "be well beaten and 
ostracized from the sacred circle of so-called 
'scientists'. " 
Yet the concept of volition could not be relinquished 
without also dispensing with all notions of ethics, indi- 
vidual responsibility, and purposeful behavior: 
Even the most vigorous exponents of a naturalist 
psychology, such as Huxley and Clifford, felt them- 
selves obliged somehow to reconcile traditional 
notions of free will and volition with the 
deterministic implications of a "scientific" 
psychology. (Daston, 1978,197) 
The task proved a difficult one, however; as Brown (1947, 
53-54) expressed it, Huxley 
is sure that every phenomenon has its efficient 
[physical] cause..., yet he is sure of the power of 
the will at least in part to determine or condition 
human phenomena. There, on the horns of a great 
dilemma, he hangs. 
There also hung many of his colleagues and con- 
temporaries. 
Another major problem that the new psychology not 
only left unresolved, but actually exacerbated, was the 
question of whether the nature of mind is best understood 
when mind is viewed holistically or when it is viewed 
atomistically. The problem, which may be labelled the 
conceptual one of unity versus multiplicity, has been an 
underlying theme in philosophical and scientific debates 
throughout history, the wave-particle debate in physics 
about the nature of light being just one example. It is 
equally important in the history of psychology: It was a 
prominent theme in the surveys of two early historians of 
the field (Brett, 1921; Murphy, 1929). Flugel 
(1933/1964) and, more recently, Watson (1973) enumerated 
some antithetical tendencies or "prescriptions" in 
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psychology, which in Watson's view have served in the 
place of a guiding paradigm in a pre-paradigmatic 
psychology. In many of these debates in psychology (such 
as between structuralism and functionalism, content and 
act psychology, associationism and gestalt psychology, or 
even materialism and dualism), the underlying issue is 
often the basic one of whether to view the nature of mind 
as fundamentally a unity or a multiplicity. Is it, in 
other words, an indivisible whole that is the cohesive, 
organizing factor of mental life, or is it a structure 
built up from innumerable elements or experiences? Is 
mind the sum of the parts, or the factor drawing the 
parts together in the first place? In brief, is mind 
best understood from the bottom up or the top down? 
In the 19th century, this problem was a crucial one 
in the conflict betwen the old dualistic psychology and 
the new psychology; it was a battle "which pitted the 
metaphysical 'unity of self' against the scientific 'mul- 
tiplicity of selves"' (Robinson, 1978,349). The first 
was the traditional notion of self, derived from Plato's 
concept of the soul as a simple, noncomposite, 
indivisible unity. Even an associationist such as J. S. 
Mill found this a compelling idea: 
There is a something I call Myself, or... my mind, 
which I consider as distinct from these sensations, 
thoughts, etc.; a something which I conceive not to 
be the thoughts, but the being that has the 
thoughts. (Mill, 1843/1846,42) 
On the other hand, Mill went on to say that we can have 
no knowledge of what this something is ("although it is 
myself") but only of "the series of its states of con- 
sciousness" (Mill, 1843/1846,42). For an increasing 
number of 19th-century scientists, that knowable "series" 
was the only conception of mind that science needed, 
especially since the view of mind as a multiplicity con- 
formed much better to the analytic method of science and 
the atomistic view of matter in 19th-century physics than 
did the unitary, indivisible soul. 
Nevertheless, most psychologists recognized that the 
multiplicity view of mind, although it did fit com- 
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fortably with the basic principles of science, did not 
fit comfortably with human experience and, moreover, that 
it left some fundamental problems unresolved. As 
McDougall later said, the basic problem for all theories 
of mind is "What holds consciousness together? " 
(McDougall, 1911/1915,264n, quoting C. A. Strong). How 
do we get psychical unity out of physical multiplicity, 
"the hanging together of a multiplicity of conscious 
processes in a numerically distinct or individual stream" 
(McDougall, 1911/1915,164)? The question was not an 
idle one; it became particularly relevant when clinical 
cases and hypnotic experiments began to provide instances 
in which the multiple conscious processes within one body 
did not in fact "hang together. " 
The problem of the unity or multiplicity of mind was 
important to psychology in other ways as well. First, it 
raised yet again the unanswered problem of the relation- 
ship of psychology to science: whether psychology is in 
fact a science and, if so, what this might mean for our 
understanding of the nature of science. If mind is most 
basically a multiplicity -- that is, if it is a composite 
structure built up from numerous psychological elements 
-- then the analytic method of science was appropriate 
for psychology. If mind is most basically a unity -- 
that is, a noncomposite ontological unit which cannot be 
reduced to constituent elements without losing its essen- 
tial nature -- or even both a unity and a multiplicity 
simultaneously, then the analytic method was 
inappropriate, or inadequate. This in turn would mean 
either that psychology was not wholly a science and must 
be studied with methods other than (or in addition to) 
the analytic one, or that the scientific method must be 
conceived as something broader than quantitative analy- 
sis. As Murphy (1929,415) suggested: "It may well be 
that psychology, precisely because of its concern with 
problems refractory to existing methods, will be the 
means of wresting from nature new methods and realities. " 
The historian Brett, in the context of discussing the 
unity-multiplicity problem, said simply: "The central 
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problem [in psychology] is the question of method" 
(Brett, 1921,148). Toward the end of the century, there 
was a resurgence among psychologists of those who 
insisted that the unity and wholeness of mind and experi- 
ence was as fundamental -- or even more so -- to psychol- 
ogy as were discrete, analyzable units. To these 
psychologists (who included William James, James Ward, 
and G. F. Stout), when experience is "decomposed into 
elements" in the interests of conforming to the analytic 
scientific method, an important datum -- the whole -- has 
been lost (Daston, 1982). 
Secondly, the unity-multiplicity problem was impor- 
tant because of its close relationship to the question of 
the nature of the relationship of mind and body, that is, 
whether mind is caused or causal. Could mind be 
understood adequately as a series or sum total of 
elementary units, such as simple ideas or sensations, or 
as a by-product of an evolving complex of simple 
physiological processes? Or was it itself a fundamental, 
elementary causal principle in nature? In essence, the 
unity/multiplicity debate, like that of volition versus 
determinism, was a variant of the primary problem facing 
scientific psychology: whether -- and how -- the concept 
of mental causality could be accommodated within a 
scientific understanding of nature. 
The Solution: Parallelistic Psychology 
Scientific psychologists had quickly worked them- 
selves into an impasse: They had set up an implacable 
dichotomy of naturalistic (or physicalistic) and super- 
naturalistic (or dualistic) ideas about mind, but most of 
them were unable to throw themselves wholeheartedly on 
the side of naturalism as they had defined it, which 
logically required the denial of such "supernaturalistic" 
ideas as volition and the unity of human personality and 
which led to such unacceptable ideas as the automaton 
hypothesis and the subordination of psychology to 
physiology. Unfortunately, the rigidity of the dichotomy 
-- the identification of particular categories of ideas 
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as "supernaturalistic" and hence unacceptable within 
science -- precluded any serious or widespread considera- 
tion among psychologists that the solution to the 
paradoxes and difficulties they found themselves con- 
fronting might lie in a close and critical examination of 
prevailing assumptions about both naturalism and super- 
naturalism. The result, as was described in Chapter 1, 
was a decision worthy of Solomon, half of human experi- 
ence being assigned to science, the other half to reli- 
gion, philosophy, and other humanities. The arrangement 
seemed to work quite well for all parties concerned, 
since neither side needed to be troubled any longer by 
questions, problems, or conflicting facts raised by the 
other side. For psychologists in particular, this meth- 
odological or conceptual parallelism meant that they need 
no longer be troubled by questions, problems, or 
phenomena that threatened the status of psychology as a 
science. 
This desire to purge psychology of any elements 
threatening its eligibility as a science helps explain 
why psychologists (of both the 19th and 20th centuries) 
embraced the various forms of positivism (Boring, 1950, 
655) with such enthusiasm: "No other science had started 
off by defining its aims in a framework of positivist 
psychology" (Danziger, 1979,224). The term "positivism" 
has several meanings, both general and specific. In its 
general form it refers to the belief that the limits of 
knowledge are fixed at what is observable and that there- 
fore metaphysics and associated speculation must be 
eliminated in favor of scientific observation; modern 
positivism in this form may be said to have originated 
with Hume and to have culminated in the logical 
positivism of Mach and the Vienna Circle. In its 
specific form (perhaps better labelled "Positivism, " with 
a capital "P"), Positivism was formulated in the early 
19th century by Comte, who expanded the general form of 
positivism into a religion of humanity and a theory that 
human thought and history have evolved through three 
stages, from primitive theological thinking, to 
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metaphysical explanation, to the most advanced stage, 
that of scientific description. Positivism, whether of 
the general kind or of the particular Comtean variety, 
provided psychologists with the rationale for eliminating 
from psychology large and troublesome questions about the 
nature of mind, about the conflict between the scientific 
principle of determinism and the human experience of 
volition, or about the causal relationship between mental 
and physical processes. Such questions belonged to 
metaphysics, not science. 
The influence of positivism on psychology was 
tempered, however, by the new conceptual parallelism. In 
France, Taine, whose immense influence had made French 
psychology strictly naturalistic and positivistic 
(Robinson, 1978,50-67), had also provided the rationale 
for an autonomous science of psychology. Robinson (1978, 
59) has pointed out that, despite his firmly 
physicalistic belief that personality depends on 
molecular movements in the brain, Taine also admitted 
that "the language of neurophysiology and the language of 
consciousness are not meaningfully interchangeable ... the 
one cannot be reduced to the other. " Similarly, in 
England, Hughlings Jackson's doctrine of concomitance (as 
described in Chapter 1) helped establish a parallelism 
that freed psychologists to study psychological behavior 
and processes without needing to relate them back to 
their physiological substratum. This methodological 
parallelism, it should be emphasized, was quite different 
from the metaphysical parallelism of, say, Leibniz or of 
those scientists (including Jackson) who, influenced by 
the doctrine of the conservation of energy, insisted that 
mind and brain had to be closed causal systems that were 
correlated but did not interact. Instead, this paral- 
lelism was a methodological, conceptual, or linguistic 
one only; it allowed for nearly any metaphysical position 
on the relationship of mind and matter, insisting only on 
the conceptual and methodological separation of them. It 
was purely a "pragmatic theory of psycho-physical paral- 
lelism, " which provided "a disciplinary division between 
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physiology and psychology" (R. Smith, 1981,271). Thus, 
it allowed psychologists the "luxury of ontological 
agnosticism while they got on with their work" (Young, 
1970,233). 
It also helped change the nature of that work. 
Biological functionalism began to replace physiological 
reductionism as the predominant approach to psychology. 
Because the positivistic parallelism had freed 
psychologists from the need to address the mind-matter 
question theoretically (and in fact had rejected it as 
totally inappropriate for psychology to address), and 
because the methodological parallelism had freed them 
from the need to address the mind-matter problem empiri- 
cally, psychologists turned more and more to the study of 
the function of psychological behavior in an organism's 
interaction with and adaptation to its environment. 
An Illustrative Example: The Problem of the Subconscious 
The general shift in psychology from a physiological 
reductionism to a more purely psychological functionalism 
was evident in changing ideas about subconscious 
processes. Although the concept of unconscious phenomena 
was an old one among philosophers (Ellenberger, 1957; 
Margetts, 1953; Whyte, 1960), the notion that such 
phenomena could be studied systematically and that they 
might have important implications for an understanding of 
conscious phenomena did not become widespread until the 
19th century. This burgeoning interest in the uncon- 
scious had its roots in the discovery of mesmeric 
phenomena by Mesmer and his followers in the late 18th 
and early 19th centuries; and it grew concurrently with 
the development of scientific psychology. It was spurred 
on by physicians such as Elliotson, Esdaile, and Braid, 
who studied mesmerism and hypnosis in the mid-19th 
century, and it was revived during the last two decades 
of the century, particularly after Charcot took an inter- 
est in hypnotism. Perhaps most important, however, was 
the growing public interest in subconscious phenomena, 
fueled by von Hartmann's widely read book, The Philosophy 
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of the Unconscious, first published in 1869. 
This growing awareness of subconscious phenomena had 
far-reaching effects on the development of psychology, 
primarily because subconscious phenomena raised important 
questions about the definition of mind and thus of 
psychology. Traditionally mind had been equated with 
consciousness; the demonstration that complex behavior 
and, apparently, complex mental processes occurred 
without a person's conscious awareness suggested that 
mind was not coterminous with consciousness. The problem 
then arose of how mind should be defined, and whether and 
how to fix a boundary between mental and physiological 
processes. Moreover, if not all mental processes occur 
within consciousness, then psychology's traditional 
method of the introspective examination of mental content 
was inadequate. From this grew the debate about whether 
psychology should be the introspective study of mental 
processes or the observation of behavior. 
The development of ideas in the 19th century about 
the subconscious. thus mirrored the development of ideas 
about mind and psychology in general. As with psychology 
in general, when scientifically oriented thinkers first 
turned their attention to subconscious phenomena, the 
predominant interpretation was a physiological one: "The 
unconscious took on a neurological veneer which was in 
keeping with the somatic orientation of the day" 
(Margetts, 1953,133). Because mind was still largely 
identified with conscious awareness, unconscious 
phenomena were interpretted as nervous system reflexes. 
Mill, for example, described unconscious mental 
processes, or "the apparently suppressed links in a chain 
of association, " as being "the chain of causation being 
continued only physically, by one organic state of the 
nerves succeeding another so rapidly that the state of 
mental consciousness appropriate to each is not produced" 
(Mill, 1884,2: 22-23). In 1842 Braid introduced a 
physiological interpretation of mesmerism that offered an 
acceptable scientific alternative to the "occult" ideas 
about mesmeric fluid then prevailing. He suggested that 
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the hypnotic trance was the result of exhaustion of the 
nervous system brought on by the prolonged fixation of 
the subject's attention during the induction procedure: 
Fixed attention leads to suppressed respiration with 
decreased oxygenation of the blood and accumulation 
of carbonic acid. These are the pneumo- and 
hemodynamic changes that cause the "derangement of 
the state of the cerebro-spinal centres"... in the 
hypnotic state. (Kravis, 1988,1193; quoting Braid) 
In 1853 Carpenter proposed his famous hypothesis of 
unconscious cerebration: Unconscious mental processes or 
behavior were the product of the reflex action of the 
cerebrum in the absence of the Will's conscious control 
or volition (Carpenter, 1853, pp. 811,819) Even as late 
as 1880, Heidenhain published what became an influential 
physiological theory of hypnotism (Heidenhain, 
1880/1882). Like Carpenter, he believed that the 
phenomena of hypnotism were physiological reflexes; but 
unlike Carpenter, he believed that unconscious phenomena 
occur, not because of a reflex action of the cerebral 
centers, but because of a reflex that completely bypasses 
the cerebral centers. In his view, hypnotic induction 
involves the monotonous stimulation of facial, optic, or 
auditory nerves, which then causes the inhibition of gan- 
glion cells in the cerebral cortex and, hence, the sup- 
pression of consciousness. 
As with psychology in general, however, increased 
knowledge about subconscious phenomena led many 
psychologists and physicians to recognize the inadequacy 
of purely physiological approaches. In particular, it 
became clear that many subconscious acts were not simple 
reflex responses but were often complex performances 
requiring memory, judgment, or complicated calculations. 
Many subconscious actions seemed to be no different in 
kind from conscious ones, since to the outside observer a 
subconscious and a conscious act could appear identical. 
Whereas those who had proposed physiological hypotheses 
had emphasized the differences between conscious and 
unconscious states (namely, the absence of consciousness 
in the latter), later psychologists emphasized their 
similarities -- especially the role adaptive behavior 
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played in both states. The implication of these 
similarities was that subconscious acts were not simply 
physiological reflexes, but involved "mental" processes 
of some sort, with the sole difference being that they 
occurred outside instead of within conscious awareness. 
As a result, many psychologists during the last two 
decades of the century -- particularly clinicians working 
directly with patients who spontaneously exhibited sub- 
conscious functioning -- began to adopt a more purely 
psychological, functional, or dynamic approach to subcon- 
scious phenomena. One historian summarized psychiatry's 
development in the late 19th century as a change in 
emphasis "from psychotic, supposedly organic, conditions 
to neurotic 'functional' conditions" (Mora, 1965,156). 
Even Braid had exemplified the shift in emphasis that 
would occur later in the century among students of sub- 
conscious phenomena in general. Although "Braid insisted 
on a physiological substratum" (Kravis, 1988,1203), his 
later ideas showed increasing attention to the role of 
monoideism (or the fixed attention of the subject on a 
particular idea) and of suggestion. This shift to a 
psychological emphasis was by no means universal; the 
debate between those who viewed unconscious processes as 
physiological automatisms and those who viewed them as 
mental processes outside conscious awareness continued 
throughout the 19th century, and later (Prince, 
1929/1939,627). Nevertheless, among those late 19th- 
century psychologists and physicians who were most 
actively involved with research on subconscious 
phenomena, psychological approaches clearly dominated 
during the later years of the century. 
The Primacy of Matter 
It is important to emphasize, however, that neither 
in psychology in general nor in the study of subconscious 
processes in particular was the shift to a predominantly 
functional, psychological approach in any way a repudia- 
tion of the fundamental principle, elaborated in the ear- 
lier physiological stage, that physiological processes 
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are the basis or substratum for psychological ones. The 
autonomous, parallelistic psychology had derived directly 
from physiological psychology, the primary difference 
being that the former assumed, rather than addressed 
directly, the underlying concomitance, or correlation, of 
physiological and mental processes. Once this con- 
comitance seemed firmly established, and once it was 
widely accepted, on the basis of this concomitance, that 
the application to psychology of the scientific concept 
of law and of the experimental method was legitimate, 
then psychologists felt secure enough to adopt a working 
parallelism and study mental processes independently, "in 
their own coherence. " 
They did not, however, feel secure enough to question 
the adequacy of the doctrine of concomitance that they 
had inherited from physiological psychology. With regard 
to the precise nature of the relationship between mental 
and physical phenomena, the doctrine should have been a 
purely neutral statement; one of its principles, as 
stated by Hughlings Jackson, was simply "that for every 
mental state there is a correlative nervous state" (Jack- 
son, 1931-1932,2: 72). Jackson himself had insisted that 
his concern with the problem of mind and matter was 
purely methodological: "I do not trouble myself about 
the mode of connection between mind and matter. It is 
enough to assume a parallelism" (Jackson, 1931-1932, 
1: 52). However, even he later modified that neutrality 
when he went on to insist that, because of the law of the 
conservation of energy, there can be "no interference of 
one with the other" (Jackson, 1931-1932,2: 72). Few 
psychologists, in fact, considered the doctrine of con- 
comitance to be a neutral one. As was pointed out in 
Chapter 1, physiological psychologists in the late 19th 
century (as well as later) concentrated almost exclu- 
sively on studies in which the nervous system was the 
independent variable and mental phenomena the dependent 
one. Not surprisingly, the conclusion was that mind is 
in some sense dependent on brain. As a result, 19th- 
century psychologists held some version of a dual-aspect 
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or epiphenomenal view of mind: Mind, in other words, was 
a property or function of matter (or, along with matter, 
a property or function of some "Unknowable" substance) 
that evolved with matter and emerged as consciousness at 
a particular level of complexity. Few questioned whether 
the demonstrated correlation between mental and physical 
processes had also established their causal relationship. 
In short, throughout the last half of the 19th 
century -- scientific psychology's formative period -- 
two principal assumptions were established as the basis 
upon which modern psychology would develop. On the one 
hand, the naturalization of mind eventually led to the 
assumption that mind is ultimately derived from matter 
and, thus, somehow secondary to it and the laws of the 
physical world. On the other hand, the unresolved con- 
flicts and paradoxes about the nature of mind, which had 
increased rather than lessened during this naturalization 
process, led to the agnostic view that the mind-matter 
problem is an unanswerable one, as well as to the 
positivistic view that it is in any case an inappropriate 
question for science. In other words, modern psychology 
was built on the paradoxical premise that the question of 
the nature of the relation of mind to matter both has 
already been basically solved and is unresolvable. The 
former assumption, however, would seem to credit science 
with too much accomplishment; the latter, with too 
little. 
In the following two chapters, the views of 11 19th- 
century scientists will be examined in some detail to 
illustrate the ways in which each contributed to the 






It is a truism to say that no one works in isolation. 
To understand the motivations, methods, and purposes of 
anyone's work -- whether that person is a scientist, 
philosopher, artist, or worker of any sort -- it is as 
necessary to study the context in which the person was 
working as it is to study the person's own work. Thus, 
to understand what Myers as a psychical researcher was 
trying to accomplish, one must have some understanding of 
how his contemporaries approached the problems with which 
he was concerned. Against this background, one can bet- 
ter see both what Myers accepted in the thinking of his 
contemporaries, and also what he rejected; and one can 
begin to understand more clearly to what extent Myers 
approved of and supported the new psychology and where he 
diverged and dissented from it. 
In Chapter 2I outlined in a general way scientific 
and other intellectual developments in the 19th century 
that influenced the development of the new psychology. 
In this and the following chapter, I take the somewhat 
more specific approach of examining the thinking of indi- 
vidual scientists who were among those particularly 
instrumental in defining the direction that scientific 
psychology took. These chapters are neither an exhaus- 
tive nor even a completely systematic survey of such 
individuals. The individuals discussed were chosen for 
several reasons. The theme and purpose of Myers's 
psychological studies was to help and encourage the 
development of an empirical method for studying the rela- 
tionship between mind and matter, and he believed that 
the study of subconscious psychophysiological processes 
would be the most productive approach to this question. 
I have therefore chosen to examine some contemporaries of 
Myers who wrote prominent and important essays and books 
dealing with the question of the mind-matter relation- 
ship, or with subconscious phenomena -- and usually with 
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both. Because the "birth" of the new (that is, 
scientific) psychology may be dated to about the time of 
the 1855 publication of Bain's Senses and the Intellect 
and the 1860 publication of Fechner's Psychophysics, and 
because Myers went up to Cambridge as an undergraduate in 
1860 and died early in 1901, I have limited my choices to 
individuals who published much of their important work on 
these topics between about 1860 and 1900. This is not to 
say that works published prior to that period had no 
important effect on either scientific psychology or 
Myers; but by examining individuals whose major work was 
contemporaneous with Myers's adult years, I hoped to gain 
an understanding of the immediate intellectual context 
that drove him to address the problems and to develop the 
ideas that he did. Finally, since Myers himself hoped 
and believed that the most valuable aspect of his work 
would be its usefulness in promoting empirical, 
scientific research, I have examined only scientists of 
the period, and none of the many philosophers, 
theologians, and other writers who considered these ques- 
tions of mind-matter relations and subconscious 
phenomena. Nonetheless, one should always keep in mind 
that in the 19th century, the distinction between, say, a 
scientist and a philosopher -- to say nothing of a 
psychologist and a physiologist -- was often a somewhat 
arbitrary one. The most characteristic feature of 19th- 
century intellectual life was the astounding eclecticism 
of its leaders. As Boring (1950) emphasized, most people 
working and writing on psychological topics in the 19th 
century were philosophers, physiologists, and physicists, 
and many of them worked and wrote in all these areas. 
The 11 individuals discussed in this and the follow- 
ing chapter illustrate particularly well the two main 
currents of thought that I described in Chapter 2 as 
influencing the development of psychology in the 19th 
century. On the one hand, they all supported the natu- 
ralization of mind, invoking the premier scientific prin- 
ciple of continuity to establish that mind is a natural 
phenomenon to the study of which the concepts and methods 
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of science can be applied. Thus, a central theme in 
their writings was to demonstrate that mind is a function 
of the nervous system, that mind is invariably correlated 
with brain processes, and that the foundations of 
psychology lie in physiology. Closely related to this 
belief that mind and psychology should be brought within 
the domain of scientific inquiry was an intense antago- 
nism among most of these scientists to old dualistic, 
metaphysical, or religious and theological ways of defin- 
ing or studying the mind. These individuals thus con- 
tributed importantly, each in his own way, to the 
increasingly rigid dichotomization of the new scientific 
naturalism and the old metaphysical supernaturalism or 
dualism. Indeed, the more radical of them exemplified 
what was described in Chapter 2 as Houghton's first stage 
of Victorian thought: Their writings were often charac- 
terized by an intense and even acrimonious partisanship, 
which had the positive effect of launching psychology 
firmly down the scientific path, but also had the nega- 
tive effect of keeping that path a straight and narrow 
one. 
On the other hand, many of these scientists (particu- 
larly the more moderate and thoughtful of them) also 
recognized the inadequate or even paradoxical positions 
toward which an extreme naturalization of mind led, and 
so they additionally supported and contributed to the 
development of the new conceptual and methodological 
dualism that gained momentum during the late 19th 
century. As their writings illustrate, this new dualism 
particularly took the form of a positivistic, conceptual 
separation of science from metaphysics, religion, or the 
humanities; but in psychology it also increasingly took 
the form of a linguistic or methodological parallelism 
that conceptually separated physical and mental processes 
and thus allowed psychology to develop as an autonomous 
discipline with its own unique role in science, variously 
conceived as the study of behavior, experience, or 
psychophysiological, adaptive functioning. 
Having just acknowledged that disciplinary distinc- 
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tions in the 19th century were more arbitrary than they 
are now, I have nevertheless attempted to categorize the 
individuals discussed in this and the following chapter 
as psychologists or non-psychologists. In this chapter I 
discuss 6 scientists who are (and were) not considered 
primarily psychologists, but whose writings on the prob- 
lem of reconciling mind and science had a wide general 
audience in the 19th century and who thus both reflected 
and influenced general trends of thought affecting 
psychology. In Chapter 4I will discuss 5 scientists who 
have been more readily identified as psychologists and 
whose writings have thus perhaps had more immediate and 
specific impact on professional and academic 
psychologists. However, the arguably inconsistent deci- 
sion to place, say, Henry Maudsley among the non- 
psychologists and Pierre Janet among the psychologists 
only underscores a major theme raised in this thesis: 
that the problem of bringing mind, or mental processes, 
within the framework of modern science raised issues of 
central concern to all branches of science, and not just 
to the one we have rather arbitrarily defined during the 
past century as psychology. 
William Carpenter (1813-1885) 
In beginning with Carpenter -- born in 1813, the 
oldest scientist among the 11 presented here -- I begin 
with an individual who vividly personified the 
intellectual transition from the old religious world view 
to the new scientific world view that defined the 19th 
century. An influential physiologist, Carpenter was also 
a lifelong Unitarian and theist, and the fundamental 
problem he addressed throughout his career was the prob- 
lem represented by scientific psychology: the conflict 
between mechanistic determinism -- the central tenet of 
the new world view and seen as the defining character- 
istic of physical systems -- and volition -- the central 
tenet of the old world view and seen as the defining 
characteristic of mental systems. Yet, although Car- 
penter was an important pivotal figure in the history of 
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psychology, he is rarely discussed in historical studies 
of the field. His texts on comparative physiology, which 
were published in numerous editions throughout the last 
60 years of the 19th century, were an important resource 
for, and influence on, those seeking to apply the princi- 
ples of the physiological sciences to the study of mental 
functioning; but his defense of a modified form of 
Cartesian dualism bucked the contemporary trend to 
undermine and abandon the old dualism. Thus, although he 
became widely known among psychological scientists for 
his hypothesis of unconscious cerebration in particular, 
they were perhaps less willing to condone or even 
acknowledge his more general theoretical contributions to 
psychology. 
The most important key to understanding Carpenter's 
views on human mental functioning is to recognize that he 
made a careful and specific distinction between mind and 
will. Mind, for Carpenter, referred to the functioning 
of the cerebral hemispheres, that is, to the mental or 
psychological processes associated with cerebral 
activity. This cerebral activity, however, could have two 
quite different sources, or causes; as Carpenter 
expressed it, there are "two distinct agencies in the 
Mental constitution of each individual" (1874/1882,9). 
On the one hand, it may be the result of purely 
physiological, reflex processes; on the other hand, it 
may be the result of the influence of the independent, 
freely acting will. Carpenter summarized the distinction 
when he said: 
The actions of our Minds, in so far as they are 
carried on without any interference from our Will, 
may be considered as "Functions of the 
Brain".... [The Will is] a new and independent Power, 
which may either oppose or concur with the automatic 
[cerebral] tendencies.... [It is the] entity wherein 
Man's nobility essentially consists, which does not 
depend for its existence on any play of Physical or 
Vital forces, but which makes these forces sub- 
servient to its determinations. (1874/1882,27) 
Elsewhere, he asks whether the Will is "the mere 
resultant of the general (spontaneous or automatic) 
activity of the Mind, and dependent, like it, upon Physi- 
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cal antecedents? Or is it a Power... completely independ- 
ent of these conditions...? " He answers that it is the 
latter, "a self-determining power" (1874/1882,392). 
Thus, in Carpenter's system there are three elements. 
The Body, which is the instrument of the Will (1874/1882, 
120), serves "to bridge over the hiatus between the indi- 
vidual consciousness [the Will] and the External World" 
(1874/1882,1). Specifically, it is the cerebrum that 
serves as this bridge. The Will is the individual con- 
sciousness, whose defining characteristics are its con- 
scious awareness and its volition, or freedom from physi- 
cal and mental deterministic laws. The term Mind, in 
contrast, denotes cerebral functioning, which may reflect 
either the activity of the body or the activity of the 
Will. 
In one sense, therefore, Carpenter's psychology was a 
monistic one. He was explicit on the point that mind is 
the activity of the cerebral hemispheres and, as such, is 
a physiological function; he spoke of his "convic- 
tion... of the inseparable relation between Corporeal and 
Mental action" (1874/1882,352) and criticized "those 
older notions of the essential independence of Mind and 
Body, which a truly philosophical Psychology can no 
longer accept as consistent with the fundamental facts of 
our composite nature" (1874/1882,140). He insisted that 
the "vast body of Physiological evidence... proves the 
direct and immediate relation between Mental and Cor- 
poreal agency" (1874/1882, liv). Moreover, like an 
increasing number of other 19th-century scientists, he 
believed that the distinction between mind and brain was 
no more than a conceptual or linguistic one. In intro- 
ducing his doctrine of unconscious cerebration, he said 
that "it seems a matter of no practical consequence, 
whether the doctrine be stated in terms of Metaphysics or 
in terms of Physiology -- in terms of mind, or in terms 
of brain" (1874/1882,516). Elsewhere he explained that 
mind and body are "in different philosophical 
categories, " because of the difference in their proper- 
ties, but that they "are so intimately blended in their 
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actions" that they cannot be studied in isolation 
(1874/1882,2). He defined psychology, therefore, as the 
study of the relationship between mental and physiologi- 
cal processes, saying that "so long as either the Mental 
or the Bodily part of Man's nature is studied to the 
exclusion of the other,... no real progress can be made in 
Psychological Science" (1874/1882,2). 
In another sense, however, Carpenter's system of 
psychology was also a dualistic one, differing from 
traditional dualism primarily by limiting the independent 
agency to Will, or conscious volition, instead of 
attributing all mental activity to an independent agency. 
The dualism, instead of being between all physical 
processes on the one hand and all mental processes on the 
other, was between physiological automatism and will. 
Carpenter defined automatism as all bodily and mental 
activities "determinately related to... previous bodily or 
mental activities, " involving no "choice or self- 
direction on the part of the Ego" (1876/1888b, 287n). 
Will, on the other hand, was defined as the conscious, 
freely acting causal agency within each individual. The 
dualism, therefore, was essentially between those aspects 
of human nature that are subject to determinism and those 
that are free. Carpenter explained the purpose of his 
primary text on psychology, The Principles of Mental 
Physiology (1874/1882), to be the defense of two theses: 
first, that much mental activity is automatic and, as 
such, is the product of physiological processes; and sec- 
ond, that there is an "independent Power, controlling and 
directing that [mental] activity, which we call Will" 
(1874/1882, liii-liv). He thus maintained "a fundamental 
distinction" between these two types of mental activity 
(1874/1882, ix), the automatic activity being subject to 
mental laws, or "uniformities of succession, " the free 
activity being "beyond and above this automatic exercise 
of our powers" (1874/1882,250). 
Carpenter saw these views as differing radically from 
either the materialist or the spiritualist philosophies 
of the 19th century. Materialism, he pointed out, recog- 
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nizes the physiological fact demonstrating mind's depend- 
ence on body; but it denies the experience of every human 
that mind (or, as he would say, Will through the mind) 
influences the body. Modern scientific research has 
"elucidate[d] the mechanism of automatic activity, " but 
in so far as those who profess to be its expositors 
ignore the fundamental facts of consciousness on 
which Descartes himself built up his philosophical 
fabric. . . and repudiat[e] the doctrine (based on the 
universal experience of mankind) that the mental 
states which we call volitions and emotions have a 
causative relation to bodily changes, they appear to 
me to grasp only one half of the problem. 
(1876/1888b, 285-286) 
Carpenter therefore explicitly rejected the position of 
colleagues such as Huxley and Tyndall, who believed that 
mental states are only "the outcome of the 
'potentialities' of matter,... subject to physical condi- 
tions alone, " and that "Man is only a... complicated... 
automaton" (1876/1888b, 284). Spiritualism, 1 in contrast, 
recognizes that universal human experience of a "self- 
determining power" (1874/1882,5); but it gives this mind 
"a separate immaterial existence, " denying that bodily 
conditions affect it (1874/1882,7). Carpenter's system, 
however, recognized both types of agency, emphasizing the 
causal power of both the free will and the physical body. 
Carpenter's dualistic view of human mental functioning 
was a conscious attempt to resolve the conflict, so cen- 
tral in 19th-century thought, between determinism and 
free will -- between fixed and unvarying law, which was 
seen as the essence of science, and volition and individ- 
ual responsibility, seen as the foundation of religion 
and ethics (see especially 1874/1882, chapter 20). This 
attempt at reconcilement led him also to reconstruct, in 
the light of Darwin's hypothesis of natural selection, 
Paley's old doctrine that design in nature testifies to 
the existence of a designer (1884/1888). These attempts, 
however, had little impact on the direction of 19th- 
century scientific thinking, because they in fact dif- 
fered only in detail, not in essence, from the discontin- 
uous, dualistic thinking that scientists were rejecting 
in increasing numbers. The importance of Carpenter's 
96 
writings to psychology therefore lay instead in his 
approach to abnormal psychology, and specifically his 
hypothesis of subconscious mental activity, which he 
called the doctrine of "unconscious cerebration. " 
The doctrine was built on the premise that mental 
activity is, in essence, physiological, being simply the 
translation of cerebral processes into sensations, ideas, 
and emotions (1874/1882,111), and transcending 
physiological bounds only when the will interferes and 
alters the automatic, reflex behavior that would other- 
wise have occurred. Much of Carpenter's text on psychol- 
ogy (1874/1882) is devoted to describing this automatic, 
physiological nature of mental processes. In his chap- 
ters on habit and memory, for example, he claimed that 
memory is the result of physiological traces in the 
cerebrum (436) and that associations of habits of thought 
are determined by "nerve tracks laid-down" and associated 
reflex actions of the cerebrum or sensory-motor tracts of 
the brain (442). He suggested that both the estab- 
lishment and the loss of memories depends on the brain's 
"nutrition, " and he attributed temporary or partial 
memory losses to "local and transient alterations" in 
blood circulation (448). He concluded, therefore, that 
"Memory is essentially an automatic [that is, 
physiological] form of Mental activity" (465). 
Similarly, he defined common sense as, psychologi- 
cally speaking, "those original convictions or ultimate 
beliefs, which cannot be resolved into simpler elements" 
(471) but physiologically as "the automatic action of the 
brain" that results either from inherited racial habits 
(or "nerve tracks") or early and deliberate training of 
the mind/cerebrum (473). Imagination, creativity, and 
even genius are the products of "an automatic 
[physiological] operation... often carried on beneath the 
consciousness" (510); "even the highest intuitions of 
genius are the expressions of appropriate changes in the 
Brain-tissue" (644). Conversely, delirium and insanity 
are the products of pathological physiological conditions 
that result in both "a functional disturbance of the 
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Cerebrum" (660) and, especially, a "deficiency of voli- 
tional control" (658). 
Nonetheless, according to Carpenter, all mental 
processes are also subject to the overriding influence or 
control of the will. Memory is "capable of being guided 
and disciplined by the will" (466). Although the will 
cannot control genius, it can indirectly influence and 
improve it by supplying the materials, focusing atten- 
tion, and cultivating certain habits of thought (503- 
513). Even insanity, a "disordered physical action of 
the Cerebrum, " can sometimes, especially in the early 
stages, be controlled and limited by the will (673-674). 
Nevertheless, although all mental processes are subject 
to the influence and control of the conscious, volitional 
agency, they are most fundamentally physiological 
processes. 
Carpenter's dualism of Body and Will, or physiologi- 
cal deterministic causal agency and conscious, volitional 
causal agency, led directly to his doctrine of uncon- 
scious cerebration: All mental processes that are not 
caused by conscious, volitional activity can only be 
caused by the physiological reflex activity of the 
cerebrum. As Carpenter pointed out, because British 
philosophers had long equated mind with consciousness, 
there had been much controversy about the nature and even 
existence of unconscious mental processes, a concept 
which seemed to be a paradoxical juxtaposition of the 
terms "unconscious" and "mental. " Carpenter, therefore, 
proposed to resolve this paradox by changing the assump- 
tion that mind should be equated with consciousness and 
substituting instead the idea that volition be equated 
with consciousness. He thus proposed the term "uncon- 
scious cerebration" to convey the idea that unconscious 
mental processes are the automatic, physiological reflex 
actions of the cerebrum, operating in the absence of any 
activity of the will (1874/1882, chapter 13). 
Carpenter thus accounted for the wide variety of sub- 
conscious phenomena that attracted increasing attention 
during the half of the century, including hypnosis 
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(1874/1882, chapter 14), dreams and somnambulism 
(1874/1882, chapter 15), and mesmerism and the quasi- 
religion Spiritualism (1877; 1874/1882, chapter 16). All 
are explained as the suppression (by suggestion, sleep, 
or pathology) of the will and the release of the cerebrum 
to function automatically, usually under the influence of 
some dominant idea upon which the cerebral attention is 
focused. Mesmerism and hypnosis, for example, can be 
explained by the "physiological" principle that expecta- 
tion and suggestion result in a "transient condition of 
the sensorium, which... we can pretty certainly assign to 
a reduction in the supply of blood caused by a sort of 
spasmodic contraction of the blood-vessels" (1877,15), 
rendering the subject "a mere thinking automaton" 
(1874/1882,553). 
Carpenter's dualism of Body and Will also enabled him 
to explain phenomena demonstrating the influence of mind 
on body, such as the observation of "every medical man of 
large experience" that a patient's "undoubting faith" in 
the treatment can speed healing (1876/1888a, 257). For 
Carpenter, healings by faith, as well as the less common 
phenomena of stigmatization and the physical effects of 
hypnotism and somnambulism, are neither miracles nor 
fraud, but have "a definite Physiological rationale" 
(1874/1882,689): Because ideas that are not under con- 
scious control are simply cerebral states, then the 
phenomenon of a mental state producing a physical effect 
is simply the phenomenon of one physiological state 
affecting another. Stigmatization, for example, "pre- 
sents no difficulty whatever, " since bleeding "under 
strong emotional excitement... [is] a well-authenticated 
physiological fact" (1873/1888,221-222). 
Carpenter thus made two major contributions to the 
development of scientific psychology: First, in an age 
in which "scientific" (that is, physiological) accounts 
of mental functioning were gaining enormous prestige, 
Carpenter's hypothesis of unconscious cerebration to 
account for subconscious processes was readily embraced 
by many other scientists. Second, he was among the first 
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scientists, especially in Britain, to give systematic 
attention to the study of abnormal psychology. He 
described the study of abnormal mental phenomena as 
"probably the most promising field of Psychological 
inquiry" (1874/1882, liii), saying it is "absolutely 
essential to a due understanding of the relation of the 
Will to the Automatic activity of the Mind, and of both 
to the Physiological Mechanism" (1874/1882, lvii). More- 
over, because he believed that the comparison of normal 
and abnormal mental states would demonstrate the essen- 
tial dualism between automatic mental functioning and 
volitional activity, he also believed that the study of 
abnormal psychology might provide "the most satisfactory 
grounds which Science can afford" for belief in an 
"Infinite Mind and Will" (1874/1882,28). 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that Carpenter's 
contributions to scientific psychology were more negative 
than positive. First of all, Carpenter displayed a 
tendency not uncommon among 19th-century scientists heady 
with the prospect of explaining mental phenomena 
physiologically, and that was to present their specula- 
tions confidently, with little or no basis in fact, as 
likely explanations. Thus, he presented, as near-certain 
"explanations, " the nerve-pathway hypothesis of habit and 
the trace hypothesis of memory (1874/1882, Ch. 10). He 
explained the reported ability to awaken at specified 
times as "a peculiar physical receptivity for impressions 
of some particular ideas" and as an "unconscious 
chronometry... connected with the sequence of the organic 
functions" (1874/1882,582-583). Not only did he not 
present evidence for such explanations, but the explana- 
tions were also so vague as to be practically meaning- 
less. He said that mesmeric states could "pretty 
certainly" be attributed to "a reduction in the supply of 
blood caused by a sort of spasmodic contraction of the 
blood-vessels" (1877,15). He presented no evidence in 
support of this idea; but even if he had, this explana- 
tion of mesmerism failed to account for the truly impor- 
tant phenomenon -- what triggered the contraction in the 
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first place. In discussing a case of planchette writing 
in which a verified item of information, apparently 
unknown to the sitters, was given, Carpenter concluded 
that "the rational explanation of this obviously [my 
italics] is, that the writing was guided by the cerebral 
memory (so to speak), instead of by the conscious memory" 
(1877,143). In this case, the assertion that the event 
was the result of a physiological cerebral reflex rested 
on the equally undemonstrated assumption that the sitters 
had in fact once known, but subsequently forgotten, the 
information. In short, for certain phenomena Carpenter 
preferred a rational explanation rather than an empirical 
explanation. 
Perhaps more misleading than presenting groundless 
speculations as probable was his offering rudimentary or 
incomplete explanations as authoritative. For example, 
he, like many 19th-century psychologists, accepted the 
phenomenon of suggestion as the explanation for mes- 
merism, hypnotism, and spiritualism, even though (as 
Myers frequently pointed out) they had merely substituted 
one unknown for another, since the mechanism behind sug- 
gestion was itself completely unknown. Even Carpenter's 
own hypothesis of unconscious cerebration, in which he 
attributed all subconscious phenomena to cerebral 
reflexes, was based on a very shaky foundation: Not only 
did he offer no evidence that such physiological reflexes 
had ever been detected, but his speculations were based 
on a severely limited range of observations. As Myers 
complained, Carpenter (and others) "stop their discus- 
sions, intentionally and avowedly, upon the threshold of 
our present subject [subconscious phenomena]" (Myers, 
1885b, 61), primarily because they thought it adequate to 
deal only with the simplest cases or with the most 
blatant cases of fraud or self-deception, and altogether 
ignored conflicting, more puzzling, or more complicated 
cases. 
Carpenter's contributions to the development of 
psychology were also impaired because he held, and 
encouraged, the belief in complete scientific objectivity 
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that was prevalent during much of the 19th century. As 
Carpenter put it, "the rate of its [science's] progress 
has been in great degree commensurate with the degree of 
freedom from any kind of prepossession" of scientists 
(1876/1888a, 239). This belief prevented him from con- 
sidering the possibility that the assumptions or presup- 
positions of modern scientists (their "common sense, " as 
he put it) might not be infallible. This was particu- 
larly apparent in Carpenter's writings "On the Fallacies 
of Testimony in Relation to the Supernatural, " by which 
he meant testimony relating primarily to mesmerism and 
Spiritualism (1876/1888a; 1877). Carpenter's argument 
was that anyone who could be considered a "believer" in 
the phenomena was, ipso facto, disqualified as a com- 
petent witness or investigator, since he or she was 
"prepossessed" by this dominant idea, or belief. Con- 
versely, only those whom Carpenter called "sceptics" were 
qualified to judge, since they were not "prepossessed" by 
that dominant idea. Carpenter explained that "mental 
prepossessions ... produce sensations having no objective 
reality.... I refer to the sensations produced by mental 
expectancy, a most fertile source of self-deception" 
(1876/1888a, 244). According to him, the physiological 
mechanism behind hallucinatory perceptions was that 
"changes in the cerebrum [produced by the expectant 
idea]... act downwards upon the sensorium at its base, in 
the same manner as changes in the organs of sense 
[produced by actual physical stimuli] act upwards upon 
it" (1876/1888,245); "thus it becomes obvious that the 
testimony of a single cool-headed sceptic... should be 
accepted as more trustworthy than that of any number of 
believers, who have, as it were, created the sensorial 
result by their anticipation of it" (1877,41). 
Carpenter was, quite rightly, writing to educate the 
general public and to discourage their facile and naive 
acceptance of unusual phenomena at face value. But the 
dismissal of observations could all too easily expand to 
include not only those of the naive observer, but also 
those of any observer whose ideas differed from Car- 
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penter's. In contrasting those who are "led by their 
'prepossessions "' and those who are led by "the guidance 
of trained and organized common sense" (1876/1888,249), 
Carpenter cited William Crookes as an example of the 
first group, and himself as an example of the second. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Crookes had as much right 
as Carpenter to consider himself trained in "those 
scientific habits of thought" (1877,60), Carpenter dis- 
missed Crookes's claims as "evidence of the degree in 
which certain minds are led by the influence of strong 
'prepossession, ' to believe in the creations of their own 
visual imagination" (1876/1888a, 247). Conversely, Car- 
penter declared himself free not only from prepossession 
in favor of the phenomena in question, but also from any 
"scientific 'prepossession' against miracles, as would 
prevent me from accepting them as facts, " given the 
appropriate evidence (1867/1888a, 241). 
Carpenter apparently, however, did not recognize that 
his cautionary remarks about "prepossessions" might be a 
double-edged weapon. According to Carpenter, Crookes was 
disqualified as an observer by his "prepossessions, " 
whereas Carpenter could be relied on as a competent 
observer because he was led by "the general experience of 
intelligent men, embodied in what we term 'educated com- 
mon sense"' (1877,57). Carpenter, however, never 
explained why the assumptions associated with "educated 
common sense" should not themselves be considered 
"dominant ideas" that influenced or even distorted one's 
perceptions -- why Carpenter and other "cool-headed scep- 
tics" guided by "educated common sense" should be exempt 
from "mental expectancy, " that "most fertile source of 
self-deception" (1876/1888a, 244), or from supplementing 
their actual observations with what "must have happened" 
(1874/1882,628). Elsewhere, Carpenter himself had cau- 
tioned the reader to be wary of relying too heavily on 
common sense and "to beware of excluding all experience 
save their own, " lest one become "too prone to deny the 
reality of those [experiences] in which he does not him- 
self share.... [W]hat we now regard as 'necessary truths' 
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may require modification in the future" (1874/1882,405, 
409). 
Carpenter's proneness to apply double standards when 
judging what was "objective" science and what was not 
weakened another, related argument as well. Carpenter 
based his conviction that human beings have an independ- 
ent will, free from the bondage of deterministic laws, 
entirely on the direct subjective experience of each per- 
son that he or she is such a free agent -- that is, on 
"our own consciousness of the possession of a self- 
determining power" (1874/1882,392). Yet Carpenter him- 
self had said that "there is often a contrariety between 
our beliefs as to our own states of mind, and the facts 
of that state" (1874/1882,299). He was here referring 
to beliefs based on sensory experiences, and he con- 
sidered "the direct testimony of consciousness" to be 
exempt from such "contrariety" (1876/1888b, 289). But 
Carpenter might have been better advised to apply his own 
words of caution to his reliance on the "commonsense" 
belief in free will. Numerous experiments during the 
19th century demonstrated that post-hypnotic subjects 
could carry out actions that they believed themselves to 
have chosen freely, when in fact the action had earlier 
been suggested to them while they were hypnotized; such 
experiments suggested that even the "direct testimony of 
consciousness" might be as unreliable as sensory experi- 
ences. 
In short, Carpenter's writings on psychology suggest 
that his views on mind were based more on his assumptions 
than on observations --particularly his assumption that 
"educated common sense" could be relied upon to be 
generally "free from any prepossession" and thus adequate 
to judge what is or is not possible. As Carpenter him- 
self expressed it, "we should rather trust to the evi- 
dence of our sense, than to that of our senses" (1877, 
113). The prevailing effect of this tendency to invoke 
"common sense" as the authoritative arbiter on longstand- 
ing and complicated question was to discourage further 
inquiry into problems, such as those of the nature and 
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extent of volition or consciousness, that might be more 
complicated than "common sense" now assumed. For a field 
such as scientific psychology, and especially abnormal 
psychology, that had just entered its infancy, such dis- 
couragement amounted to strangling the baby in its crib. 
Henry Maudsley (1835-1918) 
In distinct contrast to Carpenter's modified dualism 
were the psychological theories of another prominent 
19th-century physiologist and physician, Henry Maudsley. 
For many people in the 19th century, Maudsley's name 
became almost synonymous with the rather rigid and narrow 
materialistic philosophy that (perhaps, at first, neces- 
sarily) characterized the thinking of so many of the 
early proponents of a physiological psychology. Myers, 
for example, confided to a friend 
that the kind of adversary present to my mind is a 
man like Dr. Maudsley; -- a man for whose private 
character I can well believe that I should feel much 
respect, but who represents a school of 
thought... [of] men whose minds associate religion 
and the mad house, psychology and the vivisection- 
table, Love and the Strand. (August 28,1883 letter 
to J. A. Symonds) 
Maudsley approached psychiatry -- and by extension 
psychology -- primarily from the perspective of the 
biological sciences rather than clinical observation and 
philosophy, and his Physiology and Pathology of Mind 
became "a turning point in English psychiatry" (Lewis, 
1951,269). But like many of the early proponents of a 
naturalistic psychology, he had little tolerance for what 
he considered the old ways of thinking about mind. 
The principle of continuity, so important in much of 
19th-century scientific thinking, was the central point 
from which all of Maudsley's beliefs about mind and 
psychology developed; and the converse side of that focal 
point was his intense anti-dualism. His primary purpose 
was to repudiate the old theological ideas of mind as a 
non-physical entity working through the body, and the 
accompanying disdain for the body, primarily because he 
could find no demarcation line separating a purely 
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material living system from a supposedly dualistic one: 
Trace the gradual development of the nervous system 
through the animal series,... and let it be declared 
at what point it suddenly... becomes the mere 
mechanical instrument of a spiritual 
entity... [where] does the immaterial principle 
abruptly intervene and supersede the agency of mat- 
ter, becoming the entirely distinct cause of a 
similar, though more exalted, order of mental 
phenomena? (1873/1886,263) 
Like so many of the early psychologists, therefore, 
Maudsley established an inflexible dichotomy between 
scientific, physiological psychology and metaphysical 
dualism, believing that the two could never co-exist and 
that the former would only be triumphant when the latter 
had been destroyed; and he became so militant in his 
attempt to aid in this destruction "that he wrote 
intemperately, " with "diatribes" and "vehement 
assertion[s]" (Lewis, 1951,270). He pronounced dualism 
to be a position held by "metaphysicians, religious 
ascetics, and maniacs" (1873/1886,13); and he firmly 
closed the door on any attempts to reconcile science and 
religion by proclaiming that "the union of philosophical 
inquiry [that is, empirical science] and religious faith 
is not a natural union" and that its products are like 
those of other "unnatural unions" -- "sterile" at best, 
"monstrous" at worst (1873/1886,275). 
Maudsley's definition of materialists is a succinct 
statement of his own belief about the nature of mind: 
They are "those who maintain that mind is an outcome and 
function of matter in a certain state of organization" 
(1879,667). More specifically, as early as his first 
published paper he explained that "man's consciousness 
and moral nature and all his other psychological 
attributes are closely dependent on the physical struc- 
ture of his brain" (Lewis, 1951,264 [quoting Maudsley in 
Journal of Mental Science, l85ß0. Accordingly, Maudsley 
believed that psychology and physiology are not separate 
sciences but jointly pursue the study of the physiology 
of the nervous system, and he argued that all forms of 
mental activity, from the most primitive instincts and 
automatic reflex actions to the highest forms of human 
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intellect, emotion, or volition, are the increasingly 
complex products of the evolution of the nervous system. 
Memory, for example, he described as being "the organic 
registration of the effects of impressions" (1873/1886, 
25). Moreover, although memory is often considered a 
defining feature of mind, the essence of personal 
identity, and a phenomenon beyond physical explanation, 
it is in fact, he pointed out, a characteristic of all 
organic matter, down to individual nerve-cells, which 
display in their actions a capacity for learning and 
repetition (1873/1886,25). Even volition, for Carpenter 
the one aspect of human personality exempt from 
deterministic physical laws, is for Maudsley "a 
physiological function of the supreme [cerebral] 
centres, " operating in accordance with "the fundamental 
property of organic structure to seek what is beneficial 
and shun what is hurtful to it" (1873/1886,27). 
Maudsley also frequently cited data showing, he 
believed, a correlation between brain size and 
intellectual or moral development. As a physician and 
psychiatrist, however, he was particularly concerned with 
mental health. Believing that insanity and other mental 
disorders were entirely diseases of the nervous system, 
he argued that the observation and classification of them 
should be conducted by "the same pathological principles 
as other diseases, " not by "exclusively psychological" 
principles (1873/1886,92). Even where no structural 
defect was apparent, he warned that the physician should 
not conclude that there is no physiological cause, since 
there is as yet so little knowledge about molecular or 
chemical processes in the nervous system, or about struc- 
tural features too minute to be presently detectable. 
A favorite theme, however, was the inheritance of 
mental and moral capacities and, especially, deficits. 
Each improvement or decline in human insight, intellect, 
wisdom, or feeling "has tended to determine by degrees a 
corresponding structural change of the brain, which has 
been transmitted as an innate endowment to succeeding 
generations, just as the acquired habit of a parent 
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animal becomes the instinct of its offspring" (1879, 
677). For instance, as one example of inherited 
insanity, Maudsley published a paper demonstrating what 
he considered the insanity of the 18th-century scientist 
and seer Swedenborg, who had, according to Maudsley, 
inherited the tendency toward insanity from his father 
(1873/1886,163-217). Similarly, morality -- the prod- 
uct, he said, of biological factors promoting actions 
helpful to the race and suppressing those that are harm- 
ful -- is an inherited physiological characteristic, and 
so Maudsley cautioned that if a person "does not ever 
exercise the nervous substrata which minister to moral 
functions,... they undergo atrophy in him, and he runs the 
risk of transmitting them to his progeny in so imperfect 
a state that they are incapable of full development" 
(1879,679). 
Maudsley's views on the physiological inheritance of 
morality and intellect found perhaps their most extreme 
expression in his remarks about the primitive peoples of 
the world. He explained, for example, that the 
native Australian, who is one of the lowest existing 
savages, has no words in his language to express 
such exalted ideas as justice, love, virtue, mercy; 
he has no such ideas in his mind, and cannot com- 
prehend them. The vesicular neurine which should 
embody them in its constitution and manifest them in 
its function has not been developed in his convolu- 
tions; he is as incapable therefore of the higher 
mental displays of abstract reasoning and moral 
feeling as an idiot is, and for a like reason. 
(1873/1886,54) 
Elsewhere he spoke at length about the intellectual, 
moral, and emotional inferiority of primitive peoples, 
noting, for example, that "many savages cannot count 
beyond five" and that "many savages regard as virtues 
most of the big vices and crimes.... Their moral feeling, 
such as it is, is extremely circumscribed, being limited 
in application to the tribe" (1879,675-676). He also 
added that no amount of education or training would erase 
the physiological differences. Even if a primitive child 
and a European child were to receive similar educations, 
the former would remain inferior to the latter because of 
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their inherited biological endowments. 
Because of his views on the physiological nature and 
the inheritance of mental characteristics, unconscious 
phenomena had a prominent role in his theories of mind as 
the predecessor of consciousness in the evolution of the 
nervous system. Maudsley outlined two "propositions" 
defining the nature of unconscious phenomena. First, 
they were physiological reflexes that could completely 
resemble acts involving consciousness and will, when in 
fact they lacked any conscious or volitional element 
(1873/1886,17). Second, they could be actions or behav- 
ior that had originally been initiated and controlled by 
conscious volition, but that, with practice or repeti- 
tion, had become unconscious and automatic (1873/1886, 
19). The mind was thus a hierarchy of physiological 
functions in which unconscious phenomena, the older and 
more fundamental of mental phenomena, formed the bulk of 
mental activity. Consciousness, therefore, was not only 
not the primary or even defining characteristic of mind, 
but it was a late-appearing and "'incidental accompani- 
ment of mind. ' If we were not conscious, nothing would 
be changed in our life, except that we would not know 
that we exist" (Ellenberger, 1957,11). 
Maudsley regularly described his approach to psychol- 
ogy as positivistic and agnostic. He refused to specu- 
late about "which is the true doctrine" of the nature of 
mind (1879,667), since this "is a question which science 
cannot touch" (1873/1886,13). Nonetheless, his writings 
are largely a defense of the scientific and ethical 
merits of materialism, which, he complained, has been 
"hated... because misunderstood" (1879,672). His self- 
proclaimed agnosticism, like that of many 19th-century 
scientists, was really a disingenuous attempt to disguise 
his metaphysics with the cloak of scientific objectivity, 
an attempt which did not, however, fool all observers: 
Formally to abjure all metaphysics, and then really 
to admit no end of doubtful metaphysics of physics 
-- as Mr. Huxley and Dr. Maudsley, and so many 
others are constantly doing -- is scarcely con- 
sistent with adherence to the principles of pure 
science" (Ladd, 1892,52). 
109 
Maudsley and most other 19th-century scientists had 
rejected metaphysics as a method for arriving at knowl- 
edge; but many of them then found themselves in the 
dilemma of being unable to allow metaphysics any place 
within the scientific framework but also unable to dis- 
pense with metaphysics entirely. As Lewis (1951,267) 
pointed out, Maudsley "denounced introspection and 
metaphysics, yet he constantly returned to the metaphysi- 
cal problem of the mind-body relationship, which fas- 
cinated him. " 
The weaknesses of some of his thinking were the 
direct result of his inability to recogize and acknowl- 
edge the effects of his metaphysical beliefs on his 
scientific work. His writings were filled, for example, 
with much "brain mythology" (Lewis, 1951,272), that is, 
assertions that he represented as facts, but that were 
really speculations ranging far beyond known facts. Con- 
versely, his assumptions may occasionally have prevented 
him from becoming as aware as he should have been of 
research findings contradicting his beliefs. Myers, for 
example, pointed to Maudsley as an example of "the danger 
of confident negations. " Maudsley had proclaimed that, 
contrary to the claims of "quasi-scientific authors" 
(Maudsley's words), there was no evidence that intense 
ideas can produce stigmata-like bleeding. Myers then 
referred to recent relevant experiments of the French 
scientists Beaunis, Bourru, and Burot, and asked whether 
Maudsley had intended to label such scientists "quasi- 
scientific" or whether he had simply written in "mere 
ignorance of the facts, " that is, without being aware of 
their experiments. (Myers, 1886e, 169n-170n). Either 
reason, Myers implied, was indefensible. 
More generally, and perhaps more importantly for the 
development of psychology, Maudsley urged scientists to 
"apply themselves diligently to discover... how much mat- 
ter can do without spiritual help" (1873/1886, vi), 
apparently not recognizing (or ignoring) that he was beg- 
ging the major question: Is matter the primary factor, 
able to do without "spiritual help, " whereas "spirit, " or 
110 
mind, is a secondary phenomenon? Or are they in some 
sense co-existing and equal factors? 
Such weaknesses, and indeed the narrow rigidity that 
characterized Maudsley's thinking, was most fundamentally 
the result of his inability to entertain the idea that 
there could be any alternative to a strict scientific 
materialism except the old spiritualistic, theological 
thinking that had long resisted and contradicted 
scientific findings. For him, therefore, as for many of 
his contemporaries, the issue was not one of bringing 
scientific findings to bear on metaphysical questions, 
but of vanquishing and replacing metaphysics with 
science. Such rigid dichotomizing, unfortunately, was 
not conducive to the development of the new concepts, 
methods, or approaches that a science as problematic as 
psychology so badly needed. 
Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895) 
For over a century Huxley has for many people been 
the personification of the so-called science-religion 
conflict, the public defender of Darwin, and the spokes- 
man for the new secular world view against the 
increasingly defensive and rapidly retreating old 
theological guard (Irvine, 1955). His success, and that 
of colleagues such as Maudsley, in replacing the church 
with the laboratory as the source of human knowledge, was 
the result in large part of his (and their) ability to 
define and maintain an apparently clearcut dichotomy 
between truth and error. Huxley urged his readers and 
listeners to adopt, as twin guideposts for determining 
what lies within the boundaries of knowledge, first the 
positivistic principle that the empirical scientific 
method is the only means of producing knowledge, and, 
second, the agnostic principle that there can be no 
knowledge about matters for which there is, or can be, no 
empirical evidence. Because the conflict between science 
and religion is essentially on the issue of the nature of 
human beings and their place in the universe, Huxley, 
although a biologist by profession, focused much of his 
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attention and his writings on the implications of modern 
science for psychology and an understanding of mind. 
Unfortunately, although he showed much zeal in promoting 
the distinction between empirical science and author- 
itative theology, he was not so zealous in maintaining 
the distinction between scientific method and scientific 
dogma -- that is, between, on the one hand, the method of 
empirical observation characteristic of science in gen- 
eral and, on the other hand, the assumptions and opinions 
about the nature of the universe currently prevailing 
among scientists. 
Huxley's goal was straightforward, and that was to 
replace the supernatural view of the world with the natu- 
ral one. He introduced his Essays Upon Some Controverted 
questions (1892) with the observation that all the essays 
dealt with this problem of the conflict between Natu- 
ralism, which views the world as a unified entity subject 
to order, regularity, and unvarying laws of operation, 
and Supernaturalism, which cuts "the Universe into two 
halves" (1892,35n), one subject to order and law, the 
other capricious, free, and capable of introducing 
irregularity or disorder into the first. A major task 
for Huxley, therefore, was to destroy, by attacking its 
many weak points, ecclesiastical authority and its 
pretensions to knowledge. In many of these essays, he 
contrasted Biblical claims and scientific findings, and 
showed the former to be seriously defective as matters of 
knowledge. Moreover, he insisted that the choice between 
ecclesiastical and scientific authority was between Faith 
and Truth. Using Newman as an example, Huxley said that 
"for him, the attainment of faith, not the ascertainment 
of truth, is the highest aim of mental life"; and he 
quoted another cleric as saying that "Faith... is the 
power of saying you believe things which are incredible" 
(1889b, 939). For Huxley, "faith, in this sense, is an 
abomination, " and he concluded that the conflict between 
science and religion "is even more moral than 
intellectual" (1889b, 939) and that "in the matter of 
intellectual veracity science is already a long way ahead 
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of the Churches" (1887/1892a, 312). 
This overriding concern for intellectual veracity and 
truth -- even painful truth -- led him to insist on 
nothing but the scientific method and reason as the tools 
for attaining knowledge: 
My conviction [is] that there is only one method by 
which intellectual truth can be reached, whether the 
subject-matter of investigation belongs to the world 
of physics or to the world of consciousness.... 
[I]nductive evidence... [is] the one and indivisible 
mode of ascertaining truth by the use of reason. 
(1886/1892,217) 
Huxley's greatest contribution, however, was probably his 
insistence on the obverse of this positivistic principle, 
and that was the principle "that it is wrong for a man to 
say that he is certain of the objective truth of any 
proposition unless he can produce evidence which logi- 
cally justifies that certainty, " a principle that Huxley 
labelled "Agnosticism" (1889b, 937-938). It was with 
this point that Huxley most frequently hammered 
Christianity, describing ecclesiasticism as "the 
championship of a foregone conclusion as to the truth of 
a particular form of Theology... whatever the results of a 
strict scientific investigation of the evidence of these 
propositions" (1889b, 939). 
A corollary of both positivism and agnosticism, and 
another theme Huxley re-iterated frequently, was the 
limits of science (and, hence, of human knowledge). 
Affirming the point made by Descartes and Berkeley that 
we can only know what the nervous system has translated 
into our own conscious experience, Huxley argued that we 
can thus never know the true nature of either matter or 
mind, that we can never answer such questions as the 
existence of God or immortality, and that the centuries 
spent debating such questions have been fruitless (e. g., 
1889b, 938). He thus praised Hume and Kant, who saw the 
distinction between phenomena, which we can know, and 
noumena, which we cannot; and he was unceasingly critical 
of those who "were -ists of one sort or another" and 
"were quite sure they had attained a certain 'gnosis, ' -- 
had, more or less successfully, solved the problem of 
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existence" (1889a, 183). 
Nonetheless, Huxley did believe that as a scientist 
he himself had attained a certain degree of "gnosis" -- 
not about the "problem of existence" but about a funda- 
mental attribute of the universe. He expressed his 
belief in "the universality of the law of causation" and 
his "disbelief in spontaneity... [that is, ] uncaused 
action" (1886/1892,230,229): 
The fundamental axiom of scientific thought is that 
there is not, never has been, and never will be, any 
disorder in nature. The admission of the occurrence 
of any event which was not the logical consequence 
of the immediately antecedent events, according to 
these definite, ascertained, or unascertained rules 
which we call the "laws of nature, " would be an act 
of self-destruction on the part of science. 
(1887/1892c, 247) 
By extension, if anything appears to be a violation of 
that order -- "catastrophic" or capricious -- this is 
evidence not of disorder in nature but of disorder, or 
incompleteness, in our understanding of natural law. 
Huxley corrected the misconception of scientific laws as 
reified entities or causal mechanisms compelling com- 
pliance. They are, instead, simply statements or con- 
cepts describing observed regularities in the facts of 
nature and predictions of future events based on those 
past regularities (1887/1892a, 304). As such, they have 
"no more existence outside the mind than colour has" 
(1887/1892c, 252-253). Consequently, Huxley claimed, he 
had no "a priori objections" to so-called "miracles" and 
would "accept them and... amend our expression of the laws 
of nature" accordingly, provided the evidence for them 
was good enough (1887/1892c, 257). 
In sum, Huxley's primary tenet was faith in the con- 
tinuity and regularity of nature, which he defined as 
"the totality of that which is. The world of psychical 
phenomena appears to me to be as much part of 'Nature' as 
the world of physical phenomena" (1892,35n). He 
admitted, however, that, though both classes of phenomena 
are a part of nature, the relationship between them is 
unknown. The two classes "run, not in one series, but 
along two parallel lines, " and "though there is a most 
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intimate relation and interconnection between the two, 
the bridge from one to the other has yet to be found" 
(1887/1892c, 240). Specifically, it is the causal rela- 
tionship between the classes of phenomena that remains in 
question: "The ultimate form of the problem is this: 
Have we any reason to believe that a feeling, or state of 
consciousness, is capable of directly affecting the 
motion of even the smallest conceivable molecule of mat- 
ter? " (1887/1892b, 292). 
It is at this point -- on the major psychological 
question of volition and the causal relationship between 
mental and physical phenomena -- that Huxley crossed the 
border of agnosticism. Although he repeatedly denied the 
chorus of charges that he was a materialist, reminding 
his readers of the agnostic position that "we can have no 
knowledge of the nature of either matter or spirit" 
(1870,144), his belief in determinism nonetheless con- 
flicted with his agnosticism and led him to adopt, in no 
uncertain terms, the belief that matter is the primary, 
independent factor in the universe and mind a secondary, 
dependent one. This essential relationship, in Huxley's 
view, holds regardless of whether one denies the causal 
efficacy of volition -- in which case mind is simply a 
"sign, " or epiphenomenon, of the material events -- or 
whether one admits the causal efficacy of mind -- in 
which case mind is a property of matter, "undistinguish- 
able from material things" (1887/1892b, 293). As Huxley 
himself summarized his position, "I have frequently 
expressed my incapacity to understand the nature of the 
relation between consciousness and a certain anatomical 
tissue..., [but] so far as observation and experiment go, 
they teach us that the psychical phenomena are dependent 
on the physical" (1892,43). In the same breath, he 
expressed both an inability to understand the nature of 
the mind-matter relationship and a fundamental conclusion 
about its nature. Huxley was agnostic, therefore, not 
concerning the nature of the relationship of mind and 
matter -- he was convinced that mind is ultimately 
dependent on (because derived from) matter -- but only 
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concerning the specific nature of that dependence. For 
Huxley, in short, as for many other 19th-century 
scientists, the exact nature of the dependence of psychi- 
cal processes on physical ones was an open -- though 
unresolvable -- question; but the general dependence of 
mind on matter was a resolved -- and thus closed -- ques- 
tion. 
Huxley's belief about the relationship between mind 
and matter had two major components. The first was that 
the phenomena of consciousness are "called into exist- 
ence" by physical processes. Specifically, they are a 
function of brain, in the sense that they are an "effect, 
or series of effects, which results from the activity of 
an organ" (1886/1892,213,225). He insisted that "we 
have as much reason for regarding... the nervous system as 
the cause of the state of consciousness as we have for 
regarding any event as the cause of another, " cause being 
simply a statement about the orderly sequence of events, 
and mental events always being "the consequent of physi- 
cal antecedents" (1874,574-575,558). In this connec- 
tion, Huxley endorsed what we now call "systems theory, " 
the idea that a complex arrangement of elements can 
exhibit properties that were not found in any of the con- 
stituent elements. Life, for Huxley, as well as mind, 
are such properties, arising from particular arrangements 
of non-living chemical elements (1870,136-137). 
The second component of Huxley's belief was that, 
even though physical events "give rise to" mental events, 
the reverse is not true. He claimed to see "no such evi- 
dence" that mental states can cause molecular changes, 
and he supported this conclusion by describing experi- 
mental and clinical evidence that purposeful activity, 
which we have in the past attributed to the conscious, 
volitional agency we call mind, can occur in the 
demonstrable absence of consciousness. He cited, for 
example, experiments with frogs, as well as Dr. Mesnet's 
case of a brain-injured soldier, as evidence that animals 
as well as humans can function "quite as well without 
consciousness, and consequently without volition, as with 
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it" (1874,575). 
Nevertheless, it becomes clear that his conclusion is 
not based so much on these few observations as it is on 
his beliefs and assumptions about the nature of mind -- 
beliefs belying his claim to be agnostic about the nature 
of mind. All events, Huxley believed, mental as well as 
physical, are part of a deterministic chain in which one 
event is the direct antecedent of, and gives rise to, the 
next event; but "volitions do not enter into the chain of 
causation... at all" (1874,576). The explanation of this 
is that, as Huxley reminded us, we do not apprehend the 
physical world directly, but only indirectly, in that the 
nervous system translates the physical world into our 
conscious perception of it. Thus, mind and mental events 
are not entities, existing in that world and having some 
interaction with or effect on that world; they are only 
the nervous system's translations, or representations, of 
events occurring in the physical world independently of 
the associated mental events: 
Our mental conditions are simply the symbols in con- 
sciousness of the [physical] changes which take 
place automatically in the organism.... [T]he feeling 
we call volition is not the cause of a voluntary 
act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which 
is the immediate cause of that act. We are con- 
scious automata. (1874,577) 
We are, in other words, deterministic chains of physical 
events that, because of their complexity, have produced 
the property of being conscious of some of those physical 
events. 
As I said earlier, Huxley was adamant in denying that 
he was a materialist; but readers could perhaps be for- 
given for replying that in denying that this label 
applied to his ideas, Huxley was playing word games. He 
defined materialism as the belief "that there is nothing 
in the universe but matter and force; and that all the 
phenomena of nature are explicable by deduction from the 
properties assignable to these two primitive forces" 
(1886/1892,220). He dismissed this belief as a "grave 
philosophical error" and "as utterly devoid of justifi- 
cation as the most baseless of theological dogmas" (1870, 
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139,144); and he insisted that there were no grounds for 
calling him a materialist, since he admitted conscious- 
ness as very much a part of the natural order which, 
though connected with physical phenomena in some 
mysterious way, could not be equated with or reduced to 
physical phenomena or even deduced from the properties of 
those physical phenomena (1886/1892,221). The phenomena 
of consciousness, in other words, were representations of 
physical phenomena, but they were not in any sense the 
physical phenomena themselves. Huxley thus insisted that 
"I see nothing materialistic in the phraseology which I 
have employed" (1886/1892,227). Many other people, 
however, did. Huxley had limited his definition to a 
very specific form of materialism; for others, in con- 
trast, materialism should be defined in the more general 
way that Maudsley had defined it, as the belief that 
"mind is an outcome and function of matter in a certain 
state of organization" (Maudsley, 1879,667). Regardless 
of the label attached to it, Huxley's position was 
unquestionably that of assuming matter to be the primary 
variable and mind to be the secondary, dependent one. 
Huxley's positivism and agnosticism did not prevent 
him from allowing his beliefs about the nature of mind to 
take precedence over the observational methods of science 
in which he claimed his sole allegiance lay. He ignored, 
for example, the not insignificant amount of evidence 
that was then accumulating and suggesting that hypnotic 
and hysterical subjects could produce physiological 
changes in their own bodies, frequently on demand. 
Instead, Huxley limited his observations on subconscious 
phenomena to cases in which nervous system damage was 
clearly involved (e. g., Huxley, 1874), and he then abused 
the inductive method by drawing the illogical conclusion 
that, because some apparently purposeful movements can 
occur in the absence of consciousness, then mental 
phenomena always simply accompany, but never give rise 
to, physical phenomena. This facile dismissal of the 
apparent efficacy of volitional or ideational states as 
illusory was, however, an avoidance of and not a solution 
118 
to the problem of how changes in mental state result in 
changes in physiological processes. Whether the event in 
question is ordinary intentional behavior or the rare and 
dramatic hypnotic production of a blister, the assumption 
that a mental process is a derivative of brain or other 
physical processes forecloses any consideration of 
psychology's fundamental problem of whether mind is a 
product or a principle of nature. 
In sum, because of Huxley's rigid distinction between 
deterministic, scientific naturalism and indeterministic, 
dualistic supernaturalism, there was no room in his 
system for volition, mental efficacy, or any phenomena 
calling into question the adequacy of the natu- 
ral/supernatural dichotomy as he conceived it. In his 
single-minded determination to obliterate the errors of 
the old system of thought, he built a new system based 
more on his assumptions about the nature of mind as a 
derivative epiphenomenon than on observations of 
phenomena relevant to the problem of the nature of mind. 
Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) 
Haeckel was a biologist who, early in his career, was 
profoundly influenced by Darwin and thus became the first 
German biologist to recognize the importance of Darwin's 
work to biology and to incorporate it into his own work. 
Although he was well known and respected among scientists 
for his research and theoretical ideas in biology, it was 
as a proponent of Darwinism in Germany and one who 
applied Darwinism to broader questions of philosophy and 
religion, that he became more generally known. He "was 
an extreme champion of evolutionary theory. He was an 
excellent artist, whose imagination was prone to rule his 
pen and brush. For more than a generation he purveyed a 
crude philosophy. which grew into something resembling a 
religion" (Singer, 1959,475). Huxley and most other 
contemporary scientists maintained at least some degree 
of agnosticism, or humility, in the face of such 
momentous questions as the ultimate nature of the mind- 
matter relationship, God, and immortality. Haeckel had 
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no reservations about offering answers to such questions. 
Nonetheless, as Haeckel himself claimed (1894, vii, 60), 
a majority of late 19th-century scientists probably held 
the same fundamental views that he expressed, even if few 
were willing to state the implications of those views as 
openly, unhesitatingly, or brazenly as Haeckel did. 
The essence of Haeckel's philosophy was summed up in 
the title (and contents) of his book Monism (1894). In 
it he expressed the basic view, held by Huxley and all 
others who called themselves scientific naturalists, of 
nature as a unity, of the continuity of inorganic and 
organic phenomena, of "the indissoluble connection 
between energy and matter, between mind and embodi- 
ment..., between God and the world" (1894,4-5). Con- 
versely, his position was thus also one of intense anti- 
dualism, or opposition to the old religious view that 
contrasts natural and spiritual, a created world and a 
creator God, or a material, inert body and an immaterial, 
activating soul. Haeckel's goal, therefore, was to end 
"the antithesis so needlessly maintained" between science 
and religion (1894, vii), by showing the basic unity, 
continuity, and evolutionary development of all phenomena 
once considered irreconcilably different. 
Haeckel's system derived from the basic premise that 
atoms -- which he and most other 19th-century scientists 
considered the elementary building blocks from which all 
matter, organic and inorganic, is composed -- are not 
"dead" but are "animated, " in that an inherent aspect of 
their nature is movement, or energy. As "living 
elementary particles endowed with the power of attraction 
and repulsion" (1894,19), they form the basis from which 
all phenomena, physical and psychical, have evolved. He 
cited the laws of the conservation of energy and of mat- 
ter as proof of the unity of nature, and he generalized 
these to the law of the conservation of substance, which 
summarized the fundamental principle of monism that 
"energy and matter are inseparable, being only different 
inalienable manifestations of one single universal being 
-- substance" (1894,17-18). 
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Haeckel began by denying any demarcation between 
inorganic and organic substances. Organic material -- or 
life -- is simply the result of the combination of carbon 
and its properties into complex compounds. Similarly, he 
denied any demarcation between the matter and the mind of 
organic, living substances, mind being simply a complex 
form evolved from the basic elementary energy processes 
of individual atoms, or cells. Psychology, therefore, is 
not, "as hitherto, idle speculation about an independent 
immaterial soul-existence and its puzzling temporary con- 
nection with the animal body" (1894,42). Just as atoms 
have combined to evolve from inorganic substances, to 
one-celled organic substances, and finally to the most 
complex animal life, the energy inherent in each single 
atom has combined to evolve from inorganic attraction and 
repulsion, to simple irritability, to the most complex 
and specialized brain activity, consciousness. There- 
fore, just as biology is a specialized branch of physics 
and chemistry, psychology is a specialized branch of 
physiology, studying the functions and activities of 
organisms. Consciousness and the soul, accordingly, are 
not "incomprehensible" or beyond human understanding, but 
are simply the aggregate of the energy or functions of 
the body's constituent cells. In Haeckel's words, con- 
sciousness "is a mechanical work of the ganglion-cells, " 
and "the soul a sum of plasma-movements in the ganglion- 
cells" (1894,47,113). 
For Haeckel, cosmology was as straightforward and 
simple a matter as psychology. God, he said, is no more 
a personal entity external to or separable from the 
material world than mind is from body, or energy is from 
the atom. God is the sum or total of the energy of the 
material uni Jverse, "the infinite sum of all natural 
forces" (1894,78). He went on to explain that sub- 
stance, "the one single universal being, " consisted of 
two kinds -- matter and ether; and although he admitted 
that the relationship between ether and matter -- whether 
they were two antiVthetical substances, or whether mat- 
ter arose out of ether -- was as yet unknown (1894,93), 
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he nonetheless offered a "provisional" scheme of their 
relationship. Ether, he suggested, is the "mobile or 
active substance, " dynamical and continuous, the 
"creator" or "spirit. " Matter, in contrast, is the 
"inert or passive substance, " atomic and discontinuous, 
the "created" and "body" (1894,106). 
Haeckel, like Huxley, denied that he was a 
materialist, correcting his critics on this point and 
insisting instead that he was a monist. He argued that 
monism, "the unity-philosophy, " recognizes spirit as much 
as matter, but takes the position that "the two are 
inseparably combined in every atom" (1894,58). His pur- 
pose, therefore, was not to deny spirit or mind, but to 
oppose "the antiquated" dualistic view of two antitheti- 
cal substances, of personal immortality, and of a per- 
sonal God who is the cause of, and external to, Nature. 
He singled out his colleague Du Bois-Reymond for particu- 
lar criticism: In 1872 Du Bois-Reymond had delivered his 
so-called "Ignorabimus" address, in which he confessed 
his conclusion that the relationship between physiologi- 
cal facts and facts of consciousness was "absolutely and 
for ever inconceivable" (quoted in Tyndall, 1875/1879, 
229). Haeckel dismissed this confession of ignorance as 
the product of the dualistic view of consciousness or 
mind as "an insoluble 'world-riddle, ' a transcendent 
phenomenon in essential antithesis to all other natural 
phenomena" (1894,110). Likewise, he dismissed the 
belief in human immortality as an "irrational dogma" that 
had been disproven by, among other things, physiology and 
its "localisation of the various activities of the mind" 
in the brain (1894,55). In short, monism did not reduce 
mind, consciousness, or spirit to matter, as materialism 
did, but raised matter to include those phenomena as part 
of its fundamental nature. 
Unlike Du Bois-Reymond or Huxley, Haeckel felt no 
need to curb science in with an agnostic confession of 
the limits of human intellect. Although he admitted that 
there were such limits, he insisted that the "gaps... 
can... be filled up by hypotheses, by conjectures of more 
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or less probability..., in so far as they are not 
inconsistent with a rational knowledge of nature. Such 
rational hypotheses are scientific articles of faith" 
(1894,91). Nonetheless, one could argue that, just as 
theological articles of faith had hindered the progress 
of knowledge and acceptance of new ideas, scientific 
articles of faith prevented Haeckel from seeing 
inadequacies, inconsistencies, or complexities in his own 
doctrine. A contemporary observer noted that Haeckel was 
a "naive" materialist who suffered "the natural diffi- 
culty which persons who have had no philosophic training 
experience in observing and apprehending the importance 
of the immaterial facts of consciousness" (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 1911,17: 878). More recently, Chadwick 
(1975,179) described Haeckel as an example of 
how a scientist of academic stature lost standards 
when he became an evangelist. As a scientist, 
Haeckel had care, diligence, accuracy and reverence. 
As an evangelist for anti-Christian scientific reli- 
gion, he was careless, inaccurate, and irreverent as 
any hack writer hired to be unfair for the sake of a 
cause and willing, if necessary, to be scurrilous. 
In other words, because he was so vehemently opposed to 
the old theological dualism and intent on destroying it 
and replacing it with a new scientific faith, his own 
thinking became less than rational. 
Perhaps most interestingly, however, Haeckel also 
failed to note that his own system was less monistic than 
he thought. In differentiating his monistic substance 
into ether and matter -- into a dynamic, active, con- 
tinuous, "creator" and an inert, passive, discontinous 
"created" -- he had, in essence, simply described the 
genus dualism, even as he denounced a particular species 
of it. Like many of his contemporaries, he adopted so 
narrow, uncompromising, and rigidly polarized a view of 
scientific and religious thought that he failed to recog- 
nize that the lines between science and religion, monism 
and dualism, are not so cleanly drawn as he assumed. 
Both sides, in fact, faced the basic problem of how to 
reconcile the apparent unity of consciousness and brain, 
or energy and matter, or the "active" and the "inert, " 
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with their equally apparent discontinuity. And neither 
side, in fact, had yet offered a satisfactory solution. 
John Tyndall (1820-1893) 
Tyndall's name, like Huxley's, has long been associ- 
ated with the incendiary materialism and naturalism that 
ignited the science-religion conflict of the 19th century 
and that ultimately undermined the old dualistic world 
view. Tyndall was indeed one of the many 19th-century 
scientists who shared the same fundamental views that 
Haeckel espoused; but, despite the notoriety that some of 
his lectures and essays on materialism attracted among 
the general public, Tyndall was in reality a far less 
polemical and far more thoughtful exponent of scientific 
monism than Haeckel was. The strength of Tyndall's posi- 
tion derived from his continuing attempt to acknowledge 
equally, and to balance, two competing strains in his 
thinking: On the one hand, as a physicist, he believed 
first and foremost in the ultimate continuity and unity 
of the universe, exemplified in the law of the conserva- 
tion of energy and matter, and he thus rejected the old 
dualistic juxtaposition of Nature and Supernature. On 
the other hand, he also had a keen, almost mystical, 
awareness of the incomprehensibility of the universe -- 
of the ultimate mystery it must always remain. Tyndall 
himself said that his thinking could be summarized as one 
idea: "That idea is the polar conception of the grandeur 
and littleness of man -- the vastness of his range in 
some respects and directions, and his powerlessness to 
take a single step in others" (1879a, 395-396). The one 
pole led him to argue for a new materialism -- one in 
which our conception of the nature of matter is radically 
revised. The other pole led him to defend the new, 
epistemological dualism -- one in which the scope and 
limits of science (and hence, knowledge) are defined by 
our conception of the knowable and the unknowable. 
In numerous places (for example, 1861/1879,4; 
1877/1879) Tyndall expressed his belief -- and the one 
fundamental to scientific naturalism -- that the unity, 
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continuity, and determinism of the universe have been 
demonstrated by the doctrine of the conservation of 
energy, which states that no new energy is ever created 
but that all natural phenomena result from the conversion 
of one form of energy into another. He also explained 
that in his famous Belfast address to the British Associ- 
ation (1874) he had been attempting to extend the nebular 
theory from the inorganic to the organic worlds -- to 
show, in other words, that all of the visible universe is 
formed from its gradual development out of the same basic 
elements (1874/1879,211). As he expressed this else- 
where, "The tendency, indeed, of modern science is to 
break down the wall of partition between organic and 
inorganic, and to reduce both to the operation of forces 
which are the same in kind, but which are differently 
compounded" (1879b, 50). Additionally, he believed that 
the doctrine of the conservation of energy implied causal 
determinism, "bringing vital as well as physical 
phenomena under the domain of that law of causal connec- 
tion which, so far as the human understanding has yet 
pierced, asserts itself everywhere in nature" (1874,45). 
Tyndall then went on to argue that this new knowledge 
of the continuity of nature requires a new definition or 
conception of matter. The old conception regards matter 
as "all-vile, " the inert, dead substance that is, at some 
stage, energized or activated by "all-noble, " vitalizing 
spirit (1870/1879,131-132). Tyndall offered instead a 
new conception, one that he said degrades neither mind 
nor matter but "regard[s] them as equally worthy" 
(1870/1879,133). The principle of continuity demands 
that life and mind are not something injected into dead 
matter, but, on the contrary, that they are inherent in 
every atom and element of matter. Tyndall credited John 
Toland (1670-1722), the English deist, with being "the 
founder of that monistic doctrine which is now so rapidly 
spreading, " because he "affirmed motion to be an inherent 
attribute of matter" (1879a, 378). Modern science, 
however, could now go further and recognize that this 
inherent motion, deriving from the polar forces of 
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attraction and repulsion in electricity and magnetism, 
constituted a "marvellous structural power" (1867/1878, 
67). The motion was not random or lawless, but was evi- 
dence of a "tendency on the part of matter to organise 
itself, to grow into shape, to assume definite forms in 
obedience to the definite action of force.... Incipient 
life, as it were, manifests itself throughout the whole 
of what we call inorganic nature" (1868/1879,81). 
Tyndall also demonstrated the continuity of 
inorganic, vegetable, and animal forms of matter by com- 
paring the transformation of a drop of water from liquid 
to crystal, the growth of an acorn into a tree, and the 
development of a cell into a baby. All, he said, are 
evidence of "a formative power" or "an intrinsic 
architectural power" -- a latent potential in all 
elementary particles of matter to develop into complex 
forms under the appropriate environmental conditions 
(1875,591-592). In short, "believing as I do in the 
continuity of Nature, I... discern in that Matter... the 
promise and potency of all terrestrial Life" (1874,55). 
This is materialism, he agreed, but materialism of a very 
different sort from that so feared, hated, and vilified 
by many of his contemporaries; it is "the practical 
materialism of the present" (1875,599). Instead of 
degrading mind and spirit, he said, his materialism 
elevates matter and makes it the object of wonder, 
mystery, and awe: "What an astonishing addition is here 
made to the power of matter! Who would have 
dreamt... that such a power [of crystallization] was 
locked up in a drop of water? " (1875,592). 
As with most other 19th-century scientists, Tyndall's 
belief in continuity carried with it a rejection of the 
old dualism, or what he called the "creative hypothesis, " 
which postulates not only a natural order but also an 
external order from which comes life, spirit, mind, and 
the creative or volitional agency that introduces the 
latter order into the former. In an early essay prompted 
by the Church's call for a national day of prayer 
intended to end a drought (1861/1879), Tyndall argued 
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that the religious concept of prayer as a causal agent 
and the scientific concept of law were mutually exclu- 
sive: 
Assuming the efficacy of free prayer to produce 
changes in external nature, it necessarily follows 
that natural laws are more or less at the mercy of 
man's volition, and no conclusion founded on the 
assumed permanence of those laws would be worthy of 
confidence" (1861/1879,6). 
He rejected, in short, volition as a causal phenomenon. 
Later, in the Belfast Address (1874), Tyndall traced the 
evolution of human thought from the old anthropomorphic, 
teleological concept that attributed natural phenomena to 
the caprice of an external Will, to a doctrine of atoms 
and physical theories that attribute natural phenomena to 
an orderly succession of natural law. The former concept 
postulates "an external artificer" who has created all 
natural phenomena; the latter postulates evolution and 
the creation of an "infinity of forms... by its [Nature's] 
own intrinsic force and virtue" (1874,19). The two 
views, he thought, are totally incompatible; even the 
attempted compromise that allows God only the single 
creative act of having produced the one primordial germ 
of life is to Tyndall an unacceptable "anthropomorphism": 
"Two courses, and two only, are possible. Either let us 
open our doors freely to the conception of creative acts, 
or, abandoning them, let us radically change our notions 
of Matter" (1874,54). Tyndall left no doubt that the 
scientific principle of continuity leaves only one 
choice: "The order and energy of the universe I hold to 
be inherent, and not imposed from without, the expression 
of fixed law and not of arbitrary will" (1877/1879,339). 
Furthermore, the corollary of this conclusion is that 
the old notion of the relationship of mind and body must 
also be abandoned. The hypothesis of a soul or "self, 
which acts through the body as through a skillfully con- 
structed instrument... increases our darkness ... [since] 
it explain[s] the unknown in terms of the more unknown" 
(1877/1879,357). 
In dismissing these tenets of religion, however, 
Tyndall did not also dismiss religion itself. First of 
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all, he made it clear that religions had erred in 
trespassing onto a territory that was not theirs, 
proclaiming knowledge that they did not in fact have 
(1874,60; 1874/1879,212); religion is "mischievous, if 
permitted to intrude on the region of knowledge" (1874, 
60-61). Religion's domain is, instead, human feeling and 
emotion, "the lifting power" that suggests truths of 
which we get only "mere hints and glimpses, " but that 
"must long, if not for ever, lie beyond" the reach of our 
knowledge (1875,599; 1874/1879,212). It is thus, he 
said, the present form of religion we must reject, not 
religion itself (1861/1879,2; 1874,60). 
He went on to say that religion, properly understood, 
has an important role to play in human life. The domain 
of science -- that of intellect and reason -- is insuffi- 
cient for many people: "Man never has been, and he never 
will be, satisfied with the operations and products of 
the Understanding alone; hence physical science cannot 
cover all the demands of his nature" (1874,6-7). There 
are, for example, both "analytic and synthetic tendencies 
of the human mind, " and people of different temperaments 
favor one over the other. Those of "warm feelings and 
minds open to the elevating impressions produced by 
Nature as a whole... lean to the synthetic side"; those of 
"more precise and more mechanical bias" seek "the satis- 
faction of the understanding" (1874,24). 
Moreover, many people combine both tendencies in 
their character, Tyndall himself being an important exam- 
ple. In numerous places, he spoke of the mystery and awe 
he experienced in the face of the growing knowledge about 
the nature of matter, an "essentially mystical and trans- 
cendental" phenomenon (1879b, 51). Also, despite his 
rejection of Christianity and the "form" of religion, he 
confessed that he had nonetheless retained his religious 
sentiment, both because of and in spite of his scientific 
knowledge. He explained that, even after his rejection 
of Christianity, he "could by no means get rid of the 
idea that the aspects of nature and the consciousness of 
man implied the operation of a power altogether beyond my 
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grasp" (1879a, 384); and he remained aware of "a Power 
which gives fulness and tone to [my] existence, but which 
[I] can neither analyse nor comprehend" (1870/1879,136). 
Tyndall also argued that in science as well as in 
life the intellect alone is insufficient. He repeatedly 
referred to the role that "intuition, " "genius, " 
"imagination, " and "spiritual insight" play in science 
(1868/1879,77; 1870/1879,103-104). He noted that "the 
kingdom of science... cometh not by observation and expe- 
riment alone" (1874/1879,210). Scientific theories, 
although derived from experience and experiment, are in 
fact "wholly ultra-experiential" (1874,53), and "the 
difference between the great and the mediocre investiga- 
tor" lies entirely in their relative ability to move 
beyond the "experience" to the "ultra-experiential" 
(1874/1879,210). In a positivistic age that worshipped 
cold, hard facts and shrank from such un-empirical words 
as "intuition, " Tyndall reminded his fellow scientists 
that science without intuition or creative genius "would 
be a mere tabulation of co-existences and sequences" 
(1870/1879,104). Moreover, such insight could occur 
either before or after the collection of raw data: An 
act of genius or insight, said Tyndall, could be both one 
"which unravels and illuminates the tangle of centuries 
of observation and experiment" or one "which anticipates 
the fact and constitutes a spur towards its discovery" 
(1879a, 417). Tyndall acknowledged that he himself had 
received much inspiration from Tennyson's poetry; "writ- 
ings apparently far from science have often spurred me on 
in the pursuit of science" (1897,470). 
Religion and science, therefore, in Tyndall's view 
are "not opposed, but supplementary" (1874,64), each 
having its own role to play, the one satisfying human 
emotion, the other satisfying human intellect. Tyndall 
thus shared the view that grew increasingly important 
throughout the latter part of the 19th century, the new 
dualism that segregated aspects of human thought into 
different territories and "allow[ed] each its fair share" 
(1868/1879,79). Although he urged both sides to work 
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together and "wait calmly for the statement of the whole" 
(1868/1879,79), he also made it clear that "the whole" 
was in fact forever unavailable to the human mind. 
Instead, each age must reconcile and balance the two 
sides by its own intuitive, subjective, or "creative" 
conception of the nature of the universe (1874,64). 
It follows from Tyndall's distinction between reli- 
gion and science that the primary criterion distinguish- 
ing -- and separating -- the two is the boundary that can 
be fixed between what humans can know and what they can- 
not. Thus, an important theme that recurs throughout his 
writings is the limits, or boundaries, of science. He 
defined the primary purpose of one paper as "to define, 
if possible, the bourne between this [physical science] 
and that other region [religion], to which the question- 
ings and the yearnings of the scientific intellect are 
directed in vain" (1868/1879,79). To those heady with 
the progress and prospects of science, Tyndall cautioned 
that we need to make "as much a recognition of the weak- 
ness of science as an assertion of its strength, " specif- 
ically by distinguishing "between what men knew or might 
know, and what they could never hope to know" (1879a, 
394). He acknowledged that those limits are not fixed. 
In a passage anticipatory of Kuhn's later theory of the 
progress of scientific knowledge (Kuhn, 1962), Tyndall 
described Emerson's idea that 
knowledge spreads by intermittent victories instead 
of progressing at a uniform rate .... At a given 
moment knowledge is surrounded by a barrier which 
makes its limit. It gradually gathers clearness and 
strength until by-and-by some thinker of exceptional 
power bursts the barrier and wins a wider circle, 
within which thought once more entrenches itself. 
(1877/1879,342) 
Nonetheless, Tyndall attempted to segregate the realm 
of science from the realm of religion by defining the 
limits of knowledge. On the one hand, science can poten- 
tially understand "everything" about "this intermediate 
phase of things that we call nature"; on the other hand, 
science knows nothing of the origin or destiny of 
nature.... [M]any of us... feel that there are more 
things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in the 
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present philosophy of science, but [also]... how vain 
is the attempt to grapple with the Inscrutable. 
(1879b, 52) 
Tyndall identified the Knowable as being physical science 
alone. A scientist 
must be a pure materialist. His enquiries deal with 
matter and force, and with them alone .... The mind of 
man may be compared to a musical instrument with a 
certain range of notes, beyond which in both direc- 
tions we have an infinitude of science. The 
phenomena of matter and force lie within our 
intellectual range.... But behind, and above, and 
around all, the real mystery of this universe lies 
unsolved, and, as far as we are concerned, is inca- 
pable of solution.... [B]e careful of pretending to 
know more about it than is given to man to know. 
(1867/1879,72-73) 
Specifically, Tyndall argued that a problem fre- 
quently subjected to the scrutiny of human intellect is 
in fact beyond the range of human intellect -- that prob- 
lem being the relationship of mind and matter, the "two 
opposite faces" of that "mysterious duality" (1870/1879, 
133-134). In numerous places Tyndall insisted that, 
although the absolute correlation of mental phenomena 
with brain phenomena was known, the nature of that rela- 
tionship, or connection, was not only unknown but unknow- 
able. In his essay "Scientific materialism, " for exam- 
ple, he claimed that, since the correlation of mind and 
brain is "invariable, " then the one was theoretically 
predictable from the other: "given the state of the 
brain, the corresponding thought or feeling might be 
inferred; or, given the thought or feeling, the cor- 
responding state of the brain might be inferred" 
(1868/1879,86; see also 1879a, 392). Nevertheless, he 
went on to say, 
the passage from the physics of the brain to cor- 
responding facts of consciousness is unthinkable. 
Granted that a definite thought, and definite 
molecular action in the brain, occur simultaneously; 
we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor 
apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would 
enable us to pass, by a process of reasoning, from 
the one to the other. They appear together, but we 
do not know why. (1868/1879,87) 
Even if we had an exact knowledge of the correspondence, 
"the chasm between the two classes of phenomena would 
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still remain intellectually impassable" (1868/1879,87). 
Thus, he concluded, a neutral statement of the "invari- 
able" correlation, or parallelism, is as far as science 
can go; and this is in fact not very far. The scientist 
cannot 
say that his molecular groupings, and motions, 
explain everything. In reality they explain 
nothing. The utmost he can affirm is the associa- 
tion of two classes of phenomena.... The problem of 
the connection of body and soul is as insoluble, in 
its modern form, as it was in the pre-scientific 
ages. (1868/1879,87-88) 
Science can describe the mind-matter relationship but 
it cannot explain it, because with mind or consciousness, 
"the methods pursued in mechanical science come to an 
end... [and] logical continuity disappears" (1879a, 390- 
391). Tyndall therefore insisted that he must remain 
agnostic on the question of whether mind is a causal fac- 
tor in physical events, or merely a by-product of them, 
since 
the production of consciousness by molecular action 
is to me quite as inconceivable on mechanical prin- 
ciples as the production of molecular motion by con- 
sciousness.... I, however, reject neither, and thus 
stand in the presence of two Incomprehensibles, 
instead of one Incomprehensible. While accepting 
fearlessly the facts of materialism dwelt upon in 
these pages, I bow my head in the dust before that 
mystery of mind. (1874/1879,224) 
Tyndall's agnosticism about the relationship between 
mind and matter, and his recognition of the limits of 
human intellect, were both commendable up to a point; but 
they were also indicative of the general effect that 
19th-century agnostic parallelism had on the direction of 
scientific psychology. First of all, Tyndall's conten- 
tion that the methods of science "come to an end" when 
they encounter the phenomenon of mind or consciousness, 
together with his agnostic acquiescence to the "mystery 
of mind", surely had the effect of suppressing among 
psychologists the intuition, insight, or creative genius 
that generates theoretical understanding and takes a 
science beyond the stage of being "a mere tabulation of 
co-existences and sequences. " 
Equally pernicious, however, was the vague assumption 
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of Tyndall, and of many other scientists, of an "invari- 
able" correlation between mental processes and brain 
processes. As James (1890b, 1; 177-178) pointed out (and 
as I will discuss further in Chapter 4), defining the 
level at which mental and physical processes are corre- 
lated -- that is, "which mental fact and which cerebral 
fact" can be said to be concomitant -- is problematic at 
best. Perhaps more importantly, however, the nature and 
extent of mind-brain correlation should have become the 
major empirical problem for any scientific psychology 
that sought theoretical understanding of its phenomena, 
namely, psychophysiological functioning. Most 
psychologists assumed, as Tyndall did, an "invariable" 
but unspecified correlation and proceeded to examine only 
the mental or behavioral side of the psychophysiological 
equation, "in its own coherence. " Even among those 
scientists who continued to demonstrate "the control 
which the nervous system exercises over man's moral and 
intellectual nature, " and thus the dependence of mind on 
brain (1874/1879,221), there was no converse attempt to 
examine whether, or when, a mental state might also 
exercise some control over a physical state. 
Unfortunately, because Tyndall and many others limited 
the question of the mind-matter relation to the 
metaphysical, ontological one, and then declared 
repeatedly (and rightly) that such a question was beyond 
the reach of science, they effectively forestalled any 
attempts to distinguish the empirical question of cor- 
relation from the metaphysical one. The invariability of 
the correlation remained essentially unchallenged, and 
the assumption of a unilateral dependence of mind on 
brain became entrenched in the minds of scientists. 
W. K. Clifford (1845-1879) 
Clifford, professor of mathematics at University Col- 
lege, London, was during his short life another outspoken 
member of the group of scientists who unceasingly 
attacked religion and theology as hindrances to the 
advance of knowledge and who argued that the scientific 
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principle of continuity demanded instead an ultimately 
monistic view of the universe rather than the religious, 
dualistic system of Nature and Supernature. Clifford was 
highly regarded as both a mathematician and a 
philosopher, and through his essays published in such 
periodicals as Mind and Fortnightly Review, he became 
well known to the general educated public as another 
influential proponent for the often militant attempt of 
scientific naturalists to undermine the dualist concep- 
tion of mind and replace it with a monistic one. Yet per- 
haps the most charitable thing to be said about his 
papers on psychological topics is that he died young, 
before he had had sufficient opportunity to develop the 
humility about human knowledge that Tyndall showed. Dog- 
matic to an extreme, Clifford was the quintessential 
19th-century scientist who apparently believed that 
scientists had achieved an adequate understanding of the 
major outlines of the universe, if not all the details. 
He, like many other scientists, therefore believed that 
science had revealed enough basic principles about the 
nature of the universe so that the nature of mind and of 
the relationship of mind and matter could be inferred 
from these principles. He thus implicitly encouraged 
psychologists in the rationalistic approach of taking 
these inferences as premises of psychology, rather than 
in the empirical approach of using science as a means of 
producing observations, and thus ultimately increasing 
knowledge, relevant to the question of mind and its rela- 
tion to matter. 
Clifford's views can be summarized by saying that he 
viewed the nature of the universe as ultimately monistic, 
the nature of mind as atomistic, and the nature of the 
mind-matter relation as parallelistic. These views all 
derived from his basic faith in the continuity of all 
phenomena and from his associated belief that the "guid- 
ing conception of uniformity" in science is atomism, or 
the belief that all phenomena are the products of "prac- 
tically uniform elements" (1875,778-779). The doctrine 
of evolution and continuity allowed for no place at which 
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consciousness, or mind, was suddenly introduced as a new 
element; nor did it allow for any break between inorganic 
and organic matter. The conclusion must therefore be, he 
said, that inherent in every particle or element of mat- 
ter is a correspondingly simple particle or element of 
consciousness. Just as all forms of matter are more or 
less complex aggregates of simple elements, so all forms 
of mind, from the simplest feeling to the higher func- 
tions of sentience. consciousness, intelligence, and 
volition, are complex aggregates of these simple elements 
of mind, which Clifford labelled "Mind-Stuff" 
(1878/1886). 
Another scientific principle, the doctrine of the 
conservation of matter and energy, then provided the 
basis for Clifford's conclusion about the nature of the 
relationship between an element of matter and its associ- 
ated element of mind. This doctrine says that no new 
energy is ever created, but that energy is continually 
being transformed from one form into another or trans- 
ferred from one location to another. The doctrine, he 
said, must hold true in the brain as anywhere else; and 
this fact, he went on, precludes mind from being a causal 
factor in any chain of physical brain events, since that 
would involve the introduction of new energy into the 
chain -- a break in continuity as well as a violation of 
the conservation principle (1874,727). Thus, he con- 
cluded, mental and physical facts 
are on two utterly different platforms -- the physi- 
cal facts go along by themselves, and the mental 
facts go along by themselves. There is a paral- 
lelism between them, but there is no interference of 
one with the other.... [I]f anybody says that the 
will influences matter, the statement is not untrue, 
but it is nonsense.... Such an assertion belongs to 
the crude materialism of the savage.... [T]he only 
thing which influences matter is the position of 
surrounding matter or the motion of surrounding mat- 
ter. (1874,728) 
Clifford thus rejected the kind of materialism that 
conflates matter and mind and tries to reduce the latter 
to the former. Physical facts, he said, are objects, 
things available to one's perception or consciousness. 
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Mental facts, in contrast, are "ejects, " things inferred 
only and not perceivable (1878/1886,72). There is a 
correspondence or parallelism between mental facts and 
physical facts, just as there is between a map and the 
terrain it represents, or between a spoken sentence and a 
written one (1874,732); but, like the map and the land, 
or the speech and the writing, the two sets of facts can- 
not be confused: "Sometimes one series is known better, 
and sometimes the other, " but in mixing them up, we are 
"acting exactly in the spirit of the new materialism" 
(1875,792-793). Instead, in the spirit of the new 
dualism, Clifford insisted on keeping the two series 
entirely separate. 
This atomistic and parallelistic view of mind led 
Clifford to insist on an absolute one-to-one cor- 
respondence, or concomitance, between mental events and 
physical events. First of all, in general the "laws con- 
necting consciousness with changes in the brain are very 
definite and precise" (1875/1886,247). Since, however, 
consciousness is a complex compound made up of numerous 
individual elements of mind-stuff, paralleling similarly 
complex brain processes built up from numerous material 
elements, then it follows that each individual element of 
one parallels some individual element of the other: 
"This correspondence [of mind and brain] extends to the 
elements, and... each simple feeling corresponds to a spe- 
cial comparatively simple change of nerve-matter" 
(1878/1886,282-283). 
Despite the naturalistic and even materialistic tenor 
of Clifford's writings, his philosophy was actually a 
kind of idealism, based on the recognition that we can 
have direct knowledge only of our own sensations or con- 
sciousness and that our knowledge of the external world 
is simply our indirect perception of it, a representation 
filtered through our sensory apparatus. As Clifford 
expressed this, 
The physical world which I see and feel and infer, 
is just my dream and nothing else .... This doctrine 
of Berkeley's has now been so far confirmed by the 
physiology of the senses, that it is no longer a 
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metaphysical speculation, but a scientifically 
established fact. (1875,780) 
In an odd twist of logic, Clifford concluded from this 
knowledge about perception, not that mental phenomena are 
symbols or representations in consciousness of the real 
material world, but that the material world is a symbol 
or representation of a reality that we can never directly 
know (1874,87; 1875,782,793). This reality is the 
mind-stuff behind or inherent in every particle of mat- 
ter. Thus, the ultimate reality, or noumenal thing-in- 
itself, is neither mind nor matter (both of which are 
complex compounds), but the elemental mind-stuff from 
which both derive (1874,733). 
Though perhaps technically an idealistic philosophy, 
Clifford's system was, practically speaking, a 
materialistic one in the sense that the phenomenon of 
mind, or consciousness, was clearly dependent on the par- 
ticular substratum of its associated brain. Individual 
consciousness, according to Clifford, is the product of 
numerous compounded elements and, as such, is dependent 
for its continued existence on the continued existence 
and integrity of the compound physical structure that is 
its material representation. Clifford was particularly 
insistent on this point in connection with his dismissal 
of the suggestion by the physicists Stewart and Tait 
(1875/1876)2 that mind or consciousness might not be 
dependent on the particular physical configuration of the 
brain, but might instead be associated more permanently 
with a form in a presently imperceptible order of things 
of which the visible material universe is only a derived 
part. Clifford dismissed this possibility categorically: 
"If individual feeling always goes with individual nerve- 
message,... does it not follow that when the stream of 
nerve-message is broken up, the stream of feelings will 
be broken up also? " (1875/1886,248). Elsewhere, he 
argued that "if mind is the reality or substance of that 
which appears to us as brain-action, the supposition of 
mind without brain is... a contradiction in terms" (1874, 
734). 
137 
Perhaps the most notable characteristic of Clifford's 
writing, however, is his imperious dogmatism. For exam- 
ple, he dismissed the hypothesis of a mental phenomenon 
being a causal factor -- that is, initiating some change 
-- in the physical world, because this would necessitate 
the "creation" of new energy (a violation of the con- 
servation principle) and because only a physical 
phenomenon, he said, can affect another physical 
phenomenon; but "if mind were a force we should be able 
to perceive it... and to measure it" (1874,727-728). One 
might first object that a "force" is not what scientists 
measure, but instead certain measurable effects that we 
attribute to a cause called "force. " More importantly, 
however, Clifford's arguments beg the very question at 
issue, whether only physical phenomena affect physical 
phenomena or whether, instead, mental phenomena affect 
physical phenomena, not by introducing "new" energy but 
by instigating -- in an admittedly unknown way -- the 
transfer or transformation of energy. 
Similarly, in dismissing the idea that a particular 
mind or consciousness could exist in some form or in con- 
nection with some structure other than the brain, Clif- 
ford asserted that it is not "possible that an organiza- 
tion like the brain can exist without being perceived, " 
because "this is a physical question, and we know quite 
enough about the physical world to say 'Certainly not. ' 
It is made of atoms and ether, and there is no room in it 
for ghosts" (1874,734). Therefore, he concluded, it is 
"a practical certainty... that there is no mind without a 
brain" (1874,734). Such a statement -- implying that 
nothing exists except what we can now perceive -- seems a 
surprisingly dogmatic one for a scientist who was, 
presumably, aware of, say, the accelerating discoveries 
of spectroscopy. More interesting from the modern per- 
spective, however, is Clifford's conjecture, made to dis- 
miss the notion of imperceptible matter or substance, 
that "if some vast brain existed somewhere in space, 
being invisible because not self-luminous, then according 
to the laws of matter at present known to us, it could 
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affect the solar system only by its weight" (1874,735). 
It has in fact been by such calculations that physicists 
in recent years have learned that the vast majority of 
matter in the universe is "dark, " or imperceptible to us 
except indirectly by its effect on gravitational pull 
(see, e. g., Galeotti & Schramm, 1990; Kormendy & Knapp, 
c. 1987). As Myers suggested, "Clifford had not really 
turned over his atoms thoroughly enough to make sure that 
no ghost was hidden among them" (Myers, 1900b, 116); and 
his "reduction of the Cosmos into ether and atoms is 
scarce more reasonable than its reduction into the four 
elements, air, water, earth, and fire" (Myers, 1889j, 
392). 
More generally, Clifford assured his readers that 
science had now laid to rest some of the great metaphysi- 
cal questions: 
There are numbers of questions relating to the con- 
nection of the mind with the body which have ceased 
to be open questions, because Science has had her 
word to say about them; and they are only open now 
to people who do not know what that word of Science 
is, and who will not try to learn it. (1874,715) 
The task of psychology, therefore, was reduced con- 
siderably; it was simply "the science of the laws which 
regulate the succession of feelings in any one conscious- 
ness" (1874,715). 
Clifford's review (1875/1886) of Stewart and Tait's 
The Unseen Universe (1875/1876) reveals that the probable 
cause of his extreme dogmatism was his intense anti- 
religious sentiment. Clifford is surely one of the best 
representatives of the first stage of the intellectual 
transition described by Houghton (1957), characterized by 
extreme polarization, rigid partisanship, and acrimony. 
In categorically rejecting the suggestion of Stewart and 
Tait that there may be some form of existence after death 
in association with some presently unknown substance, 
Clifford insisted that there are two, and only two, pos- 
sibilities: We can either "identify ourselves with some- 
thing wider and greater that shall live when we as units 
shall have done living, " or "we may fashion another 
life..., not orderly, not natural, not healthy, but 
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monstrous or supernatural; whose cloudy semblance shall 
be eked out with the dreams of uneasy sleep or the crazes 
of a mind diseased" (1875/1886,163-164). With two such 
choices before him, Clifford opted for the former, and he 
counselled his readers to "put death out of sight... to 
cover over and dismiss the thought of our own personal 
end" (1875/1886,164). More generally, Clifford dis- 
missed the speculations of Stewart and Tait as simply 
another religion -- the replacement of the Christian 
trinity with a pantheistic one of substance, energy, and 
life. All religions, however, must be dismissed as 
simply the "sickly dreams of hysterical women and half- 
starved men, " to be contrasted with "the sturdy strength 
of a wide-eyed hero who fears no foe with pen or club" 
(1875/1886,179). 
Elsewhere, it is even more apparent that Clifford's 
beliefs were perhaps based less on their own intrinsic 
merit than on his desire to rid the world of past error 
and superstition. He rejected the possibility of mental 
causality because this would, he insisted, "leave the way 
open for the doctrine of a destiny or providence outside 
of us, overruling human efforts and guiding history to a 
foregone conclusion, " a doctrine he objected to because 
it was "immoral" and had so often "paralyzed the efforts 
of those who were climbing honestly up the hillside 
towards the light and the right, and... [because it had] 
nerved the sacrilegious arm of the fanatic or the 
adventurer who was conspiring against society" (1874, 
730). Clifford had obviously not learned Tyndall's les- 
son that one should not confuse the form with the sub- 
stance of religion; nor, apparently, had he considered 
that mental causality might not lead inexorably to these 
other doctrines. Clearly, there was much more at work in 
Clifford than the desire "of the seeker after truth to 
find out whether a proposition is true or no" (1874, 
730). 
The 6 scientists in this chapter illustrated the gen- 
eral climate of thought about mind and science in which 
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scientific psychology developed. In the following chap- 
ter, I turn to 5 scientists whose writings illustrate how 
these general ideas were applied specifically to the 





1 "Spiritualism" here refers to the philosophical doc- 
trine opposed to materialism, and not to the 19th-century 
religious movement that purported to have proved com- 
munication between the living and the dead, a movement 
about which Carpenter also had much to say (e. g., 1877, 
1876/1888a). 
2 The Unseen Universe, by the physicists Balfour Stewart 
and P. G. Tait, was a widely read book that went through 
numerous editions in the late 19th century. In it the 
authors argued that the hypothesis of survival of con- 
sciousness or mind after death, but in some other 




Alexander Bain (1818-1903) 
It is appropriate to begin this chapter on the foun- 
dations of modern psychology with Alexander Bain, because 
he has frequently been referred to as a major transition 
figure between the old and the new psychologies and as 
the first major modern psychologist (Hearnshaw, 1964,9; 
Robinson, 1978,90; Thomson, 1968,30; Watson, 1963/1971, 
213-214; Young, 1970,101). One of his contemporaries 
described him as being "the first in Great Britain during 
the nineteenth century to apply physiology in a thorough- 
going fashion to the elucidation of mental states" 
(Davidson, 1910,222); and another credited him with 
being "the first to publish a text-book on the mind with 
an introductory chapter on the brain and nervous system" 
(Hurd, 1898,350). Murphy (1929,112) said that he was 
"the first to write a comprehensive treatise having 
psychology as its sole purpose"; and Robinson (1978,71) 
described that treatise (Bain's 1855 Senses and the 
Intellect) as "the pioneering text in modern psychology. " 
Moreover, he was not only a pioneer of modern psychology, 
but a highly influential one. According to Murphy (1929, 
111-112), he occupied "a position of author- 
ity... throughout the second half of the century.... Never 
had a psychologist been so widely read in his own day. " 
He was Professor of Logic and English at Aberdeen 
University from 1860-1880, and he also founded in 1876 
the first journal devoted to psychology, Mind, and pro- 
vided its financial support from 1876 until 1891 (David- 
son, 1910,222). 
Bain's psychology was transitional because it was 
based both on 18th-century British philosophy and on 
19th-century German and British physiology. A close 
friend and colleague of J. S. Mill (Davidson, 1910), Bain 
applied Mill's empirical associationism to physiology to 
produce the first detailed psychophysiology, in which 
physiology, and specifically the sensory-motor reflex 
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model, was shown to be fundamental to psychological 
processes (Murphy, 1929,110). Bain, however, postulated 
that sensory-motor processes begin, not in sensation, as 
the empiricists had assumed, but in the innate and 
spontaneous activity of energy in the brain. Bain's 
associationism was thus an active, rather than passive, 
one, since motion, produced by spontaneous internal brain 
energy, preceded sensation, rather than vice versa, as 
previous associationist models assumed (Young, 1970, 
115). 
A central theme of Bain's writings, therefore, was to 
demonstrate the relevance of physiology to psychology, 
and especially the dependence of all mental life on 
physiological, and specifically brain, processes -- that 
is, "the physical basis of our intellectual acquisitions" 
(Bain, 1872/1874,111-112). Although his interest in 
mind's dependence on brain had originally been aroused by 
phrenology, he accepted only this general principle, not 
the specific system described by phrenologists (Young, 
1970). The specific details of his system were based not 
on anatomy, but on the concept of energy that became so 
influential after Helmholtz's enunciation of the doctrine 
of the conservation of energy. All living processes 
were, in essence, "energy exchanges between the organism 
and the environment, " as well as the conversion of that 
physical energy into psychophysical processes (Robinson, 
1978,72-73). 
Bain's Mind and Body (1872/1874) dealt explicitly and 
extensively with the question of the relationship of 
brain and mind, and the first half of the volume was 
devoted primarily to describing evidence for the thesis 
that all feelings, intellectual capacities, and voli- 
tional activities are directly correlated with and 
dependent on brain states, that "the mind is completely 
at the mercy of the bodily condition" (41). For example, 
Bain stated that "the association of brain-derangement 
with mind-derangement is all but a perfectly established 
induction" (14). He described the general principle that 
brain size is correlated with intelligence and the gen- 
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eral principle of concomitance, that "for every mental 
shock, every awakening of consciousness, every mental 
transition, there must be a concomitant nervous shock; 
and as the one is more or less intense so must be the 
other" (43). He argued that consciousness is a dis- 
turbance of nerve currents, and that such a disturbance 
is conscious or unconscious depending on the extent to 
which the disturbance is novel, intense, diffuse, or dif- 
ferent from previous disturbances. (These "laws" of 
relativity, novelty, and diffusion became the basis for 
later hypotheses in psychology about habit and 
automatism, especially that of William James. ) Moreover, 
Bain postulated that mental states are related to the 
amount of energy in the brain -- pleasurable states 
resulting from an increase in brain energy and painful 
states resulting from a decrease. As an example, he said 
that when "the blood... flows in excess to the brain, " the 
result is a state of well-being, "an extraordinary 
exaltation of mental function... and even ecstatic enjoy- 
ment" (61-62). 
Bain also described this correlation of mental and 
physiological state as an atomistic and associationistic 
one: "To every discriminated sensation there is (we must 
believe) a distinct and characteristic group of currents, 
actuating a separate group of fibres and cells, and sus- 
ceptible of being united with any definite movement or 
any other definite sensation" (98). A permanent "trace" 
is left in the nerve cells whenever there is a new 
stimulus (51), and memory is the resuscitation of the 
nerve-elements involved in the original stimulus (90). 
Thus, a major task for psychology, according to Bain, is 
to discover, in physiological studies, "by what means the 
connexions are permanently fixed in the several tracts, " 
or the nature of "the physical bond underlying memory, 
recollection, or the retentive power of the mind" (116). 
In Bain's view, the discovery of this physical process 
underlying memory "would make all the rest [of 
psychology] easy enough" (87). 
Bain's theory, therefore, was that intellectual capa- 
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city -- the limits of intellectual acquisition, faculty, 
or talents -- is determined by the number of neural ele- 
ments and connections. Moreover, even allowing for 
duplication of "traces" between hemispheres or other 
parts of the brain (to account for the restoration of 
function sometimes observed after brain injury), Bain 
considered the human brain to be of more than adequate 
size to support the view of the "physical embodiment of 
the Intellect" (90n): "Numerous as are the embodiments 
to be provided for, the nervous elements are on a cor- 
responding scale, and... there is no improbability in sup- 
posing an independent nervous track for each acquisition" 
(108). 
Bain, however, was not unmindful of evidence support- 
ing the view that mental state also affects physical 
state. He acknowledged that there are anomalous cases of 
an inverse relationship between mind and body, such as 
when martyrs or heroes demonstrate intense or high mental 
activity when the body is weak or otherwise depleted of 
energy; but he nonetheless cautioned that such cases are 
too few to infer any independence of mind from body. 
More importantly, he mentioned briefly the phenomenon of 
the apparent power of the imagination over bodily states, 
such as in hypnosis or mental healing. He accounted for 
such phenomena, however, by explaining that since ideas 
are, in essence, faint or weak nerve currents, then the 
intensified ideas associated with hypnosis or other such 
states are simply intensified nerve processes and, as 
such, produce the resulting physical effects. 
Bain was unequivocally anti-dualistic, believing that 
the physiological study of mind had completely 
invalidated the old "doctrine of two substances" (129), 
the view that "assumes for mind a separate existence, a 
power of living apart, an option of working with or 
without a body" (132). He objected to the doctrine of two 
substances on two grounds: First of all, he objected on 
the empiricist grounds that "of mind apart from body we 
have no direct experience, and absolutely no knowledge" 
(130). Second, as Clifford and others frequently did, he 
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appealed to the argument (derived from the doctrine of 
the conservation of energy) that there is (or must be) an 
unbroken causal chain of brain processes associated with 
mental events, in contrast to the gap that one would 
expect, on the dualist's interaction hypothesis, at the 
point where the immaterial mind interacts with the 
material brain. Thus, in his view, mind must be com- 
pletely dependent on the physical body, and "without it 
we should not have mental states at all" (133). 
Nevertheless, despite these views on the nature of 
mind, Bain did not adopt a totally reductionist view of 
mind. Instead, he believed that mind and matter are "two 
very distinct natural phenomena... united in the most 
intimate alliance" (88). He was thus an early champion, 
and perhaps even the originator (Davidson, 1910,222), of 
the psychophysical, dual-aspect, but monistic parallelism 
that quickly became the predominant. position on the rela- 
tion of mind and brain among 19th-century psychologists. 
Bain described two distinct components to this paral- 
lelism. On the one hand, mind and matter are utterly 
different from each other, the one having the properties 
of extension and localization, the other not. The facts 
of mind and matter thus present "a wider contrast" than 
any other phenomena (124), necessitating "our study of 
the two separate departments... each according to its own 
kind" (127). Psychology, therefore, is "destined to be a 
double study -- to conjoin the mental philosopher with 
the physical philosopher" (196). On the other hand, in 
contrast to this methodological dualism, Bain argued for 
an ontological, or metaphysical, monism. According to 
this view, mind and matter are two separate aspects of 
"one substance, with two sets of properties, two sides, 
the physical and the mental -- a double-faced unity" 
(196). In Bain's view, therefore, there is in reality no 
such thing as a "mental" event that interacts with a 
physical event; there is only an indivisible 
"psychophysical" event: "The line of mental sequence is 
thus, not mind causing body, and body causing mind, but 
mind-body giving birth to mind-body" (132). 
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Bain recognized that he was left with the problem of 
how to explain "the fact of the union itself" (127). In 
particular, the alliance of an extended, localized state 
with an unextended, unlocalized state presented "the only 
real difficulty" (136). In the face of this difficulty, 
Bain urged that we take "a step of genuine enlightenment" 
and simply "accept the union as a fact, just as we accept 
any other union -- Heat with Light, Magnetism with the 
sesquioxide of iron, gravity with Inert Matter" (128), 
even though "in comparison with all ordinary unions, it 
[the union of mind and matter] is a paradox" (136). Bain 
explained his leap of faith as follows: Since the 
process of explanation involves "the discerning of agree- 
ment among facts remotely placed" (121), and since the 
widely differing facts of mind and matter can be assimi- 
lated no further than a description of their connection, 
or concomitance, it follows that one has reached "the 
final term of explanation, the full revelation of the 
mystery. There is nothing farther [sic] to be done; 
nothing farther to be desired" (122). Like the "majority 
of persons, " Bain was "disposed to treat the question [of 
the relationship of mind and matter] as insoluble, as 
unsuited to our faculties, as what is termed a 'mystery"' 
(120). Thus proclaiming any empirical exploration of the 
relationship futile, Bain, in short, became an early 
exemplar of the complacent position in psychology that we 
can assume mind's dependence on brain, even as we declare 
our inability to know mind's relation to brain. 
Theodule Ribot (1839-1916) 
Bain's title was Professor of Logic and English, and 
he is still often referred to as a philosopher. Ribot 
was among the first of a new generation of scientists who 
primarily considered themselves -- and were called -- 
psychologists, rather than physicians, physiologists, or 
philosophers who wrote on psychological topics. 
Appointed Professor of Experimental and Comparative 
Psychology at the College of France in 1888, Ribot was a 
highly influential scientist who, in more than a dozen 
148 
books on psychological topics, contributed to the devel- 
opment of psychology as an anti-metaphysical, 
positivistic adjunct to the physical sciences. According 
to a modern historian of psychology (Robinson, 1978, 
278), Ribot among all 19th-century psychologists had per- 
haps the "most diffuse and effective" influence in shap- 
ing both the character of modern psychology and its 
effect on modern thought in general. Editor of Revue de 
philosophie and a founder of the French Society for 
Physiological Psychology, Ribot had particular influence 
on French psychologists and psychophysiologists of the 
next generation, including Binet, Richet, and especially 
Janet; and he was one of the "most important spokesmen of 
that nineteenth-century version of French materialism 
which has found its way into the daily consciousness of 
contemporary man" (Robinson, 1978,291). Like so many of 
the scientists in this and the previous chapter, Ribot's 
primary purpose was to defeat once and for all the old 
metaphysical psychology and to bring psychology within 
the confines of physical science by demonstrating the 
ultimate dependence of psychological states on 
physiological states. In his words, "the organism and 
the brain... constitute the real personality, " and the 
apparently psychological problem of "the unity of the ego 
is, in its ultimate form, a biological problem" (1898, 
154-156). 
Ribot firmly distinguished the old, metaphysical 
psychology, in which mind or soul is an independent 
"force, " or a transcendental, simple, unitary entity with 
certain faculties, from the new positive psychology, in 
which mind or soul is simply the name or concept associ- 
ated with the activities of a particularly advanced level 
of physiological functioning. He ruled out the pos- 
sibility of any reconciliation or middle ground between 
these two points of view, since "the language and the 
methods of the two sides are now so different, that all 
mutual understanding is henceforth impossible" (1898,2). 
Ribot, like so many other scientists, could only view the 
old and the new psychologies as mutually exclusive and 
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his scornful rejection of the old was clear when he 
admitted that his own views were "undoubtedly... 
hypotheses, but they are at least not of a supernatural 
character" (1898,87-88). Like so many of his con- 
temporaries, Ribot's first concern was to rid psychology 
of the demon supernaturalism, or anything remotely asso- 
ciated with it. 
Instead of being "the fundamental property of the 
'soul' or 'mind, '... [and] that which constitutes its 
essence, " consciousness for Ribot was "a simple 
phenomenon, superadded to the activity of the 
brain,... appearing and disappearing according to circum- 
stances" (1898,4). He considered psychology to be 
purely a branch of biology, the study of the evolutionary 
process that culminated in the appearance of a new char- 
acteristic, consciousness. Early in his career, Ribot 
stated that his theory of memory derived from what he 
described as the position of Huxley, Clifford, and 
Maudsley that "consciousness is only an adjunct of 
certain nervous processes, as incapable of reacting upon 
them as is a shadow upon the steps of the traveler whom 
it accompanies" (1882,11). Later, he modified this 
position somewhat and rejected the position of those who 
turned this epiphenomenalist hypothesis into an automaton 
hypothesis, in which consciousness, solely a product of 
biological processes, has no effect on them. Ribot now 
(1898) considered this an "exaggerated" view and said 
instead that consciousness must have appeared and sur- 
vived during the evolutionary process because it had some 
efficacy: 
It is probable that consciousness was produced like 
every other vital manifestation, first, in a 
rudimentary form, and, to all appearances, without 
much efficacy. But from the moment it was able to 
leave behind it a vestige... from that moment a new 
chance of survival was created. To unconscious 
adaptation, blind, accidental, dependent upon cir- 
cumstances, was added a conscious adapta- 
tion,... surer and quicker than the other.... The 
metaphor of the automaton is no longer acceptable. 
(1898,16-17) 
Nonetheless, he left no doubt about the subsidiary, sec- 
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ondary, derivative status of consciousness, saying that 
"the fundamental and active element is the nervous 
system, [and] the other [consciousness] is only a con- 
comitant" (1898,11-12). Psychologists, he said, may 
treat mental (both intellectual and emotional) states as 
causal phenomena, particularly in connection with per- 
sonality changes, so long as they do not forget that all 
mental states "have their roots in the organism and are 
pre-determined by it..., [and] that these [mental] causes 
are in their turn effects" (1898,51). 
Instead of the old notion of mind or self as a 
simple, unitary entity, Ribot viewed mind as a complex 
compound of innumerable elements of the nervous system 
working in coordination: "Physiology shows that this 
verdict [of simplicity or unity of mind] is an illu- 
sion... . The apparently simple is, on analysis, found to 
be complex" (1882,42,45). In contrast to an indivisible 
essence, "contemporary science ... sees in conscious per- 
sonality a compound resultant of very complex states" 
(1882,107). For Ribot, therefore, individual identity, 
the characteristic sense of permanent unity that each 
individual experiences, derives solely from the body -- 
that is, from "coenaesthesia, " the "organic concious- 
ness, " or the internal, general sensibility of the 
organism's nervous activity (1882,108; 1898,19-20, 
154). This coenaesthesia is the basic, stable, longstand- 
ing, and therefore unnoticed "something that remains" 
behind all the changes, development, and fluctuations in 
the elements that make up an organism's body and mind. 
Identity, therefore, is the "consensus" or "co-ordination 
of the nerve-centres, which themselves represent a co- 
ordination of the functions of the organism, " and "the 
conscious ego is only the psychological expression" of 
that co-ordinated functioning (1898,86-88). 
Ribot's conception of self is thus that of a 
"colonial consciousness, " but it is not thereby com- 
parable to the empiricist, associationist view of self as 
simply a bundle of sensations or perceptions; these 
empiricists, he said, neglect "the relations between 
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primitive states" (1898,89). Instead, he proposed that 
higher individuals evolve out of confederations of 
numerous lower individual elements, and the higher con- 
glomerate functions as a single, higher individual, 
rather than as a collection of multiple individuals, 
because one power gradually becomes stronger until it 
dominates and "obliterates" the others (1898,141-142). 
In particular, "by a long series of successive functional 
delegations, the brain of higher animals has succeeded in 
concentrating within itself the greater part of the 
psychic activities of the colony" (1898,144). 
Ribot derived his view of specific psychological 
processes in the same way that he derived his general 
view of mind, by assuming mental phenomena to be the 
evolved, dependent product of biological processes. 
Memory, for example, is first and foremost "a biological 
fact -- by accident, a psychological fact" (1882,10). 
He argued that memory is most fundamentally an organic 
phenomenon, associated with all levels of biological 
functioning, and that it becomes psychological only at 
the latest stage of evolution, when consciousness is 
introduced. Both muscular tissue and nervous tissue, for 
example, demonstrate the capacity for conservation and 
reproduction, and "psychological memory is only a partic- 
ular phase" of this organic memory, identical to it in 
every way except for the addition of consciousness (1882, 
19). Consciousness accompanies new actions, but once 
these are learned and habitual, consciousness lapses, and 
the memory is again purely an organic one, capable of 
controlling behavior entirely automatically. Conscious- 
ness, therefore, plays merely a "supplementary part... in 
the mechanism of memory" (1882,19), albeit a useful one 
at certain times. 
Ribot thus emphasized that memory is not a separate 
faculty of mind, but is a characteristic of all organic 
processes, and the mechanism by which it occurs involves 
both a static and a dynamic form of physiological traces. 
He insisted first that any impression that activates a 
nerve must modify that nerve's structure in some 
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permanent way, even though we cannot yet detect such 
modifications (1882,23-24). A corollary of this trace 
hypothesis is that, since no idea, sensation, or movement 
is the product of an isolated nerve, but is composed of 
numerous interconnecting nerve elements, then the con- 
necting pathways or associative systems between the ele- 
ments develop "dynamic affinities, which, by repetition, 
become as stable as the primitive anatomical connections" 
(1882,24-26). Memory, in short, "is a biological 
fact... not a collection of impressions, but an accumula- 
tion of dynamical associations" (1882,31). 
Ribot similarly derived his interpretation of subcon- 
scious processes from his basic view that mind, or con- 
sciousness, is a late-appearing product of evolution, an 
adjunct to the more basic neurological processes. Ribot 
said that the most important question to be settled about 
subconscious functioning is whether this is a mental 
activity or a physiological activity -- whether, that is, 
there is some form of consciousness associated with all 
behavior, or whether there is in fact no continuity of 
consciousness, but instead a threshold, above which there 
is consciousness and below which there is only 
physiological functioning (1910). For Ribot, the most 
probable answer is the latter, "that subconscious 
activity is purely cerebral, " unaccompanied by any 
psychic factor (1910,37). Although in this paper Ribot 
said only that "I incline toward this hypothesis, " in an 
earlier book (1882) he had expressed more conviction. 
Consciousness, he said, 
is a complex modality requiring a particular condi- 
tion of the nervous system.... If one of the condi- 
tions of consciousness is wanting, whether 
intensity, or duration, or others of which we are 
ignorant, a part of this complex phenomenon -- con- 
sciousness -- disappears; but another part -- the 
nervous process -- remains. (1882,36) 
Subconsciousness is simply the state underlying con- 
sciousness, in which mental functioning, including com- 
plex processes such as problem solving, continue solely 
as physiological cerebration. The relationship of con- 
sciousness to subconsciousness, or more particularly of 
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psychical memory to organic memory, is that "one is only 
a special phase of the other... only a single factor is 
added" (1882,39). Presumably, therefore, the organism 
could readily function purely as an automaton; the addi- 
tion of consciousness simply gives it an added edge of 
advantage. 
Ribot's view of the evolution of mind -- as well as 
its pathological dissolution -- owed much to the theories 
of Hughlings Jackson. Ribot described memory as a par- 
ticular example of Jackson's law of evolution and dis- 
solution, since memory is a hierarchy or continuum rang- 
ing from the newest memories, which are conscious, 
unorganized, and unstable, to the oldest memories, which 
are unconscious, organized, and stable, and continuing to 
hereditary memories, which are innate, instinctual capa- 
cities. Amnesia, or dissolution of memories, follows the 
reverse order of their acquisition, such that "the new 
perishes and the old endures" (1882,119). Thus, 
intellectual acquisitions go first (because they are 
"acquired and objective"), followed by emotional 
faculties (the "innate ... expression of organic life"), 
and finally actions "almost entirely organic" (1882,120- 
121). The law of amnesia, therefore, is that "it advances 
progressively from the unstable to the 
stable... follow[ing] the path of least resistance -- that 
is to say, of least organization" (1882,122). The law 
of the loss of memory furnishes proof, according to 
Ribot, that memory is a fundamentally biological 
phenomenon, and only "accidentally" a psychological one: 
This law, general when applied to memory, is only 
one phase of a still more general law in biology. 
It is a well-known fact in organic life that struc- 
tures last formed are the first to 
degenerate.... [I]n the biological world, dissolution 
acts in a contrary direction to evolution: it pro- 
ceeds from the complex to the simple. Hughlings 
Jackson was the first to show that the higher func- 
tions. . . were the first to disappear; that 
the lower, 
the simple, general automatic functions were the 
last to go.... The law [of memory] which we have for- 
mulated is only the psychological expression of a 
law of life, and pathology shows in its turn that 
memory is a biological fact. (1882,127) 
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Aphasia, or the loss of speech, follows the same law 
(1882,151-172). Moreover, Ribot speculated that 
recovery of memory and of speech would also fit Hughlings 
Jackson's law, the oldest and most stable forms being the 
first to re-appear (although he could cite only three 
weak cases supporting this conjecture) (1882,123-126, 
172-173). 
In keeping with his physiological theories, Ribot 
attributed not just loss of memory and speech, but indeed 
all abnormal mental processes to organic disturbances. 
He attributed memory loss to "grave anatomical lesion, 
[or] a degeneration of the nervous cells" (1882,118). 
Conversely, hypermnesia, the abnormal exaltation of 
memory, is "always associated with some organic dis- 
order.... [It] seems to depend entirely upon physiological 
causes, and particularly upon the rapidity of the 
cerebral circulation, " such as during fevers, mania, 
ecstasy, hypnotism, hysteria, brain diseases, or near- 
drownings (1882,. 174-176). He also believed that, since 
personality and identity depend on coenaesthesia, then 
disorders of personality must result from an impaired or 
disordered body sense: "The sense of the body plays the 
principal part in the pathology of personality" (1898, 
99). In general, "perversions of the general 
sensibility, " from denial of various bodily parts, to 
alterations of body sense, to denial of one's whole body, 
are "explained by a suppression or alteration of the 
internal sensations" (1898,32,130-131). Multiple per- 
sonality cases derive from "profound causes, probably 
physiologic, having their roots in cenesthesia [sic]" 
(1910,39). Elsewhere, he was not so cautious and 
declared that such cases are "undoubtedly connected with 
the unknown organic change which dominates the whole 
situation" (1898,72). The "two subjective memories" of 
alternating personalities are "the organised expression 
of the two coenaesthesias" (1898,116). Although Ribot 
lamented that "ignorance of the causes arrests our pro- 
gress, " he sought those causes down only one avenue: 
"What are the physiological influences that thus change 
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the general tone of the organism, consequently the 
coenaesthesia and the memory? " (1898,116). When 
addressing the topic of hallucinations, Ribot insisted: 
"There must exist here some anatomical and physiological 
causes, at present unfortunately unknown, the discovery 
of which would solve the problem" (1898,104). He 
admitted that an illusory idea may produce organic 
effects, such as in hypnotized subjects, but he then 
insisted that there must be an underlying organic 
derangement producing the illusory idea (1898,118). Hyp- 
nosis in general he attributed to suppression of elements 
of "the real personality" by "some imperfectly understood 
condition of the nervous centres" (1898,122). 
The above paragraph illustrates that for Ribot, as 
for Carpenter, Huxley, Clifford, and other 19th-century 
scientists, psychological studies too often became a 
rationalist process of inferring explanations, 
hypotheses, or theories from assumptions or principles 
borrowed from other sciences, with insufficient attention 
paid to the empirical process of verifying -- or, more 
importantly, falsifying -- these assertions. None of the 
above statements were supported with relevant evidence; 
and even where he infrequently claimed to be citing evi- 
dence far his position, it is clear that that evidence 
could as easily support another interpretation. He 
insisted, for example, that Siamese twins must share a 
part of their personalities because they share parts of 
their body: 
There will be of necessity... a partial penetration 
of the two egos, and there must exist a determinate 
element of psychic life held in common by 
them.... Each individual is thus a little less than 
an individual, which has been fully corroborated by 
experience. (1898,37) 
Little evidence was, in fact, cited; but one must 
certainly consider that shared environment and the prac- 
tical necessity for cooperation would be equal to shared 
coenaesthesia as candidate explanations for the twins' 
alleged similarities. Yet Ribot went on to speculate that 
if two men could be created "constitutionally identical, " 
with "their hereditary influences rigorously alike, " and 
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their "physical and moral impressions" identical, "there 
would be no other difference between them than that of 
their position in space" (1898,49). Almost comically, 
Ribot then declared himself "somewhat ashamed of having 
accumulated so many data and proofs to establish a truth 
so evident to my eyes" (1898,49-50). 
In fact, the "truth so evident to my eyes" seems to 
have blinded Ribot to the realization that confident 
assertions do not constitute evidence. Physiologically 
oriented scientists such as Ribot, Carpenter, and 
Maudsley carried psychology a major step forward when 
they ended the segregation of psychology and physiology. 
Their usefulness, however, ended when they began sub- 
stituting inference, assumption, and assertion for obser- 
vation; and the expansion of psychological knowledge 
slowed when many of them, satisfied that they had at last 
mortally wounded the enemies supernaturalism and super- 
stition, became content with "brain mythology" and with 
the associated assumption of a one-way causal dependence 
of mental phenomena on neurological phenomena. Now that 
these scientists had firmly aligned psychology on the 
side of natural science, in opposition to metaphysics and 
theology, it remained for other scientists to move 
psychology beyond "physiologizing" and seek an 
understanding of. mental phenomena as, in their own right, 
biologically adaptive phenomena. 
Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) 
Psychologists such as Bain and Ribot had concentrated 
on the first task in the development of scientific 
psychology -- that of bringing it under the auspices of 
science. Wundt was one of the new psychologists who 
turned their attention instead to the second task -- that 
of establishing psychology as a full-fledged autonomous 
discipline, defined by its own subject matter and meth- 
ods. Moreover, as founder and head of the laboratory for 
experimental psychology at Leipzig, where many (if not 
most) of those who became psychologists in the late 19th 
century launched their careers, and as a prolific writer 
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whose works spanned six decades of psychology's formative 
period, Wundt had a far-reaching impact on the new dis- 
cipline. 
Unlike the many exponents of a naturalistic psychol- 
ogy who emphasized the continuity between mind and 
nature, Wundt was among those who began to ride -- or 
direct -- the swing of the pendulum back toward emphasiz- 
ing the radical differences between mind and matter and, 
hence, the need for a new and independent science to 
study the former. The most fundamental distinction 
between mind and nature, according to Wundt, is that the 
former is immediately, or directly, known, whereas the 
latter is mediately, or indirectly, known (e. g., 1894, 
452). This differentiation not only led Wundt to define 
psychology as a science distinct from, and not merely 
subsumed under, the natural sciences; it also led him to 
declare psychology as "the fundamental science supporting 
the natural sciences" and the natural sciences as 
"derivative sciences" (Leary, 1979,234-235). 
Wundt's definition and conception of psychology and 
its methods derived directly from this distinction of 
mind and nature. First of all, he explicitly rejected 
the "deep-rooted tendency to hypostatise mental events" 
and thus to consider either ideas or consciousness as 
objects (1894,250). To accept the notion that mind is a 
"transcendental substance" to which experience belongs 
is, he said, to be guilty of transforming immediate expe- 
rience into objects, or phenomena, a position which con- 
fuses immediate with mediate knowledge and "implies a 
kind of unconscious materialism" (1894,451,453). 
Instead, he defined consciousness as internal experience: 
"Our mind is nothing else than the sum of our inner expe- 
riences, than our ideation, feeling, and willing col- 
lected together to a unity in consciousness" (1894,451); 
and self is "simply and solely the perception of the 
interconnection of internal experience which accompanies 
that experience itself" (1894,250). Psychology, there- 
fore, is quite simply the study of internal experience, 
of "Man himself, not as he appears from without, but as 
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he is in his own immediate experience" (1894,1). Thus, 
its primary method is introspection, or the direct obser- 
vation of that internal experience. More specifically, 
as a science, psychology seeks to discover and describe 
the laws of the interrelation between experiences; it 
seeks to understand the "interconnection of simultaneous 
and successive mental processes; and the problem of con- 
sciousness consists in determining how the particular 
phenomena are interrelated, and how their relations and 
connections again combine to form the totality of mental 
life" (1894,238). 
This fundamental distinction between mind (or 
directly known experience) and nature (or an indirectly 
known and hence postulated substratum) provided the con- 
ceptual basis for Wundt to define the nature of the rela- 
tionship of mind and matter. Mental processes and physi- 
cal processes are, he insisted, "wholly incomparable"; 
even a complete knowledge of one domain would reveal 
nothing about the other (1894,445-446). Because they 
are phenomena of two entirely different kinds, and 
because of the principle of the conservation of energy, 
there can be no causal connection between the two sets of 
processes; each is a "closed circle" and must be studied 
independently as such (1894,41). The "psychical can 
only be adequately explained from psychical, just as 
motion can only be derived from motion, and never from a 
mental process" (1894,442). Hence, physiology studies 
the interconnections of one circle and thus discovers 
physical laws, whereas psychology is concerned only with 
"the explanation of the interconnection of the psychical 
manifestations of life, which form another and a separate 
causal series" (1894,449). 
Paradoxically, however, although the physical and the 
psychical are "two utterly disparate principles, " they 
are "yet never out of relation to each other" (1894, 
449). There can logically be no causal connection 
between them, but they are nonetheless linked in some 
manner: "There is a uniform co-ordination of the 
two.... The connexion can only be regarded as a paral- 
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lelism of two causal series existing side by side, but 
never directly interfering with each other in virtue of 
the incomparability of their terms" (1894,442). 
Wundt, like other proponents of psychophysical paral- 
lelism, was not unmindful of the objection that "this 
'concomitance' in the midst of 'absolute separateness' is 
an utterly irrational notion" (James, 1890b, 1: 136). He 
attempted to mitigate the problem, however, by suggesting 
that the parallelism, or concomitance, between the two 
series occurs only at the level of the most elementary 
processes. Like many other 19th-century scientists, 
Wundt found it "inadmissable" to think that there had 
been a radical point of discontinuity in the evolutionary 
process when "mental existence suddenly appeared" (1894, 
443). Instead, like Clifford and others, he thought it 
more likely that this point of apparent discontinuity was 
only the point at which we can detect mental life and 
that in fact a primitive mental process accompanies every 
basic physical process. Thus, he could argue that the 
"connexion" between mental and physical processes was 
only at this basic level: "The principle of psychophysi- 
cal parallelism, then, refers always to a parallelism of 
elementary physical and psychical processes, and not to 
any parallelism of complex activities on either side or 
of mental function and bodily structure, " since complex 
mental and physical processes were the result of two com- 
pletely separate causal chains (1894,448). 
Wundt emphasized the complete separation of physical 
and mental causality, and hence the need for a separation 
of physiology and psychology, by insisting that, although 
we often talk about the interaction of mental and physi- 
cal processes, it is only out of ignorance of the com- 
plete causal chain on one or the other side that we mix 
our terms. Psychology and physiology may "supplement each 
other; where certain links are wanting in the causal 
nexus of the one side, " we may substitute "connecting 
terms" from the other: 
But it is always understood that the interpolation 
does not carry with it any real completion of the 
broken chain of connected processes; it is simply 
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the substitution for a term of one series the paral- 
lel term of the other. (1894,449) 
Mind and body, therefore, do not influence or interact 
with each other; physical sensations do not cause ideas, 
and volitions do not cause movement: 
We may speak... of the influence of mind upon body, 
or vice versa. But... a direct causal influence can- 
not be exerted.... Thus an external voluntary move- 
ment is not produced by the internal act of will, 
but by the cerebral processes correlated with it; an 
idea does not follow from the physiological excita- 
tions of the sensory centre, but from the 
[psychical] processes, sensational and associative, 
which run parallel to them. (1894,449-450) 
This seemingly paradoxical situation, in which physi- 
cal and mental processes are correlated at one level and 
yet independent at another level, was the inevitable 
result of the two premises on which Wundt built his 
psychology. First of all, he accepted the "numerous 
experiences which put beyond all doubt the connection of 
physiological cerebral function... and... mental activity" 
(1894,7). Second, he accepted "the very first rule of 
scientific logic, -- that only those connections of facts 
may be regarded as causal which obtain between gener- 
ically similar phenomena" (1894,6). 
These two premises, however, led not only to Wundt's 
metaphysical position of psychophysical parallelism; they 
also provided the basis for his conception of psychologi- 
cal science. In his efforts to establish the autonomy of 
psychology, to prevent "the subordination of psychology 
to biology, " Wundt "proceeded from the basic distinction 
between Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften 
which was so characteristic of German academic life" 
(Danziger, 1979,211,206), and he separated the human, 
or psychological, sciences from the natural sciences. He 
went even further, however, and also "distinguished two 
kinds of psychology, physiological and experimental 
psychology, on the one hand, and social or ethnopsychol- 
ogy, on the other" (Danziger, 1979,206-207). Danziger 
pointed out that the separation of these "two com- 
plementary halves" of psychology was made on the basis of 
the distinction between individual and social psychology. 
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Yet the distinction also -- and perhaps more fundamen- 
tally -- stemmed from Wundt's two postulates about mind- 
matter relations: that at an elementary level mental 
processes are correlated with physiological processes and 
that at higher levels mental processes form completely 
independent causal chains. 
Thus, in Wundt's experimental psychology, or 
psychophysics, the psychologist studies the correlation 
of elementary physiological sensorimotor processes and 
the inner experience, or elementary mental sensations, 
associated with them. Yet Wundt explicitly rejected the 
materialistic reductionism to which the study of 
psychophysiological correlation could lead. Although 
psychophysics studies the connection of cerebral and men- 
tal activities, "baseless hypotheses regarding the 
dependence of mental function upon physical processes" 
result from the mistake of confusing one causal chain 
with another (1894,7). Hence, in studying the higher 
phenomena of mental life, the psychologist turns from 
studying the elementary correlation of mind and brain to 
studying the independent mental causal chain, and 
psychology is thus rescued from being subsumed under 
physiology and is recognized as an autonomous science. 
Wundt's separation of psychology into two branches, 
based on the two perennial but conflicting premises of 
psychology -- one being the assumption of 
psychophysiological concomitance, the other being the 
assumption of a causal chain of mental events -- had 
several important consequences. First of all, it set the 
stage for the fragmentation of psychology, in which dif- 
ferent branches of psychology were separated not only by 
the kinds of phenomena they studied, but also by the 
principles of causality and the methods they applied to 
those phenomena. 
Perhaps more importantly, however, this separation of 
psychophysiology on the one hand and "pure" psychology on 
the other hand made it easier subsequently for 
psychologists to ignore the problems and paradoxes raised 
by the enigma of "'concomitance' in the midst of 
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'absolute separation'. " Like Bain, Wundt argued, in 
effect, that the only way to deal with the paradox that 
mental and physical events appear connected, but are so 
different that they cannot be causally connected, was 
simply to accept that "for psychology, as for physiology, 
the principle of psychophysical parallelism turns out to 
be an ultimate postulate, behind which it cannot go" 
(1894,450). By accepting this dualistic parallelism as 
an ultimate postulate, psychologists could study psychol- 
ogy either from the point of view of physical causality 
(sensorimotor processes and psychophysical concomitance) 
or psychical causality (higher mental and social 
phenomena). They could ignore, however, the apparent 
incompatibility of biological determinism and mental 
efficacy. Although Wundt admitted that this return to a 
dualism of mind and matter may seem unsatisfactory and 
"in opposition to our justifiable endeavour after a 
monistic world-theory, " it is nevertheless a necessary 
consequence of scientific analysis, which separates "idea 
and object" and hence divides "the experiential sciences 
into those of nature and mind" (1894,450). With his 
acceptance of this "ultimate postulate" and his sepa- 
ration of the psychological and the natural sciences, 
Wundt, in effect, like most of his contemporaries, fore- 
closed any empirical attempt to push beyond the paradox 
of the dual assumptions that mental and physical 
processes are invariably correlated but that they are 
also conceptually distinct and hence causally independ- 
ent. Metaphysics, he acknowledged, could pursue the 
"inquiry after a higher unity in which the dualism of the 
parallelistic principle may be resolved" (1894,450); but 
any such attempts to go beyond the principle of 
psychophysical parallelism in understanding mind-matter 
relations are "the business not of psychology, but of 
philosophy" (1894,451). 
Another consequence of Wundt's systematization of 
psychology was that he found himself forced to ignore or 
distort phenomena that did not fit readily into his 
system. He was particularly dismissive of the phenomena 
163 
of modern spiritualism and of hypnosis, phenomena that 
suggested both that there were mental processes not sub- 
ject to introspection by the normal waking consciousness 
and that these subconscious mental processes could have 
causal effects on physical systems. He confined his 
observations to the simplest phenomena, dismissing all 
reports of more complex or puzzling phenomena as unreli- 
able (e. g., 1894,328); and he was particularly superfi- 
cial in his treatment of hypnosis, showing himself 
unaware of the broad range of complex phenomena elicited 
in the research of both British and continental investi- 
gators, as well as of the various hypotheses proposed to 
try to understand them (Myers, 1893c). Accordingly, he 
considered all the phenomena of hypnosis or spiritualism 
as readily explainable, the former by known physiological 
processes associated with sleep, suggestion, or automatic 
physiological functioning, the latter by fraud (1894, 
Lecture 22; 1879). 
Wundt's hostility to the phenomena, however, seemed 
to stem, not only from the usual aversion of scientists 
to such phenomena as simply old superstitions in a new 
guise, but more specifically from their incompatibility 
with his assumptions about mind. For Wundt, the 
phenomena of hypnosis -- and indeed of all apparently 
subconscious phenomena -- lie outside the realm of 
psychology because, not being subject to introspection, 
there can be no question of [applying] an experi- 
mental psychological method [to them].... [J]ust in 
the cases which present the most interesting 
phenomena, there is a total absence of any sub- 
sequent recollection. We can only infer what goes 
on in the mind of the somnambulist from his words 
and actions. (1894,336-337) 
Furthermore, since such subconscious processes do not 
form part of one's conscious experience, or the normal 
chain of mental events, they are, by Wundt's definition, 
not psychological at all, but are interesting only as 
examples of "an abnormal excitability of the nervous 
system" (1894,328). 
In objecting to subconscious phenomena as being out- 
side the range of consciousness and introspection, 
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however, Wundt ignored the obvious fact that all 
scientific knowledge of mental processes, even that 
obtained from the introspective method, derives from 
"infer[ring] what goes on in the mind of the [subject] 
from his words and actions. " Subconscious experience, 
therefore, is in principle as accessible to observation 
and experiment as is conscious experience, being limited 
only by the investigator's ingenuity in eliciting from 
the subject the appropriate words and actions. 
Wundt's objections to spiritualistic phenomena were 
more complicated. First of all, he objected to them on 
methodological grounds: Sittings were not, he pointed 
out, adequately controlled by the investigators. The 
objection -- not at all a novel one by 1879 -- was valid 
for most spiritualistic observations; Wundt did not 
address the ones for which it did not seem valid. More 
fundamentally, however, he objected to spiritualistic 
phenomena because, he claimed, they contradict the 
scientific principle that all natural phenomena are law- 
ful processes. According to Wundt, "the most conspicuous 
characteristic of these [spiritualistic phenomena] lies 
precisely in the fact that in their presence the laws of 
nature seem to be abrogated"; they cannot, therefore, be 
natural phenomena (1879,581). Natural science is based 
on "the presupposition of an unchangeable order of occur- 
rence" (1879,581). Spiritualism, in contrast, acording 
to Wundt, is based on the presupposition that "causality 
has a flaw, " and hence its proponents insist that 
scientists "abandon the presupposition of a universal 
causality" and their "former view of nature" (1879,583). 
Thus, "spiritualistic observation and natural science 
stand directly opposed to each other" (1879,581), and, 
if the facts of spiritualism are true, then "all natural 
laws [would be] overthrown by the fact" (1879,583). 
One could, of course, argue (as Myers did) that 
phenomena that appear to contradict the present views of 
science may require an expansion of science, not its 
overthrow; but Wundt's objections to the phenomena asso- 
ciated with spiritualism went even further than their 
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apparent incompatibility with science. He also objected 
to them on moral and religious grounds. Wundt was 
apparently among that growing group of 19th-century 
people who believed that the duality of human experience 
required the separation, not just of natural sciences and 
human sciences, or of physiological psychology and "pure" 
psychology, but also of science and humanities. The 
relations between science, philosophy, and ethics were, 
in Wundt's system, curiously uneven. Science and 
psychology, he said, must be free from philosophical 
biases, but, conversely, philosophy must be based on 
scientific findings (1894,2). Yet even though the aim 
of philosophy is to extrapolate from the data of experi- 
ence and build "a coherent theory of the universe" (1894, 
438), and even though there is "no concept so abstract, 
no notion so remote from the world of sense that it must 
not be represented in thought by some kind of sensible 
idea" (1894,445), still morality -- which one would 
think would have some connection with philosophy -- 
"should remain untouched by the imperfections of the 
world of sense" (1879,590). The phenomena of 
spiritualism, in Wundt's view, violated this separation 
of the two realms of human experience, and ran the risk 
of undermining this elevation of moral and ethical think- 
ing above "knowledge and perception" (1879,590) and of 
degrading it to a crude materialism. 
Taking at face value the claim of ardent 
spiritualists that the phenomena in question testified to 
"the condition of the spirit after death" and that 
mediums were the "chosen instruments of Providence, " 
Wundt understandably concluded that spiritualism was a 
"caricature... of a higher order of the world" (1879, 
592). Moreover, the phenomena associated with 
spiritualism were dangerous because they had a 
"demoralizing influence" produced by "the corrupting 
effects of superstition" (1879,592). In short, the 
reality of the phenomena was unimportant in comparison 
with their "corrupting effects. " The idea that the 
reality of the phenomena, if established, might have 
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effects far more interesting and profound than the crude 
speculations of the spiritualists seems never to have 
occurred to Wundt. 
Wundt understood that a psychology that blurred the 
distinction between mind and matter ran the risk of 
degenerating into a physiological reductionism that 
excluded the essence of human experience. Yet in 
attempting to redefine the boundaries between the world 
of mind and the world of matter, he failed to appreciate 
that this newly defined psychology ran its own risk of 
excluding vast areas of human experience, such as subcon- 
scious phenomena, that did not fit the redefined system. 
Perhaps of even greater consequence for psychology, 
however, was that, despite his insistence on keeping 
metaphysical assumptions out of psychology and on keeping 
morality separate from science, Wundt, like most other 
psychologists, in fact allowed his assumptions about the 
nature of mind, matter, and "supersensuous" phenomena 
such as ethics to influence, unseen and unacknowledged, 
the boundaries of psychology. 
Pierre Janet (1859-1947) 
Pierre Janet's general approach to psychology was, 
perhaps more than that of any other psychologist dis- 
cussed in this chapter, closer to the approach adopted by 
the majority of psychologists who succeeded him in the 
20th century. Ironically, although Janet -- a 
philosopher at Le Havre, physician at the Salpetriere, 
and professor of experimental psychology at the College 
of France -- was a central figure in late 19th- and early 
20th-century French clinical and experimental psychology, 
until recent years he had relatively little influence in 
psychology. Because of the decline of interest in 20th- 
century psychology in hypnosis, hysteria, and somnam- 
bulism, the predominance of psychoanalytic theory and its 
offshoots, the growing divergence of academic and clini- 
cal psychology, and Janet's own reticence to cultivate 
followers, his influence was for a time limited, at least 
until psychologists began once again to become interested 
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in the problems of subconscious phenomena on which he had 
worked and until Ellenberger's (1970) in-depth examina- 
tion of his work re-awakened interest in him specifi- 
cally. Nonetheless, Janet stood as an exemplar of the 
scientific psychologist: In his strict, positivistic 
avoidance of what he saw as metaphysical issues; in his 
insistence that psychology be a descriptive, not a 
theoretical, science; in his adoption of a meth- 
odological, linguistic parallelism that thereby avoids 
the pitfalls of physiological reductionism; and in his 
view of psychology as the study of the observable con- 
duct, or functioning, of the organism, he represented the 
most important and influential trends in modern psychol- 
ogy. 
The most fundamental characteristic of Janet's 
approach to psychology, and the one most reflective of 
the new scientific psychology in general, was his 
insistence that the question of the relationship between 
mind and body, or mental and physiological functioning, 
was an "altogether idle" question, of no concern or 
importance to the psychologist. Influenced particularly 
by Taine and Ribot, Janet, in rejecting metaphysical 
speculation for empirical observation as the method of 
psychology, rejected also the questions that had been 
central to the old metaphysical psychology: "There is no 
reason why we should begin over again here the old ques- 
tion about the physical and the moral [psychological], 
which, from a scientific standpoint, is altogether idle. 
The physician simply sets forth the phenomena" 
(1893/1901, xiii). The task of psychology, therefore, 
was simply to describe. With barely hidden disdain, 
Janet explained late in his career that, whereas some 
persons attempted to use psychological research to reach 
"the summit of the highest metaphysics, my old studies, 
very modest as they were, simply endeavored to throw 
light upon, describe and classify certain phenomena of 
pathological psychology" (n. d., 53-55). 
For Janet, as for so many other psychologists, a 
working assumption of mind-brain unity, derived from the 
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general observations of mind-brain concomitance, provided 
a sufficient understanding of mind-matter relations for 
psychologists to proceed with their work. The word 
"mind" therefore denoted certain brain processes: "You 
will understand, once for all, that the word 'mind' 
represents the highest functions of the brain and proba- 
bly the functions of the cortex" (1893/1901,52). 
Psychological phenomena were those that are of "cortical 
origin" (1893/1901,27). Thus, when Janet explained that 
he was studying functional, or psychological, dis- 
turbances rather than organic ones, he meant that he was 
studying "those which may be justly considered as 
cerebral -- namely, as psychologic" (1893/1901,326). 
The paralyses he treated were the result of "transitory 
modifications of the cells of the cerebral convolutions 
which manifest themselves in the form of a psychological 
disturbance" (1893/1901,336). 
Janet would not enter into discussions about what 
caused these modifications of the cerebral cells; "we do 
not permit ourselves metaphysical speculations on the 
unknown alterations of the cerebral cells" (1893/1901, 
52). Nevertheless, he did allow himself to speculate 
that, in general terms, the cause was a weakness of the 
higher nervous system, or a loss of physiological energy, 
such that there was a fundamental disturbance in higher 
nervous system (that is, mental) functions. Thus, he 
said, hysterics and other "neuropaths" were "individuals 
whose central nervous system is weakened" (1907/1924, 
311), and neurosis in general is a depletion of "our 
nervous system... a depression, an exhaustion of the 
higher functions of the encephalon" (1907/1920,333). 
This depletion of energy could be brought on "by exhaus- 
tion of all kinds, organic ailments, and hereditary 
predispositions" (1930/1961,128). Anything, in other 
words, that lowered an individual's nervous system 
resources, such as puberty, disease, physical or 
intellectual fatigue, emotion, or hereditary weakness, 
could lead to mental illness (1907/1920,333); whether it 
actually did or not depended both on the amount of nerv- 
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ous energy expended and the amount of nervous energy one 
had to start with. Therefore, since "modifications of 
psychological energy... determine great changes in charac- 
ter and play an important part in most psychological dis- 
orders, " the psychology of the future must "study the 
physiological production of energy and its distribution" 
(1930/1961,132-133). 
Yet once he had made it clear, "once for all, " that 
"a mental malady is a cerebral malady" (1893/1901,515), 
Janet proceeded to describe and discuss the phenomena he 
studied solely in psychological terminology. Thus, for 
example, he criticized those who approached hysteria as 
an organic disease, saying that hysteria is "a purely 
mental malady" (1907/1920,277). There has, as a result, 
been some confusion about Janet's position, with some 
writers pointing out that "Janet was decidedly opposed to 
physiological explanation" (Sutcliffe & Jones, 1962,242) 
and that Janet brought to medicine "a more psychological 
view of mental illness" (Perry & Laurence, 1984, p. 34), 
others noting "his preference for physiological 
hypotheses" (White & Shevach, 1942,313). 
The confusion disappears, however, when one recog- 
nizes that for Janet "there is no opposition between the 
definitions that gloriously entitle themselves 
physiological and those that modestly call themselves 
psychological" (1907/1920,321), because they are, in 
fact, simply two different ways of describing the same 
phenomena. Like. Taine, Janet believed that the dif- 
ferences between the physiological hypotheses and the 
psychological ones were "purely verbal differences" 
(1907/1920,337); but since the psychologist's task is to 
describe and since, at this point in our knowledge, the 
psychological terminology is more advanced, accurate, and 
precise, then it is much to be preferred. Janet fre- 
quently objected to physiological hypotheses, such as 
when he observed that Charcot "sought these general laws 
[of hysteria] too much in the physiological domain" 
(1907/1920,17); his objection, however, was not to 
physiological theories per se but rather to the tendency 
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of scientists (such as Charcot and Ribot, "two of my 
masters" [1907/1920,3]) to pretend to a more precise 
knowledge of the physiology involved than they in fact 
had. Similarly, his colleague Pitres was "in too great 
haste, we think, in translating these psychological 
facts, still vague as yet, into anatomical language, 
speaking of an encephalic centre of affective passions" 
(1893/1901,377). Janet admitted that eventually enough 
may be known about the physiological processes involved 
to give a precise "physiological definition of hysteria"; 
but meanwhile, "a psychological definition is... the for- 
mula best able to sum up, simply from a clinical point of 
view, the great majority of hysterical symptoms" 
(1893/1901,514-515). His objection to physiological 
theorists therefore was that they 
take the most commonplace psychological definitions 
and replace their terms with words vaguely borrowed 
from the language of anatomy and the current 
physiological hypotheses.... [T]hat hysteria will not 
be recognized later as resulting from some unknown 
disturbance of the secretion of a vascular gland or 
from some lesion of a nowadays badly defined nervous 
system, I should not dare assert; but... [for now] 
the psychological conception has the mastery. I 
again observe to you that I consider the pretended 
physiological definitions as mere translations of 
the psychological ideas. (1907/1920,322-323) 
Janet's position was, in short, that of an increasing 
number of his colleagues in psychology: Without 
generally acknowledging that he held any metaphysical 
position whatever, he nonetheless assumed a general 
ontological monism of mind and brain, while at the same 
time he insisted on a linguistic or terminological 
dualism that allowed one to describe and discuss 
psychological processes despite the lack of any knowledge 
of the presumed substratum of physiological processes. 
This assumed monism of mind and brain led Janet also 
to take a definite position in the central 19th-century 
conflict over whether the nature of mind is fundamentally 
a multiplicity or a unity. Because all terms such as 
"mind, " "mental, " or "psychological" denote cerebral 
processes, mind was simply the aggregate of certain 
cerebral processes. For Janet, as for Ribot, mind was 
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(in James's words) a product rather than a principle, a 
unified system of elements rather than a unifying force. 
He unequivocally rejected the old idea of mind, or self, 
or human personality, as a simple unity for the new view 
of it as a complex compound: "The word 'conscious- 
ness'... means a rather complicated psychological opera- 
tion, and not an elementary and irreducible operation, as 
is generally believed"; and "the word 'I-* ... designates 
something very complicated. The question here is of the 
idea of personality, of my whole person; it is the union 
of present sensations different from" the individual 
sensations that comprise it (1907/1920,303,305). Per- 
sonality was an aggregate of elementary cerebral 
processes, and the development of personality involved 
the assimilation of "a psychological atom" into that 
aggregate, or the "enormous mass of thoughts already con- 
stituted into a system" (1893/1901,34-35). Thus, 
"psychological life ... owes its apparent unity to 
synthesis alone" (1893/1901,501). 
From this view of mind or personality as atomistic, 
Janet derived his view of the nature of normal 
psychological functioning, which he described as "a 
twofold operation, " the first stage being the production 
of the elementary sensations or "psychological atoms" and 
the second being the absorption of those parts into the 
larger structure: 
First, there is produced in the mind, in the corti- 
cal cells of the brain, if we may so speak, a very 
large number of small, elementary, psychological 
phenomena.... Secondly, there takes place a reunion, 
a synthesis of all these elementary phenomena, which 
are combined among themselves and particularly com- 
bined with the vast and prior notion of personality 
(1893/1901,35-36) 
Not all psychological elements pass from the first stage 
to the second stage; most elementary sensations, in fact, 
are not assimilated into the complex that is personality 
or consciousness. They may "determine a few reflexes, 
awake perhaps a few little states of elementary con- 
sciousness, contribute, no doubt, to [one's] general 
state of well-being or discomfort, but [they] are not 
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clearly perceived by [one's] personality" (1907/1920, 
306). Normal psychological functioning, however, is the 
result of those elements that are absorbed into the 
synthesis or field of consciousness that comprises per- 
sonality. 
Abnormal psychological functioning occurs therefore 
when, because of a general debilitation or weakening of 
the nervous system, fewer psychological elements are 
incorporated into the already existing synthesis. All 
the myriad symptoms of hysteria and other 
psychopathological conditions -- including loss of sensa- 
tion (anaesthesia), loss of memory (amnesia), decreased 
volitional activity (abulia), impaired motor functioning 
or paralysis, changes in character or emotional reac- 
tions, suggestibility, fixed ideas, or somnambulism -- 
are the result of this contraction of the field of con- 
sciousness or decrease in the patient's ability to 
incorporate new elements into the personality. Janet's 
distinction between organic and functional (or 
psychological) disease was that in the former neither of 
the two stages of psychological functioning are operat- 
ing, whereas in the latter only the second stage fails to 
occur. In other words, in organic disease, the 
psychological elements (or cortical alterations) are 
never produced or are destroyed; in functional disease 
they are produced and remain intact but are never assimi- 
lated into the personal synthesis. They are, in a word, 
dissociated from the complex that is personality. 
Hysteria is thus "a pathological incapacity to collect 
the elementary sensations in a general perception" 
(1907/1920,172). The problem is not with the registra- 
tion of the relevant traces or modifications in the 
brain, but with their incorporation into personal con- 
sciousness; the sensations "still exist on their account 
and even determine reflexes and usual movements, " but 
they "can no longer be connected with the totality of 
consciousness" (1907/1920,173). Whereas organic 
psychological impairment involves "the destruction of an 
idea, " functional impairment involves "the dissociation 
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of an idea" (1907/1920,173). In organic amnesia, for 
example, the loss of memory is "due to the destruction of 
traces.. . which the sensations leave in the brain, " that 
is, "a definite and material destruction of the cerebral 
cells which have stored up these modifications" 
(1893/1901,93). In functional amnesia, in contrast, 
"the elements of remembrance, the conservation and the 
reproduction of the images are intact; but there is a 
lack of the real synthesis of the psychological elements 
which suppresses, more or less completely, the assimila- 
tion of the remembrances to the personality" (1893/1901, 
106). 
Much of Janet's research, therefore, consisted of 
demonstrating that the pathological symptoms he 
encountered in his patients were psychological and not 
organic -- that the "psychological atom, " or elementary 
modification of the cerebral cells, existed even if it 
remained outside the personal synthesis or field of con- 
sciousness. In this connection he conducted numerous 
experiments that revealed that hysterics did in fact 
sense what they were unaware of sensing (e. g., 1893/1901, 
24-32). Moreover, his studies also demonstrated that, 
whereas in organic disorders the loss of function follows 
anatomical patterns, in functional disorders the loss 
follows a hierarchical or developmental pattern such as 
Hughlings Jackson had described for nervous system 
functioning. As the level of nervous strength is 
lowered, functions disappear in the order of how recent 
in the evolutionary development of the nervous system 
they are. Thus, the newer, more complex, less stable 
functions of the "higher" cerebral centers -- the 
"psychological" functions -- disappear first, whereas the 
older, simpler, more stable ones of lower brain processes 
-- the "automatic" functions -- remain (e. g., 1907/1920, 
200-201,333). 
Janet's view of mind as the integrated functioning of 
the higher cerebral processes led him to maintain 
throughout his life that subconscious processes were 
always pathological, since, being dissociated from the 
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personality complex, they were evidence of an impaired 
nervous system. He recognized the relationship between 
suggestibility, somnambulism, hysteria, and hypnosis; but 
he went further and maintained Charcot's view, against 
findings apparently to the contrary (e. g., Wingfield, 
1889), that somnambulism, suggestion, and hypnosis could 
be elicited only (or primarily) in hysterics (1893/1901, 
269-277,447-448,517-518; 1907/1920,5,114-115,286- 
292). Hysteria, he thought, should not be considered an 
abnormal subset of the phenomena of suggestion or hyp- 
nosis -- as maintained by Bernheim and the Nancy school, 
as well as by Gurney, Myers, and others associated with 
the SPR. Rather, the "tendency to suggestion and subcon- 
scious acts is the sign of mental [that is, cerebral] 
disease... [and], above all, the sign of hysteria" 
(1893/1901,277). 
Nevertheless, Janet's studies had also led him to 
recognize that psychological processes did not divide 
cleanly into the conscious, synthesized personality 
(whether one of normal, healthy scope or one of 
pathological contraction) and isolated, dissociated sub- 
conscious elements. In certain subjects the dissociated, 
unintegrated elements themselves began to coalesce into a 
new synthesis; what was dissociated, therefore, was no 
longer isolated elements but another personality system. 
This phenomenon, which Janet called somnambulism, raised 
the question, so poignantly addressed by Morton Prince in 
his discussion of the Sally Beauchamp case (Prince, 
1905/1930): Which is the "normal" or "real" personality? 
Janet took the functional view that the more com- 
prehensive, integrated state was the normal, healthy 
state, whereas the more contracted, limited one was the 
hysterical, abnormal state. In a case such as that of 
Dr. Eugene Azam's Felida, in which the second, or somnam- 
bulistic, personality was the more extensive personality, 
it represented "a momentary cure" (1907/1920,90); the 
somnambulistic state was "simply the normal life, such as 
this subject would continually live if [she] were not 
ill" (1893/1901,448). 
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Similarly, Janet's studies had shown that subcon- 
scious processes did not cleanly fit the pattern of 
simple dissolution, along Jacksonian hierarchical lines. 
Some subconscious processes seemed to become part of a 
newly evolving system of consciousness, and some of these 
systems evolved to a point at which they were equal or 
even superior to the original personality. As van der 
Hart and Friedman (1989) pointed out, it was "a paradox" 
of Janet's work that he set out to study hysteria as a 
lower form of mental activity and in the process discov- 
ered some higher forms of mental activity: 
He had intended to study ways in which human 
activity in its simplest form manifested in 
hysterics. He found, however, certain of these dis- 
sociated elementary forms of activity were highly 
developed, including the ability to reason, to make 
judgements, sustain memories, etc. Contrary to what 
he expected, integrative and creative activities 
were present at the level of personality (complete 
with sense of self), but remained outside of per- 
sonal awareness in the normal waking state.... Thus 
Janet's observations led from the hypothesis of the 
absence of the function of creative synthesis in the 
personality to the recognition of the presence of 
this function in a state which was dissociated from 
concious awareness. (6) 
Whereas Janet had intended to demonstrate his hypothesis 
that subconscious processes were the product of a 
pathological dissolution from a complex, integrated state 
to less complex, dissociated states, he had discovered 
that some subconcious states are as complex and 
integrated as conscious ones. His hypothesis of subcon- 
scious phenomena as dissociative seemed, therefore, not 
wrong but somehow incomplete. 
Janet's conclusion that, in cases such as those of 
Felida and Miss Beauchamp, the somnambulistic personality 
was the healthy, "real" personality may have been medi- 
cally -- that is, functionally -- adequate; in their new, 
more integrated states they led healthier, more normal 
lives. On a theoretical -- or even on a personal -- 
level, however, this conclusion seems less adequate. The 
hysterical personality was, after all, the older, 
original personality showing the usual continuity -- if 
not scope -- of memory and consciousness; the somnam- 
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bulistic, healthier personality, in contrast, was of 
relatively recent origin and had apparently begun as a 
dissociated psychological fragment. Janet was clear in 
his stance that the medical, practical criterion was the 
only factor worthy of a psychologist's attention. 
Instead of using subconscious psychological phenomena to 
address "the great problem of the connections between 
soul and body, between thought and brain, " Janet reminded 
his readers that "I have something quite different to do" 
(n. d., 63,62). Regardless of whether or not theoretical 
discussions of these larger issues lead to some knowledge 
of mind-brain relations, "that is quite another problem" 
from the practical problem with which Janet was con- 
cerned: 
Far be it from me to discuss these fine theories 
which seduce certain minds by their scientific 
appearance, and which after all do probably contain 
some truth.... There are many... clinical problems of 
great importance which it seems to me must be 
studied..., and the very least of them is to my mind 
more important than all the huge tomes full of 
speculations put together. (n. d., 64,66) 
Janet's concern as a physician to cure his patients 
was understandable; but his naivety in thinking that 
psychology could be purely descriptive, positivistic, and 
functional without addressing basic underlying theoreti- 
cal questions foreshadowed the inadequacy of some of his 
views, such as his view of subconscious processes as 
solely pathological, dissociative, and inferior; his view 
of psychological processes as cerebral elements or 
"traces" in the brain; or his view of personality as an 
atomistic structure consisting solely of those elements 
forming the synthesis we recognize as consciousness. A 
psychology in which basic theoretical questions were 
excluded as "metaphysical" and "idle" was like the 
proverbial house built on sand -- constructed perhaps 
from quality materials and with quality workmanship, but 
precarious nonetheless. Janet's own researches cried out 
for a deeper insight into the nature of the processes 
causing the "transitory modifications of the cells of the 
cerebral convolutions which manifest themselves in the 
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form of a psychological disturbance" (1893/1901,336). 
He knew perhaps better than most psychologists "that we 
do not yet understand the enormous influence of the 
thought on the body" (1893/1901,373), but he was content 
to fill that gap with descriptions of cases showing the 
influence of thought on body, "whatever be their cause" 
(1893/1901,514). Yet this divorce of description and 
observation from larger orienting theoretical questions 
could only have the effect of limiting the completeness 
and effectiveness of those descriptions and observations. 
As Myers pointed out, although Janet's work was "full of 
new observations and reflections, " it was also often 
"lacking in width of purview" (Myers, 1889g, 186,191). 
Janet's positivistic approach had not only led him to 
inadequate conclusions; it had also, in at least one 
instance, led him to drop, and eventually repudiate, one 
of his own potentially most illuminating lines of 
research. In the early 1880s he carried out a series of 
experiments with his patient Madame B., or Leonie (Janet, 
1886/1968a, 1886/1968b) in which the experimenters 
attempted to hypnotize her or otherwise influence her 
behavior from a distance beyond her sensory range. He 
suggested that "in the light of the above-mentioned facts 
[reported in the papers], the supposition that our [that 
is, the experimenters'] thought can influence the sub- 
ject... seems to have some likelihood" (Janet, 1886/1968a, 
127). He rightly "abstained from drawing conclusions" 
and urged the need for more research "on this delicate 
subject which is as interesting to psychology as it is to 
physiology" (1886/1968a, p. 131; 1886/1968b, 267). But he 
himself never pursued this further research, and by 1930 
he was not only rebuking others who had tried to urge the 
importance of such research, but he was declaring that he 
had always been "skeptical as to mental suggestion and 
hypnotism from a distance" (1930/1961,125) -- apparently 
forgetting that he had earlier expressed the opinion that 
that hypothesis had "some likelihood. " For psychologists 
such as Janet, committed to the view that science and 
metaphysics are antithetical, any attempt to use one to 
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advance the insight of the other was "idle" and "a simple 
departure from more profound studies" (1930/1961,125); 
and even the suggestion that a continuation of Janet's 
studies might reveal "unknown faculties of the human 
mind" was an "abuse of my former observations" 
(1930/1961,125). Janet had been willing to conduct and 
describe experiments indicating that a subject could be 
hypnotized from a distance, until others began to con- 
sider possible theoretical implications of this research; 
Janet then abandoned this line of research entirely, 
eventually even repudiating and denying it altogether. 
William James (1842-1910) 
There is little room for doubt about the central role 
William James played in the establishment of psychology 
as an autonomous scientific discipline. Not only is his 
Principles of Psychology (1890b) considered a classic 
treatise and textbook in psychology, "probably the best- 
known book in all psychology" and one that immediately 
"established James as the foremost psychologist of the 
day" (Gregory, 1987,395,396); its wide-ranging impact 
can also be gauged by the present-day assessment of his- 
torian Jacques Barzun that it is "a masterpiece in the 
classic and total sense, " that is, one that "ought to be 
read from beginning to end at least once by every person 
professing to be educated" (Barzun, 1983,34). Perhaps 
the defining characteristic of the book is its anti- 
reductionism: James refused to allow the reduction of 
mental life to ideational or sensational elements, of 
mind to brain, of psychology to chemistry or physiology, 
or of human experience to philosophical systems. As a 
result, he firmly fixed psychology in its own domain as 
the study of experience -- that is, of thoughts and feel- 
ings as they are experienced, in relation to the whole of 
mental life at any given moment, rather than as isolated 
objects of analysis. James's primary aim in psychology 
was to restore to it an understanding of mind or con- 
sciousness, not as an ineffectual by-product of evolu- 
tion, but as a fundamental and active agent both in the 
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functioning of organisms and in the evolutionary process. 
It is ironic, therefore, that it was William James who, 
despite his own deep interest in the basic problems and 
questions underlying psychology (and specifically and 
particularly in psychical research's approach to these 
questions), did more than perhaps any other psychologist 
to provide justification for psychologists to abandon 
basic questions. 
For James, at the heart of psychology was the ques- 
tion of the relation of mind and body: "The real thing 
to aim at is a causal account; and I must say that that 
appears to be (provisionally at least) in the region of 
the laws as yet unknown of the connexion of the mind with 
the body. There is the subject for a 'science' of 
psychology! " (November 1,1892 letter to James Ward). He 
agreed with his critic G. T. Ladd (Ladd, 1892) that 
psychology was not yet "a 'science' of the correlation of 
mental states with brain-states" (1892,151); thus far, 
it was only "a mass of phenomenal description, gossip, 
and myth" (1892,146). Nonetheless, it had a good basis 
in "an extensive body of rather orderly knowledge" about 
the correlation of mental states with other physical con- 
ditions (1892,152), and, he said, "the ascertainment of 
the laws of such correlation [of mental states with brain 
states] forms the program of a science well limited and 
defined" (1892,151). 
Nevertheless, although James thus made it clear that 
our knowledge of the correlation of mind and brain was in 
its infancy, since "any exact account of brain states is 
at present far beyond our reach" (1892,151), numerous 
aspects of his own work and thought fed the growing con- 
viction among psychologists that the question of mind- 
body relations was an inappropriate question for science 
and that all that remained for science to contribute to 
it was to fill in details about which mental processes 
depend on which brain processes. As James himself recog- 
nized, "modern psychology, finding definite psycho- 
physical connections to hold good, assumes as a con- 
venient hypothesis that the dependence of mental states 
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upon bodily conditions must be thorough-going and com- 
plete" (1902/1958,29). Without accepting that 
hypothesis himself, James had nonetheless done much to 
lead others to accept it unquestioningly by urging on 
them a "strictly positivistic point of view" as the only 
appropriate perspective for a scientific psychologist 
(1890b, vi). One of his primary aims in the Principles 
was to convince his readers that psychology as a natural 
science could never explain, but could only describe, 
mind-brain relations: "Psychology, when she has 
ascertained the empirical correlation of the various 
sorts of thought or feeling with definite conditions of 
the brain, can go no further... as a natural science. If 
she goes further she becomes metaphysical" (1890b, vi). 
Yet there was much in the Principles to suggest to 
psychologists that they had already gone as far as they 
could go -- in a qualitative if not a quantitative sense 
-- in describing mind-matter relations. The fact of a 
general, neutral concomitance between mind and brain was 
well established: "Consciousness... 'corresponds' to the 
entire activity of the brain.... [T]his formula... is... 
unobjectionable if taken vaguely, positivistically, or 
scientifically, as a mere empirical law of concomitance 
between our thoughts and our brain" (1890b, 177). This 
general law of concomitance is, at present, "the ultimate 
known law" (1890b, 346). Yet, James pointed out, if one 
attempts to go further and identify a more "elementary 
psycho-physic law" by learning "which mental fact and 
which cerebral fact are, so to speak, in immediate jux- 
taposition, " one immediately encounters an apparently 
insuperable conceptual problem (1890b, 177). To discover 
this elementary law, one must first identify the minimal 
mental fact and the minimal physical fact which are con- 
nected. The minimal mental fact, in James's view, can 
only be an entire thought, as it is experienced; but what 
are the parameters of that thought? And what is the min- 
imal physical fact to which it corresponds? The brain, 
he says, is made up of separate molecules, but the 
thought seems to correspond to the entire brain process 
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occurring at the time the thought occurs. Yet an 
"'entire brain-process' is not a physical fact at all. 
It is the appearance to an onlooking mind of a multitude 
of physical facts. " It is, in short, a concept or "fic- 
tion of popular speech" and thus "cannot serve as the 
objectively real counterpart to any psychic state 
whatever" (1890b, 178). 
Thus, when James went on to restate more explicitly 
his principle of positivism for psychology, it is diffi- 
cult for the reader not to conclude that psychology as a 
science had in fact progressed as far in its understand- 
ing of mind-matter relations as it could: 
a blank unmediated correspondence... of the succes- 
sion of states of consciousness with the succession 
of total brain-processes... [is] the simplest psycho- 
physic formula, and the last word of a psychology 
which contents itself with verifiable laws, and 
seeks only to be clear, and to avoid unsafe 
hypotheses. (1890b, 182, James's emphasis) 
This "empirical parallelism... [is] the wisest course, " 
and the positivistic psychologist will say only "that 
nature in her unfathomable designs has mixed us... of 
brain and mind, that the two things hang indubitably 
together and determine each other's being, but how or 
why, no mortal may ever know" (1890b, 182). Many 
psychologists, not surprisingly, concluded at this stage 
in the history of psychology, as James did at this stage 
of his book, that "we have now finished the physiological 
preliminaries of our subject and must... study the mental 
states themselves" (1890b, 183). 
James argued for a positivistic psychology because he 
understood that science can study only phenomena, not 
metaphysical propositions as such souls or "mind-stuff": 
"We need a fair and explicit abandonment of such ques- 
tions as that of the soul, the transcendental ego, the 
fusion of ideas or particles of mind stuff, etc., by the 
practical man" (1892,149). He praised those who 
understood the need to separate the metaphysical from the 
empirical questions, and thus he argued that "almost all 
the fresh life that has come into psychology of recent 
years has come from the biologists, doctors, and psychi- 
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cal researchers" (1892,149). Unfortunately, however, 
the border between the empirical and the metaphysical is 
not a clearcut one, and, indeed, progress in science 
often comes from those who remain in the gray border area 
and attempt to translate the latter into the former. 
This, in fact, was exactly what the psychical researchers 
James praised were attempting to do. James himself 
defined metaphysics as "nothing but an unusually 
obstinate effort to think clearly" (1890b, 145); and he 
reminded his readers that the empirical parallelism he 
urged his colleagues in psychology to adopt was 
"certainly only a provisional halting-place, and things 
must some day be more thoroughly thought out" (1890b, 
182). Yet he had also urged his colleagues "to avoid 
unsafe hypotheses" by becoming strictly positivistic, and 
most of them did so by avoiding any topic that could be 
construed as metaphysical and thus by abandoning the 
question of mind-matter relations altogether. In these 
circumstances, clearly, if "things" were ever to be "more 
thoroughly thought out, " it was not likely to be by 
psychologists. 
In short, James's positivism encouraged the sepa- 
ration, rather than the interaction, of descriptive 
science and theoretical philosophy, and it thus led 
psychologists to abandon questions of major theoretical 
importance. Similarly, James's pluralism, developed and 
propounded by him to extend and broaden the study of 
human experience, encouraged psychologists to dichotomize 
and segregate, rather than try to integrate, various 
kinds of human experience and thus simply to accept, 
rather than be puzzled by and stimulated to consider fur- 
ther, paradoxes of human experience. James had intended 
his pluralism and radical empiricism to encourage the 
phenomenological study of human experience in its entire 
scope and variety and to discourage the intellectualist 
tendency to systematize too quickly and thereby to study 
only those aspects of thought or behavior that fit or 
confirm one's system. Behind this pluralistic, radical 
empiricism was his conviction that there was some truth 
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or validity to even opposing views: "James was... intent 
on giving each of them [opposing views] room to differ 
and to possess part of the truth without mutual cavil" 
(Barzun, 1983,235). For example, in The Varieties of 
Religious Experience James described the differences 
between the mystical-religious and the rationalist- 
scientific approaches to knowledge. To the mystic, 
knowledge comes from inner experiences that are as 
convincing to those who have them as any direct 
sensible experiences can be, and they are, as a 
rule, much more convincing than results established 
by mere logic ever are.... [Y]ou cannot help regard- 
ing them as genuine perceptions of truth, as revela- 
tions of a kind of reality which no adverse argu- 
ment, however unanswerable by you in words, can 
expel from your belief. (1902/1958,72) 
To the rationalist, in contrast, 
all our beliefs ought ultimately to find for them- 
selves articulate grounds... [including] (1) 
definitely statable abstract principles; (2) 
definite facts of sensation; (3) definite hypotheses 
based on such facts; and (4) definite inferences 
logically drawn. Vague impressions of something 
indefinable have no place in the rationalistic 
system. (1902/1958,72) 
James, however, argued that both "vague impressions" 
(feelings) and "logic" (intellect) have their place in 
human knowledge. In urging the importance of studying 
the "Unclassified Residuum, " or phenomena that do not fit 
present scientific systems, he observed: 
To no one type of mind is it given to discern the 
totality of Truth. Something escapes the best of 
us, not accidentally, but systematically, and 
because we have a twist. The scientific-academic 
mind and the feminine-mystical mind shy from each 
other's facts, just as they fly from each other's 
temper and spirit.... [Yet] in psychology, physiol- 
ogy, and medicine, wherever a debate between the 
Mystics and the Scientifics has been once for all 
decided, it is the Mystics who have usually proved 
to be right about the facts, while the Scientifics 
had the better of it in respect to the theories. 
(1890a, 362) 
James described other dichotomous views or 
approaches, similarly intending to inspire psychologists 
(and others) to look for the truth in both perspectives. 
Most of these dichotomies reflected the fundamental oppo- 
sition that had developed between religion and science. 
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In the Principles, for example, James contrasted the 
teleological view that "the Kosmos [is] an expression of 
intelligence rational in its inward nature .... that it is 
a realm of final purposes, that it exists for the sake of 
something, " with the mechanistic view that "the present 
[is] only as so much mere mechanical sprouting from the 
past, occurring with no reference to the future" (1890b, 
8). With this distinction made, he then wholeheartedly 
opposed the view that mind is a mechanistic automaton or 
reflex and endorsed the view that mental phenomena, 
unlike physical ones, are characterized by purpose or 
intelligence. 
Likewise, he contrasted the personal and the 
impersonal views of life, distinguished by whether or not 
the personal significance and destiny of an individual 
being was considered important (1897/1961,45; 1902/1958, 
371); and he then argued that, even though the personal 
view had undoubtedly led to excesses and was thus not "a 
sufficient world-theory, " nevertheless to dismiss it 
altogether was "a most shallow verdict" (1897/1961,45). 
Since the personal view of life was "perenially fed by 
facts of experience, " psychology must follow the lead of 
psychical research in studying these experiences and in 
attempting to halt the rapid divergence of mechanistic 
science and human experience, to "[bridge] the chasm, 
[heal] the hideous rift that science, taken in a certain 
narrow way, has shot into the human world" (1897/1961, 
46) : 
The spirit and principles of science are mere 
affairs of method; there is nothing in them that 
need hinder science from dealing successfully with a 
world in which personal forces are the starting- 
point of new effects.... [T]his systematic denial on 
science's part of personality as a condition of 
events, this rigorous belief that in its own essen- 
tial and innermost nature our world is a strictly 
impersonal world, may, conceivably, as the whirligig 
of time goes round, prove to be the very defect that 
our descendants will be most surprised at in our own 
boasted science. (1897/1961,47). 
Yet James's own arguments for a positivistic psychol- 
ogy had sown the seeds that undermined the purpose that 
lay behind his pluralism and radical empiricism. Hoping 
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eventually to "bridge the chasm" and "heal the hideous 
rift" between diametrically opposed views and approaches, 
he had 
thought it wiser to leave the thesis and antithesis 
dangling.... It takes two opposing views to cut into 
a subject, just as a pair of scissors requires two 
opposing blades.... Feeling that both views were 
valid in a context, he knew both must be right" 
(Allport, 1966,146). 
He had encouraged a broader and more diverse psychology, 
but he had also fostered the conviction among 
psychologists that when they had described "the bare 
phenomenal fact with no hypothesis" (1890b, 177), they 
had done as much as they could as psychologists: "The 
phenomena are enough" (1890b, 346). His positivism had 
discouraged psychologists from theoretical attempts to 
reconcile and unify diverse, pluralistic phenomena; the 
scissors with its opposing blades had been constructed, 
but it had not yet been put to use cutting into basic 
problems. James had encouraged this broad-based fact- 
gathering by emphasizing the antithesis, rather than the 
interaction, of fact and theory: "If the hard alterna- 
tive were to arise of a choice between 'theories' and 
'facts' in psychology, between a merely rational and a 
merely practical science of the mind, I do not see how 
any man could hesitate in his decision" (1892,153). 
Moreover, for him it was sufficient simply to accept the 
pluralistic view "that the world can be handled according 
to many systems of ideas... each corresponding to some 
part of the world's truth, each verified in some degree, 
each leaving out. some part of real experience" 
(1902/1958,107,108n). Whether the fragments would ever 
be put together into a larger understanding, "only the 
future can answer" (1902/1958,108n). As a result, the 
opposing views were left "dangling, " and the "rift" and 
"chasm" between the purposeful, personal view of the 
universe and the mechanistic, impersonal view, far from 
being bridged, continued to grow. 
The extent to which psychologists, in following the 
positivistic, pluralistic path laid out for them by 
James, nonetheless diverged from the larger goals he had 
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in mind can perhaps best be understood by considering the 
extent to which they failed to take up "the general prob- 
lem of the subliminal, as Myers propounds it.... [as] one 
of the great problems, possibly even the greatest prob- 
lem, of psychology" (March 3,1901 letter to James Sully, 
quoted in James, H., 1920,2: 141). James said that "the 
really important part of these investigations [of subcon- 
scious phenomena] ... (is] their possible application to 
the relief of human misery.... [N]othing less than the 
cure of insanity -- that direst of human afflictions -- 
lies possibly at the end of such inquiries" (1890a, 371- 
372). Here again he emphasized a rigid dichotomy between 
a practical psychology and a metaphysical psychology: 
"The kind of psychology which could cure a case of melan- 
choly, or charm a chronic insane delusion away, ought 
certainly to be preferred to the most seraphic insight 
into the nature of the soul" (1892,153). As a result, 
psychologists in general failed to take up the question 
of subconscious phenomena as a problem of general 
theoretical import in psychology, and the study of such 
phenomena became more and more confined to the clinical 
or medical perspective. 
Yet James himself had been intensely interested in 
subconscious phenomena because of their potential for 
increasing knowledge about the nature and extent of mind 
or human personality -- a question he labelled "Myers's 
problem" (1902/1903,17; 1909/1961,324). A study of 
subconscious phenomena was "destined to throw a new light 
into the very abysses of our nature" (1890b, 211), and 
hence was "of the most urgent importance for the com- 
prehension of our nature" (1890b, 373). Nevertheless, in 
his zeal to purge psychology of the theoretical and 
philosophical excesses with which it had often been bur- 
dened, James led psychologists to abandon the basic 
theoretical questions with which even the most practical 
psychology must be guided if it is to achieve results of 
any lasting value. Subconscious phenomena, as James 
recognized, had much potential for shedding light on the 
fundamental question of whether mind or human personality 
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is "an elementary fact in nature" or, in contrast, "is 
but a passive resultant of the really elementary forces, 
physical, chemical, physiological, and psycho-physical, 
which are all impersonal and general in character" 
(1902/1958,105). Yet psychology, transformed by James 
and others into a positivistic, pragmatic, and 
phenomenologically pluralistic undertaking, was no longer 
interested in such fundamental questions. 
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PART II - MYERS: EXPANDING PSYCHOLOGY 
CHAPTER 5 
PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES: TERTIUM QUID 
Background: Victorian Rationalism 
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) has been described as 
the "inspiration of later Victorian rationalism, which 
attracted many of the epoch's chief intellectuals" 
(Altick, 1973,234). Even among those who disagreed with 
details of his empiricist philosophy, of his sociopoliti- 
cal utilitarianism, or of his associationist psychology, 
his liberal and empirical approach to social and 
intellectual problems had widespread influence, particu- 
larly through his first book, the System of Logic 
(1843/1846). He articulated the belief that knowledge 
derives solely from experience and from scientific -- 
that is, deductive and inductive -- reasoning. According 
to Mill, there are two kinds of natural law: those that 
are always universal and those that are universal only 
under appropriate circumstances. In other words, there 
are, above all, the basic laws of nature -- the axioms, 
principles, or general propositions that are invariably 
valid, such as the principle of the uniformity of nature 
and, closely related to it, the law of causation or "the 
principle that every occurrence has a cause" (Schneewind, 
1967,317). There are also, however, the empirical laws 
of nature, or "regularities which hold as far as a 
limited experience shows but which, we have reason to 
believe, might well not hold under quite different cir- 
cumstances" (ibid. ). According to Mill, therefore, 
science is a process of both induction and deduction, in 
which basic laws are derived from empirical laws, and 
vice versa; and the ultimate aim of scientific knowledge 
is to show how the two types of laws are connected and 
"why the combination of circumstances and laws renders 
inevitable the limitations within which the empirical 
laws hold" (ibid. ). For Mill and the many 19th-century 
thinkers who were influenced by him, not only physical 
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science but also knowledge about social, political, and 
even religious matters could and must rely on the empiri- 
cal epistemological methods of science. 
The impact of Mill's writings was particularly strong 
on intellectual circles at Cambridge in the 1860s; and it 
was to Cambridge that Frederic Myers came as a freshman 
in 1860 and where he remained (except for brief periods) 
until his death in 1901. Myers had been born at Keswick, 
England, in 1843, the son of a liberal clergyman who died 
when Myers was 8. His intellectual and creative 
abilities emerged early and remained intensely active the 
rest of his life: He was reading (the Bible) by the age 
of 4; he had memorized 560 lines from Macaulay's Lays at 
age 5 1/2 (Gauld, 1968,41); in his youth he "gradually 
wrote out Bucolics, Georgics, Aeneid from memory" (Myers, 
1893/1961,10); and he won major prizes for his poetry 
both before entering Cambridge and while at Cambridge. 
At Cambridge he earned a First Class in both the Classi- 
cal and Moral Sciences Triposes, and he began reading for 
the Natural Sciences Tripos (which, however, he was never 
given official permission to finish). In 1865 he was 
appointed to a fellowship and lectureship in classics at 
Cambridge, which he held until 1869. In that year, 
Myers's teacher and friend Henry Sidgwick had taken the 
audacious and courageous step of resigning his fellowship 
after he had concluded that he no longer believed in the 
articles of the Anglican Church which fellows were then 
required to support. Both Myers and Sidgwick, like many 
others at Cambridge influenced by Mill's liberalism, had 
become increasingly active in the movement to broaden the 
reach of higher education in Britain, and in 1869 Myers 
too resigned his fellowship at Cambridge -- in his case 
to work full time in this movement. For several years he 
devoted himself to working for women's education in par- 
ticular. After the passage of the Education Act of 1870, 
he began work in 1872 as a government school inspector, 
and in 1875 he was appointed school inspector for the 
Cambridge District, a position he held for the next 25 
years. 
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Myers's work in education, however, eventually pro- 
vided simply the background and financial support for the 
real work of his life. Myers had grown up during "the 
very flood-tide of materialism, agnosticism, -- the 
mechanical theory of the Universe, the reduction of all 
spiritual facts to physiological phenomena" (Myers, 
1893/1961,15). Like many of the intellectual leaders of 
the mid-19th century, he had rejected the Christianity in 
which he had been raised because of its insufficient 
rational basis and, as he put it, "the need for an inward 
make-believe" that it required (Myers, 1893/1961,13). 
Nevertheless, scientists such as many of those discussed 
in the preceding chapters were giving widespread currency 
to the new assumption that mind, consciousness, spirit -- 
the phenomenon of Life, in other words -- was a secondary 
byproduct of elementary material processes, and this 
assumption also seemed to him a gratuitous one that 
required closer scrutiny. In particular, he believed 
that it could be tested only by the scientific, or 
empirical, examination of all phenomena that suggested 
the primary or causal efficacy of psychological 
processes. After more than a decade of informally study- 
ing some such phenomena with friends and acquaintances, 
in 1882 Myers collaborated with a group of scholars, 
scientists, and other persons in forming the Society for 
Psychical Research, an organization intended to be the 
focal point for systematic effort to examine the assump- 
tion, increasingly entrenched in modern thought, that 
matter is, in the final analysis, the fundamental prop- 
erty of nature which has produced mind or consciousness 
and upon which mind is wholly dependent. And over the 
next two decades; Myers eventually became the focal point 
for the work of the SPR, arguing for the importance -- 
and the feasibility -- of questioning that assumption; 
identifying and describing phenomena pertinent to the 
question; and enunciating the principles and methods he 
believed to be the most appropriate for attacking the 




Mill's liberal and empirical approach to social and 
intellectual problems was commonplace among mid-19th- 
century scientists, such as those discussed in Chapters 3 
and 4. An equally important aspect of his approach was, 
however, less common among 19th-century scientists, par- 
ticularly among those engaged in the difficult and con- 
troversial task of transforming the study of human nature 
and mind from a metaphysical to an empirical enterprise. 
As I pointed out in Chapter 2, for Houghton (1957) Mill 
was the exemplar of the kind of thinker who believes that 
knowledge advances when one extracts, from even opposing 
views and positions, the strong points and truths in them 
and then attempts to combine them into some new, broader, 
and more inclusive view. According to Mill, weaknesses 
and errors of thought can be attributed primarily to too 
little data, too narrow a perspective, or, "in a word, 
one-sidedness" (Schneewind, 1967,315). Such an approach 
thus went far beyond merely being tolerant of opposing 
views; for those who agree with Mill that "both sides of 
the great controversies" are neither wholly "right, nor 
wholly wrong" (Mill, 1910,2: 360), it follows that one 
should actively seek and critically study opposing views 
in an effort to appropriate from them any and all ele- 
ments that could be used in building a more accurate pic- 
ture of reality. Moreover, by continually exposing ideas 
to new data and opposing perspectives, one could identify 
-- and attempt to eliminate -- weaknesses in those ideas. 
I argued earlier, and hope to demonstrate in the rest 
of this thesis, that 19th-century psychical research, 
particularly in the work of Frederic Myers, became the 
stronghold not only for Mill's empirical approach to 
problems of mind and human behavior, but especially for 
Mill's (in Gurney's words) "tertium quid" approach to 
knowledge. Because the first generation of scientific 
psychologists, as represented by the scientists discussed 
in Chapters 3 and 4, had undertaken the formidable job of 
replacing one approach to psychology with a new and 
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entirely different one, their often strident partisanship 
was, up to a point, understandable and arguably neces- 
sary. Nonetheless, as I discussed in Chapter 2, 
scientific psychology by its very nature confronted 
scientists with problems and paradoxes unknown in other 
sciences. Scientific psychology was, unlike other 
sciences, an attempt to apply objective methods to essen- 
tially subjective phenomena. As a result, it intensified 
paradoxes that other sciences could avoid. First of all, 
it brought the essence of human experience -- volition -- 
into conflict with the essence of science -- determinism. 
It brought, in other words, the duality of human experi- 
ence -- including that of mind and matter, cause and 
effect, free will and law -- into conflict with the fun- 
damental principle of the continuity, uniformity, or 
unity of nature. The attempt to apply the analytic, 
reductionistic methods of science to the question of mind 
or consciousness also brought scientists face to face 
with the paradox of unity and multiplicity, of whether 
the essence of a phenomenon -- be it an atom or a mind -- 
lay in its wholeness or in its aggregate parts. More- 
over, psychology. raised the fundamental and never-before 
encountered problem of whether the essence of science 
itself lies in its method or in its principles -- or, 
more specifically, which of its principles are, in Mill's 
terms, basic laws of nature and which are empirical laws 
of nature. 
Behind all of these problems and paradoxes lay the 
fundamental questions of psychology: What is the nature 
of what is variously called mind, consciousness, soul, 
personality? How can mental phenomena be reconciled with 
physical phenomena? Is mind derivative from, and hence 
secondary to, matter, or is it itself a primary, causal 
feature of nature? Does the observed correlation, or 
concomitance, of mental functioning and nervous system 
functioning imply the one-way dependence of consciousness 
on brain, or is there instead a two-way interaction sug- 
gesting a more equal status in nature for consciousness 
and matter? The attempt to apply scientific methods and 
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principles to the problem of mind made such questions 
unavoidable. Yet, as I tried to show in Part I, most 
scientists, including psychologists, did ultimately avoid 
them. Instead of moving beyond the old dualism that had 
proved so unsatisfactory to the modern scientific mind, 
they set up a new dualism in which paradoxes were 
resolved by placing the conflicting elements of experi- 
ence into different categories of thought. They dealt 
with the anomaly of volition in an otherwise 
deterministic nature by narrowing science, by defining it 
as a specific world view that excluded mental causality, 
rather than as a general epistemological method that 
might, in principle, ultimately be able to incorporate 
mental causality in an expanded view of nature. In 
psychology, they dealt with the problem of mind by 
segregating it from the problem of matter, by estab- 
lishing a conceptual parallelism that allowed 
psychologists to examine one or the other set of 
phenomena but did not allow them to move beyond the vague 
assumption of psychophysical unity and examine the actual 
nature of that concomitance. Caught in the apparently 
unyielding dichotomy of materialistic naturalism and 
dualistic supernaturalism, scientists felt compelled to 
choose one or the other position; and, paradoxically, in 
so doing they further entrenched the rift between mind 
and matter that they had initially intended to abolish. 
Myers saw quite a different option. In his view, the 
really interesting work in science, and the real chal- 
lenges, do not end but begin precisely when one comes up 
against two contradictory findings, or positions, or 
theories. He, like Mill, believed that conflicting posi- 
tions suggest the need for a broader conceptual frame- 
work, which requires both more information and the wider 
view that that information brings. The really good work 
in science, therefore, and the real breakthroughs occur 
when one continues to compare conflicting data and ideas 
until a new picture emerges that can put conflicts and 
paradoxes in a new light or a larger perspective. In 
particular, one will never resolve conflicts, or move 
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beyond paradoxes, without continually re-examining the 
assumptions that gave rise to the conflicts in the first 
place. 
The Empirical Approach 
It is readily apparent from even a brief glance at 
Myers's writings that his primary and ultimate concern 
was with the question of whether individual personality 
or consciousness survives death. His interest in 
psychology and in the problem of the relation of mind and 
body was no mere academic interest, but was of concern to 
him for the very practical and direct reason that it is 
of concern, at some time, to all individuals who feel any 
attachment to life or to other individuals and who are 
aware of their own inevitable death and that of everyone 
around them. As he expressed it, 
the question for man most momentous of all 
is... whether or no his personality involves any ele- 
ment which can survive bodily death. In this direc- 
tion have always lain the greatest fears, the 
farthest-reaching hopes, which could either oppress 
or stimulate mortal minds. (Myers, 1903,1: 1) 
Whether individual persons are isolated, temporary 
products of natural processes occurring independently of 
themselves, or whether they are in some sense conscious, 
permanent participants in those processes is the question 
with the most profound implications for how one lives and 
interacts with other persons. If death, Myers said, 
marks the end of an individual -- of individual con- 
sciousness, mind, self, soul, personality, or whatever we 
choose to call it -- "then any human conception of a 
moral universe must simply be given up. We are shut in 
land-locked pools; why speak to us of an infinite sea? " 
(Myers, 1900c, 121). 
Religion and philosophy, of course, had always 
attempted to provide answers to this question of sur- 
vival, but for Myers belief in religious and philosophi- 
cal proposals was insufficient, and indeed impossible, 
without the rational grounds of empirical observation to 
support them. Like many of his contemporaries, Myers had 
come to accept the empirical methods of science as the 
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only reliable and ultimately successful means of gaining 
knowledge. Thus, knowledge about "the existence, the 
powers, the destiny of the human soul" (Myers, 1903,1: 1) 
could only be attained "in the same way as we have 
attained knowledge about physical things" (Myers, 1881, 
103), by "those methods of inquiry which in attacking all 
other problems [man] has found the most efficacious" 
(Myers, 1903,1: 1). Knowledge could not, in other words, 
come from "fondling hallowed traditions" or "juggling 
with metaphysical terminology"; it was "not attainable in 
any other way" than "by observation and experiment, " by 
"an inquiry resting primarily... upon objective facts 
actually observable, upon experiments which we can repeat 
to-day, and which we may hope to carry further to-morrow" 
(Myers, 1900b, 456; 1903,1: 7). 
Myers was clearly aware that science and intellect 
are limited modes of human experience. A person whose 
intensely poetic and emotional nature was vividly 
apparent in all his writings, he recognized that science 
and intellect may not provide a person's "only or his 
deepest insight into the meaning of the Universe, " and 
that "contemplation, revelation, ecstasy, may carry deep 
into certain hearts an even profounder truth" (Myers, 
1900c, 114). He recognized also that science "rests on 
assumptions which we cannot fully prove; or which even 
indicate, by their apparent inconsistency, that they can 
be at best but narrow aspects of some underlying law 
imperfectly discerned" (ibid. ). Nonetheless, for Myers 
as for an increasing number of people in the modern world 
of the 19th century, science, "a narrower, but a more 
stable range of demonstrated fact, " was more satisfying 
than "Tradition and Intuition. " We must recognize the 
limitations, he said, of scientific inquiry, 
just as we admit the inadequacy, the con- 
ventionality, of human speech itself. Speech cannot 
match the meaning which looks in an hour of emotion 
from the eyes of a friend. But what we learn from 
that gaze is indefinable and incommunicable. Our 
race needed the spoken and written word, with all 
its baldness, if they were to understand each other 
and to grow to be men. So with Science as opposed 
to Intuition. Science forms a language common to all 
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mankind; she can explain herself when she is 
misunderstood and right herself when she goes wrong; 
nor has humanity yet found... that the methods of 
Science, intelligently and honestly followed, have 
led us in the end astray. (Myers, 1900c, 114) 
In other words, whereas religion or metaphysical specula- 
tion may bring private conviction, only the scientific 
method can provide public knowledge: 
Religions and philosophies... are but balloon-flights 
which have carried separate groups up to the 
mountain summit, whither science at last must make 
her road for all men clear. It is by breach of con- 
tinuity... that they have been able to soar so high. 
For Science, on the other hand, the continuity of 
the Universe is in fact its key. (Myers, 1903, 
2: 261) 
The Principle of Continuity 
For Myers, Mill, and virtually all 19th-century 
scientists, the continuity or uniformity of nature had 
emerged as the one most fundamental principle guiding 
modern scientific knowledge: "If Nature is to be 
intelligible to our minds she must be continuous; her 
action must be uniformitarian and not catastrophic" 
(Myers, 1895a, 22). The ultimate consistency of the 
universe was one of those "assumptions which we cannot 
fully prove" but on which science depended entirely: 
The faith to which Science is sworn is faith in the 
uniformity, the coherence, the intelligibility of, 
at any rate, the material universe.... [I]f any 
phenomenon... seems arbitrary, or incoherent, or 
unintelligible, she does not therefore suppose that 
she has come upon an unravelled end in the texture 
of things; but rather takes for granted that a 
rational answer to the new problem must somewhere 
exist, -- an answer which will be all the more 
instructive because it will involve facts of which 
that first question must have failed to take due 
account. (Myers, 1900c, 120) 
The faith to which Myers and his colleagues in the SPR 
were sworn -- "the one dogma which that Society holds in 
corporate fashion" (Myers, 1894-1895,190) -- was that 
all phenomena -- mental and material, normal and 
abnormal, commonplace and rare -- are in some sense con- 
tinuous and coherent and thus amenable to the rational, 
empirical methods of science: 
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We adopt the ancient belief... that the world as a 
whole, spiritual [or mental]1 and material together, 
has in some way a systematic unity; and on this we 
base the novel presumption that there should be a 
unity of method in the investigation of all fact. 
We hold therefore that the attitude, the habits of 
mind, the methods, by aid of which physical science 
has grown deep and wide, should be applied also to 
the spiritual world. (Myers, 1900c, 117) 
The rationale behind the development of the new 
scientific psychology of the 19th century had been this 
belief that the same attitudes and methods must be 
applied in psychology as well as in other areas of human 
knowledge. Myers realized, however, that the principle 
of continuity implied more than simply uniformity of 
approach; it also implied that if true knowledge about 
mental phenomena were to be attained, scientists had to 
achieve some understanding of the continuity between men- 
tal and physical phenomena -- in short, of the nature of 
the relationship between mind and matter. Myers credited 
primitive peoples with having "dimly felt after a princi- 
ple of continuity, " with the result that in their notions 
about souls and survival they had developed what he con- 
sidered to be rather crude, materialistic ideas about the 
relationship of mind and matter. Yet "where the savage 
assumed too little difference between the material and 
the spiritual world the [modern] philosopher has assumed 
too much. He has regarded the gulf as too unbridgeable" 
(Myers, 1903,2: 252). And even among 19th-century 
scientists who professed to reject the old dualism of 
mind and matter in the name of scientific continuity, the 
failure to address directly the conflicts and paradoxes 
of mind and matter and to try to resolve them in some 
more coherent picture simply created a new dualism, as 
antithetical to the scientific principle of continuity as 
the old one had been, and led them to segregate from 
science certain phenomena, such as consciousness and 
volition, which they could not deny but also could not 
fit coherently into the scientific world view. 
The principle of continuity had also, however, led 
many 19th-century scientists not simply to segregate but 
to reject outright certain other phenomena or ideas, such 
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as mesmeric phenomena, telepathy, 2 or the idea of sur- 
vival after death. As Myers understood, "the difficulty 
of belief is not so much in defect of trustworthy evi- 
dence as in the unintelligibility, the incoherence of the 
phenomena described, which prevents them from being 
retained in the mind or assimilated with previous knowl- 
edge" (Myers, 1903,2: 505). Unable to connect the 
phenomenon to any known process of psychophysiological 
functioning, most scientists rejected a report, for exam- 
ple, that a woman had seen an hallucination of her 
brother's death by drowning some hours after his death 
but before the news arrived by telegram (Sidgwick, 1891, 
32-35): 
These resolute antagonists mean that no new evidence 
can carry conviction to them unless it be continuous 
with old evidence; and that they cannot conceive 
that evidence to a world of spirit can possibly be 
continuous with evidence based upon our experience 
of a world of matter. (Myers, 1903,2: 2) 
In short, the refractory phenomena of psychology and 
psychical research -- phenomena such as volition or 
telepathy -- that seemed to contravene known scientific 
principles were either denied or were maintained by a 
discontinuous segregation from other aspects of knowl- 
edge. Myers, agreeing with the premise of the "resolute 
antagonists, " rejected their response. He acknowledged 
that "I have myself felt the full force of this objection 
[of discontinuity], and I believe that some effort to 
meet it has become absolutely needful" (Myers, 1903, 
2: 505). He emphasized repeatedly that "I agree with this 
demand for continuity" (Myers, 1903,2: 2) and that "the 
principle of continuity... has guided us throughout this 
work" (Myers, 1903,2: 202). His response to apparent 
discontinuity of phenomena was not, however, either to 
deny or to segregate the problematic phenomena but to 
assume that continuity or coherence was in fact there, 
waiting to be discerned. Those who banned certain 
phenomena or questions from scientific inquiry showed, he 
thought, "a want rather than an excess of confidence" in 
"the immutable regularity" of nature (Myers, 1881,99). 
Myers, in contrast, had full confidence in the ultimate 
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regularity and rationality of all phenomena and thus in 
the methods of science to weave, in principle, any 
apparent loose end into the fabric of knowledge; and the 
principal task for psychical research, as for psychology 
in general, was to discover the continuity between 
apparently conflicting phenomena, "to bring our theories 
[and phenomena] into harmony with established physiologi- 
cal facts" (Myers, 1885c, 124); and to show "at what 
points our inquiries touch the recent results of science" 
(Myers, 1886b, xxxix). The model that Myers therefore 
held up to psychologists and psychical researchers was 
biology, "the science which on the whole approaches the 
closest to our own inquiries. " Myers considered biology 
a model science because it now had a major guiding theory 
-- that of evolution, 
the doctrine that the whole cosmical order is the 
outcome of a gradual development... a working 
hypothesis which covers enough of the known facts of 
the universe to make its possible extension to all 
facts a matter of hopeful interest... a co-ordinating 
and continuous principle of unity which renders it 
in some respects the best type of a true science 
which we possess. (Myers, 1886b, xxxix-xl) 
The goal for psychology, he believed, was likewise to 
develop "a co-ordinating and continous principle of 
unity" that would extend to both the psychical and physi- 
cal sides of psychological phenomena, not just one or the 
other (1886b, xl-xli). 
Expanding Science 
For Myers, therefore, because he so fervently 
believed in the continuity and rationality of the 
universe, even questions so complex and apparently beyond 
the reach of human experience as the question of survival 
could be approached, and knowledge pertinent to them 
attained, precisely because of the continuity of all 
phenomena. The first step was to recognize that the 
split between science on the one hand and religion, 
metaphysics, and philosophy on the other had occurred 
because people's need for answers to questions about 
their place, role, and destiny in the world outstripped 
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their actual available knowledge: "The divorce of Reli- 
gion from Science" began when man's "need of a theory of 
the unseen world... went far beyond what his scraps of 
experience could tell him, " when he asked "question[s] to 
which he could not find, yet would not wait for an ans- 
wer" (Myers, 1900b, 115). Religion and metaphysics, in 
short, had provided answers where there was no empirical 
knowledge; science, on the contrary, could provide 
empirical knowledge, even though final answers were 
necessarily always beyond reach. Religion and 
metaphysics had attempted to deal immediately with the 
highest questions, but science could work only with 
observable phenomena of experience: "We cannot get any 
nearer to the truth" than what we perceive in and infer 
from phenomena that we can observe (Myers, 1885c, 126), 
and "we can devise no way whatever of bringing them [the 
highest questions of philosophy] to scientific test. 
They deal with infinity; and our modes of investigation 
have grasp only on finite things" (Myers, 1903,2: 79). 
Yet even though many questions for which we would like 
answers are ultimately unanswerable, knowledge pertinent 
to them can be built up, like any knowledge, bit by bit, 
from observable phenomena. Such a gradual, even 
indirect, approach to knowledge is slow; the "inquiry 
must be extended over many generations.... [T]here are no 
shortcuts to mastery" (Myers, 1894-1895,198). Neverthe- 
less, it is in the long run more sure: "Great convic- 
tions are sounder and firmer when they are of gradual 
growth" (Myers, 1903,2: 79). 
Thus, Myers thought, if we wish to address important, 
complex questions, those questions must continually serve 
as clearly visible guideposts; but we must not begin with 
"the wrong end" of the inquiry, that is, "with the 
highest generalisations.... [W]e must learn first not what 
we are most eager to learn, but what fits on best to what 
we know already" (Myers, 1881,102-103). This did not 
mean reducing the unknown to the already known; it meant 
instead linking the unknown to the already known by a 
series of continuous steps and thus, potentially, expand- 
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ing the conceptual and theoretical framework of science 
to accommodate the now unknown. 
Moreover, instead of abandoning important, complex, 
and difficult questions as beyond the finite reach of 
human intellect, those who want to advance knowledge con- 
cerning such questions must begin by translating them 
from abstract, metaphysical questions into empirical ones 
(Myers, 1885c, 127). Myers's review, for example, of 
William James's Principles of Psychology (Myers, 1891d) 
was a plea, in opposition to James's positivistic sepa- 
ration of metaphysics and psychology, to try instead to 
translate the former into the latter, and thus to attack 
large questions by an "attempt to give [them] a precise, 
an experimental character" (132). An optimist by nature, 
Myers fervently believed that progress of all kinds is 
aided by the motivating power of an ideal goal, and is 
inhibited by lowering one's expectations. 3 Thus, whereas 
James had warned that the data of psychology cannot pro- 
vide answers to fundamental, metaphysical questions, 
Myers agreed but then turned the issue around and argued 
instead that fundamental questions provide the guidance 
and direction for producing the data -- and ultimately 
the knowledge -- of psychology. Whereas James had 
emphasized the limitations of psychology, Myers in con- 
trast wanted to awaken scientists to a sense of the 
potential power and scope of psychology. We may, he 
said, so far have insufficiently appreciated "how very 
far... the possibility of experiment may extend" (Myers, 
1891d, 119). The dilemma of free will versus 
determinism, for example, is clearly a metaphysical, and 
ultimately unanswerable, question. We can, however, try 
to "reduce this to an experimental question" -- and in 
the process perhaps open the door to alternate ways of 
conceiving the problem other than in the rigidly 
polarized positions of mechanistic determinism or 
uncaused free will -- if we ask "whether molecular move- 
ments are ever determined by a cause other than any known 
molecular force" (Myers, 1891d, 130), specifically, 
whether we can demonstrate the action of one mind on 
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another (such as in Janet and Gibert's experiments on 
suggestion at a distance) or the action of one mind on 
distant matter (that is, in Myers's terminology, 
telekinesis). To those who attempted to limit, on the 
basis of our present knowledge, what we can and cannot 
subject to scientific inquiry, Myers replied: "Which is 
the mystical, which the scientific course? -- on the one 
hand to ignore these deeper problems... or, on the other 
hand, to attack them with conscious weakness indeed, con- 
scious inadequacy? " (Myers, 1891d, 132). 
In short, the major motivation behind psychical 
research was to take the first tentative, empirical steps 
toward elucidating, if not resolving, larger problems, 
rather than to allow such problems to be abandoned as 
insoluble: "Such confrontations with metaphysical prob- 
lems reduced to concrete form are a specialty of our 
research" (Myers, 1894c, 421). Myers believed that the 
limits of science are fixed only by our ingenuity in 
translating large, metaphysical problems into finite, 
empirical ones, never by the topic of the questions 
involved. He and his SPR colleagues rejected the idea 
that a distinction could be made between legitimate and 
illegitimate phenomena and topics for scientific study, 
the illegitimate being those "not in obvious conformity 
with established conventions, " or, in other words, with 
the present world view of scientists (Barrett, Massey, 
Moses, et al., 1883,149). In this connection he (like 
James) called attention to the danger to science of "the 
instinct of system, of a rounded and completed doctrine" 
that prematurely delimits what science can and cannot 
address: A "determined protest against premature 
synthesis is as much needed now as ever" (Myers, 1889j, 
392). In particular, this protest was directed against 
limiting science to the subject matter, methods, and con- 
cepts of the physical sciences by conceding prematurely 
that questions about the nature of the relationship 
between mental and physical phenomena -- going beyond the 
vague assumption of concomitance --are scientifically 
unapproachable. Instead, "the only line of demarcation 
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which science can draw, -- is between things which can, 
or which cannot, be cognised by our existing faculties, " 
a line which is by no means 
permanent and immovable.... On the contrary, it is 
the continual work of science to render that which is incognisable cognisable, that which is 
imperceptible perceptible.... Aristotle... relegated 
his unknowable to the fixed stars. . . but we have no more reason than he had to take our [present] mental 
horizon for an objective line. (Myers, 1881,103) 
Myers's goal, therefore, as well as that of most of 
the early psychical researchers, was "the application, as 
far as possible, of the scientific method to problems 
hitherto left to metaphysical or religious speculation" 
(Myers, 1887a, 132). Their aim was "far wider than the 
mere exposure of fraud... [or] the mere production of 
specimens of patient and intelligent investigation. [It] 
is not the founding of a new sect, nor even the estab- 
lishment of a new science, but is rather the expansion of 
Science herself" to address problems "which Science must 
needs set forth, if her methods and her temper are to 
guide and control the widening curiosity, the expanding 
capacities of men" (Myers, 1900c, 125; 1886b, xxxvi). 
The Question of Psychophysiological Concomitance 
Myers thus defined experimental psychology as "the 
attempt to attack the great problems of our being, " not 
by metaphysics or introspective analysis but by the meth- 
ods of the natural sciences (Myers, 1885d, 637); and he 
thus argued that "the question of the survival [after 
death] of man is a branch of Experimental Psychology" 
(Myers, 1891e, 644). The first step toward transforming 
this question from a transcendental one to an empirical 
one was to recognize that the key issue behind it was the 
same as the key issue behind psychology: the nature of 
the relationship between a mental phenomenon and its 
physiological substratum, especially whether personal 
consciousness is wholly dependent on a particular con- 
figuration of molecules. His approach therefore was not 
simply to learn whether there were any phenomena suggest- 
ing survival, but -- more importantly for one who 
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believed so strongly in the necessary continuity of all 
phenomena -- whether human personality is of such a 
nature that it could conceivably survive. He rejected 
the idea that there must be -- even could be -- radical 
discontinuity between premortem and any postmortem exist- 
ence. The principle of continuity demanded that "if an 
unseen world exists" -- if, in other words, there is some 
mode of existence not presently perceptible by us -- then 
"we must in some sense be in it" now (Myers, 1891e, 634). 
If mind or personality can exist in some phenomenal form 
other than the familiar biological one, then this "must 
needs be a great structural fact of the Universe" (Myers, 
1903,2: 288). 
Before addressing such a question as survival, there- 
fore, we had to have a far greater understanding of 
living personality (Myers, 1891d, 121; 1903,1: 9), since 
a pre- and postmortem personality must in some sense be 
continuous in nature. The most fundamental fact about 
personality is that it is partly physiological, partly 
psychological: "To every observable thought or emotion 
of man there probably corresponds some change or movement 
in the material substance of the brain" (Myers, 1891e, 
635). Yet this observed "parallelism between psychical 
and cerebral energies" tells us nothing, in fact, about 
their actual relationship: "As to the origin or essen- 
tial significance of this close connection of 'psychosis' 
and 'neurosis'4 we avowedly know nothing at all" (Myers, 
1891e, 635). Moreover, merely continuing to observe the 
parallelism would not advance our knowledge in any 
qualitative sense: "The exacter correlation can tell us 
little more than the vaguer told us -- little more than 
we had always known" (Myers, 1891e, 635). 
To advance our understanding of the relationship 
between mind and brain beyond the long-recognized but 
little understood parallelism, Myers believed that 
psychologists needed to move beyond simply observing that 
for every mental fact there is a corresponding physical 
fact and needed to begin to study those situations in 
which the ordinary balance between mental and physical 
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functioning seemed to be altered. Abnormal, unusual, or 
subconscious psychological phenomena could, he thought, 
provide the greatest insight "into the mechanism of our 
most inward being" (Myers, 1885b, 61) because they pro- 
vided an opportunity for "studying the machinery thus 
thrown slightly out of gear,... isolating and exaggerating 
one process after another for more convenient scrutiny" 
(Myers, 1885d, 637). In particular, abnormal states such 
as hypnosis, hysteria, somnambulism, or trance often 
seemed to show in relief certain latent capacities, 
including exaggerations of ordinary sensorimotor 
functioning -- hyperaesthesia, for example -- or, 
occasionally, unfamiliar modes of functioning -- say, 
telepathy. Studying alternate "patterns" of personality, 
in other words, "may reveal elements absent from other 
patterns" or "teach us... something fresh as to the ele- 
ments already known" (Myers, 1892f, 367). 
The study of subconscious phenomena was therefore 
important because it was revealing that mind is greater, 
not only in extent but in ability, than had previously 
been thought. It was indicating, Myers thought, that "no 
known form of human consciousness manifests... the total 
Self;... we... can only discover indirectly and inferen- 
tially, by experiment and artifice, the extent of our 
intellectual being" (Myers, 1891e, 637). What was par- 
ticularly needed now, however, was a study of subcon- 
scious phenomena undertaken from a purely psychological, 
scientific perspective and not, as in most previous 
studies, from a clinical perspective. In other words, 
although subconscious phenomena were beginning to be 
widely studied as a medical problem, Myers believed that 
it was even more important for them to be studied as a 
general theoretical problem in psychology. Yet general 
scientific or psychological -- that is, theoretical -- 
purposes had thus far been almost completely neglected. 
The study of hallucinations, for example, "has usually 
been undertaken with a therapeutic and not with a purely 
scientific purpose, " with the result that pathological 
aspects of hallucinations have been noted and emphasized, 
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rather than their "absolute psychological significance" 
(Myers, 1892e, 342). Similarly, Myers believed that hyp- 
notism was one of the greatest potential methodological 
tools for psychologists because with it "we can fairly 
hope, by experiments made no longer at random, to 
reproduce and systematise most of those phenomena of 
spontaneous somnambulism which once seemed to lie so 
tantalisingly beyond our grasp" (Myers, 1903,1: 157). 
Yet, here too, in the burgeoning study of hypnosis, 
we have to regret the lamentable scarcity of purely 
psychological experiments over the whole hypnotic 
field. We are habitually forced to base our 
psychological inferences on therapeutic practice; 
and in directions where there has been no 
therapeutic effort there are gaps in our knowledge, 
which those hypnotists who have good subjects at 
their disposal should be invited to fill up as soon 
as may be. (Myers, 1903,1: 191) 
Even hysteria, clearly a severe clinical problem and 
understandably emphasized as such, was also an important 
potential source of knowledge about psychophysiological 
functioning (Myers, 1893d; 1903, Chapter 2). Hysterics 
showed a subconscious control over physiological 
functioning, such as hysterical anaesthesias or stigmata, 
practically unknown in normal conditions. Hysteria was 
thus "in some ways a better dissecting agent than any 
other" for isolating and studying certain 
psychophysiological functions, involving both 
"acquisitions as well as losses of faculty" (Myers, 1903, 
1: 65,66). Moreover, hysterical disorders often mimic 
neurological disorders: "The symptoms of hysteria 
form... a series of phantom copies of real maladies of the 
nervous system.... [But they] are often due... not to 
purely physiological, but rather to intellectual causes" 
(Myers, 1903,1: 43). A comparison of hysterical and 
neurological disorders could therefore perhaps reveal 
much about the nature and extent of psychological 
processes as causal processes, especially the degree to 
which they are dependent on neurological conditions or, 
conversely, may themselves alter neurological conditions. 
What was needed, however, was "a wider purview than the 
mere pathologist's" --that is, a psychological or 
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theoretical, rather than medical, perspective (Myers, 
1892c, 304). 
Myers also emphasized that subconscious, abnormal 
phenomena were important to study precisely because they 
are rare, anomalous phenomena. In opposition to 
psychologists who emphasized the study of normal 
psychological phenomena because, they thought, this 
approach would yield more findings of general practical 
utility, Myers was 
in no wise deterred by the fact of the apparent use- 
lessness of some of them [unusual faculties] for our 
waking ends. Useless is a pre-scientific, even an 
anti-scientific term, which has perhaps proved a 
greater stumbling-block to research in psychology 
than in any other science. In science the use of 
phenomena is to prove laws, and the more bizarre and 
trivial the phenomena, the greater the chance of 
their directing us to some law which has been over- 
looked till now. (Myers, 1903,1: 150) 
In fact, he said, "the more rare and useless the faculty, 
the more interest it has" as a clue to the nature and 
mode of psychological functioning (Myers, 1898b, 103): 
We must guard against confusing importance for 
immediate practical life with importance for 
science.... [It] is not the broad and obvious 
phenomena, but the residual and elusive phenomena, 
which are oftenest likely to introduce us to new 
avenues of knowledge. I wish to persuade my readers 
that this is quite as truly the case in psychology 
as in physics. (Myers, 1903,2: 86) 
In short, "experimental psychology cannot aford to push 
aside... the anomalies, the residual phenomena" (Myers, 
1892g, 444). 
On the other side of the psychological equation, just 
as subconscious phenomena were showing mind to be more 
extensive and of a different nature than previously 
thought, so 19th-century physics was showing the physical 
universe to be more extensive -- and even of a different 
nature -- than previously thought. The discovery and 
study of electromagnetic radiation in particular had 
begun to reveal just how narrow and limited our sensory 
perceptions are: "Our knowledge of the visible solar 
spectrum is but an introduction to the knowledge which we 
hope ultimately to attain of the sun's rays. The limits 
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of our spectrum do not inhere in the sun that shines, but 
in the eye that marks his shining" (Myers, 1903,1: 17). 
The physicist William Barrett, a colleague of Myers's at 
the SPR, pointed out that whereas the human eye is 
limited in the range of radiation it can detect, other 
eyes might have different ranges; and "we should expect 
that the collective visual power of the whole of animal 
life would far transcend the range of vision of any 
single individual" (Barrett, 1895,24). To those whose 
thinking about the nature of psychophysical processes was 
circumscribed by their assumption that our perception of 
the physical world is somehow a benchmark, Myers cau- 
tioned that "Science, while perpetually denying an unseen 
world, is perpetually revealing it" (Myers, 1881,103). 
The discovery of radiation had led 19th-century 
scientists to conclude that there exists an ether -- a 
homogeneous, frictionless, non-material substance filling 
what we perceive as "empty" space, which serves as the 
transmitting medium for light and electromagnetic forces. 
Subsequent physics erased the need for this particular 
concept of ether; but, if anything, it further validated 
the larger idea behind the concept of ether -- and the 
one that was of especial significance to Myers -- that 
the imperceptible range of the material universe far 
exceeds the few aspects of it that are perceptible to our 
normal, unaided senses. The study of light, said Myers, 
had led to the discovery of "the etherial environment -- 
a system of laws, that is to say, which while fundamen- 
tally continuous with the laws of matter, does yet supply 
a new conception of the Cosmos, at once more generalized 
and more profound" (Myers, 1900b, 118). It was "more 
profound" because the expansion of our knowledge "into 
regions of rays which no senses born within us have 
enabled us directly to discern" (Myers, 1894-1895,196) 
implied that we have not yet exhausted our potential 
knowledge of environments co-existing, undetected, with 
the perceivable world. Science cannot "conjecture 
beforehand how many distinct but coexisting environments 
may now surround us.... Her own history has been one of 
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constantly widening conceptions" (Myers, 1894-1895,195). 
In a prescient remark preceding the upheavals in 
scientists' conception of space, matter, and time brought 
on by 20th-century physics, Myers suggested that "in a 
universe... where a world of ether coexists with a world 
of matter ... [we] must be ready to conceive other 
invisible environments or co-existences, and in a sense 
to sit loose to the conception of Space, regarded as an 
obstacle to communication or cognition" (Myers, 1903, 
2: 262). 
Yet he also emphasized repeatedly that such "unseen" 
environments must be "fundamentally continuous" and 
interrelated with the one we know directly; "if an unseen 
world exists... we must in some sense be in it" (Myers, 
1891e, 634). Like 
a tadpole... who had learned theoretically that what 
he was breathing in his pond was not the water but 
the oxygen dissolved therein, -- and who then 
should... raise his head above water... [and] perceive 
frogs and other animals respiring the translucid air 
(Myers, 1903,2: 526) 
scientists too, through both theoretical and empirical 
means, would probably continue to discover unsuspected 
environments, co-existing and continuous with the famil- 
iar world we perceive directly, even if also differing 
from it in certain respects. 
Myers therefore was in a real sense motivated by the 
hope that a combined study of the unsuspected range of 
mind and the unsuspected extent of matter would begin to 
suggest new and Unsuspected ways of understanding the 
relation between the two. To Myers and other early 
psychical researchers, it remained very much an open 
question whether "the physiological doctrine as regards 
what is styled the influence of mind on body is settled 
or complete" (Myers, 1881,99) -- despite the assertions 
of Clifford and others to the contrary. In Myers's view, 
"we can in no way define the connection between our own 
consciousness and our organisms. Just here it is, I 
should say, that telepathic observations ought to supply 
us with some hint"; or, as he said in more general terms, 
they "may in time teach us something of the relation of 
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life to the organism" (Myers, 1903,1: 246,2: 141). The 
advances in the physical sciences, particularly biology 
and physiology, had, Myers thought, distorted our view of 
the mind-matter problem because, "when we see half of 
some body strongly illuminated, and half of it feebly 
illuminated, it is hard to believe that the brilliant 
moiety is not the larger of the two" (Myers, 1886b, xl). 
Yet the present skewed state of our knowledge should not 
obscure the remaining problem: 
The central problem of the relation of the objective 
and the subjective sides of these psychoneural 
phenomena can be in no way altered by any increase 
of definiteness in our knowledge of the objective 
processes which correspond to the subjective states 
(Myers, 1886b, xl). 
With a working philosophy of psychophysical parallelism, 
physical scientists and even psychologists had managed to 
avoid the problem. Psychical researchers did not: 
The whole problem of the relation of the psychical 
to the physical -- of thought and will to space and 
matter -- is forced upon our attention with star- 
tling vividness from the very beginning of this 
inquiry.... [D]ilemmas which the metaphysician can 
evade, and the physicist ignore, 
the psychical researcher cannot (Myers, 1886d, 290). 
Moving Beyond Controversy 
One of Myers's most fundamental beliefs, in sum, was 
that "these deeper problems" had to be attacked empiri- 
cally, even "with conscious weakness indeed, conscious 
inadequacy" (Myers, 1891d, 132). As important as the 
nature of the questions addressed, however, was the man- 
ner in which one addressed them. Another of his most 
fundamental beliefs, therefore, was in Mill's and 
Gurney's "tertium quid" approach to advancing knowledge 
on unresolved and controversial issues. Psychologists, 
he said, "have no excuse for lingering in the antiquated 
notion that philosophy is a kind of polygonal duel 
between 'systematic thinkers"' (Myers, 1891d, 133). On 
the other hand, the agnostics' advice "to halt and mark 
time" and to suspend judgment on controversial issues, 
although a commendably cautious and sensible approach, in 
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practice had not been conducive to resolving the issues. 
First of all, Myers noted, the agnostic rarely remains 
agnostic but often "harden[s] into Materialism... passes, 
so to say, from Huxley to Clifford" (Myers, 1900c, 116). 
Secondly, agnosticism often bred complacency, stagnation, 
or avoidance of the problems; "the passivity of pure 
Agnosticism... [is] too tame a surrender" (ibid. ). Rather 
than simply seeking suspension of judgment while the 
problems were being worked on, agnostics instead usually 
ruled the problems out of the domain of science 
altogether and thus sustained the "scientific supersti- 
tion" that certain questions are empirically unapproach- 
able (Myers, 1903,1: 1). Agnostics, in other words, 
allowed opposing positions and views to stand and made no 
attempt to move beyond them: "Suspense of judgment, 
indeed, in matters of such moment, is so irksome an atti- 
tude of mind, that we need not wonder if confidence of 
view on the one side is met by a corresponding confidence 
on the other" (Myers, 1880/1888,104). 
Finally, agnosticism was bought only at the price of 
discontinuity and inconsistency of thought. As Myers 
noted, the prevailing temper of the times had become "not 
so much materialistic as agnostic, " in that people 
attempted to maintain a belief in human responsibility 
and ethics in the face of a deterministic, materialistic 
philosophy of science. They could do so, however, only 
by divorcing their "emotional creed" from their 
"scientific creed" and establishing "a system of belief 
and emotions which may indeed be able to accommodate 
themselves to modern science, but are in no sense sup- 
ported thereby" (Myers, 1886b, liv, lvi-lvii). The 
agnostic approach, Myers thought, had allowed con- 
tradictory views to stand, and even to be held 
simultaneously, because it emphasized suspension of judg- 
ment, rather than the resolution of problems. 
Expanding Observations 
If one were, in contrast, to attempt to resolve -- or 
at least advance our knowledge concerning -- disputed 
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issues by, as Mill said, "tak[ing] something from both 
sides of the great controversies, and mak[ing] out that 
neither extreme is right, nor wholly wrong" (Mill, 1910, 
2: 360), then one had to have as broad a knowledge as pos- 
sible of both (or all) sides. Myers therefore repeatedly 
denounced the methodological parochialism of restricting 
one's observations to a limited range of phenomena or 
data and advocated instead the approach of amassing a 
broad range of data -- broad not just in quantity but 
especially in kind -- in order to prevent the premature 
assumption of a hypothesis, theory or view that may be, 
not necessarily wrong, but misleadingly narrow and 
incomplete. For example, he said, Carpenter's hypothesis 
of unconscious cerebration to explain subconscious 
phenomena in general, and Faraday's hypothesis of uncon- 
scious muscular action to explain table-tilting in par- 
ticular, "were, so far as they went, not only legitimate, 
but the most logical.. . to explain the scanty evidence 
with which alone Faraday and Carpenter attempted to 
deal"; they were not, however, hypotheses widely applica- 
ble (Myers, 1886b, lxii). Myers also noted that Janet's 
observations of automatic writing had thus far been con- 
fined to hysterical patients alone, and also to rela- 
tively few of them (about 20 reported by 1889 [Myers, 
1889g, 189], compared with the approximately 200 
automatists Myers had observed "in less detail" by 1892 
[Myers, 1892g, 470-471]). As a result, "a good many pas- 
sages of M. Janet's... seem to me... lacking in width of 
purview, " although containing "much which I hold to be 
true and important" (Myers, 1889g, 191). 
Myers and his colleagues in the SPR also thought that 
the differences of opinion labelled mesmerism and hyp- 
notism were probably the result of limited observations 
on both sides (Barrett, Gurney, Myers, et al., 1883a). 
The mesmeric hypothesis was the old one that said that 
the phenomena produced by Mesmer and his successors were 
the result of a physical force or "effluence" passing 
from the mesmeriser to the subject. The new hypothesis 
of hypnotism said that the phenomena were solely the 
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result of suggestion, or the subject's belief that a 
certain procedure or cause would bring a certain result. 
In Myers's view, all current theories about mesmerism or 
hypnotism were "narrow and misleading" because of the too 
narrow range of observations on which they were usually 
based, especially "from the confinement of attention to 
some few of the commoner and more obvious manifestations 
of hypnosis" (Myers, 1898b, 101). The Nancy view of hyp- 
nosis had prevailed over the Salpetriere view because 
Bernheim, Liebeault, and their colleagues had experi- 
mented on a more varied range of subjects than had Char- 
cot and his colleagues. Their triumph was "essentially 
the triumph of generalisations based on a wider experi- 
ence over generalisations based on a narrower experience" 
(Myers, 1889g, 198). Now, however, the Nancy school was 
in danger of becoming trapped in its own brand of dog- 
matism by 
insisting that all in hypnotism is suggestion.... I 
must adhere to the view which I have often 
expressed.... Has not the history of hypnotism thus 
far been a slow but repeated justification of those 
who, in each successive controversy, took the wider 
and less exclusive view? (Myers, 1889g, 198) 
In appealing for a wider gathering of data and facts, he 
thus urged "a freer communication between opposing 
schools" in a joint effort to attack the problems 
involved (Myers, 1892c, 326). 
In order to amass the range of data needed to address 
problems of the scope Myers wished to see addressed in 
psychology, a variety of methods and approaches were 
necessary: "The higher the generalisations to be 
reached, the more various probably must be the means 
employed for reaching them" (Barrett, Gurney, Myers, et 
al., 1883b, 290). What was needed, to avoid "falling 
prematurely under the power of suggestion of any one 
theory" (Myers, 1889g, 189), was "an immense and many- 
sided extension of definite psychological experiment" 
(Myers, 1891d, 133). In addition, what was needed was 
observation of naturally occurring, or spontaneous, 
phenomena from "a wide range of society, and... a variety 
of circumstances, " to allow for the full and fair evalua- 
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tion of all hypotheses, including those "discordant with 
our own" (Myers, 1886b, lxix). 
In particular, Myers urged the study of phenomena and 
beliefs among ancient cultures and so-called primitive 
peoples. One of his earliest papers was an attempt to 
suggest some parallels between ancient Greek oracles and 
divination practices and more recent phenomena such as 
table-tilting or automatic writing (Myers, 1880/1888). 
He contended that primitive beliefs and reports were not 
necessarily invalid superstitions simply because they 
were of primitive origin. There was "danger... in being 
too ready to take for granted that when we have explained 
how a belief arose we have done with it altogether; that 
because a tenet is of savage parentage it hardly needs 
formal disproof" (Myers, 1880/1888,5). At a time when 
most Westerners regarded non-Westerners as "childish" 
savages and ancient "beliefs and tendencies as due solely 
to the childishness of savage man, " Myers urged the 
potential importance of comparative ethnology and 
anthropology to psychology and "hoped that shamans and 
medicine-men will not vanish before the missionary until 
they have yielded some fuller lessons to the psycho- 
physicist [that is, psychologist]" (Myers, 1886b, xlv). 
Although the form their practices, beliefs, and inter- 
pretations took might be "repulsive" to the modern mind, 
the substance behind them might be correct. It was 
vanity, he thought, to assume that modern "civilized" 
people have a monopoly on the truth; and it was 
"question-begging" to dismiss a belief because it is old, 
"when the actual problem is really whether that belief be 
true or no" (Myers, 1899b, 384). 
Thus, instead of judging "the worth of ideas by trac- 
ing their origins, " as scientists following in the foot- 
steps of Tylor, Lubbock, and Spencer tended to do, Myers 
urged that we adopt 
a somewhat more searching criterion. Instead of 
asking in what age a doctrine originated -- with the 
implied assumption that the more recent it is, the 
better -- we can now ask how far it is in accord or 
discord with a great mass of actual recent evidence. 
(Myers, 1903,2: 191) 
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Gurney's survey of witchcraft literature, for example, 
had shown that firsthand (not secondary) accounts of 
phenomena attributed to witchcraft bore a remarkable 
resemblance to modern phenomena of hypnotism and hysteria 
(Gurney, 1886). This example suggested that, faced with 
unusual or abnormal phenomena, one was not limited 
either, on the one hand, to accepting traditional 
explanations and beliefs about them in their original 
form or, on the other, to rejecting the observations 
altogether: Invalid or insufficient interpretations may 
have derived from perfectly valid observations. The 
important question to ask was "whether hypotheses, now 
admitted to be erroneous, had ever been based in past 
times on evidence in any way comparable to that which we 
have adduced" (Myers, 1886b, lxix). 
Expanding Interpretations 
Myers also, however, cautioned against, not just too 
narrow a range of observation, but the too rigid dis- 
missal of hypotheses alternate to one's own, whether 
ancient ones or ones of more recent vintage. He defended 
the approach of explicitly maintaining multiple 
hypotheses as working possibilities, believing that this 
breadth of view might lead one ultimately to identify 
some more comprehensive or general principle that 
encompasses aspects of alternate hypotheses as well as 
all data. In introducing, for example, Phantasms of the 
Living, Myers contrasted his own approach to such cases 
with that of his co-authors, Gurney and Frank Podmore. 
In what might be called the "depth" approach of Gurney 
and Podmore, the belief was "that 'causes are not to be 
multiplied without necessity', " that known causes must 
first be pushed to their limits, and that evidence not 
readily fitting known causes must be "set aside as at 
present inexplicable" (Myers, 1886b, lxvi-lxvii). In 
such an approach, in Myers's view, there was the danger 
of prematurely limiting and fixing one's assumptions and 
conceptions, "in the same way as other men often refused 
to look beyond the limit to which the accredited sciences 
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had already attained" (Myers, 1886f, 156). 
In Myers's "breadth" approach, in contrast, one is 
"careful not to overrate its [one hypothesis's] efficacy; 
we must be on the watch for other approaches, for hints 
of inter-relation between disparate and scattered 
phenomena" (Myers, 1886b, lxvii). He thought that the 
present conception of, for example, telepathy would prob- 
ably turn out to be wholly inadequate and incomplete: 
Telepathy, as we now know it, is probably little 
more than a mere preliminary conception, a 
simplified mode of representing to ourselves a group 
of phenomena which, as involving relations between 
minds, may probably be more complex than those which 
involve even the highest known forms of matter. 
(Myers, 1886b, lxvii) 
As a result, he thought it was "rash" to suppose that the 
many supernormal phenomena all result from a single cause 
(Myers, 1886e, 176); it was, for example, "unreasonable 
to treat telepathy as if it stood alone as a possible 
explanation" (Myers, 1890b, 318). He was "inclined 
provisionally to accept" the idea that there was "no 
single capacity of percipience, no single energy of com- 
munication, " but'instead multiple "causes cognate but not 
identical, " operating "in varying proportions" and in 
different situations (Myers, 1886e, 176,179). 
Finally, maintaining multiple hypotheses or inter- 
pretations as working possibilities was important because 
this stimulated the gathering of a broader range of data 
or observations. With regard to hypnotism, for example, 
people who favored the mesmeric hypothesis usually 
emphasized quite different kinds of phenomena than did 
those people who favored the suggestion hypothesis. The 
opposition between the Nancy, Bordeaux, Salpetriere, and 
Pitie schools of hypnotism was "necessary and 
advantageous" because it provided competition and stimu- 
lated researchers to extend their work in different 
directions (Myers, 1886e, 180n). Similarly, there were 
at the time two primary, but diametrically opposed, 
explanations of planchette writing -- the unconscious 
cerebration hypothesis and the Spiritualist hypothesis -- 
each of which emphasized quite different, but equally 
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important, aspects of the phenomenon. Yet "neither 
theory is at present capable of direct proof. They are 
merely of use to direct our observation to the important 
points in the cases" (Myers, 1884,233). 
Myers's Concept of Naturalism 
In sum, because Myers, like Gurney, believed so 
strongly that there was often "a great deal to be said on 
both sides" of a controversy, he also believed that this 
dual approach to expanding the framework of science -- by 
extending the range and kind of observations and by main- 
taining multiple hypotheses, interpretations, or 
approaches to those observations -- would ultimately lead 
to new perspectives or conceptions that could accommodate 
the strengths and eliminate the weaknesses of the oppos- 
ing positions. I outlined in Chapter 1 several important 
dichotomies of thought that scientific psychology and 
psychical research had renewed and even intensified. One 
of the most fundamental of these dichotomies -- and the 
one at the root of the modern conflict between science 
and religion -- was that between naturalism and super- 
naturalism. Naturalists believed there was only one 
world, the "orderly world of Nature" (Huxley, 1892,3); 
supernaturalists believed there were two worlds, nature 
and a world above or beyond nature, the latter not sub- 
ject to the determinism of nature. In one sense, Myers 
was a strict naturalist, believing in the continuity of 
all phenomena in one world and the invariability and 
universal application of natural laws. He, like most of 
his scientific contemporaries, accepted "the doctrine of 
the fixity of natural laws" and considered it "essential 
that the idea of'unvarying law should get possession of 
men's minds" (Myers, 1881,98). Thus he, again like most 
of his scientific contemporaries, rejected the concept of 
miracles, conceived as "violations of natural law" or 
"exceptions" to natural law "permitted by Providence, " 
because, he said, "we know now that natural laws are 
never violated" and "we conceive that all phenomena alike 
take place in accordance with the laws of the universe" 
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(1881,99; 1889f, 14). 
Myers's conception of naturalism was, however, also 
somewhat different from that prevalent among his con- 
temporaries. For him, belief in one continuous, orderly 
world did not automatically imply that the laws of matter 
provided the sole and fundamental foundation of that 
world: "Accepting as perfectly valid every law which 
recognised science can establish" does not preclude the 
supposition that there may also be "further laws, of a 
different kind it may be, " but still "susceptible of 
rigorous investigation" (Barrett, Massey, Moses, et al., 
1884b, 111). The modern belief that the universe is 
"inevitably naturalistic, cosmical, evolutionary" and 
never the result of "specially-authorised interferences" 
does not exclude the belief that there may be "a scheme 
of laws... of which our sciences of matter are... powerless 
to take account, " but which new sciences, such as 
psychology and psychical research, might discover (Myers, 
1890b, 329). Thus far, Myers said, science had for- 
mulated three basic laws or principles. The first one, 
underlying science as a whole, was the principle of 
uniformity, that "all operations in the universe obey 
unchanging law" (Myers, 1893b, 93). The second, underly- 
ing physics, was the principle of conservation, that "all 
matter and all energy known to us are indestructible" 
(ibid. ). The third, underlying biology, was evolution, 
or the general principle that "all physical and vital 
operation in the universe is at present following certain 
obscurely discernible streams of tendency" (ibid. ). In 
his view, there remained at least one additional such 
general principle to be discovered, "a fourth law lying 
at the root of psychology" (Myers, 1893b, 104). The 
"future of Experimental Psychology" was to discover this 
principle; failure to do so would leave all psychological 
knowledge "superficial and fragmentary" (Myers, 1892g, 
535). 
Myers and his colleagues in psychical research thus 
rejected both supernaturalism and the prevalent form of 
naturalism for a different, expanded concept of 
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scientific naturalism: "We altogether repudiate" the 
distinction between 'natural' and 'supernatural"' (Bar- 
rett, Massey, Moses, et al., 1883,150). In an early 
(1881) essay on the French historian Renan, Myers 
expressed his belief that it was possible to reach an 
"ultimate reconcilement" in "the conflict between science 
and orthodoxy [religion]... which ... too often assumes 
[the form] of a sheer and barren contradiction"; but to 
do so, it was first necessary to "reject all question- 
begging terms -- all phrases such as 'violations of the 
order of Nature"' (Myers, 1881,96). He endorsed the 
general belief behind St. Augustine's statement that "God 
does nothing against nature. " No phenomena, in other 
words, violate the laws of nature. Nevertheless, since 
"our knowledge of the laws of nature is in its infancy, " 
some phenomena may indeed go "against Nature as we know 
it -- in its familiar and ordinary way. " Therefore, 
Myers urged antagonists in the controversy between natu- 
ralism and supernaturalism to move beyond the divergent 
and polarized positions in which their assumptions, or 
"prepossessions, " had fixed them: "Let us not oppose law 
and miracle.... Let us not oppose the natural and the 
supernatural. " Such "polemical antitheses" derive from 
the fact that "on each side of the controversy we find a 
reasonable prepossession pushed too often to an 
unreasonable extreme" (Myers, 1881,96-97). As a result, 
resolute antagonists... cannot conceive that evidence 
to a world of spirit [see footnote 1] can possibly 
be continuous with evidence based upon our experi- 
ence of a world of matter. I agree with this demand 
for continuity; and I agree also that claims usually 
advanced for a spiritual world have not only made no 
attempt at continuity with known fact, but have even 
ostentatiously thrown such continuity to the winds. 
The popular mind has expressly desired something 
startling, something outside Law and above 
Nature.... I can hardly too often repeat that my 
object in these pages is of a quite opposite charac- 
ter" (Myers, 1903,2: 2). 
As a first step toward resolving or reconciling the 
apparent contradiction between naturalism and super- 
naturalism, or even that between the scientific world 
view and the religious one, Myers rejected the word 
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"supernatural" altogether as a meaningless word and 
instead 
ventured to coin the word "supernormal" to be 
applied to phenomena which are beyond what usually 
happens -- beyond, that is, in the sense of suggest- 
ing unknown psychical laws. It is thus formed on 
the analogy of abnormal. When we speak of an 
abnormal phenomenon we do not mean one which con- 
travenes natural laws, but one which exhibits them in 
an unusual or inexplicable form. Similarly by a 
supernormal phenomenon, I mean, not one which over- 
rides natural laws, for I believe no such phenomenon 
to exist, but one which exhibits the action of laws 
higher, in a psychical aspect, than are discerned in 
action in every-day life. By higher (either in a 
psychical or in a physiological sense), I mean 
"apparently belonging to a more advanced stage of 
evolution. " (Myers, 1885b, 30n) 
Beyond Credulity and Incredulity 
Closely related to this rejection of the old natu- 
ral/supernatural. dichotomy was Myers's conviction that 
both modern scientific thought and traditional popular 
thought had failed utterly to provide an adequate account 
of the questions, phenomena, and experiences with which 
the psychical researchers were attempting to deal. 
Reports, for example, of so-called mind cures or of stig- 
matization were greeted either with "blank incredulity" 
or with "miraculous pretentions" (Myers & Myers, 1893, 
202) and "treated... as though [they] must be either 
fraudulent or miraculous -- ou supercherie, ou miracle" 
(Myers, 1903,1: 188). Furthermore, Myers noted, this 
failure was circular and self-perpetuating, since super- 
stition about a phenomenon grows in direct proportion to 
scientists' tabooing of it: "Loose assertion" on the 
part of the public "has been met with contemptuous 
neglect" on the part of scientists (Myers, 1885b, 62); 
but conversely, 
no attempt to discourage inquiry into any given sub- 
ject which strongly interests mankind, will in 
reality divert attention from the topic thus 
tabooed .... The subject will be pursued with the more 
excited eagerness because regulating knowledge and 
experienced guidance are withdrawn.... Where savants 
have minimised, they [the public] have magnified, 
and the perplexing modes of marvel which the 
textbooks ignore, have become, as it were, the gan- 
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glia from which all kinds of strange opinions ramify 
and spread. (Myers, 1886b, lviii) 
As had happened in the case of the phenomena associated 
with modern Spiritualism, "a swarm of follies and 
credulities must inevitably perch and settle" when 
intellectual leaders -- both religious and scientific -- 
fail to provide anything but "superficial" and "emo- 
tional" explanations (Myers, 1900c, 124; 1889f, 63): 
Let those who mock at the weaknesses of "modern 
Spiritualism" ask themselves to what extent either 
orthodox religion or official science has been at 
pains to guard the popular mind against losing 
balance upon contact with new facts.... [R]idicule is 
no remedy. The remedy lies... in inculcating the 
intellectual virtues. (Myers, 1900b, 124) 
Myers and other psychical researchers attempted to fill 
this gap. They understood all too well "the mischief 
which is being done to the minds of men and women" by the 
uncritical acceptance of certain phenomena at face value; 
but they also understood that "it is useless to scoff or 
to sermonise, you must understand and explain" (Myers, 
1885b, 33). In particular, they hoped to provide the 
"regulating knowledge and experienced guidance" by seek- 
ing some middle course between denying the reality of 
people's reported experiences and accepting the "strange 
opinions" that they had spawned: "Is there not some mid- 
dle term, some intermediate series, with which both these 
extreme series may have points of resemblance? " (Myers, 
1903,2: 506). Psychical research was intended to attract 
those who were not satisfied with either credulity or 
incredulity: "Between the scornfully sceptical and the 
eagerly superstitious we have virtually had to create a 
public of our own" (Myers, 1894-1895,190). 
Unfortunately, that public proved to be a relatively 
small one. The old, clearcut dichotomies, in which one 
position was assumed to be true and the other false, were 
far more strongly entrenched in people's minds than the 
notion that limited knowledge and perspectives may have 
resulted in a mixture of truth and falsehood on both 
sides. Consequently, the psychical researchers found 
themselves faced with contradictory criticisms, some 
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people saying they were overly credulous, others saying 
they were overly skeptical (Gurney & Myers, 1887,7-8). 
They were constantly, in other words, confronted with 
"the difficulty of getting heard when one proposes a 
'third position, ' that is, an original one, other than 
the familiar pair of pro and con" (Barzun, 1983,176). 
These, then, were the general purposes and principles 
on which Myers (and many of his colleagues) attempted to 
build psychical research: first, to maintain a belief in 
the ultimate rationality and continuity of all phenomena, 
mental as well as physical; and second, to attempt to 
forge a new perspective on old problems concerning the 
nature of mind by extending one's range of observation 
and data beyond ordinary, familiar phenomena and by 
broadening one's concepts through continually examining 
assumptions, hypotheses, and views contrary to one's own. 
On the basis of this "tertium quid" approach, rooted in 
Mill's epistemology, Myers went on to make what I con- 
sider to be two major contributions to psychology. In 
the first place, he proposed a theoretical model of mind 
that was an important attempt to move beyond the two 
predominant, but. diametrically opposed, views of mind and 
to develop a new, more comprehensive view. Secondly, he 
suggested that the mind-matter problem could be 
approached empirically by studying abnormal psychology, 
not from a medical perspective in which therapeutic 
advances were the goal, but from a psychological and 
evolutionary perspective in which theoretical advances 
were the goal; and he outlined numerous lines of research 
that might contribute to such a study. In the following 
chapter, I will describe Myers's model of mind, and in 
Chapter 7I will discuss some of the kinds of research 
that he believed must be conducted and considered when 




1I remind readers of note 3 in Chapter 1, in which I 
said that, despite their different connotations in modern 
usage, the words "spirit" and "mind" refer to the same 
general aspects of human experience. Thus, whenever 
Myers used the word "spirit" or its derivatives, we need 
to resist our automatic reaction which invests this word 
with our usual assumptions about or associations with it. 
In using this word, he was referring to the mental, 
psychical, psychological aspects of experience; but he 
probably used it rather than, say, "psychological" in 
order to avoid the assumption -- becoming so prevalent in 
19th-century psychology -- that the phenomena so desig- 
nated are solely aspects of cerebral processes. He 
acknowledged (1892c, 305) that "spirit" was an 
unsatisfactory word to use, because of its usual 
theological implications, and he suggested the word 
"metetherial" as a possible substitute (Myers, 1898/1909, 
212). Lacking any really satisfactory substitute, 
however, he did continue to use the more common word 
(Myers, 1895a, 23); but in using either "spiritual" or 
"metetherial" he did not mean to assert the old theologi- 
cal, dualistic idea of a discontinuous, supernatural 
realm. He meant only to express his conviction that not 
all phenomena are in essence material and that mind or 
mental efficacy is as fundamental and primary an aspect 
or characteristic of nature as matter. 
2 The word "telepathy" did not come into use until 1882, 
when Myers introduced it in a paper read to the SPR (Bar- 
rett, Massey, Moses, Podmore, Gurney, & Myers, 1883,147; 
Myers, 1896a, 174). Before this, the terms "thought- 
reading" or "thought-transference" had been used to refer 
to the phenomenon of one person apparently deriving 
information directly from another person's mind. 
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3 Myers wrote about the damaging effect that he thought 
the erosion of ideals in the late 19th century was 
already having, both on individuals and on society at 
large, and he argued that, if this loss of ideals con- 
tinued, it would be a major cause of a general decline in 
Western civilization (1888b). In the last paper he pub- 
lished before his death (1900a), he again referred openly 
to this theme that the real motivating force behind human 
activity is an ideal goal. He quoted Henry Sidgwick as 
having said, in "almost his last words to me, " that "we 
must idealise, or we should cease to struggle" (262). 
Similarly, he quoted Tennyson (like Sidgwick, a person 
who was a major influence on Myers's thinking) to 
illustrate his belief that, even if ideals are, by 
definition, unattainable -- even if basic questions are 
unanswerable -- they are our guiding poles: "But blind 
or lame or sick or sound, / We follow that which flies 
before" -- even though "We know the merry world is 
round, / And we may sail for evermore" (261; quoting Ten- 
nyson's The Voyage, "that allegory of the lifelong quest 
of an Ideal"). 
4 By "psychosis" and "neurosis" Myers meant here "mind" 
and "brain" -- that is, psychological events and 
neurological events -- a usage common in the 19th century 
and not implying kinds of mental illness. 
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CHAPTER 6 
STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS: A NEW MODEL OF MIND 
Theory in Science 
It is clearly a chicken-and-egg question to ask 
whether the scientific process begins with theory or with 
observation. Theories cannot usefully be constructed 
without the material of empirical observations; but -- as 
with any perceptual process -- observation does not occur 
without a phenomenon being filtered through the prism of 
some conceptual construct: "The observation of any con- 
crete empirical event is carried out under the dictates 
of some 'theory' -- that is, certain things are attended 
to and certain things are overlooked" (Hall & Lindzey, 
1957,17). Theories are general organizing principles 
that both systematize a wide range of known fact and 
predict an equally wide range of new data. A theory 
must, first of all, provide for "the incorporation of 
known empirical findings within a logically consistent 
and reasonably simple framework. A theory is a means of 
organizing and integrating all that is known concerning a 
related set of events" (Hall & Lindzey, 1957,13-14). 
Perhaps more importantly, however, a theory must also 
stimulate "the collection or observation of relevant 
empirical relations not yet observed. The theory should 
lead to a systematic expansion of knowledge concerning 
the phenomena of interest. . . by the derivation from the 
theory of specific empirical propositions" (Hall & Lind- 
zey, 1957,13). The growth of scientific knowledge is 
thus a continual interplay of observations that spawn 
, organizing 
ideas, that in turn stimulate new observa- 
tions, that in turn modify old generalizations -- and so 
on, indefinitely. 
Perhaps the most important contribution that Myers 
hoped, and attempted, to make to the newly emerging 
science of psychology was to provide it with a general 
theoretical foundation that could serve, as all theories 
must, both as a point of orientation and as a point of 
departure. As I have explained in earlier chapters, he 
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did this first of all by trying to recall psychologists 
to the basic theoretical question of psychology: the 
nature of mind and its relation to matter. He went much 
further than this, however, as I will try to show in this 
and the next chapter, and developed a new model of mind 
that both systematized a wide range of psychophysiologi- 
cal phenomena and suggested novel empirical means for 
broadening the base of observations relevant to psychol- 
ogy's main question. 
As in any science, the phenomena of psychology can be 
approached either from a structural perspective or from a 
dynamic perspective. In other words, psychologists may 
take a descriptive approach -- describing the 
phenomenological relationship between various events or 
facts; or they may take an explanatory approach -- des- 
cribing the causal relationship between the various 
phenomena (Deese, 1972). A general theoretical approach, 
however, must be both structural and dynamic: It must 
organize phenomena in a coherent descriptive framework, 
and it must provide an explanatory framework that can 
predict and accommodate new phenomena. Myers's model of 
mind was both structural and dynamic. On the one hand, 
in what might be called his "spectrum" model of mind, he 
described the phenomenological or structural relationship 
between all psychological processes, conscious and sub- 
conscious. On the other hand, in a dynamic "filter" 
model of mind similar to those of Schiller (1891/1894), 
James (1890,1898/1900), and Bergson (1913), Myers 
described this phenomenological spectrum as the result of 
evolutionarily adaptive processes that limited and shaped 
consciousness rather than produced it. 
A Structural Model of Mind 
Myers began by attempting to overcome the fundamental 
theoretical impasse that separated the new psychology 
from the old psychology. As in physics -- which 
throughout its history had seen the recurrent waxing and 
waning of, now, the particle theory of light and, then, 
the wave theory -- psychological theorizing had remained 
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polarized between, in essence, a particle theory of mind 
and a wave theory. The "wave, " or unity, theory of mind 
was associated with the old, dualistic psychology and is 
the commonsense one, held by most people on the basis of 
their own subjective experience, that the mind or self is 
an abiding, autonomous, indivisible, free, and conscious 
causal agent. Myers quoted from the 18th-century 
philosopher Thomas Reid to describe this position: 
The conviction which every man has of his 
identity... needs no aid of philosophy to strengthen 
it; and no philosophy can weaken it.... I am not 
thought, I am not action, I am not feelings; I am 
something that thinks, and acts, and suffers. My 
thoughts and actions and feelings change every 
moment...; but that self or I, to which they belong, 
is permanent.... [A] person is a monad, and is not 
divisible into parts. (1885d, 639; 1903,1: 10) 
The "particle, " or multiplicity, view, in contrast, was 
associated with the new physiological psychology and con- 
ceived of mind, or the self, as an aggregate of 
psychological elements. The mind was a product of physi- 
cal and evolutionary processes, its conscious portion was 
only a part of it, and its perceived unity was derived 
entirely from the evolved coordination of the parts of 
the bodily organism. Ribot provided Myers with his des- 
cription of this view: 
It is the organism... which constitutes the real per- 
sonality.... The conscious personality is never more 
than a small fraction of the psychical personality. 
The unity of the Ego is not therefore the unity of a 
single entity diffusing itself among multiple 
phenomena; it is the co-ordination of a certain num- 
ber of states perpetually renascent, and having for 
their sole common basis the vague feeling of our 
body. This unity does not diffuse itself downwards, 
but is aggregated by ascent from below...; the Self 
is a co-ordination. (1903,1: 10, translated and 
quoted by Myers from Ribot; see Ribot, 1898,154- 
155) 
The two views were completely opposite in nature and 
apparently "hopelessly incompatible"; and yet each of 
them was supported by experience -- "the one by our 
inmost consciousness, " or personal experience, and "the 
other by [the] unanswerable observation and inference" of 
scientific analysis (1903,1: 11). In keeping with his 
tertium quid approach to such intractable and paradoxical 
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problems, Myers believed that in fact "the reconcilement 
of the two opposing systems in a profounder synthesis" 
was possible and that the controversy would be resolved 
with "a judgment more decisively in favour of both 
parties than either could have expected" (1903,1: 11). 
Neither view was wrong; they were both simply incomplete. 
Myers "unreservedly conceded" to those who held the 
psychophysiological "particle" view that mind, or human 
personality, is not what we generally take it to be 
(1903,1: 11; 1885d, 638) and that "the old-fashioned con- 
ception of human personality as a unitary consciousness 
known with practical completeness to the waking self 
need[s] complete revision" (1903,2: 81). The rapidly 
multiplying observations of experimental psychology, 
neurology, psychopathology, and hypnotism clearly showed 
that higher mental processes had evolved from lower ones; 
that the human mind is far more extensive than ordinarily 
thought, since much of our psychological functioning 
remains outside the range of our conscious mental life; 
and that under certain conditions, consciousness could 
fragment into multiple parts. 
Nevertheless, Myers also believed that even though 
the observations were correct, the theoretical conclusion 
drawn from them -- that human personality is therefore a 
product of multiple elements -- may be a premature and 
superficial conclusion. He believed that psychologists 
had not yet carried the analysis of human personality far 
enough or deep enough, and that, when they did, that 
analysis would, paradoxically, reveal an underlying con- 
tinuity or unity of human personality out of which were 
continually being filtered only those elements most use- 
ful and adaptive to everyday life: "There exists a more 
comprehensive consciousness, a profounder faculty, which 
for the most part remains potential only..., but from 
which the consciousness and faculty of earth-life are 
mere selections" (1903,1: 12). 
Myers's model of mind derived, by analogy, directly 
from Hughlings Jackson's hierarchical model of nervous 
system functioning, which in turn had derived from Spen- 
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cer's ideas about the evolution and dissolution of com- 
plex systems (Jackson, 1884). Jackson described the 
nervous system as a hierarchy of three general levels, 
ranging from the oldest and most basic biochemical 
processes, to the mid-level sensorimotor processes, to 
the most recently evolved cerebral centers with which the 
higher mental processes are associated. Evolution occurs 
as the older processes, by repeated functioning, become 
more organized, automatic, unconscious, and stable. 
Receding, as it were, from center stage and into the 
background of consciousness, these processes nevertheless 
continue to function automatically, providing the basis 
upon which higher and more complex processes develop. 
These higher processes, being newer, are thus less 
organized, less automatic, less stable, and more con- 
scious, requiring, because of their relative 
unfamiliarity, more attention from the organism. When 
injury or disease strikes the nervous system, the higher 
processes -- being less stable -- are the first to be 
affected and impaired, and when the higher processes can 
no longer function, lower functions re-emerge from the 
background and take over the primary, overt functioning 
of the organism. According to Jackson, therefore, dis- 
solution of the nervous system occurs in the exact 
reverse order as its original evolution occurred, and the 
symptoms of insanity are simply whatever lower-level 
nervous system processes remain functional when higher- 
level ones have been impaired (Jackson, 1884,591). 
This model of a hierarchical system that is in a con- 
stant state of change -- or evolution and dissolution -- 
in response to the demands of the organism's environment 
became the model for Myers's conception of mind, or human 
personality. 1 Just as Jackson had applied a hierarchi- 
cal, evolutionary model to the nervous system and its 
corresponding psychophysiological phenomena and had thus 
"clear[ed] up much previous confusion of thought, " so, 
Myers thought, one could apply a similar hierarchical, 
evolutionary model to clear up the present confusion 
about the unity versus the multiplicity of mind, brought 
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on by the new recognition that the extent of mind 
exceeded our conscious awareness (1903,1: 72-73). 2 The 
confusion had arisen, in large part, because "mind" had 
long been equated with "consciousness, " that is, with 
what one was aware, cognizant, or sensible of. Thus, for 
many in the 19th century, the term "unconscious mind" was 
a contradiction in terms. This belief gave rise to such 
interpretations of unconscious phenomena as Carpenter's 
hypothesis of unconscious cerebration, which said that 
all unconscious processes are simply physiological 
reflexes. Other people, however, pointed out that many 
unconscious or subconscious processes displayed charac- 
teristics that we ordinarily attribute to conscious 
beings, such as memory, volition, and creativity. Myers 
himself, for example, argued that 
I wish to protest against the undue extension of 
such phrases as 'unconscious cerebration, ' and to 
insist that we have as good ground for attributing 
consciousness to some at least of these subliminal 
operations in ourselves as we have for attributing 
consciousness to the intellectual performances of 
our neighbors. (1892d, 327) 
Thus, unless one were willing to insist that all con- 
scious mental processes are also simply physiological 
reflexes, this unconscious cerebration hypothesis seemed 
clearly inadequate. 
Many psychologists were thus led to propose instead 
that the unconscious or subconscious was an alternate, or 
second, personality, with a separate memory chain, focus 
of consciousness, and thus self-identity comparable in 
kind (if not degree) to the original personality (see, 
e. g., Binet, 1890,1891/1896; Sidis, 1898/1906,1912; 
Sidis & Goodhart, 1905). This conception, however, 
inevitably led to such problems as who or what these per- 
sonalities were, how many of them there could be, and how 
one ethically decides which was the "real" personality 
and which would be eliminated as intruders -- a problem 
that became particularly poignant for Morton Prince when 
he was faced with the godlike task of banishing Sally 
from Christine Beauchamp's new merged personality 
(Prince, 1905/1930). 
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Instead of defining mind or consciousness as the con- 
tent of our awareness -- which, obviously, changes every 
moment -- Myers defined it by the criterion of 
memorability. This criterion was not the same as that of 
those philosophers, such as Locke and Hume, who argue 
that self-identity or personality can be defined by the 
criterion of continuity of memory. Myers was fully aware 
of the inadequacy of proposing a continuous or persisting 
memory chain as a criterion for self-identity. Not only 
the phenomena of abnormal psychology, but also the daily 
phenomenon of sleep called this definition into question: 
"Experimental psychology [is] upsetting the old 
metaphysical view... that the persistence of the one 
thread of memory... is a proof of the true personality.... 
[M]emory, as we know it, cannot prove the personality of 
man" (1885d, 648,651). Instead, for Myers, "conscious 
means memorable": It is not only what is actually in 
memory at any given time -- that is, what is within 
supraliminal waking consciousness or capable of being 
brought within it by supraliminal, waking effort. It is, 
more fundamentally, what may potentially be brought 
within supraliminal waking consciousness -- that is, what 
is "capable of reappearing in the field of memory if a 
favourable occasion recurs" (1885c, 129; see also 1891d, 
117): 
When we conceive any act other than our own as a 
conscious act, we do so either because we regard it 
as complex, and therefore purposive, or because we 
perceive that it has been remembered.... The 
memorability of an act is, in fact, a better proof 
of consciousness than its complexity.... I cannot see 
how we can phrase our definition more simply than by 
saying that any act or condition must be regarded as 
conscious if it is potentially memorable; -- if it 
can be recollected, under any circumstances, by the 
subject concerned. (1903,1: 36-37) 
Broadly speaking, then, anything that enters into one's 
range of experience becomes part of one's consciousness 
and, in principle, capable of entering into one's waking 
consciousness or awareness, given the appropriate condi- 
tion or the discovery of an "appropriate artifice" or 
experimental method to do this (1891d, 115). 
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For Myers, therefore, the definition of mind did not 
involve the problematic task of defining what was in or 
out of one's waking awareness. Furthermore, for him the 
problem of the nature of mind was not the straightforward 
one of whether mind should be considered unitary, double, 
or multiple. When, for example, Dessoir raised (in his 
book Das Doppel-Ich) the problem of whether consciousness 
should be considered duplex or multiplex, Myers replied 
that psychologists must "probe the matter still deeper, " 
since the problem was "far more complex than a mere fis- 
sion into two [or more] personalities" (1889h, 211). 
Similarly, the structure of human personality was more 
complex than a simple division -- at some boundary or 
threshold of sensation, perception, or memory -- into 
consciousness and unconsciousness (1885a, 234). In his 
view, there is "no persistent plane of cleavage" or "mere 
counting of heads (to use a somewhat inappropriate meta- 
phor), " but there is instead a complex, fluctuating, but 
continuous "gradation" of consciousness (1889h, 211). 
Myers thought that our conception of mind would have 
to be altered along lines similar to the changes modern 
science had brought to our understanding of light. Thus, 
he suggested that the individual self or personality 
could be thought of as a ray of light which, when fil- 
tered through a physical object or prism, becomes visible 
as a continuum, or spectrum, of colors extending 
indefinitely in either direction. Our ordinary waking 
consciousness corresponds only to that small segment of 
the solar spectrum that is visible to the naked eye (and 
that varies from species to species); but just as the 
solar spectrum continues indefinitely in either direction 
beyond the small visible portion, so human consciousness 
might extend indefinitely in either direction beyond the 
small portion of which we are normally aware. And, just 
as the physical sciences have developed artificial means 
of extending our sensory perception far beyond its 
ordinary limits into the infrared and ultraviolet 
regions, so the task of the psychological sciences is to 
expand our perception and understanding of human con- 
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sciousness beyond its ordinary limits. As Myers 
expressed it, "optical analysis splits up the white ray 
into the various coloured rays which compose it": 
The sunbeam..., when fanned out into a spectrum, is 
barred with belts and lines of varying darkness; 
.. [and] where at either end the spectrum fades out into what for us is blackness, there stretches 
onwards in reality an undiscovered illimitable 
ray.... Even thus, I venture to affirm, beyond each 
end of our conscious spectrum extends a range of 
faculty and perception, exceeding the known range, 
but as yet indistinctly guessed. The artifices of 
the modern physicist have extended far in each 
direction the visible spectrum known to Newton. It 
is for the modern psychologist to discover artifices 
which may extend in each direction the conscious 
spectrum as known to Plato or to Kant. (1903,1: 17- 
18) 
To try to make his conception of mind clearer, Myers 
also varied the metaphor to compare consciousness to 
heat, such that 
our supraliminal [ordinary waking] consciousness or 
memory resembles the range of temperature covered by 
our ordinary thermometers. The thermometer's range 
represents but a small segment of the temperatures 
whose existence in the Cosmos is implicit by the 
very nature and constitution of the planet on whose 
surface our short range of temperatures prevails. 
Even so our supraliminal consciousness, with its 
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consciousness of wider scope. That wider conscious- 
ness, again, may conceivably extend from the 
absolute zero, or point -- wherever that may be -- 
where no consciousness has yet begun, up to a point 
of expansion where it may transcend any analogy 
which we can employ. For just as we know of no 
superior limit to heat, unless it be that point 
where, in consequence of the complete dissociation 
of matter, the energy which we call heat must change 
its character in some unknown way, so also we know 
of no superior limit to consciousness, unless it be 
at that point where individual consciousness, indi- 
vidual memories, may be merged in some vaster and 
unknown form of life. (1892c, 306-307) 
In short, mind was not to be equated with that rela- 
tively small fragment of it that we know as our waking 
awareness, perception, or memory. The particular portion 
of the psychological spectrum that comprises our waking 
self has been, as it were, filtered out from the whole: 
The matters of which we are superficially conscious 
have been selected from among the matters of which 
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we might have been conscious, much as the matters to 
which we attend are selected from among the matters 
to which we might attend. (1892c, 307) 
The waking self is thus "a restricted personality, " or "a 
segment of our being"; and "our being" is that "wider 
personality subjacent but habitually unreachable" (1885b, 
234; 1893d, 20). Consciousness, by his definition there- 
fore, was not limited to the "restricted" waking con- 
sciousness, but was the entire spectrum, including all 
"psychical action... included in an actual or potential 
memory below the threshold of our habitual conscious- 
ness. " The "supraliminal" consciousness referred to the 
ordinary waking portion; the "subliminal" consciousness 
referred to all that lay outside the waking portion 
(1892c, 305). 
Myers was thus quite explicit in his terminology: By 
individuality, or Self, he meant to refer to the entire 
spectrum; by personality, or self, he meant the small 
segment of it that we habitually perceive or are aware 
of. The individuality or Self is "the underlying psychi- 
cal unity, " or "our persistent being... an irreducible 
Ego... [that] finds at different moments very different 
channels or capacities of self-manifestation" (1892c, 
305; 1889d, 60,63). The personality or self, in con- 
trast, is one of those "different channels or capacities 
of self-manifestation" (of which, as I will explain fur- 
ther below, there may be more than one within one Self). 
It is "more external and transitory.... [It is] any chain 
of memory sufficiently continuous, and embracing suffi- 
cient particulars, to acquire what is popularly called a 
'character' of its own" (1892c, 305). 3 
An Evolutionary Model of Mind 
Myers went on to suggest that the same mechanism 
carved out the waking, or supraliminal, portion of the 
psychological spectrum in a species or an individual as 
had determined the visible portion of the solar spectrum: 
natural selection in response to the demands of the 
organism's environment. Out of the potential sensory or 
psychological processes latent in consciousness, only 
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those most useful for survival have thus far developed: 
My waking consciousness may embrace only such part 
of my whole range of faculties as it has been useful 
for my ancestors to keep under immediate control in 
their struggle for terrene existence.... [T]he range 
of perception which rises above the threshold -- the 
spectrum, as I call it, of my supraliminal con- 
sciousness -- may merely have been determined by 
natural selection. (1894-1895,197) 
The waking self was not the only possible self that could 
have developed out of the entire, latent Self; nor, as 
Myers frequently emphasized, was it psychologically supe- 
rior to or more important than the rest of the spectrum 
of consciousness: 
I hold that we each of us contain the potentialities 
of many different arrangements of the elements of 
our personality. .. . The arrangement with which we habitually identify ourselves, -- what we call the 
normal or primary self, -- consists, in my view, of 
elements selected for us in the struggle for exist- 
ence with special reference to the maintenance of 
ordinary physical needs, and is not necessarily 
superior in any other respect to the latent per- 
sonalities which lie alongside it, -- the fresh com- 
binations of our personal elements which may be 
evoked, by accident or design, in a variety to which 
we can at present assign no limit. (1888c, 387) 
Nor, he said elsewhere, do we have any reason to assume 
that our waking consciousness "does really cover the most 
important part of the psychical operations which are 
going on within us" (1887b, 258-259). Myers agreed with 
Hughlings Jackson, who, when discussing the evolution and 
dissolution of the nervous system, had insisted that 
manifesting states are the '"fittest, ' not 
'best, '.... [T]he evolutionist has nothing to do with good 
or bad" (Jackson, 1884,591). 
Myers's model of the evolution of mind closely paral- 
leled certain ideas of Spencer and von Baer, from whom 
Jackson had derived his model of the evolution and dis- 
solution of the nervous system. Von Baer (1792-1876) had 
written about "the law of development" of an individual 
organism from a homogeneous embryo to a heterogeneous and 
increasingly complex organism. Spencer had applied von 
Baer's law, Coleridge's similar idea of a "tendency to 
individuation, " and associationist principles (Young, 
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1968,1970) to develop his general principle that the 
universe -- like the embryo -- began as a simple 
homogeneity, or formless unity, which then began to 
divide and differentiate into parts, which in turn 
integrated to form new units that became increasingly 
complex in the ongoing process of adapting to their 
environment. Jackson had in turn applied these general 
ideas about the evolutionary differentiation and increas- 
ing complexity of systems to physiology and the nervous 
system in particular (Young, 1968,1970). 
An important aspect of Myers's ideas about the evolu- 
tion of mind or consciousness was that, just as the forms 
of all living organisms were somehow inherent in the 
original homogeneity, or "primal germ, " from which all 
life had developed, similarly all forms of consciousness 
were inherent in the homogeneous primal germ from which 
mind had developed. All life 
starts from an X of some sort; and for my present 
argument it matters not whether you call Xa carbon- 
atom or an immortal soul. Whatever it was, X had 
certain propensities, which must have dated in any 
case from some age anterior to its existence upon 
our recent planet... (and] on which earth's forces 
began their play. (1892c, 318) 
Thus, Myers suggested, there had been a "primitive simple 
irritability" (1903,1: 95), or "undifferentiated sensory 
capacity of the supposed primal germ" (1896a, 167), which 
Myers called panaesthesia. Out of this homogeneous or 
undifferentiated sensibility had developed the particular 
senses we now have. For example, the evolutionary 
process had eventually reached "a point... where vision 
differentiate[d] itself from various indefinite forms of 
perception... with the growing sensibility of the pigment- 
spot to light and shadow" (1903,1: 224). Similarly, 
other senses had evolved out of some pre-existing latent 
potential, and other forms of perception, he suggested, 
may yet be emerging and evolving: 
Whatever be the part which we assign to external 
influences in its evolution, the fact remains that 
the germ possessed the power of responding in an 
indefinite number of ways to an indefinite number of 
stimuli. It was only the accident of its exposure 
to certain stimuli and not to others which has made 
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it what it now is. And having shown itself so far 
modifiable as to acquire these highly specialised 
senses which I possess, it is doubtless still 
modifiable in directions as unthinkable to me as my 
eyesight would have been unthinkable to the oyster. 
(1889g, 190) 
Human beings are now the highest point on the evolu- 
tionary scale, since "they have evoked in greatest multi- 
plicity the unnumbered faculties latent in the 
irritability of a speck of slime" (1903,1: 76). 
Nevertheless, it does not thereby follow that our present 
sensory capacities and our normal waking consciousness 
mark the final point of the evolutionary process: "To 
anyone. . . who takes a broad view of human development, it 
must seem a very improbable thing that that development 
should at this particular moment have reached its final 
term" (1903,1: 186). Just as in the individual spectrum 
of potential consciousness some perceptions and capa- 
cities have become supraliminal, so in the evolutionary 
spectrum of potential consciousness, some faculties have 
been evoked and some remain latent or potential only 
(1903,1: 119). But there is "no apparent reason why 
these latent powers should not from time to time receive 
sufficient stimulus" to appear sporadically, and even 
ultimately to develop more fully (1903,1: 186). 
Myers believed that there were many kinds of 
phenomena demonstrating that the differentiation of 
sensory and perceptual capacities out of the original 
undifferentiated panaesthesia was an incomplete and ongo- 
ing evolutionary process. For example, in the phenomenon 
known as synaesthesia, two sensory capacities seemed to 
be linked in unaccustomed ways, resulting in "con- 
comitance of sense-impression" (1903,1: 224). Thus, in 
so-called "coloured audition" or "sound-seeing, " the 
sensation of a particular sound will inevitably be 
accompanied by the sensation of a particular color. 
Myers suggested that synaesthesia was "a kind of vestige 
of that undifferentiated continuous sensitivity from 
which we suppose our existing senses to have been spe- 
cialised in the struggle for life" (1892g, 529). 
Similarly, phenomena considered examples of hyper- 
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aesthesia, or "unusually keen sensation" (1896a, 167), 
may suggest the development of increasing sensitivity in 
known senses; or they may also suggest the emergence of 
new sensory or perceptual capacities, "as yet incipient 
and unrecognised,... a wider selection from the potential 
panaesthesia of the primal germ" (1895i, 410). In short, 
perceptual capacity, like consciousness in general, is a 
spectrum or continuum in which the boundaries between 
particular senses are not rigidly fixed, and likewise in 
which the boundary between what is a latent or potential 
capacity and what is an emergent or known capacity is 
continually evolving and changing. As a result of this 
fluidity of boundary, perceptual capacities -- new and 
old -- may occasionally be more closely linked together 
than usual or may occasionally become unusually acute. 
In Myers's view, therefore, if psychologists wished 
to gain a wider theoretical perspective on the nature of 
mind, they should be concerned not just with what human 
consciousness has evolved out of, but also with what it 
might be evolving into: "It must be on the future as 
much as on the past, on what is now in process of evolu- 
tion as much as on what has already been evolved, that 
the attention of the psychologist should be fixed" (1903, 
1: 97-98). The process of evolution involved not simply 
the adaptation of an organism to its environment, but 
also the widening perception of that environment, the 
"gradual discovery of an environment, always there, but 
unknown" (1903,1: 95). On both the individual and the 
evolutionary level, organisms were continually evolving 
from being "unconscious of all the stimuli to which 
[they] had not yet learnt to respond, " to becoming 
increasingly aware of aspects of their environment that 
had existed all along, but unperceived and unsuspected by 
them (1903,1: 95). During the course of development or 
evolution, in other words, the supraliminal portion of 
the spectrum of consciousness has been gradually expand- 
ing into (as it were) new territories, indicating that 
not only is that spectrum far more extended than it 
superficially -- that is, supraliminally -- appears to be 
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at any given point in time, but also that the environment 
around it is more extended. Since life and consciousness 
are still, presumably, evolving, "it should be... the 
business of the psychologist to look out for extensions 
of capacity -- to recognise evolution" (1892c, 315). 
Such an approach, Myers believed, would not only broaden 
our perspective on the nature and extent of mind, but 
would also broaden our perspective on the nature and 
extent of that environment in which mind exists. Myers 
himself believed that that broadened perspective would 
indicate that "Thought and Consciousness are not, as the 
materialists hold them, a mere epiphenomenon .... but, on 
the other hand, are, and always have been, the central 
subject of the evolutionary process itself" (1891e, 642). 
In any case, "to those who will say that all this is a 
mere fantasy played on the great theme of Evolution, I 
would suggest that the theory of Evolution can never be 
-- I do not say complete -- but even coherent, until it 
can say some plausible word on Life, Consciousness, 
Thought" (1891e, 643). 
Another aspect of Jackson's model of nervous system 
functioning that was paralleled in Myers's model of mind 
was the nature of automatisms. Jackson (1884) had pro- 
posed that the older and more habitual a process became, 
the more stable, unconscious, and automatic its execution 
became, leaving the organism free to develop more 
advanced and complex processes. Similarly, Myers sug- 
gested that older psychophysiological processes became 
more stable and automatic. There is, he pointed out, an 
evolutionary advantage to "relegating voluntary ends to 
automatic execution. " First of all, learned, stable, 
automatic processes get "the needed thing done. . . with a 
verve and a completeness which conscious effort finds it 
hard to rival" (1900c, 415). But they also allow newer 
and more complex latent processes to emerge as the 
organism's conscious, supraliminal attention is withdrawn 
from the older, more primitive processes and focused 
instead on the unfamiliar and thus relatively unstable 
developing processes. 
240 
The Spectrum Model 
Myers again resorted to his analogy or model of the 
solar spectrum to illustrate in more detail the structure 
and dynamics of evolving mind. The distinction between 
subliminal and supraliminal aspects of consciousness in 
Myers's model is not as simple as a dichotomy between 
conscious and not conscious, or between weak and strong 
sensations separated by some boundary or threshold of 
awareness. To fully delineate the range of subliminal 
functioning, Myers found it necessary to depict the sub- 
liminal as falling below, above, and even within the 
supraliminal -- just as the portions of the solar spec- 
trum invisible to the unaided human eye fall below (in 
the infrared direction), above (in the ultraviolet direc- 
tion), and within the visible portion (in the dark bands 
interspersed throughout the visible range). 4 He there- 
fore urged his readers to think of ordinary waking con- 
sciousness, not as a pinnacle, but as a fragment of con- 
sciousness: 
There seems no reason to assume that our active con- 
sciousness is necessarily superior to the conscious- 
ness [or processes] which are at present secondary, 
or potential only. We may rather hold that super- 
conscious may be quite as legitimate a term as sub- 
conscious, and instead of regarding our conscious- 
ness (as is commonly done) as a threshold in our 
being, above which ideas and sensations must rise if 
we wish to cognize them, we may prefer to regard it 
as a segment of our being, into which ideas and 
sensations may enter either from below or from 
above. (1885a, 234) 
The entire consciousness, or Self, of an individual 
therefore consists not only of the waking, or "visible, " 
segment, but also of three basic kinds of subliminal, or 
"invisible, " psychological processes. First, some sub- 
liminal processes fall into the "infrared" portion of the 
spectrum of consciousness. In Myers's Jacksonian-type 
hierarchy, the infrared region contained the older, more 
primitive processes -- information or behavior that, he 
suggested, had once been conscious (either at the indi- 
vidual or at the evolutionary level), but was now uncon- 
scious, automatic, and primarily physiological. Thus, 
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"at the red end (so to say) consciousness disappears 
among the organic processes" (1894-1895,197). As I will 
describe in more detail below, sleep and its associated 
psychophysiological processes are an important aspect of 
"infrared" functioning. Furthermore, in certain other 
situations, such as those altered states of consciousness 
in which suggestion or self-suggestion becomes somehow 
effective, the individual may exhibit "increased powers 
over organic processes, " as in cases of stigmata or 
"faith healing" (1894-1895,197). Myers suggested that 
in such altered states of consciousness, the individual's 
normal waking consciousness has somehow been suppressed 
and "infrared" subliminal processes have been activated. 
As a result, certain automatic or organic processes 
relegated (by evolution or habit) to the infrared areas 
of functioning may once again come under a kind of voli- 
tional (although not supraliminal) control. 5 
Secondly, there are subliminal processes that fall 
within the supraliminal segment of the spectrum, cor- 
responding to (in the analogy of the solar spectrum) the 
dark bands interspersed throughout the visible range of 
colors. These "dark bands" are mental processes that are 
comparable in kind to supraliminal ones but that are 
nonetheless outside waking consciousness. They are "men- 
tal [operations]... which are on much the same level as 
the operations to which our minds attend, but which for 
various reasons remain in the background" (1886d, 285), 
such as sensations that we have subconsciously perceived 
with our normal senses, but have never been consciously 
aware of. As with the infrared subliminal processes, 
these "dark-band" subliminal processes may also, under 
certain conditions or in certain individuals, become 
activated such that they emerge from their ordinarily 
latent state. Hypnotized subjects, for example, may show 
hypermnesia (or a keener than usual memory) or hyper- 
acuity of the normal senses; idiots savants may show an 
unusually elevated level of calculating ability; children 
(or others) with eidetic imagery display an unusually 
vivid sense of imagery. 
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Finally, in the "ultraviolet" end of the spectrum are 
all those mental capacities that remain latent because 
they have not yet been elicited, at a supraliminal level 
of consciousness, by the adaptive evolutionary process. 
It is the subliminal phenomena on this end of the spec- 
trum that, Myers believed, could suggest where conscious- 
ness might be headed, not just where it had come from. 
In the "ultraviolet" region, therefore, were those new 
modes of perception that seemed -- rarely, fitfully, and 
briefly -- to emerge. They are the "super-conscious 
operations" that are "not below the threshold -- but 
rather above the upper horizon of consciousness" (1886d, 
285), the supernormal phenomena that "indicate a higher 
evolutionary level... [that] is above the norm of man 
rather than outside his nature" (1896a, 174; see also 
1885b, 30n). Such supernormal operations included 
telepathy, "the communication of impressions of any kind 
from one mind to another, independently of the recognised 
channels of sense" (1896a, 174); clairvoyance (or, as 
Myers preferred to call it, telaesthesia), "perception at 
a distance... independently of the recognised channels of 
sense" but also independently of any other mind (1896a, 
174); precognition, or knowledge of the future "beyond 
the scope of our ordinary inference" (1895h, 338); 
retrocognition, or knowledge of the past "beyond our 
ordinary memory" (1895h, 338); and telekinesis (now 
usually called psychokinesis), or the movement of objects 
beyond the range of ordinary muscular or other physical 
forces (1896a, 174). All of these "ultraviolet" 
phenomena suggested, in essence, newly emerging modes of 
perception or other interaction of mind or consciousness 
with its environment. Telepathy and telaesthesia implied 
a new and different kind of relationship with space; 
precognition and retrocognition implied a new relation- 
ship with time; and telekinesis implied an extended kind 
of interaction with matter. 6 
Although Myers himself had introduced some of this 
terminology -- for example, "telepathy" and 
"telaesthesia" (Barrett, Massey, Moses, et al., 1883, 
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147) and "retrocognition" (1896a, 173) -- he was careful 
to warn that the categories of phenomena were probably 
not as precisely delineated as the precise terminology 
might suggest. The terms may help to arrange and clarify 
phenomena temporarily, but because these supernormal 
operations had barely begun to emerge and differentiate 
themselves from the homogeneous panaesthesia, whether 
they would actually differentiate and develop in the 
categories we have presently constructed remained very 
much an open question: 
I am far from assuming that these terms correspond 
with definite and clearly separated groups of 
phenomena, or comprise the field of supernormal 
faculty.... [T]here is no one logical order in which 
to arrange these supernormal phenomena. They do not 
spring one from another in traceable sequence; 
rather they are emergent and scattered manifesta- 
tions of some deeper and more comprehensive law. 
The distinction suggested... between telepathy and 
telaesthesia... cannot be made fundamental. (1903, 
1: 136) 
Just as there is synaesthesia, or linked and 
undifferentiated sensation between two or more known 
sensory capacities, there may be synaesthesia among new, 
or supernormal, modes of perception: "The assumed new 
sensitivities. . . may be linked together 
in ways quite 
unknown to us" (1895i, 410). Thus, for example, in an 
apparently simple case in which, by automatic writing, 
one person had located another person's lost book, Myers 
pointed out the difficulty of specifying an exact 
explanation for the event: Was it retrocognitive aware- 
ness of the book being misplaced in the past? telepathy 
from the subliminal consciousness of the person who had 
misplaced it? telaesthesia (or clairvoyance) of the lost 
book itself? or precognition of the owner finding the 
book in the future? (1895h, 397). All that could be said 
was, in essence, that some undifferentiated, homogeneous 
panaesthesia in the ultraviolet range, above the boundary 
of the supraliminal segment, of the automatist's spectrum 
of consciousness had conveyed, through her automatic 
writing, the location of a lost book. 
It is also important to note that Myers warned his 
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readers not to take his model of the spectrum too 
literally. Consciousness was surely not so simple a mat- 
ter as a linear (or even three-dimensional) model might 
suggest, since all mental phenomena -- subliminal or 
supraliminal, infrared or ultraviolet -- were part of one 
consciousness or Self and therefore inextricably interre- 
lated (1903,1: 18). Thus, 
there is not necessarily any deeply-lying distinc- 
tion between powers which I have classed as infra- 
physiological [infrared] and powers which I have 
classed as supra-psychological [ultraviolet] beyond 
the respective limits of my imaginary spectrum. For 
aught we know, these powers may go often together. 
(1892d, 328-329) 
Elsewhere, he suggested that a circular model might be 
more appropriate: 
Observe. . . that the two subliminal prolongations of 
my imaginary spectrum -- say the phenomena of power 
over organic processes [an "infrared" phenomenon], 
and of clairvoyance [an" ultraviolet" phenomenon] -- 
do in fact approach each other, instead of lying 
more and more widely apart, so that my spectrum 
ought to be imagined as circular, not linear, and 
with the infra-red and ultra-violet regions running 
into each other in some deeply hidden way. (1892g, 
438-439) 
In one paper he offered a diagrammatic representation of 
such a circular "spectrum" (1895i, 586; the diagram is 
described on pp. 587-590). On this diagram he located 
both supraliminal and subliminal psychological processes 
with relation to a vertical time axis (with the past at 
one end and the future at the other) and to a horizontal 
psychophysiological axis (with matter at one end and mind 
at the other). Again, however, he emphasized that any 
such two- or even three-dimensional diagram was "an 
absurdly inadequate symbol of that n-dimensional 
infinitude of living faculty some few of whose properties 
we dimly perceive" (1895i, 585). There was, he believed, 
an ultimate unity or continuity to all phenomena of life 
that our categories inevitably disrupt: "The opposite 
direction of its [the diagram's] lines implies no 
ultimate divergence; all alike must be assumed to meet at 
infinity" (ibid. ) 
Nevertheless; our categories of thought are necessary 
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to us, and analogies or models such as Myers's "spectrum" 
of consciousness. -- inadequate as they are -- can serve 
the important purpose of furthering our understanding of 
a phenomenon, "if used with caution" (1892d, 329). 
Shephard (1978,183) argued for "the importance of spa- 
tial visualization in thought" for the generation and 
conceptualization of scientific ideas or other creative 
processes. Deese (1972,39-42) pointed out that many 
scientists and philosophers dislike models and metaphors 
because they oversimplify, they are inaccurate in some 
respects, and they "serve no logical function. " Yet, he 
went on, "for many people... the real heart of the 
understanding of science is in its models... [and] 
understanding is as significant as [is] the development 
of the logical consequences of some theory" (41). 
In sum, therefore, Myers thought it would be helpful 
to visualize the evolution of consciousness as the grad- 
ual shifting of the supraliminal segment up the spectrum 
in the direction of the ultraviolet region, thus grad- 
ually relegating more and more psychological processes to 
the infrared region as they are mastered, while, 
simultaneously, drawing new, latent psychological 
processes out of the ultraviolet region and into the 
supraliminal (or "visible") portion of the spectrum. 
This model helped, first, to illustrate that the 
supraliminal, overt mind is only a fragment of the entire 
consciousness. But, perhaps more importantly, it also 
helped to illustrate that the supraliminal, overt mind is 
not a stationary, fixed range of processes and that the 
boundaries separating the infrared end, the visible seg- 
ment, the interspersed "dark bands, " and the ultraviolet 
end of the spectrum are likewise not fixed or even 
precise, but are fluid and continually shifting. An 
evolutionary model, in fact, demanded a certain amount of 
instability if there was to be adaptation in the face of 
change: "Self-adaptation to wider environments must 
inevitably be accompanied... by something of nervous 
instability" (1903,1: 92). As a result of this 
instability, during the course of evolution there was "a 
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continual displacement of the threshold of consciousness" 
(1903,1: 16). Similarly, on the individual level, "the 
personality of each of us is in a state of constantly 
shifting equilibrium" (1893d, 9), as the range of our 
supraliminal awareness expands, contracts, and shifts and 
as the processes over which we have conscious, or 
supraliminal, control become increasingly complex. 
Unity and Multiplicity: A Tertium Quid 
With this evolutionary model of a Self whose latent 
capacities gradually emerge and whose emergent manifesta- 
tion grows increasingly complex in response to the 
demands of the environment, Myers thought that psychology 
could move beyond the conflict between the old concept of 
mind as a unity and the new concept of mind as a multi- 
plicity, and affirm that both views were in fact correct. 
Human mind or personality is, he insisted, "at once 
profoundly unitary and almost infinitely complex" (1903, 
1: 34). Self or individuality -- the original whole light 
ray, in the metaphor of the solar spectrum -- registers 
or otherwise incorporates within itself every sensation 
or idea that comes within its range of experience: These 
are "the elements of our personality. " Our ordinary, 
familiar waking self consists of those few "elements 
selected for us in the struggle for existence" and bound 
together in a more or less stable chain of memory. In 
certain circumstances, however, other chains of memory or 
groupings of elements may form: "The letters of our 
inward alphabet will shape themselves into many other 
dialects; -- many other personalities, as distinct as 
those which we assume to be ourselves, can be made out of 
our mental material" (1889g, 195). Moreover, the number 
of such groupings or personalities may be endless: "The 
fresh combinations of our personal elements... may be 
evoked, by accident [e. g., spontaneous somnambulism or 
multiple personality] or design [e. g., hypnosis or sug- 
gestion], in a variety to which we can at present assign 
no limit" (1888c, 387). 
On the other hand, behind the multiple elements and 
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groupings of elements of our being, there was only one 
being: a "perdurable Unity" behind "the shifting ele- 
ments" (1889i, 343; see also 1885a, 1885d). It was 
erroneous, he thought, to conclude that the analysis of 
personality into many components meant that there was no 
ultimate unity behind it, "that this view of our per- 
sonality as a complex, a shifting thing... must bring with 
it also a presumption that there is nothing in us beyond 
this ever-changing identity" (1887b, 260). The fear that 
"the analysis of man's personality would end in analysing 
man away" (1885a, 249) was unfounded. On the contrary, 
only by analyzing human personality further, by "pulling 
ourselves to pieces, " could we "hope to find indications 
that there is something in us larger and more perdurable 
than we had previously supposed" (1889g, 195). 
In particular, Myers found it significant that, in 
certain hypnotic and psychopathological cases, the vari- 
ous personalities were not totally isolated; some of them 
were, in varying degrees, aware of others. In Janet's 
case of Leonie (or Madame B. ), for example, the secondary 
personality, Leontine, was aware of Leonie, although 
Leonie was unaware of her; and the third personality, 
Leonore, possessed the memories of both the other two, 
even though they. were both unaware (directly) of her 
existence (see Myers, 1903,1: 322-326). Similarly, in 
Morton Prince's case of Christine Beauchamp, there was a 
hierarchy of selves in which each one knew about the 
one(s) preceding it, but not the one(s) above it (Prince, 
1900,1905/1930). Although this "hierarchy" of memory 
was not straightforward or even present in every case of 
multiple personality, it was a common enough feature to 
be noteworthy: 
We all know that the hypnotised subject as a rule 
remembers waking life, but that the awakened subject 
as a rule has wholly forgotten the effects of this 
hypnotic trance. The full significance of this 
fact... has hardly yet, I think, been realised in any 
quarter. (1892c, 303) 
The significance was that there may in fact be an 
underlying unity to human personality. Like different 
subsets of a large set, the different groupings of ele- 
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ments (or selves) may be totally isolated; they may over- 
lap to a greater or lesser extent; one larger self may 
include one or more smaller selves as subsets of itself; 
or, under certain conditions, boundaries between subsets 
may even dissolve entirely, leaving the original set as a 
whole. 
Death, Myers hinted, might bring one of those "condi- 
tions, " breaking down boundaries that our present 
environment has set up between the various subsets of our 
consciousness: "The doubt whether we are our selves 
already may suggest that our true subjective unity may 
wait to be realized elsewhere" (1885a, 249). Just as 
changes now in our state of consciousness may profoundly 
alter our chain of memory, "I conceive it possible that 
at some future time, and under changed conditions, I may 
recollect all; I may assume these various personalities 
under one single consciousness" (1892c, 301). 
It is important to understand, therefore, that 
Myers's hypothesis of the subliminal self was not simply 
a hypothesis of the multiplicity of personality, but went 
further and tried to reconcile the paradoxical multi- 
plicity and unity of human personality: 
My contention is, not, as some of my critics seem to 
suppose, that a man (say Socrates) has within him a 
conscious and an unconscious self, which lie side by 
side, but apart, and find expression alternately, 
but rather that Socrates' mind is capable of con- 
centrating itself round more than one focus, either 
simultaneously or successively. I do not limit the 
number of foci to two, and I do not suppose that the 
division of the brain into two hemispheres is the 
only neural fact corresponding to the psychical fact 
alleged. (1885c, 129) 
Morton Prince, for example, said that it was "a fundamen- 
tal error" to say "that normally and habitually there is 
a persistent hypnotic self... a definite entity occupying 
a definite place in the mental economy" (1905/1930,44). 
Anyone (e. g., Jastrow, 1906; Mallock, 1903), however, who 
attributed this idea of two co-existing, discrete selves 
to Myers's hypothesis of the subliminal self misunder- 
stood it: "I do not... assume that there are two correla- 
tive and parallel selves existing always within us" 
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(1903,1: 15). Instead, he assumed that there was one 
common ground of personality -- which he called the indi- 
viduality -- out of which ordinarily emerged one, rela- 
tively (but not entirely) stable personality, but out of 
which there may also emerge other psychological elements 
or even personalities. Some of these "personalities" may 
be more persistent or extensive than others; but none of 
them was "more than a fragment" of that common ground 
from which they emerged (1903,1: 15). 
In short, to understand that, in Myers's hypothesis 
of the subliminal self, mind is both a unity and a multi- 
plicity (or -- like light -- both a wave and a particle), 
one must recall the important distinction he drew between 
"individuality" and "personality. "7 Each of us has (or 
rather is) one of the former, even though we may have 
many of the latter: "The human individuality [is] a 
practically infinite reservoir of personal states; -- as 
a kaleidoscope which may be shaken into a thousand pat- 
terns, yet so that no pattern can employ all pieces con- 
tained in the tube" (1892f, 363). 
Sleep and the Evolution of Consciousness 
Myers's model of the subliminal self was intended to 
be applicable to all psychological phenomena, showing a 
coherent relationship between conscious and subconscious, 
normal and abnormal. One phenomenon to which he applied 
it, therefore, was sleep, a normal and recurrent altera- 
tion in consciousness that all of us experience. Even 
though physiologists had thus far failed to reach a 
physiological understanding or definition of sleep, Myers 
attempted to provide a psychological one (1892f; 1903, 
Ch. 4), and therefore he was concerned with "such 
manifestations of thought or sensation as the sleeping 
state affords" (1892f, 365). Following up Aristotle's 
"hint" that the soul resumes its true nature in sleep 
(Myers, 1880,68n), Myers suggested that sleep had been 
an early form of consciousness and was similar to the 
present consciousness of sub-human animals: "The 
permanent state of lower organisms, the primary state of 
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higher organisms, is one much more analogous to sleep 
than to waking" (1892f, 363). Similarly, "sleep is the 
infant's dominant phase; the pre-natal state resembles 
sleep rather than waking; and so does the whole life- 
condition of our lowly ancestors" (1903,1: 101). Thus, 
sleep is an early differentiation from that "earlier and 
less differentiated condition, " or primitive panaesthesia 
(1903,1: 21); and the evolution of consciousness is a 
process in which, in response to environmental demands, 
we become "more and more awake" (1892f, 363). Further- 
more, just "as sleep precedes vigilance, so do dreams 
precede thought" (ibid. ); dreams, he thought, represented 
"the kind of mentation from which our clearer and more 
coherent states may be supposed to develop" (1903,1: 58). 
In short, sleep and dreams constitute an earlier, or more 
primitive, form of consciousness that now falls in the 
infrared region of the psychological spectrum. 
Myers's psychological definition of sleep, therefore, 
was that it is "an alternating phase of our personality" 
(1898b 105), in which the organism reverts to a more 
primitive state of consciousness for reparative purposes: 
"It is a fully admitted, although an absolutely 
unexplained fact, that the regenerative quality of 
healthy sleep is something sui generis, which no com- 
pleteness of waking quiescence can rival or approach" 
(1903,1: 123). Myers attributed this characteristic fea- 
ture of sleep to its being a primitive, now subliminal, 
state of consciousness: "To sleep's concentrated inward 
attention I ascribe its unique recuperative power" 
(1898b, 105). In Hughlings Jackson's hierarchical theory 
of nervous functioning, a lower level takes over the pri- 
mary functioning when a higher level ceases to function. 
Similarly, in Myers's theory, consciousness reverts to an 
evolutionarily earlier level of functioning when a more 
advanced one ceases to function. In sleep, the 
organism's attention is withdrawn from the waking or 
supraliminal state, allowing the infrared portion of the 
spectrum of consciousness to take over. In Myers's model 
of mind, the infrared region consisted of those more 
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primitive processes of functioning that, at an earlier 
stage of evolution, had once been conscious but had now 
become automatic and unconscious. The infrared sub- 
liminal portion of consciousness retained a potential 
"increased control over organic functions at the founda- 
tion of life" (1903,1: 123). During sleep, therefore, 
there is decreased control over "complex muscular 
processes, " but increased control over "profound organic 
processes, " thus making sleep the "regenerative phase of 
our personality" (1903,1: 152; 1898b, 105). 
For Myers, therefore, sleep was "no mere abeyance of 
waking activities, but rather a phase of personality with 
characteristics definitely its own" (1892f, 365). 
Psychologists, he believed, should not treat sleep nega- 
tively as an abeyance of faculty, but rather 
"positively,... as a definite phase of our personality, " 
with psychological processes and functions of its own: 
"To some extent at least the abeyance of the supraliminal 
life must be the liberation of the subliminal" (1903, 
1: 122). The most obvious and important of these are 
reparative organic processes, but there were also others 
indicating a kind or a level of psychological functioning 
different from that in the supraliminal waking state. 
Perhaps the second most obvious characteristic is that in 
sleep the individual's capacity for imagery or visualiza- 
tion often increases markedly. In dreams most commonly, 
but also in hypnagogic and hypnopompic illusions, there 
is a capacity for internally generated imagery beyond the 
person's ordinary waking capacity: "The generation of a 
hallucinatory figure (however useless8 an achievement) 
marks probably the highest point which man's visualizing 
faculty ever reaches; and it is noteworthy that with many 
persons this point should be attained in dream alone" 
(1892f, 370). This imagery is most commonly visual, but 
hyperacuity of other senses may occur as well (1892f, 
370-372). 
Evidence for hypermnesia, or a heightening of memory, 
may also be found in sleep and dreams. For example, "we 
occasionally recover in sleep a memory which has wholly 
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dropped out of waking consciousness, " a phenomenon Myers 
considered common enough so that "no one will raise any 
doubt about it" (1892f, 380-381). More interestingly, 
however, there are also occasional dreams reported in 
which facts of which the person had never supraliminally 
been aware may figure (1892f, 381-392). Such extensions 
of memory suggested to Myers that, in sleep as well as in 
other subliminal states of consciousness, memory may be 
more extensive (that is, cover a wider range of experi- 
ence) than does supraliminal, waking memory -- even if it 
is also less focused, controlled, or detailed than 
supraliminal memory: "It is the memory furthest from 
waking [supraliminal] life whose span is the widest, 
whose grasp of the organism's upstored impressions is the 
most profound, " even if it is not also the most "complete 
or... reasoned memory" (1903,1: 129). Myers was even led, 
primarily on the basis of observations of memory in hyp- 
nosis, to suggest that the relationship between state of 
consciousness and extent of memory was an inverse one: 
"The further we get from the surface [of consciousness] 
the wider is the expanse of memory which we encounter" 
(ibid. ). Furthermore, the study of dream memory and the 
ways in which it differs from waking memory also inter- 
ested Myers because the observed continuity of memory 
between dreams and other altered states of consciousness, 
such as hypnosis or spontaneous somnambulism, suggested 
to him the persistence and ultimate unity of subliminal 
consciousness (1892f, 378-380). 
Myers also reported cases of dreams in which other 
cognitive processes of the dreamer seemed to have been 
enhanced. Some cases showed simply that the dreamer 
might draw on perceptions that had been subliminal only, 
to make correct inferences beyond the range of his or her 
normal range of inference (1892f, 380). In other cases, 
however, the dreamer's cognitive processes seemed to have 
been enhanced such that he or she was able to solve prob- 
lems that had so far been insoluble to the waking con- 
sciousness (1892f, 392-395). 
The above faculties associated with sleep and dreams 
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were all examples either of increased control over 
organic processes or enhanced functioning of normal men- 
tal processes -- subliminal processes, in the spectrum 
analogy, either in the infrared end or in the dark bands 
interspersed within the "visible" or normal range of con- 
sciousness. Myers's model of the subliminal mind sug- 
gested, however, that if sleep is a state of conscious- 
ness in which subliminal processes take over from 
supraliminal ones, then sleep should also facilitate sub- 
liminal functioning in the ultraviolet range of the spec- 
trum. This did, in fact, seem to be the case. In an 
early paper reporting some veridical apparitions and 
other apparently telepathic experiences, Myers and his 
colleagues noted the "heightening effect of sleep" in 
allowing such subliminal impressions "to cross the 
threshold of consciousness" (Barrett, Massey, Moses, et 
al., 1883,140). However, he also warned of the diffi- 
culty in drawing a firm line between cases that could be 
attributed to hyperaesthesia, hypermnesia, or other 
enhancements of normal mental processes, and cases in 
which a "supernormal, " or newly and gradually evolving 
form of perception, might be operating. Many cases, 
therefore, were ambiguous and had to be considered "a 
transition from mere hyperaesthesia and hypermnesia 
to... supernormal powers" (1892f, 398). 
In sum, whereas the waking consciousness consists of 
a small segment of the spectrum on which consciousness is 
intensely focused, sleep "represents a stage of wider 
potentiality; a stage where a longer spectrum is more 
faintly seen" (1903,1: 21). Thus, sleep provides a 
normal and frequently recurring state of consciousness 
for studying at least some of the mind's subliminal 
operations and thus learning more about the extended 
range of mental functioning that Myers believed belonged 
to every individual consciousness. As I will describe in 
more detail in Chapter 7, Myers therefore also believed 
that it was important to study dreams. Just as sleep, in 
his conception, was not simply an absence of waking 
functioning, dreams were not just "echoes or fragments of 
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waking experience, fantastically combined" (1892f, 365). 
Dreams were the evolutionary precursor of thought (1892f, 
363). Moreover, as representations of subliminal opera- 
tions of mind, they were a kind of language of the sub- 
liminal consciousness -- a language, Myers noted, that 
was often symbolical in content rather than literal. As 
the most common form of subliminal communication, they 
could, he believed, provide insight into the nature, as 
well as language, of less common subliminal operations, 
such as hallucinations or telepathy; and therefore 
"dreams should be subjected to an analysis far more 
searching than they have as yet received from any 
quarter" (1892f, 365-366). 
Abnormal Psychology: Evolutive and Dissolutive Phenomena 
Myers also thought that his model of mind could be 
applied to a wide range of psychological phenomena less 
common than sleep, but he emphasized repeatedly that it 
was especially important now to begin to study these 
phenomena from a purely psychological, or theoretical, 
perspective, rather than a medical, aesthetic, ethical, 
or any other one. The psychological perspective that he 
suggested had two central, but closely related com- 
ponents. In the first place, Myers assumed that mind was 
still evolving. Hughlings Jackson had described the 
ongoing process of evolution and dissolution in the nerv- 
ous system, defining "dissolution" as "the reverse of the 
process of evolution" (Jackson, 1884,590). Myers 
extended Hughlings Jackson's hypothesis to insist that an 
evolutionary hypothesis of mind implies that there will 
be both "phenomena of degeneration [dissolution] and 
phenomena of evolution" in mental functioning as well as 
nervous system functioning (1903,2: 194). Abnormal 
psychological phenomena, or deviations from the usual 
psychological state, are thus not necessarily always 
pathological or retrogressive; they may also be benefi- 
cial or progressive. It was "question-begging... to call 
[all] novel states morbid" (1887b, 245). Unless one were 
"to argue that the genus homo has reached its fore- 
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ordained evolutionary limit" (1903,1: 71), one must 
assume that, psychologically speaking, there can be pro- 
gressive as well as retrogressive alterations to human 
consciousness. 
The other major component to the purely psychological 
perspective Myers urged his colleagues to adopt was that 
all alterations of consciousness -- whether evolutive or 
dissolutive -- were the result of an instability or 
"permeability" of the psychological boundaries between 
supraliminal and subliminal processes. Myers's model of 
mind was based on "the principle of a restricted per- 
sonality" with "a wider personality subjacent but 
habitually unreachable" (1893d, 20) -- the principle, 
that is, of a limited portion of the spectrum embedded in 
the remainder of the spectrum. The boundary between 
them, however, was more or less "permeable, " such that 
there was a constant exchange of material between them. 
The boundary had to be labile if change, adaptation, and 
evolution were to occur, and such lability or "nervous 
instability" could bring changes in either direction -- 
retrogressive or progressive. 
This thesis that mental phenomena take both evolutive 
and dissolutive forms -- and not just normal and 
pathological ones -- was one of Myers's earliest beliefs. 
Most 19th-century scientists took the view that any 
"abnormal" phenomenon was degenerative or pathological. 
This was the prevailing view among French clinicians, and 
scientists such as Maudsley and Cesare Lombroso had 
carried it to an extreme, insisting that even such 
apparently beneficial phenomena as religious ecstasy or 
genius were in fact symptoms of disease or insanity. In 
Chapter 3I quoted from an 1883 letter in which Myers 
opposed the thinking of Maudsley and others who "associ- 
ate religion and the mad house, psychology and the 
vivisection-table, Love and the Strand" (Myers, 1883). 
Many scientists -- and others -- "know well that man can 
fall below himself; but that he can rise above himself 
they can believe no more" (1886b, lvi). As I mentioned 
in Chapter 5, in 1885 Myers introduced "supernormal" as a 
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word analogous to "abnormal" but implying evolutive (or 
progressive) rather than pathological (or retrogressive) 
abnormal phenomena, and he summed up the distinction 
between them as follows: 
I regard all psychical, as well as all physiological 
activities as necessarily either developmental or 
degenerative, tending to evolution or dissolution. 
And further, whilst altogether waiving any 
teleological speculation, I will ask [the reader] 
hypothetically to suppose that an evolutionary 
nisus, something which we may represent as an effort 
towards self-development, self-adaptation, self- 
renewal, is discernible especially on the psychical 
side of at any rate the higher forms of life. Our 
question, Supernormal or abnormal? -- may then be 
phrased, Evolutive or dissolutive? And in studying 
each psychical phenomenon in turn we shall have to 
inquire whether it indicates a mere degeneration of 
powers already acquired, or, on the other hand, 'the 
promise and potency, ' if not the actual possession, 
of powers as yet unrecognised or 
unknown.... Analogy..., both physiological and 
psychical, warns us not to conclude that any given 
psychosis [that is, psychological datum] is merely 
degenerative until we have examined its results 
closely enough to satisfy ourselves whether they 
tend to bring about any enlargement of human powers. 
(1885b, 31-32) 
An understanding of abnormal phenomena as potentially 
evolutive as well as dissolutive was particularly impor- 
tant to psychology if a purely psychological (or 
theoretical), as opposed to medical, understanding of 
them were to be achieved. Clinicians, not surprisingly, 
see primarily the morbidity and losses associated with 
abnormal processes, and their purpose is to restore the 
patient to an ordinary level of functioning (1898b, 103; 
1900c, 384). Myers thought that the psychologist, in 
contrast, should be interested also in what capacities 
may be gained in abnormal states, "rare and useless" as 
they may appear: "The more rare and useless the faculty, 
the more interest it has" as a source of potential new 
knowledge, because it may signal to the psychologist 
enhanced levels or even new kinds of psychological 
functioning not ordinarily apparent (1898b, 103). Even 
"the extreme incoherence and silliness" of some phenomena 
"does not prevent the process itself from being in a high 
degree instructive" to the psychologist (1889a, 532). 
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Thus, "it is the business of the physician to look out 
for degeneration -- to avert dissolution -- ... [but] it 
should be (though it has not often been) the business of 
the psychologist to look out for extensions of capacity 
-- to recognise evolution" (1892c, 315). In a review 
(1900c) of Janet's Nevroses et Idees Fixes and Flournoy's 
Des Indes ä la planete Mars, Myers contrasted the two 
approaches to, and perspectives on, abnormal subconscious 
processes, Janet's being the "therapeutic, " or clinical, 
one, Flournoy's being the purely scientific, theoretical, 
or psychological one. 
Myers was careful to emphasize, however, that in his 
insistence on acknowledging, as psychological phenomena, 
evolutionary or progressive subliminal mental processes, 
he did "not mean to imply that [subliminal] mentation is 
ipso facto superior to supraliminal... that all our best 
thought was subliminal, or that all that was subliminal 
was potentially 'inspiration"' (1903,1: 71-72)9. 
Clearly, many abnormal psychological phenomena are 
degenerative and harmful: "Hidden in the deep of our 
being is a rubbish-heap as well as a treasure-house; -- 
degenerations and insanities as well as beginnings of 
higher development" (1903,1: 72). But there was "real 
psychological danger in fixing our conception of human 
character too low; some essential lessons" concerning the 
nature and functioning of human personality "are apt to 
be missed" (1903,1: 50). The distinction between the 
subliminal and the supraliminal, as well as between the 
evolutive and dissolutive, is "a purely psychological 
one" (1900d, 289; 1903,1: 72), in a structural and in a 
dynamic sense. 
To those, therefore, such as Helen Dallas, who asked: 
"Are we then to believe that the subliminal self is both 
wiser and more foolish, truer and more false, more 
understanding and more ignorant, more reliable and more 
untrustworthy than the normal self? " (Dallas, 1900,288), 
Myers's answer was Yes. The elements of the subliminal 
self -- or, more accurately, the individuality -- can be 
arranged in numerous patterns or even "selves, " running 
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the gamut from the lowest, most elementary or frag- 
mentary, primitive, and worst to the highest, most com- 
plex and complete, advanced, and best. 
A Psychological Mechanism: Myers noted also that Breuer 
and Freud had been puzzled by their seemingly paradoxical 
observation "that amongst hysterics we find the clearest- 
minded, the strongest-willed, the fullest of character, 
the most acutely critical specimens of humanity" (1893d, 
14; 10 quoting from Breuer, J. & Freud, S., The psychical 
mechanism of hysterical phenomena, Neurologisches Cen- 
tralblatt, Jan. 1 and 15,1893). The apparent relation- 
ship between genius and insanity had also long been noted 
and debated (and still is). On Myers's model of mind, 
however, these observations were to be expected. Those 
with the greatest "permeability" in the boundary between 
supraliminal and subliminal operations would have the 
greatest potential for enhanced or abnormal mental opera- 
tions, both of a positive and of a negative nature. 11 
On the other hand, to those who noted the 
phenomenological similarities between, say, genius and 
insanity, a trance medium and an hysteric, or the sil- 
liest "twaddle" of a spiritualist medium and the most 
evidential utterances of an entranced Mrs. Piper, and 
insisted that all alike must be the same qualitatively -- 
whether all rubbish or all revelation -- Myers answered 
with what he thought should become "a guiding principle 
in psycho-physiological inquiry": 
We must expect that supernormal phenomena, if they 
occur at all, will show many points of resemblance 
to abnormal -- nay, to positively morbid -- 
phenomena, without therefore themselves necessarily 
deserving to be classed as morbid in any degree. 
When unfamiliar impulses arise in the organism -- 
whether these impulses be evolutive or dissolutive 
in character -- their readiest paths of externalisa- 
tion are likely to be somewhat similar. (1887b, 
213) 
By "path of externalisation, " Myers meant the outward or 
phenomenological manifestation that an idea might take, 
as, for example,. the idea of a friend might take a verbal 
form (speaking about him), a motor form (writing him a 
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letter), or even a sensory form (having a visual or 
auditory hallucination of him). Thus, Myers was suggest- 
ing that, just as the psychological mechanism behind, 
say, genius and insanity might be the same -- namely, a 
"nervous instability" or lability that makes the boundary 
separating supraliminal and subliminal processes more 
permeable -- so too the forms that the phenomena of 
genius and insanity take might be similar. 
Phenomenologically, the hallucinatory voices that 
Socrates heard resemble the hallucinatory voices that an 
insane person hears. Yet even though the psychological 
mechanism and "paths of externalisation" in the two 
situations are the same, it does not follow that Socrates 
was necessarily insane or that the insane person was a 
genius (1889a). 
One related line of research that Myers suggested was 
to examine the possibility that the forms that abnormal 
or supernormal psychological phenomena take in a particu- 
lar individual might be related to that individual's 
predominant mode of functioning. Galton, for example, 
had suggested that some individuals are primarily visual 
in their psychological functioning, others are primarily 
auditory, and still others primarily motor. Myers con- 
jectured, therefore, that abnormal psychological 
processes, whether degenerative or supernormal, would 
likewise take forms corresponding to that person's pri- 
mary mode of functioning, or to the "path ... worn the 
smoothest" -- visual, auditory, or motor -- in that per- 
son's brain (1889a, 535-536). 12 
A Hemispheric Hypothesis: Myers made another important 
suggestion for a "brain path" that subliminal functioning 
might take. In 1885, following up on the suggestion of a 
correspondent, P. H. Newnham, Myers proposed the 
hypothesis that, whereas the supraliminal waking con- 
sciousness operates predominantly through the left hemi- 
sphere of the brain, subliminal states of all kinds -- 
evolutive as well as dissolutive -- operate primarily 
through the right hemisphere (1885b; 1885e, 20-24): "In 
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graphic automatism [automatic writing] the action of the 
right hemisphere is predominant, because the secondary 
self can appropriate its energies more readily than those 
of the left hemisphere, which is more immediately at the 
service of the waking mind" (1885b, 43). This idea was 
again based on Hughlings Jackson's idea that when one 
level of functioning is damaged or inhibited or otherwise 
ceases, a less well-developed, lower level of functioning 
will take over. 13 
One important phenomenon suggesting this hypothesis 
to Myers had been the various neurological disorders of 
aphasia, and particularly agraphy (as he called the dis- 
order of the ability to write) (1885b). Myers noted that 
there were certain phenomenological similarities between 
automatic writing (especially in its early stages) and 
the writing of aphasic (or agraphic) patients. For exam- 
ple, the writing in both situations is often 
uncoordinated, scrawled, repetitious, or senseless 
(1885b, 36-38). More particularly, in both situations 
backwards writing or even more complex inversions of let- 
ters will occur (1885b, 39-40). Myers also pointed out 
that there are similar parallels in abnormal speech 
phenomena -- between trance-utterances, glossolalia, and 
the like on the one hand, and aphasic speech disorders on 
the other (1885b, 46). - Moreover, there 
was a tendency, noted in various forms of automatisms, 
toward swearing and other crude emotional interjections. 
Hughlings Jackson had attributed this characteristic of 
aphasia to the dissolution of higher speech functions, 
which left only lower-level, primitive, or instinctive 
forms of speech to survive (Myers, 1885b, 44-45); and in 
general neurologists attributed all aphasic phenomena to 
the inexperienced right hemisphere's taking over for the 
damaged left hemisphere. Myers left it up to 
neurologists to prove that hypothesis. His own purpose 
was simply to suggest that there were parallels between 
neurological disorders such as aphasia and psychological 
automatisms such as automatic writing, and that whatever 
mechanism lay behind one set of phenomena might also lie 
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behind the other, even if the causes behind the two sets 
of phenomena were entirely different (1885b, 39). 
Other phenomena, however, also seemed to support 
Myers's hypothesis. He and his colleagues had noted 
early in their research that, in experiments to transmit 
images telepathically, the percipient's response some- 
times showed an inversion or reversal of the image 
(Gurney, Myers, Podmore, & Barrett, 1883,161,165; 
Myers, 1885b, 44). A reversal of letters similar to that 
found in automatic writing and agraphy sometimes occurred 
also when messages were spelled out by table-tilting 
(1885b, 39n) or in writing that appeared in crystal 
visions (1892g, 500.506.510.515). Myers later became 
interested in the question of whether ambidexterity might 
be associated with certain subliminal functioning -- his 
idea being that a more active (or readily activated) 
right hemisphere might result in both ambidexterity and 
enhanced subliminal functioning. Although he never 
pursued the question in any systematic way, a few 
preliminary inquiries among some former child prodigies 
(and some automatic writers) suggested that some of them 
were more or less ambidextrous (1892e, 356; 1903,1: 82, 
84-85,2: 177). He also predicted that sleep deprivation 
might result in "some lack of concordant action of the 
two hemispheres, " thus perhaps leading a person to 
"believe himself to be two persons" (1886a, 242). He 
knew, however, of only one supporting case, in which the 
person reported that, after five sleepless nights, "the 
brain seemed divided into two parts, thinking independ- 
ently, and one side putting questions while the other 
answered them" (1886a, 242; quoting from an account 
reported by Hughlings Jackson). 
Myers's suggestion that the subliminal portions of 
our spectrum of consciousness might find their "readiest 
path of externalisation" through the right hemisphere may 
receive some support from modern observations that right- 
hemisphere functioning is, for the most part, nonverbal 
(see, e. g., Springer & Deutsch, 1981, for a review). 
Myers had remarked that "our subliminal mentation is less 
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closely bound to the faculty of speech than is our 
supraliminal" (1903,1: 98). More specifically, he had 
often noted that'the "language" of subliminal conscious- 
ness seemed to be primarily pictorial and symbolic, 
rather than verbal (e. g., 1892g, 460; 1897,70; 1903, 
1: 100,277). Ordinary perception, he noted, is itself a 
kind of symbolism, in that it is a representation, not a 
replica, of reality: "The whirling molecules are trans- 
lated for us by our narrow senses into patterns which our 
minds can comprehend" (1903,2: 551; see also 1903, 
1: 277). Perception by the subliminal consciousness, 
therefore, is probably even "more strongly symbolical" 
(1903,2: 551). The specific symbolism of verbal language 
has evolved to meet the needs of the supraliminal con- 
sciousness. The functioning of the subliminal conscious- 
ness, however, probably requires a different kind of 
"language"; and Myers predicted that "our intelligent 
study of visual and motor automatism will afford us suf- 
ficient proof that symbolism, at any rate pictorial sym- 
bolism, becomes increasingly important as we get at the 
contents of those hidden [subliminal] strata" (1903, 
1: 100). Thus, he said, art, music, and even poetry 
(whose "material... is the very language which she would 
fain transcend") are forms of subliminal language (1897, 
70; 1903,1: 101). 
Myers thought that his hypothesis also might help 
explain a frequently noted characteristic of automatic 
writing, trance speech, table-tilting, and other 
automatisms, and that was the puerile, silly, trivial 
nature of much of the content, "quite independent of the 
intellectual level of the automatist" (1887b, 212). This 
feature had, perhaps understandably, made such 
automatisms a target for much levity, derision, and 
repugnance. While understanding the repugnance many 
people (including himself) felt (1903,2: 258), Myers 
nevertheless believed that the fact should be a matter 
for instruction, not ridicule: "The interest [of most 
automatisms] ... certainly does not lie in the wisdom of 
the oracle received" (1885a, 239). The interest, Myers 
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thought, lay in the possibility of learning to gain 
greater access to subliminal portions of our conscious- 
ness: "If once we can get a spy into the citadel of our 
own being, his rudest signalling will tell us more than 
our subtlest inferences from outside of what is being 
planned and done within" (1903,2: 91). He attributed the 
puerility, like other characteristics, of the phenomena 
to their being produced by the inexperienced right hemi- 
sphere. Therefore, the "much derided phenomenon of 
'table-tilting', " for example, had a logical explanation 
(1903,2: 92): All functioning or forms of communication 
must go through a learning process or developmental 
sequence, just as an infant progresses from crawling to 
walking to more complex motor tasks. Table-tilting, 
therefore, has emerged "as in one sense the simplest, the 
least differentiated form of motor response" available to 
the subliminal consciousness, "a kind of gesture merely" 
(1889a, 533). 14 Similarly, other forms of subliminal 
communication, such as automatic writing or trance 
speech, may represent rudimentary or early attempts and 
therefore be correspondingly simple, crude, or puerile. 
Myers thus also hypothesized that variations in the com- 
plexity and level of subliminal functioning or secondary 
personalities might be correlated with the amount of time 
the person has spent in the hypnotic state or the amount 
of time the secondary personality has been in "control" 
or functioning externally (1888c, 390-391). 
Hysteria and Genius: The structure and dynamics of con- 
sciousness in Myers's theory are further illustrated (and 
clarified) by his approach to the phenomena of hysteria 
and genius. He considered both to be manifestations of 
the same general psychological mechanism -- that is, an 
unusual "perturbation, " instability, or permeability in 
the boundary between subliminal and supraliminal 
processes. "Normal" individuals, in contrast, have a 
relatively stable, less permeable barrier -- and are cor- 
respondingly less variable: "The man who is in but small 
degree thus permeable, who acts uniformly on supraliminal 
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considerations,... is likely to be safe in prudent 
mediocrity" (1903,1: 116). The difference between 
hysteria and genius was a qualitative -- not scientific 
-- one: "There may be many different forms of such 
perturbation, leading to almost opposite results" (1893d, 
8). Hysteria (which Myers called a "self-suggestive 
malady" or "disease of the hypnotic stratum") was for the 
most part (although not entirely) a dissolutive process, 
whereas genius (which Myers called a "subliminal uprush") 
was primarily an evolutive one. 
Supraliminal human personality, in Myers's view, is 
on a continuum from theoretically complete disintegration 
of the elements (which would be total insanity) to 
theoretically complete integration -- the ideal state of 
total unity and control of all latent capacities toward 
which, he thought, consciousness is evolving (1893d, 6). 
The "normal" personality is not the ideal of total 
integration (as Janet and most French psychopathologists 
assumed), but falls somewhere in the middle of the con- 
tinuum. It is "no true ideal, no stable synthesis, but 
rather a transitory and shifting compromise.... The per- 
sonality of each of us is in a state of constantly shift- 
ing equilibrium" (1893d, 6,9). The equilibrium is main- 
tained by a kind of psychological filter that controls 
the passage of psychological elements between the 
supraliminal and subliminal portions of consciousness. 
When there is "a lack of liminal stability, an excessive 
permeability, if I may so say, of the psychical diaphragm 
which separates the empirical [supraliminal] from the 
latent [subliminal] faculties of man, " then there may be 
either an "uprush" from the latent material of the sub- 
liminal into the supraliminal or, conversely, a "down- 
draught" from the supraliminal into the subliminal. The 
former is genius, the latter is hysteria, although in 
neither case is the flow of elements one-way only (1893d, 
8,16; 1903,1: 20,66). 
The study and understanding of hysteria as a 
psychological phenomenon -- as opposed to a clinical or 
medical phenomenon -- was therefore important for three 
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main reasons. First, the purely descriptive, clinical 
approach had yielded much information, but little true 
understanding of hysteria. A nosological definition of 
hysteria had proven "impossible, " since symptoms seemed 
almost infinitely variable; and even the term hysteria 
was "meaningless" (1893d, 5; 1903,1: 19). To attain "a 
comprehensive view, " Myers urged, "we must seek it from 
some psychological standpoint" (1893d, 5). Second, since 
all manifestations of human personality fall somewhere on 
the continuum from a hypothetical total disintegration to 
an equally hypothetical total integration, then the study 
of the dissolution of personality might teach us much 
about its evolution, or integration, and how a "normal" 
personality maintains a relatively stable integration 
(1903,1: 19,35). Finally, cases of hysteria provide 
"one of the most fertile sources of new knowledge of body 
and mind" (1903,1: 43). Hysterical symptoms are "phantom 
copies of real maladies of the nervous system. " They are 
not, however, organically caused, since, first, they do 
not fit any anatomical pattern; second, they might peri- 
odically change location; and third, they could often be 
cured or made to disappear by suggestion. The apparent 
ability of the hysteric's subliminal consciousness to 
initiate and control, at some level, physiological 
processes that are normally beyond conscious control 
seemed to Myers to have important implications for an 
understanding of the relationship of mind and body. 
The essence of a psychological understanding of 
hysteria is to understand the relation of the hysterical 
personality to the normal personality. Myers emphasized 
therefore that hysterical symptoms "are not pathological 
phenomena, but pathological revelations of normal 
phenomena, which is a very different thing" (1889c, 200). 
The "machinery" of an hysteric is the same as a healthy 
person's, but it is malfunctioning. Hysteria is not 
really a loss of functioning, but a narrowing of the 
field of consciousness so "that it can take in the mini- 
mum of sensations necessary for the support of life" 
(1893d, 17) -- just as the supraliminal consciousness of 
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any personality, normal or otherwise, is the narrowing or 
filtering of a larger potential consciousness. Unlike 
organic losses of function, hysterical symptoms are "the 
mere subsidence of these powers to a level where the 
empirical will can no longer reach them, " but from which 
they can potentially be recalled (1893d, 16). They are 
not "extinguished, " but submerged (1903,1: 46-47). 
Hysteria is not solely the excessive narrowing of 
consciousness, however. Again, the losses are what con- 
cern the clinician, but the gains should also be of 
interest to the psychologist. Capacities that an 
hysteric shows -- such as hyperaesthesia or dis- 
sociability -- are capacities which we all possess, but 
they are "latent and unknown" in normal persons because 
they are not adaptive or necessary for normal function- 
ing. Hysterics may show dissociability to an extreme 
degree, but some dissociability -- in the form of absorp- 
tion in or concentration on a task -- is considered a 
positive characteristic in normal persons (1889c, 201). 
Other capacities exhibited by hysterics, such as control 
over certain organic or physiological processes, might 
also be latent in all persons and be considered a "gain" 
if they could be better understood and brought under more 
control. 
In short, if understood as a psychological 
phenomenon, hysteria, in Myers's view, gave "striking" 
support to "my own principal thesis" (1903,1: 19), 
namely, that all personality is a filtering or narrowing 
of the field of consciousness from a larger Self, the 
rest of which remains latent and capable of emerging 
under the appropriate conditions. The hysterical per- 
sonality, in essence, bears the same relationship to the 
normal, healthy, supraliminal personality as the latter 
bears to the ideal, totally integrated larger individu- 
ality of which it is an extract. 15 
Myers also argued that the study of genius could 
teach us about the structure and evolutionary dynamics of 
mind in much the same way as the study of hysteria could, 
since the same psychological mechanism that produced the 
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narrowing of consciousness in hysterics produced an 
expansion of consciousness in geniuses (1892e; 1903, Ch. 
3). Myers believed that the evolution of mind was a gen- 
eral process of "gaining a completer control over innate 
but latent faculty" (1895d, 6). His definition of genius 
was that it was "an emergence of hidden faculty": 
Genius -- if that vaguely used word is to receive 
anything like a psychological definition -- should 
rather be regarded as a power of utilising a wider 
range than other men can utilise of faculties in 
some degree innate in all; -- a power of appropriat- 
ing the results of subliminal mentation to subserve 
the supraliminal stream of thought; -- so that an 
'inspiration of Genius' will be in truth a sub- 
liminal uprush, an emergence into the current of 
ideas which the man is consciously manipulating of 
other ideas which he has not consciously originated, 
but which have shaped themselves... in profounder 
regions of his being. (1903,1: 71) 
It is as if, as it were, "a vent-hole was 
opened... between the different strata of his being" 
(1892e, 359). As in hysteria, the flow of material 
between the subliminal and the supraliminal goes in both 
directions to some extent, but in the phenomenon of 
genius, unlike hysteria, "the uprush is helpful and the 
downdraught insignificant" (1897,57). 
By drawing more from the subliminal into the 
supraliminal than ordinary people are able to do, 
geniuses indicated "an advance in integration, -an 
advance in the main line of [human evolutionary] develop- 
ment" (1897,69). Genius was not in any sense pathologi- 
cal, as Lombroso and others were then insisting (Myers, 
1889g, 192; 1903,1: 71). It was neither madness nor mor- 
bid dissolution, even though genius, madness, and morbid 
dissolution resulted from the same psychological 
mechanism (1885c, 130; 1892e, 355). Any nervous dis- 
orders that occasionally accompanied genius or creativity 
were the product of the same instability of the 
psychological threshold, but they signalled, not dissolu- 
tion, but a "perturbation which masks evolution" (1903, 
1: 93). Evolution involves the increasing complexity of 
the nervous system and requires a certain instability of 
the nervous system. That instability could produce 
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pathological as well as beneficial effects, but a genius 
was "no more morbid than a champion sculler is morbid 
because on the day after a hard-won race he has a pain in 
his back" (1889g, 192). 
The advance represented by genius, however, was for 
the most part an intensification of familiar faculties 
rather than any addition of new ones. Myers again turned 
to his metaphor of the spectrum to make his conception 
clear. Even the visible portion of the solar spectrum is 
not, he pointed out, unbroken; because of processes of 
absorption, there are dark bands interspersed between the 
visible colors. Similarly, in the supraliminal portion 
of the psychological spectrum, there are, "even in the 
best of us, " many dark bands. Genius, he suggested, is 
"a brightening of the familiar spectrum" (1903,1: 78). 
In other words, material has for the most part been drawn 
from the subliminal "dark bands" within the span of the 
supraliminal, rather than from either the infrared or 
ultraviolet ends. 
The phenomenon of genius, therefore, includes the 
kinds of operations we are accustomed to calling genius, 
such as a high level of intellectual functioning or the 
unusually vivid inward visualization, auditory sense, or 
motor sense of an artist, musician, or dancer. 
Psychologically speaking, however, genius also includes 
such phenomena as hyperaesthesia (an intensification of 
the ordinary senses); hypermnesia (enhanced memory); an 
unusually accurate inward sense of the passage of time 
(sometimes observed in the ability to awaken oneself from 
sleep, or in the ability to carry out a post-hypnotic 
suggestion after a specified length of time); increased 
muscular sense (as in the then-popular parlor-game of 
"unconscious muscle reading"); or the alleged sensitivity 
to magnetic or meteorological effects (dowsing, for exam- 
ple) (1892e; 1903, Ch. 3). A psychological conception of 
genius, Myers insisted, was entirely different from the 
aesthetic conception, just as the psychological concep- 
tion of hysteria differed from the medical one (1898b, 
104). Whereas from the aesthetic view the important con- 
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sideration is the quality of the product, and from the 
medical point of view the important consideration is the 
functional ability of the organism, from the psychologi- 
cal perspective the important consideration is the 
psychological mechanism behind the phenomenon (1898b, 
104): An "uprush of subliminal faculty. . . does not 
guarantee the objective excellence of the product" 
(1892a, 201). There are, in other words, two elements in 
judging a work to be one of genius: The first is the 
mechanism or act of creating, the second is the subjec- 
tive, aesthetic judgment of others (1892e, 359). The 
first criterion is the only psychological one, and thus 
two works of art or two different phenomena may be "in 
the same psychological class" without being "in the same 
artistic class" (1903,1: 75). 
Myers therefore suggested that a particularly impor- 
tant phenomenon for studying the psychological mechanism 
behind genius and creativity was that of arithmetical 
prodigies. The "calculating boy" was of the same 
psychological genus as a Shakespeare; even if not of "the 
highest order of art" or "a high form of genius, " his 
ability was not "a mere curiosity" or "anomaly" (1898b, 
104; 1892e, 349,356). The products of the arithmetical 
prodigy, unlike those of the artist, can be judged on 
purely objective grounds; the answer is either right or 
wrong. Thus, the study of arithmetical prodigies can 
provide a relatively objective means of studying the 
otherwise subjective processes of inspiration and 
creativity (1892e, 356,360). 
Mental Causality: Some Larger Theoretical Problems of 
Psychology 
Most of Myers's writing was devoted to describing and 
developing his ideas about the structure and dynamics of 
mind and supporting them with material taken from the 
rapidly growing literature of 19th-century psychology. 
But he also, on occasion, attempted to fit his ideas into 
an even larger picture and see how, in particular, an 
understanding of mind as more extensive in scope than we 
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usually suspect might be applied to such perennial and 
intractable problems as volition, the relation of mind 
and matter, and the role of mind or consciousness. 
Volition: Myers had two suggestions for different ways 
of thinking about the problem of free will versus 
determinism -- a question that is, in essence, one about 
the nature and role of mind, since it asks whether mind 
is "not... pure effect, but a cause. " He recognized that 
in its "ultimate" form the question is "insoluble" 
(1891c, 129-130); but that ultimate impenetrability 
should not, he thought, deter us from penetrating it as 
far as we can. 
First, therefore, he suggested that, just as it had 
been a mistake to identify mind with our conscious mind, 
so it might be a mistake to limit volition to the rela- 
tively small supraliminal fragment of the total spectrum 
of consciousness. Volition should instead be considered 
the function of an individual's mind as a whole, sub- 
liminal as well as supraliminal, and not be limited to 
those acts an individual is aware of initiating. Experi- 
ments in hypnosis, particularly with post-hypnotic sug- 
gestion, had demonstrated that the line between volition 
and automatism is difficult to draw, since the subjective 
feeling that one is acting freely may in fact be illusive 
(1885d, 642-648; 1892c, 302-303). Such experiments had 
led some physiologists to suggest that if some "free 
will" is really illusory, then perhaps all is, and that 
automatism -- not volition -- underlies all behavior. 
Myers suggested that volition may not always, or even 
usually, be a function of the supraliminal self (1903, 
2: 518-523). Volition -- not automatism -- underlies all 
behavior, but it is the volition of the larger Self: "I 
think that we must not take for granted that this 
influence [volition] is necessarily accompanied with 
ordinary consciousness on the agent's part" (1886e, 165). 
In discussing the controversy over whether suggested hal- 
lucinations will-follow optical laws or psychological 
laws, Myers said that they follow both: The subliminal 
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consciousness will use whatever means it can to 
accomplish the goal -- in this case, of sustaining the 
hallucination -- because it is "an intelligent adaptation 
of means to ends" (1892g, 448). A hypnotic suggestion, 
therefore, is effective because the larger subliminal 
consciousness "carries out the idea as well as it can, 
unhindered by the mistakes or clumsiness of the conscious 
mind" (1886h, 448). 
Myers's second suggestion for a different way of 
thinking about volition grew out of his attempt to recon- 
cile the phenomenon of precognition with free will, and, 
in a sense, it resembled the indeterminism of later 
quantum physics. Like many of his ideas, this one too 
suggested that both sides of the controversy were to some 
extent correct. Objects are, to our ordinary perception, 
solid and stationary; perceived in another way, however, 
they are a collection of constantly moving molecules 
separated by vast areas of space: "Within their tranquil 
clarity a myriad molecules jostle in narrow orbits or 
speed on an uncomputed way" (1895i, 592). Volition may 
therefore occur at the individual (or "molecular") level, 
while at a larger (or "molar") level individual actions 
will still fall into an overall pattern of regularity or 
"law": "Man's petty hopes and passions may make endless 
turmoil among its [the Cosmos's] minutest elements...; 
yet on a wide view they will average out, and will admit 
of predictions fulfilled immutably, and overriding the 
small Wills of men" (1895i, 592). To make his point more 
vivid, Myers again found a delightful metaphor: "'There 
will be about so many marriages next year, ' says the 
Registrar-General; but he perforce leaves the individual 
brides and bride-grooms to sort themselves" (1903, 
2: 531). In short, "this problem of free human wills amid 
the predictable operations of unchanging law may resemble 
the problem of molecular motion amid molar calm" (1895i, 
592). 
Mind and Matter: The revelation of physics -- that the 
world operates quite differently on the molecular (and 
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smaller) level than it appears to do on the larger, molar 
level -- also suggested to Myers a different way of 
thinking about the relation of mind and matter. He 
quoted his close friend, the physicist Oliver Lodge, who 
had thought that there could be a non-material causal 
agency without thereby upsetting the law of the conserva- 
tion of energy. Life, Lodge had said, may be a "direc- 
tive and guiding force exercised upon matter... [but] not 
affecting the amount of energy in the slightest degree" 
(1903,2: 542; quoting Lodge in Nature, 44,292). Myers 
suggested that mind directs and guides matter, not by 
acting on it en masse, but by affecting the motion of 
individual molecules. 16 Even at our normal level of 
behavior, when we move, say, our hand, this action is 
executed by the activation of molecules of the brain that 
we do not consciously control, or even know about: The 
"orders are supraliminally conceived in molar terms, but 
they receive a molecular obedience.... [There] is not a 
mere puppet-like movement of such molar mechanism as we 
could ourselves conceive, but... a rearrangement of 
molecules such as no science can at present trace or 
explain" (1903,2: 511). 17 
Myers then suggested that this "molecular hypothesis" 
could be carried further to place other apparent effects 
of mind on matter -- including supernormal (or 
paranormal) ones -- on a continuum with normal 
psychophysiological activity. Hypnotic (or self-) sug- 
gestion is effective because, somehow, 18 it activates the 
volitional activity of the subliminal consciousness. The 
organic effects of hypnosis or suggestion, of stigmata, 
or of so-called faith cures (most of which, he believed, 
are probably self-suggestion) occur because of the poten- 
tial volitional control over organic processes by the 
subliminal consciousness (1903,2: 513). Supernormal 
phenomena, therefore, both telepathic and telekinetic, 
may be no more than an extension of the subliminal con- 
sciousness's control over the molecules of one brain and 
body (its own) to the molecules of other brains, bodies, 
or objects. 19 It may be an action on other objects 
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"such... as the living energy, whatever it be, in each of 
us is wont to exercise upon the brain" (1894c, 417; see 
also, e. g., 1891d, 131; 1893d, 23; 1894-1895,200; 1903, 
2: 522). The extension of this hypothesis from normal to 
supernormal phenomena was, admittedly, a radical exten- 
sion, but it arguably did not involve any process dif- 
ferent in kind from normal psychophysiological processes, 
since the nature of psychophysiological processes is 
still unknown and precisely the major question at issue 
in psychology: 
How that modification [of distant molecules] is 
effected... we cannot tell. It is the very secret of 
life which confronts us here; the fundamental 
antinomy between Mind and Matter.... I here say only 
that since this problem does already exist, -- since 
the cells are in fact altered either by the thought 
or along with it, -- we have no right to take for 
granted that the problem, when more closely 
approached, will keep within its ancient limits, or 
that Mind, whose far-darting energy we are now 
realising, must needs be always powerless upon aught 
but the grey matter of the brain. (1894c, 421) 
Although Myers's hypothesis that mind affects matter 
by directing and guiding the movement of molecules might 
seem "intolerably novel and extravagant" to some people, 
other people, he said, might recognize it as "the mere 
plagiarism of a familiar physical speculation" (1903, 
2: 531), namely, the physicist Clerk Maxwell's Demons. 
Maxwell's hypothetical demons, which he had created to 
depict his model of thermodynamics (Dampier, 1943,257), 
were 
imaginary entities conceived as illustrating what 
could be effected by creatures who could deal with 
molecules singly, -- as we might deal, say, with 
golf-balls, tennis balls, cricket balls,... -- 
instead of dealing with molecules only in the gross, 
and by prodigious multitudes at a time, which is all 
that we can actually do. (1895a, 22) 
Lord Kelvin had taken up Maxwell's speculation on (in 
Myers's words) "this minutest species of Chimaera" and 
described in one of his lectures what this hypothetical 
creature might be capable of; and, as Myers pointed out, 
Lord Kelvin's speculations described precisely the kind 
of much-ridiculed physical phenomena reported at some 
mediumistic seances (1903,2: 531-534). 20 
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Myers insisted above all else, however, that our con- 
ceptions and categories of mind and matter were 
inadequate and incomplete -- as already suggested by both 
physics and psychology -- and that the study of super- 
normal phenomena such as telepathy could be crucial to 
bringing about new and more adequate ways of conceiving 
their relationship. He cautioned that "the categories 
'material' and 'immaterial'... may be quite inadequate" 
(1890a, 247), and that "the line between the 'material' 
and the 'immaterial, ' as these words are commonly used, 
means little more than the line between the phenomena 
which our senses or our instruments can detect or 
register and the phenomena which they can not" (1886d, 
290). Anticipating a question that became of central 
importance after his death, in the wake of theoretical 
advances in 20th-century physics, Myers asked how one 
defines the distinction between subjective and objective 
when matter, which appears to have certain character- 
istics from one perspective, has different ones from 
another: "The impenetrability of matter, which seems our 
ultimate sensory fact, may be as relative and contingent 
a property as colour itself" (1890a, 247; 1903,1: 277). 
Moreover, a concept such as that of ether, he thought, 
seemed to bring us to "the brink of immateriality, " even 
though it was probably matter in another form (c. 1884, 
29). 
If the old categories of mind and matter were 
inadequate, Myers thought, so must be the old categories 
of materialism and dualism which had derived from them. 
As dualists recognize, "the gulf between the objective 
and the subjective side of our experience remains 
unbridged" (c. 1884,29-30). Yet the gulf also cannot be 
entirely "impassable, " as dualists then often assume, 
since it is now "frankly accepted" that there is "a 
physical basis or concomitance for all the operations 
which go on within our own minds" (1886e, 178-179). 
There may be, he conjectured, a kind of monism underlying 
the phenomenal dualism: "The mysterious connexion of 
Mind and Matter" may be "some identity beyond our ken" 
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(1895i, 588). 
The important aspect of Myers's thinking, however, 
was not this "speculative monism. " He himself suggested 
that we must "lay aside, for the purposes of the present 
argument, the possibility of a monistic scheme of the 
universe... which may present in an unbroken sequence both 
what we know as Matter and what we know as Mind, " since, 
"our intellects, as at present constituted, " cannot yet 
transcend the dualism that experience presents us (1886b, 
1). The important aspect of his thinking was instead his 
belief that phenomena such as telepathy break down both a 
materialistic and a rigidly dualistic scheme of the 
universe. He suggested that there may be "an inter- 
mediate conception of space -- something between space as 
we know it in the material world and space as we imagine 
it to disappear in the ideal world" (1903,1: 231), and 
that the study of telepathy and other supernormal 
phenomena might be able "to supply us with some hint" as 
to this intermediate conception of space and "the connec- 
tion between our own consciousness and our organism" 
(1900c, 410). First of all, telepathy "breaks down a 
purely physiological synthesis of man" (1890b, 318), 
primarily because a physical hypothesis of telepathy such 
as that of "brain-waves (from which ... Mr. Gurney and I 
were from the first careful to stand aloof) has become 
less and less plausible, less and less explanatory, as 
the evidence has accumulated" (1890b, 317; see also 
1900c, 408-410, for details of his criticisms). Although 
he frequently used physical terminology to describe his 
ideas, he also repeatedly reminded his readers that they 
were only "suggestive analogies, " that is, "aids to the 
imagination and nothing more" (Barrett, Massey, Moses, et 
al., 1884b, 135). 
On the other hand, any plausible conception of 
telepathy, like that of any psychological phenomenon, 
must also include its presumed physical correlates: 
Like all influences which touch and modify man's 
living, material brain, telepathy must needs have a 
physical side to it as well as psychical.... [I]n 
however complex and latent a form, there must some- 
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where be a physical structure, a physical con- 
comitance for all these things. (1894c, 422) 
Perhaps one of the most important passages in Myers's 
writings is the following summary of his views on the 
mind-matter relationship and the potential role of 
psychical research in attacking this problem: 
I do not like to assume that any effect perceptible 
to human senses is without a physical cause of some 
kind.... Such physical cause or basis may no doubt be 
so remote from our ordinary physical conceptions 
that the philosopher may be justified in leaving it 
altogether out of the question, and in dealing with 
the interrelations of thought and emotion exclu- 
sively on the psychical side; but it seems to me 
that telepathy forces us into a position where it is 
no longer safe to assume any sharply-defined dis- 
tinction of mind and matter, -- where we must rid 
ourselves of every metaphysical preconception and 
look to experiment and observation alone.... We are 
now pretty well agreed that such concomitance [of 
mind and matter] does always and inevitably subsist 
within us; but we still speak of the interaction of 
thought and emotion -- of the "world of mind" -- as 
of a realm, or of operations, where no physical 
basis must be assumed. I think it possible that the 
facts of telepathy may compel us to extend our con- 
ceptions of physico-psychical concomitance, and to 
face the supposition that though forces may exist, 
and agencies operate, which the ordinary 
materialistic view altogether denies, yet these also 
may be correlated -- though above the limit of our 
intelligence -- with the force and matter with which 
our mathematical science already deals .... [O]ur 
notions of mind and matter must pass through many a 
phase as yet unimagined. (1886e, 178-179) 
A Psychological Principle: Finally, Myers believed that 
some such concept as telepathy -- the hypothesis that 
individual minds (or Selves) can, at some now-subliminal 
level, interact directly with other minds -- would be an 
important element in the major law or principle of 
psychology that he believed remained to be discovered. 
As I explained in Chapter 5, he thought that science now 
had three major principles or "laws. " One was the law of 
Evolution, the major principle of biology; the second was 
the law of Conservation, the major principle of physics; 
and the third was the law of Uniformity, the major prin- 
ciple of science in general (1892g, 534; 1893b). The 
discovery of a comparably fundamental law was, he said, 
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crucial to "the future of Experimental Psychologyi21: If 
psychology failed in this, "her knowledge must needs 
remain for ever superficial and fragmentary, " whereas if 
such a law were discovered, he believed that psychology 
would become the apex of all other science (1892g, 534- 
535). 
Myers believed that an important hint to what the new 
law of psychology might look like could be found in a 
concept that he had borrowed from the mesmerists and then 
adapted. In many of their papers on hypnotism and on 
apparitions, Myers and Gurney had frequently referred to 
the mesmeric concept of rapport. The mesmerists had 
believed that the effects they were able to elicit from 
their subjects resulted from a radiation, effluence, or 
force passing from the mesmerist to the subject. In 
their view, this force was "an entirely physiological 
phenomenon" (1903,1: 206). Myers and Gurney believed 
that the mesmerists might have been on the right track, 
but that instead of being a physiological phenomenon, the 
influence was a psychological one. This psychological 
"rapport" was "a specialised relation between two minds, " 
a link or a "subtle intercommunication" between sub- 
liminal minds (1886d, 287; 1886b, lvii; 1903,1: 209). 
The notion of a psychological link between minds became 
the basis for Myers's concept of telepathy and, indeed, 
his concept of all supernormal interaction. The nature 
of the relation was as yet entirely unknown, as it had 
been for the mesmerists; certain people made good mes- 
merists or hypnotists, but no one understood why. The 
"rapport" did not, for example, seem "clearly referable 
either to kinship or to affection" (1884-1885,100), and 
there were telepathic or other such cases "where no pre- 
existing rapport can even be suggested, " since the people 
involved were strangers (1884-1885,122). Myers sug- 
gested, however, that in some sense this telepathic or 
mental "rapport" might be the psychological equivalent of 
the concepts of molecular attraction (Barrett, Massey, 
Moses, et al., 1884b, 135) or of gravitation (1903,1: 38) 
in the physical world. 
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Myers also believed that this new general principle 
or law of psychology would establish mind as a primary 
and fundamental characteristic of the universe, and thus 
would suggest that the universe was neither the discon- 
tinuous two worlds of the old dualists nor the reduc- 
tionistic one of the materialists and idealists, but was 
instead a hierarchy of worlds that were inextricably 
interwoven without being independent of, reducible to, or 
assimilable to another level. Whatever the new "law" of 
psychology might be, however, he thought that it would 
provide an essential tool for breaking down the old, 
fruitless dichotomies of dualism versus materialism, 
unity versus multiplicity, and free will versus 
determinism. With such a law, 
the controversy, which is now too often like a fight 
between a dog and a fish, -- between the subjective 
instincts which glide in the ocean and the objective 
facts which bark on the shore, -- may be conducted 





1 That Myers was well acquainted with Hughlings Jackson's 
work is apparent not only from his frequent references to 
him (he once, for example, referred to certain papers of 
Jackson's as "indispensable" [1885b, 35n]), but also from 
a more personal connection. Jackson's famous epileptic 
patient, Dr. Z., was Myers's brother Dr. A. T. Myers 
(Taylor & Marsh, 1980). 
2 The confusion has not cleared up at all since Myers's 
day. In recent years, studies of split-brain and other 
neurologically damaged patients have newly provoked dis- 
cussions and debates about the nature of mind, usually to 
the effect that they show that mind can be split and 
therefore is not a unitary entity but a collection of 
parts that operate in coordination (see, e. g., Chur- 
chland, 1983,1986; Gazzaniga & LeDoux, 1978; Robinson, 
1982; Sperry, 1968; Springer & Deutsch, 1981). Most 
modern authors, however, (Robinson being a notable excep- 
tion), show little or no awareness that there is a mass 
of data from the 19th and early 20th centuries that is 
pertinent to their discussions and that provoked exactly 
the same discussions a century ago. This apparent lack 
of awareness of previous research and data has led some 
writers to suggest that recent neurological studies have 
somehow revolutionized our thinking about the nature of 
mind. One philosopher, for example, called split-brain 
effects "a phenomenon which is radically different from 
anything else previously known" (Nagel, 1979,163). 
Surgically splitting the corpus callosum is a new proce- 
dure from anything previously known (although Fechner 
apparently theorized that if the brain were to be split, 
consciousness would also be split [see McDougall, 
1911/1915]); but the modern experimental techniques used 
to study the effects of split-brain surgery are not 
markedly different from some of the 19th-century experi- 
mental techniques used to study hypnotic subjects or 
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hysterical patients (see, e. g., Barrett, Gurney, Myers, 
et al., 1883a; Janet, 1893/1901), and the debate over 
whether mind is a unity or not has not changed or pro- 
gressed much in any qualitative way since the 19th 
century. 
3 Understanding the distinction Myers drew between "indi- 
viduality" and "personality" -- or between "Self" and 
"self" -- can, I think, clear up the confusion Gauld 
(1968) apparently felt with regard to Myers's theory of 
the subliminal self. Gauld complained about "the 
abstruseness and complexity of the concepts central to 
his theory, such as consciousness, mind, soul, spirit, 
personality, psychical activity, " and he argued that in 
Myers's theory the "soul, " not the "subliminal self, " is 
the "unifying principle... 'behind' all mental 
phenomena.... The concept of the 'subliminal self' is 
simply not qualified to act as a unifying theoretical 
principle" (Gauld, 1968,278,295). I do not, however, 
agree with Gauld that "Myers offers little elucidation of 
these terms" (278). Myers was, in my view, quite clear 
in his distinction between a subliminal "self" (a per- 
sonality alternate or in addition to the normal waking 
one) and the subliminal "Self" (the individuality or 
"unifying theoretical principle"). I will further dis- 
cuss this distinction, and its role in Myers's attempt to 
help resolve the unity/multiplicity paradox of mind, 
below. 
4 "Subliminal" was thus perhaps an unfortunate choice of 
terminology, since it means "below the threshold. " Myers 
used the word "subliminal" to refer to "all that takes 
place beneath the ordinary threshold [of consciousness], 
or say, if preferred, outside the ordinary margin of con- 
sciousness" (1903,1: 14). In Myers's model of mind, 
waking consciousness is not the tip of an iceberg, with 
the unconscious or subconscious beneath. Instead, it is 
a segment taken, as it were, from the middle of the 
entire spectrum of consciousness. The words "subliminal" 
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and "supraliminal" are adequate to convey the idea that 
certain aspects of our experience enter into conscious 
awareness whereas others do not; but they are not ade- 
quate to convey the more complex model of mind that Myers 
developed to differentiate various kinds of subliminal 
phenomena. It might have been better if he had used the 
alternate word he suggested, "ultra-marginal, " although 
it too was inadequate to convey the full range of Myers's 
conception of mental processes outside ordinary waking 
consciousness, since it did not depict the "dark band" 
areas of subliminal functioning occurring within the 
"visible" portion of the mental spectrum. In keeping 
with his model of mind as a spectrum, he might have used 
such words as "visible" and "invisible" consciousness, or 
"manifest" and "latent" consciousness. 
5 As I will discuss further below, Myers suggested that 
volition should be considered a function of the entire 
Self, subliminal as well as supraliminal, and not just of 
the supraliminal, waking self. 
6 Myers did not discuss the possibility that supernormal 
capacities might also appear in non-human organisms -- 
what today is referred to as "anpsi" (for a review, see 
Morris, 1977). Nevertheless, his model seems completely 
capable of including the notion of anpsi: The 
sensorimotor (or pyschophysiological) processes in animal 
species have, like those in humans, evolved out of the 
original panaesthesia underlying all life. In doing so, 
they have often developed into forms quite different from 
those in humans; and animal species have also sometimes 
retained processes that humans have apparently "lost" (or 
that, in Myers's model, have been relegated to the 
"infrared" region). And, just as still-latent capacities 
may emerge occasionally in human functioning, they may 
also emerge occasionally in the functioning of non-human 
individuals. 
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7 Schiller (1894,279-282) drew a distinction between the 
phenomenal "self" and the transcendental "Ego" that was 
similar to Myers's distinction between personality and 
individuality. Like Myers, he emphasized that the Ego is 
not a second self, but that the self is an extract of the 
Ego (410). In many respects, in fact, Schiller's and 
Myers's theories of mind are parallel. 
Ducasse (1951,495) later drew a similar distinction 
between individuality and personality. 
8I remind readers of Myers's observation that a particu- 
lar faculty or behavior may be "useless" from our cur- 
rent, limited perspective, but not, in the long run, from 
an evolutionary or scientific perspective (1903,1: 150). 
9 Jastrow, for example, was among those who apparently 
thought that Myers's hypothesis of the subliminal self 
was based on the notion that subliminal processes are 
"ipso facto" superior to supraliminal ones (see, e. g., 
Jastrow, 1906,537). Jastrow seems, however, to have 
completely misunderstood Myers's hypothesis in general. 
He criticized it as based "upon a fundamental emphasis on 
the schism of conflicting personalities, " and went on to 
argue that his own hypothesis of the "subconscious as a 
natural function with the most intimate relations to con- 
sciousness,... both parts of a common synthesis,... is 
diametrically opposed to that the subliminal self" (1906, 
537,539-540). Elsewhere (Jastrow, 1903), he criticized 
the hypothesis of the subliminal self as one of discon- 
tinuity and argued that the concept of the subconscious 
would not be recognized in psychology as important until 
the hypothesis of the discontinuity of consciousness and 
the subconscious was replaced by one recognizing their 
underlying continuity. Jastrow's hypothesis, in fact, 
was in many ways identical to Myers's hypothesis, partic- 
ularly with regard to the ultimate continuity of con- 
scious and subconscious processes. Some of the implica- 
tions that Myers drew from the same premises were 
undeniably different from Jastrow's conclusions; and this 
283 
may explain why Jastrow (and others) have been so prone 
to misread and misrepresent Myers's hypothesis. (It may 
also help explain why Jastrow [1900] and others have also 
been so prone to misread and misrepresent psychical 
research in general. ) 
10 This paper (1893d, 12-15) was the first published 
account of Freud's work in English (Fuller & Fuller, 
1986; Jones, 1961,250). Myers called Breuer's and 
Freud's paper "an important essay" and remarked that "I 
could not wish for a more emphatic support. . . of the view 
of hysteria. . . to which my own observations.. . had 
already... directed my thought" (1893d, 12,14-15). Freud 
went on, however, after Myers's death, to develop a model 
of mind and an interpretation of subconscious mental 
functioning vastly dif 
ferent from Myers's Moreover, Freud, like most late 
19th- and 20th-century psychologists, adopted the basic 
Jacksonian position of psychophysical parallelism that 
allowed psychologists to study mental phenomena in their 
own right, but without questioning the assumption that 
they are ultimately dependent on physical processes 
(Freud, 1895/1954; Angel, 1961). 
11 I will discuss in more detail below Myers's 
understanding of the relationship between genius and 
hysteria (and, by extension, insanity). 
12 It was a common belief in the 19th century that 
psychological functioning was accompanied by physical 
changes or "traces" left in the brain. Like water that 
flows through the terrain, taking the paths of least 
resistance and carving out established river-beds as it 
repeatedly passes through those paths, so (it was 
believed) the nerve-currents accompanying psychological 
processes flow through the nervous system, taking the 
"paths" of least resistance and carving out "established" 
paths that subsequent nervous action will become more and 
more likely to take. Carpenter, for example, described 
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memory, associative processes, and habits of thought as 
being the results of "nerve tracks laid-down" (1874/1882, 
442). Likewise, in the Principles of Psychology, James 
frequently referred to "paths" in the brain and nervous 
system as the "anatomical substratum" of memory, associa- 
tion, and habit (James, 1890b, 1: 108). Thus, for exam- 
ple, the "psychological law of assocation... [is] an 
effect, within the mind, of the physical fact that nerve- 
currents propagate themselves easiest through those 
tracts of conduction which have been already most in use" 
(1: 563). Similarly, memory as a phenomenon of retention 
is "a purely physical phenomenon, a morphological fea- 
ture, the presence of these 'paths, ' namely, in the 
finest recesses of the brain's tissue, " and the 
excellence of one's memory "will depend partly on the 
number and partly on the persistence of these [brain-i 
paths" (1: 659) 
Myers was somewhat more concerned to emphasize that 
here, as elsewhere, psychologists and physiologists still 
have no real understanding of the nature or extent of 
mind-brain concomitance. Therefore, in order to fore- 
stall readers who might be tempted to take his terminol- 
ogy of "brain paths" literally, Myers reminded his 
readers that he was using the terminology as a metaphor, 
and not "a real transcript of the unknown processes which 
actually occur" (1889a, 535). 
13 After Hughlings Jackson in 1868 proposed his idea of a 
leading or dominant hemisphere, the assumption throughout 
the late 19th century, and indeed up until recent years, 
was that the left hemisphere (in most people) was the 
dominant one and that the right hemisphere was the lesser 
used one (Harrington, 1985; Springer & Deutsch, 1981). 
Research has since shown that the two hemispheres are 
instead, to some extent, specialized for different modes 
of functioning -- the left one being predominantly ver- 
bal, the right one taking over more spatial and visual 
functioning. The difference between the earlier and the 
more modern views on the role of the right hemisphere in 
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normal functioning does not invalidate Myers's general 
hypothesis on the role of the right hemisphere in sub- 
liminal functioning. In fact, as I hope will be evident 
below, modern findings about the general mode of right- 
hemisphere functioning seem to lend even more support to 
Myers's hypothesis. 
14 Why the particular, and rather bizarre, phenomenon of 
table-tilting emerged as a crude "language" of the sub- 
liminal is a separate question from the general develop- 
mental process in subliminal communication that Myers was 
suggesting. 
15 Myers carried this analogy further and compared the 
hysteric's frequent unawareness of and indifference to 
her limitations to the indifference of most normal people 
to learning more about the nature and extent of their own 
minds: 
If we had been a populace of hysterics we should 
have acquiesced in our hysteria. We should have 
pushed aside as a fantastic enthusiast the fellow 
sufferer who strove to tell us that this was not all 
that we were meant to be" (1893d, 25). 
16 By referring to the hypothetical element on which mind 
might operate as the "molecule, " Myers did not mean this 
identification necessarily to be taken strictly: 
"Assuredly neither the molecule nor the atom is the last 
word of analysis, as even the ordinary physicist would 
now agree. The whole process may be something far sub- 
tler than an action on molecules" (1903,2: 522). But, 
for his purposes, the word "molecule" could serve to 
designate the level of matter -- whatever that may be -- 
on which mind hypothetically operates. 
17 Similar ways of conceiving the interaction of mind and 
brain have been proposed in more recent times. Sperry 
(1969), for example, suggested that consciousness has "a 
directive role in determining the flow pattern of 
cerebral excitation" (533). Eccles, in his Gifford lec- 
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tures (1979/1984; 1980) and in his book with Popper (Pop- 
per & Eccles, 1977), suggested that consciousness both 
"reads" and acts on, not molecules, but modules of the 
brain. 
18 Myers's hypothesis does not add any mystery to the 
mechanism of suggestion. As he repeatedly pointed out, 
no one -- least of all those who confidently proclaim a 
phenomenon "explained" when it has been attributed to 
suggestion -- understands how suggestion is effective. 
As Andrew Lang later wrote, "to 'explain the explanation' 
is the task for the future" (Lang, 1911,546). 
19 Myers's hypothesis, and its associated belief that 
normal and supernormal psychophysiological processes 
operate by the same basic mechanism -- whatever that may 
be -- was later expressed again by Thouless and Wiesner 
(1946-1949). 
20 Myers also pointed out that Lord Kelvin himself con- 
temptuously dismissed these phenomena and others that the 
psychical researchers were trying to make sense of; yet 
if Lord Kelvin's own speculations on matter and 
energy should find both confirmation and development 
in a better understanding of these telekinetic 
phenomena -- we shall have a palmary example of the 
historic truth that a leader of thought in one age 
often prepares, while he protests against, the 
thought of the next; -- may be at once its most con- 
temptuous opponent and its most illuminating precur- 
sor. (1903,2: 533n) 
21 As I hope will become clear in the next chapter, by 
"Experimental Psychology" Myers meant scientific psychol- 
ogy, that is, a psychology that relies on the empirical 
methods of both experiment and observation. His concept 
of experimental psychology, therefore, was much broader 
than the rather narrowly defined meaning the term has 
developed in the 20th century. 
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CHAPTER 7 
LATENT CAPACITIES: METHODS FOR EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
General Methodological Approaches 
Psychology has been defined in many ways, from the 
science of mind to the science of behavior. After Kant, 
psychologists began to reject the notion that psychology 
is the study of the soul or the mind, "mind" being con- 
sidered a noumenal "thing-in-itself" and hence beyond the 
reach of empirical science (Patrick, 1911). In his 1886 
and 1911 Encyclopaedia Britannica articles on psychology, 
James Ward (1911) warned psychologists not to use the 
words mind, soul, or consciousness in their definitions 
of psychology because of their metaphysical and religious 
connotations ("Hence F. A. Lange's famous mot: modern 
psychology is Psychologie ohne Seele"). His definition 
("the science of individual experience") and William 
James's definition ("the Science of Mental Life" [James, 
1890b, 1]) were attempts to depict psychology as the 
study of phenomenal mind rather than noumenal mind; but 
the paradox of attempting to apply the objective methods 
of science to the essentially subjective phenomenon of 
consciousness still remained. Moreover, the concept of 
psychology as the study of mind or consciousness became 
identified closely with Wundt's introspective subjective 
methods, and this too fueled the move to define psychol- 
ogy instead as the science of behavior. McDougall argued 
that 
psychologists must cease to be content with the 
sterile and narrow conception of their science as 
the science of consciousness, and must boldly assert 
its claim to be the positive science of the mind in 
all its aspects and modes of functioning, or, as I 
would prefer to say, the positive science of conduct 
or behavior. (McDougall, 1908/1960,13) 
Such behavioral definitions themselves, however, were 
soon carried to an equally "sterile and narrow" extreme, 
culminating in the behaviorism of Watson (1924/1958). 
How one defines psychology has important effects on 
the kinds of methods one chooses to use. Many of those 
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who believed psychology to be the study of consciousness 
relied either on the philosophical examination of the 
contents of consciousness or on the experimental techni- 
ques of introspection developed by Wundt and his fol- 
lowers. Those who believed that psychology should be 
primarily the study of neurological processes that are 
the foundation of mental life turned to physiology and 
the study of sensorimotor processes. Those who believed 
that psychology should be the study of objective behavior 
recognized, as Kant did, that science is limited to the 
study of observable phenomena, that is, behavior; but 
this then led some psychologists to the rather bizarre 
(even if logically consistent) conclusion that, since 
intention and consciousness are not observable, psychol- 
ogy can study only nonintentional, unconscious behavior 
(MacMurray, 1939,217). As I pointed out in Chapter 2, 
scientific psychology raised important questions about 
the adequacy and completeness of present scientific meth- 
ods, developed in response to problems of the physical 
sciences, when confronted with the new and often dif- 
ferent problems of psychological phenomena. I repeat the 
succinct remark of the historian Brett, who said that 
"the central problem [in psychology] is the question of 
method" (Brett, 1921,148). It follows that, since the 
method one adopts is so closely dependent on how one 
defines the problems to be addressed, then the definition 
of the field of psychology likewise becomes of central 
importance. 
For Myers, the most fundamental fact about 
psychological processes is that they are 
psychophysiological -- that is, in some sense both mental 
and physical. The definition and aims of psychology 
should, therefore, reflect this basic fact about its 
phenomena. If, he believed, psychology is to move beyond 
merely describing what we observe or what we already 
know, more or less clearly, on the basis of our own expe- 
rience, and if it is to become more than a sub-discipline 
of physiology, then the most fundamental problem in 
psychology is to develop methods for probing the exact 
nature and extent of those psychophysiological processes. 
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For Myers, therefore, the important work of psychology 
lay in going beyond what we can easily and commonly 
observe in human behavior and developing methods, or 
"artifices, " for extending our observations of the con- 
tents and capacities of mind beyond the visible portion 
of the psychophysiological spectrum. 
Myers emphasized repeatedly that, first of all, 
psychologists had to develop methods suitable to the par- 
ticular problems and phenomena of psychology and, sec- 
ondly, that all sciences must go through a developmental 
process in which their methods, initially crude and 
imperfect, are gradually improved and strengthened. In 
particular, any science which aims to study "the intimate 
constitution of man" -- that is, the nature of human per- 
sonality and psychophysiological processes -- must 
develop unique methods that "are partly those of physiol- 
ogy and partly those of psychology" (1891e, 634-635). 
Psychology still "remains in that early stage... when the 
methods of experiment are such as other sciences have 
suggested, not such as this special branch of inquiry 
suggests for itself, or can use with unique effect" 
(1892g, 443). The methods successful in the physical 
sciences, however, are insufficient for psychology: 
They help us rather to define accurately facts 
already roughly known, than to get at underlying 
facts of which common consciousness does not inform 
us. To do this we must pass from general mechanical 
artifices to artifices special to psychology. 
(1892g, 443) 
In particular, the physical sciences rely on observation 
of the physical world as it appears to our ordinary, 
waking consciousness and senses, and as our perception of 
it is extended by "mechanical artifices. " If, in con- 
trast, the goal is to extend our knowledge and 
understanding of psychophysiological phenomena, then 
methods must be found for bringing within the purview of 
ordinary consciousness psychological processes that 
usually fall outside or beyond it -- developing, in 
short, methods or "artifices" that extend our observation 
of psychological phenomena just as the physical sciences 
have developed artifices for extending our observation of 
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the physical world. 
The apparent reluctance of psychologists to develop 
their own special methods reflected, Myers thought, their 
reluctance to put themselves back in the primitive meth- 
odological state where all sciences must begin and where 
they must return every time they attack new and different 
problems: 
I allude to the ever-growing dislike felt by the 
votaries of advanced and established sciences to the 
rude approximate work which has been needed in the 
infancy of every science; and needed in greater 
degree as each new science involved a wider scope. 
(1894-1895,191) 
There was, he warned, "danger... for Experimental Psychol- 
ogy in the temptation to cling too exclusively to the 
safe methods of sciences exacter than ours can as yet in 
reality be. " If psychologists "will make only such expe- 
riments as admit of precise numerical results, " then the 
danger was that psychology will become "no more than a 
curious appendage to Neurology, " rather than its own 
science, making its own real discoveries: "Men who 
insist on electric lamps along their road will never 
reach the centre of Africa" (1894-1895,191). 
The gap between the majority of psychologists and 
those involved in psychical research therefore 
increasingly grew to be one between those who preferred 
the safe, established, precise methods of other sciences 
and who narrowed the scope of their researches accor- 
dingly, and those who preferred to keep their sights set 
on fundamental problems, however inadequate the methods 
might so far be. In reviews of two issues of L'Annee 
psychologique, published near the end of his life, Myers 
conveyed his deep disappointment with what he saw as the 
resulting superficiality and triviality of much of modern 
psychology. In one review he contrasted the safe 
"surface-mining" of most psychological researchers with 
the riskier "deep-level mining" of the psychical 
researchers (1898c). The second review was more blunt: 
The subjects of research seem scarcely of sufficient 
importance to occupy for long the attention of 
scientific minds. The elaborate Bibliography... 
represents a great mass of intellectual effort, from 
which, perhaps, fewer leading ideas have in fact 
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emerged than might have been hoped in an age where 
really illuminating generalisations in science are 
wont to be so promptly pursued. (1900e, 106) 
The reason for this triteness, he thought, lay in the 
overwhelming tendency of many psychologists "to treat the 
easy parts of the subject... and to ignore altogether 
those difficult parts, " with the result that the research 
does little more than re-affirm the "obvious common- 
sense" and thus commonplace view, and brings no real 
advance in knowledge (1900e, 106). The psychical 
researchers, in contrast, attempted to push beyond the 
commonplace and treat the difficult parts, the inevitable 
result of this approach being that they "must make many 
mistakes" (1895g, 233). 
Myers summarized the two approaches to psychology as 
follows: 
First come the many new Professors and Lecturers in 
Germany, France, America, and elsewhere who are 
making accurate experiments on everything in man 
which they can manage to get at; -- the nervous 
system in general, vision, audition, orientation, 
tactile sensibility, reaction-times, fatigue, atten- 
tion, memory, mental imagery, -- with a host of cog- 
nate inquiries. Much of this is delicate quantita- 
tive work, and is performed with instruments of 
precision. The drawback is that such methods and 
such apparatus are better adapted to give accuracy 
to facts already roughly known than to carry the 
inquirer much farther into the depths of our being. 
It is work preparatory to discovery, rather than 
discovery itself. 
At the other end of the range a group still 
small.. . is attacking psychological problems of the highest importance, but which admit as yet of only 
approximate and tentative methods of inquiry. This 
is work of discovery indeed; but it is rough 
pioneer's work -- preparatory also in its own way to 
the ultimate science to which we all aspire (ibid. ) 
Both approaches, he urged, are necessary, and both have 
serious drawbacks. The real problem comes when the two 
sides fail to cooperate and "work with little connection" 
(ibid. ). Thus, for example, he chided Binet for failing 
to note work that psychical researchers had done that was 
pertinent to his own research (1900e); but he similarly 
reminded psychical researchers "that we are no isolated 
hunters" (1895g, 233). 
Myers thus believed that the first and most important 
i 
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consideration when developing methods for a new science 
is to make those methods as broad and inclusive as pos- 
sible. The ultimate goal of any science is to arrive at 
an explanation of a phenomenon sufficient to allow one to 
predict and produce that phenomenon (1880/1888,56). All 
sciences, however, must pass through two other major 
methodological stages before reaching that most advanced 
stage. While discussing research on the physiological 
effects of suggestion, Myers noted that phenomena under 
scientific observation go through three stages: "First, 
they will occur spontaneously. Next, they will be 
empirically produced. And lastly they will be produced 
scientifically; produced, that is to say, with real 
knowledge of the conditions on which they depend" (1892d, 
333). Psychical researchers and others attempting to 
push psychology beyond the commonplace and toward "real 
discovery" were, he thought, "just entering" the second 
stage, that is, the early experimental stage "at which we 
can sometimes set the machinery going, but have no notion 
how it works" (ibid. ). This second, or early experi- 
mental, stage was clearly in Myers's view an advance over 
the first stage of observing spontaneous events: 
As I have often urged, the first discovery of an 
actual method of experiment -- however difficult and 
uncertain -- in such an enquiry as this brings it at 
once out of. a region where we can never count on 
advance into a region where, if sufficient diligence 
be used, progress must in time follow. (1895h, 335) 
Nevertheless, as long as one remains at this second 
stage, and has not yet progressed to the third stage of 
understanding fully how to produce the phenomena, then 
the observational method must continue in conjunction 
with the experimental work. It remains 
important to take stock, so to say, of the whole 
range of spontaneous phenomena corresponding to the 
phenomena which we are endeavouring to produce. We 
shall thus learn how far we are likely to be able to 
go, and we may get hints as to the quickest line of 
progress. (1892d, 333) 
As I discussed at length in Chapter 5, Myers's meth- 
odological approach, therefore, was above all a compara- 
tive one: comparing observations from widely differing 
conditions, places, or times; comparing spontaneous 
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phenomena and experimentally produced phenomena; compar- 
ing different hypotheses or perspectives. Furthermore, 
when one's purpose shifts from being primarily an eviden- 
tial one to being primarily a theoretical one, one also 
needs to compare phenomena for which there is "overwhelm- 
ing probability" that the explanation is supernormal to 
those for which there may be somewhat less, but still 
"sufficient" probability for such an explanation (1884- 
1885,54; 1886d, 283). When one's purpose is to estab- 
lish the existence of a phenomenon, "the best-attested 
instances" are most useful. When one's purpose is, on 
the other hand, to understand and explain the phenomenon, 
then one must examine a broader range of instances of the 
phenomenon to allow for the proper consideration of all 
hypotheses, including those "discordant with our own" 
(1886b, lxviii-lxix). The comparative method, in short, 
is crucial to combat the partial, incomplete, and perhaps 
even misleading view one gets from looking at a limited 
kind or range of data and interpretations. 
Perhaps the most important comparison of all, 
however, was the one that Myers believed would get to the 
heart of the question of psychophysiological con- 
comitance, and that was to compare phenomena in which 
physiological or physical factors seem to be the causa- 
tive factor and apparently similar phenomena in which 
mental or psychological factors seem to be the causative 
factor. Similar effects are not always indications of 
similar causes. As I mentioned in Chapter 6, Myers 
observed that phenomena associated with aphasia or 
agraphia are often similar to those associated with 
automatic writing (or other such automatisms), and he 
conjectured that the similarities arose because the 
linguistically inexperienced right hemisphere has 
replaced the left hemisphere in certain functions. The 
cause of the inhibition of the left hemisphere, however, 
seemed to be different in the two situations. In one 
situation, neurological damage was clearly the cause; in 
the other, since the automatist could more or less con- 
trol the onset and duration of the automatic writing (or 
other automatism), the initiating cause seemed to be men- 
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tal and not physiological. Likewise, Myers noted that 
certain physiological effects -- such as a blister -- 
could be produced physiologically by damage to the body, 
spontaneously in cases of stigmata or trance, 
psychopathologically in cases of hysteria, or experi- 
mentally by hypnosis. Conversely, similar psychological 
effects could also arise in apparently widely differing 
physiological conditions. An hallucination, for example, 
might be induced by physical illness, drugs, or alcohol; 
one might occur spontaneously, as in the veridical or 
crisis apparitions reported throughout history and 
studied extensively by Myers and his colleagues; and hal- 
lucinations could be induced experimentally, such as by 
hypnotic suggestion or crystal-gazing. In all such 
situations, the important task for psychologists was to 
compare phenomenologically similar events occurring in 
physiologically or physically different conditions. In 
this way, he believed, psychologists could learn more 
about the extent to which mind is an active, initiating 
cause of physical events, and thus they might begin to 
clarify the problem of the relationship of volitional 
mental activity and apparently mechanical physical 
activity. 
All of the lines of research that Myers urged 
psychologists to pursue involved, in one way or another, 
the study of what he called "automatisms. " The most 
important psychological fact for Myers was that "our 
normal consciousness... represent[s] only a fragment of 
the activity going on in our brains" (1891e, 636). Any 
method that could extend our knowledge of psychological 
processes beyond-our normal consciousness would therefore 
have profound implications for our understanding of the 
relation between mind and brain. But for psychologists 
to develop such methods would also require great 
ingenuity, since pushing beyond the limits of conscious- 
ness meant, in essence, pushing beyond the parameters of 
knowledge that Nature has fitted our minds for: 
There is no obvious reason why we should not, by 
suitable inquiry, bring the bulk of these hidden 
[subliminal] processes under the cognisance of the 
empirical [supraliminal] inquiring self. But we 
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must remember that in such a quest we must not trust 
to Nature's aid. Nature is propagandist, not 
scientific; she has fitted us out to use her hidden 
processes for our own and our kind's preservation, 
not to pry into and understand them with mere knowl- 
edge as our end and aim. If, therefore, we wish to 
know as well as to be, we must everywhere replace 
instinct and sensation by artifice and inference. 
By artifice and inference our field of consciousness 
may be extended as widely as by instrument and cal- 
culation we have extended our field of vision. 
(1891d, 122-123) 
Myers's definition of "automatisms" therefore was 
quite different from the meaning we generally attach to 
"automatic" or "reflex" functioning (1889a, 523). The 
class of automatisms included any phenomenon that is not 
consciously originated; but it encompassed far more than 
unconscious physiological reflexes. On the analogy of 
the spectrum of consciousness, an automatism was any form 
of communication or exchange of information between dif- 
ferent segments of the spectrum, that is, between the 
subliminal and supraliminal regionsl. Myers noted in 
particular two important, defining characteristics of 
automatisms. First, they apparently occur independently 
of any pathological physiological condition of the 
automatist, and secondly, they are "message-bearing or 
nunciative" (1889a, 523). 
Moreover, automatisms may take a wide variety of 
forms. Like other forms of communication, they may take 
sensory forms as well as motor forms (1887a, 130). Thus, 
Myers suggested, such phenomena as dreams, hallucina- 
tions, automatic writing, table-tilting, hypnotic states, 
hysteria, or genius are all forms of automatisms in the 
sense that they are all conditions that have opened up 
channels of communication between one part of the Self 
and another (1887a; 1889a; 1889g, 192-193). Hallucina- 
tions belonged to the class of automatisms that Myers 
called sensory or "passive" automatisms; automatic writ- 
ing belonged to the class of motor or "active" 
automatisms. But despite their differences in outward 
form, "they are fundamentally the same phenomenon" 
(1887a; 1889a). Psychologically speaking, the form that 
an automatism took was of secondary importance. As I 
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mentioned in Chapter 6, Myers believed that the 
psychological mechanism behind different phenomena might 
be the same, even if the phenomenological characteristics 
-- determined by some proclivity, or "line of least 
resistance, " in the nervous system -- were different 
(1888c, 394-395). What was of primary importance was the 
psychological mechanism, or the process of communication 
between the supraliminal and subliminal strata of per- 
sonality. 
What was also of primary importance, Myers 
emphasized, was the content of the "message. " An impor- 
tant question was whether automatisms were confined to 
the supraliminal and subliminal strata of one individual, 
or whether they might also derive from an external 
source. Most automatisms, Myers thought, do "originate 
within the automatist's own personality, " but when the 
information conveyed is "veridical" -- that is, when it 
"correspond[s] with objective facts not normally within 
the purview" of the automatist -- then the automatism 
seems to have been conveyed from a stratum of one indi- 
vidual's mind to a stratum of another individual's mind. 
Nevertheless, it was only by an evaluation of the content 
of the "messages" that the probable source could be con- 
jectured. 
Myers particularly emphasized the importance of 
evaluating the content of automatisms to those people 
(such as many Spiritualists) who were inclined to assume 
that all automatisms come from a source external to the 
automatist. Because an automatism, by definition, comes 
from outside the automatist's conscious awareness, it 
seems to him or her to have come from an external source, 
when in reality it has come from another part of the 
automatist's own mind. On the other hand, Myers's empha- 
sis on evaluating the content was also directed at those 
who assumed that an automatism could never originate out- 
side the automatist's own mind. Again, only an analysis 
of the content of an automatism -- not its form or the 
automatist's subjective feelings -- could determine the 
actual source. 
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Spontaneous Case and Field Studies 
As I pointed out earlier, Myers believed that, until 
a science had reached the stage where it could produce 
phenomena with real understanding of the necessary condi- 
tions involved, then experimental work must proceed arm- 
in-arm with the study of spontaneously occurring 
phenomena, even though (as he fully recognized) 
spontaneous cases were, scientifically speaking, of 
"lower rank" than experimental studies (Barrett, Gurney, 
& Myers, 1882,30; Myers, 1892d, 333). Psychical 
research in particular was "at present very much in the 
position which zoology and botany occupied in the time of 
Aristotle, or nosology in the time of Hippocrates" -- the 
stage, which all sciences go through, when the phenomena 
are "to a large extent irreproducible" and must therefore 
be studied by observing them wherever and whenever they 
can be found (Barrett, Massey, Moses, et al., 1883,149). 
Dreams 
The most frequently recurring state of subliminal 
consciousness is sleep, and Myers therefore believed that 
the study of sleep and dreams should occupy a prominent 
position in psychological research. A form of hallucina- 
tion, dreams are. by far the commonest occurrences of 
sensory automatism. Even though the "message" conveyed 
may be "nonsensical" in terms of ordinary waking 
functioning, dreams are nevertheless vehicles by which 
information is passed from the subliminal to the 
supraliminal self, and they are particularly important to 
study because they are, evidently, the "easiest method of 
communication" between different portions of personality 
(1889a, 535; 1903,2: 524). 
I have already discussed in Chapter 6 Myers's belief 
that the study of sleep and dreams would be an important 
source of knowledge about subliminal processes and how 
they resemble or (more importantly) differ from the 
supraliminal ones with which we are familiar. Dreams, 
being so frequent, numerous, and readily available for 
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study, could, for example, begin to familiarize 
psychologists with the particular symbolical, apparently 
nonverbal language of the subliminal. Myers also 
believed that dreams could teach us much about individual 
psychological modes of functioning, such as Galton's sug- 
gestion that in some people visual mental processes are 
dominant, in others auditory processes are dominant, and 
in still others motor processes are dominant. Although 
most dreams have diverse elements, Myers hypothesized 
that, in dreams as well as in other subliminal processes, 
the individual's readiest psychological "path of 
externalisation, " or mode of functioning, would 
predominate (1889a, 535-537). Analyses of dream content, 
in other words, could begin to show whether, or to what 
extent, an individual's mental processes are 
predominantly (say) visual, auditory, or motor. 
Myers also believed that the study of sleep and 
dreams could provide knowledge about the evolution of 
consciousness, since sleep in his theory is a reversion 
to an earlier stage of consciousness. Here again he 
emphasized the importance of not neglecting the uncommon 
phenomena: For psychology, "as for other sciences, it is 
the anomalies, the residual phenomena, which open out 
fresh paths of discovery" (1892g, 444). Thus, he called 
attention to a rare and little-known phenomenon that 
might provide insight into the evolution of conscious- 
ness, namely, hysterical attaques de sommeil, in which 
the subject sleeps abnormally much, and, conversely, 
reports in the medical (as well as religious2) literature 
of persons who sleep abnormally little (1892f, 364-365). 
Such cases, he thought, might be evidence of, on the one 
hand, dissolution of consciousness to a state of 
prolonged sleep and, on the other, evolution to a state 
of increased vigilance or wakefulness. 
Most importantly, however, the study of sleep and 
dreams could provide information about enhanced or even 
new psychological processes occurring in subliminal 
functioning (1892f; 1903, Ch. 4). First of all, he sug- 
gested, phenomena of sleep and dreams indicate a latent 
capacity for heightened sensory perception -- an 
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apparently paradoxical observation, given that sleep is 
usually thought of as an abeyance of sensory functioning. 
Nevertheless, in the latter part of the 19th century, 
scientists such as Baillarger, Griesinger, Maury, Galton, 
and others had begun to study hypnagogic illusions, the 
vivid sensory images -- usually visual or auditory -- 
that often occur in the state of falling asleep. Gurney 
and Myers pointed out that such images may also occur in 
the state just before awakening, and Myers labelled these 
"hypnopompic" images (Gurney, Myers, & Podmore, 1886, 
1: 390; Myers, 1892c, 314; Myers, 1892f, 369-373). Dreams 
themselves also provided evidence of heightened sensory 
capacity, being for many people "the highest point" that 
their visualizing faculty reaches (1892f, 370). Percep- 
tion of sound may also be enhanced in dreams (1892f, 370- 
371). The importance of observing and recording (and 
even attempting to induce) such phenomena, however triv- 
ial and "meaningless" they may appear, was that they 
seemed to be an "indication of intensified capacity" of 
sensory functioning in a subliminal state, beyond normal 
waking capacity (1892c, 315). 
The study of dreams might also provide insight into 
processes of creativity and genius. Dreams are above all 
else a generation or creation of imagery, but in most 
people they also indicate a dramatization or role-playing 
capacity far greater than normal (1892f, 371). In addi- 
tion, in some dreams cognitive or problem-solving 
processes seemed to have been enhanced (1892f, 392-397; 
1903,1: 134-135,372-379). Thus, in addition to creative 
processes in the dreams of ordinary people, the contribu- 
tion of dreams to the creativity and genius of artists 
and scientists seemed to Myers an important topic of 
psychological study. 
Another cognitive function that seemed to be enhanced 
in dreams was memory. As I mentioned in Chapter 6, Myers 
believed that memory in subliminal processes such as 
dreams was the widest memory, even if not the most com- 
plete or reasoned (1903,1: 129). The study of hyper- 
mnesia in dreams -- including the memory of events once 
known but now forgotten, as well as events perceived with 
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the normal senses but never consciously perceived -- was 
of interest in showing not only that memory extends 
beyond our supraliminal range, but also that sensory per- 
ception does so as well. Moreover, Myers believed that 
the study of memory in dreams would reveal an underlying 
continuity of memory between the dream state and other 
subliminal states of consciousness and, thus, provide 
further evidence for Myers's hypothesis of a fundamental 
unity of human personality behind its multiple and often 
seemingly disparate manifestations (1892f, 378-379; 1903, 
1: 128-134,370-372). 
Another phenomenon that Myers thought would provide 
interesting evidence for enhanced capacities in sub- 
liminal states of consciousness was the effect that 
dreams could have on the waking state. In this connec- 
tion he noted the similarity between dreams and post- 
hypnotic suggestions (1892f, 373-374). Dreams could, for 
example, mark the onset of a religious experience, an 
hysterical fixed idea, or even insanity; or they could 
generate self-suggestions apparently strong enough to 
lead to healing,. pain, stigmata, or even death (1892f, 
373-377; 1903,1: 126-128,369-370). These latter effects 
were particularly important to study, he thought, because 
they provided evidence that a person's subliminal con- 
sciousness could influence physiological processes to an 
extent far beyond his or her conscious control. 
The most extreme enhancement of functioning in 
dreams, however, occurred in those cases in which the 
dreamer seemed to have acquired information through some 
new, or supernormal, mode of perception, a mode of per- 
ception that seemed to be both more generalized and more 
far-reaching than sensory perception. In some dreams, in 
other words, the dreamer may show telepathic, 
telaesthetic (clairvoyant), or precognitive awareness of 
external phenomena (1903,1: 135-150,379-436). Because 
this apparent new mode of perception is, like all other 
modes of perception, emergent from the general 
sensitivity, or panaesthesia of the individual's con- 
sciousness, there may be, Myers cautioned, no fixed line 
separating dreams deriving from normal sensory and cogni- 
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tive processes, from hyperaesthesia or hypermnesia, and 
from supernormal functioning. As with other forms of 
subliminal functioning, only an examination of the con- 
tent of the dream could determine its possible deriva- 
tion. Nevertheless, Myers also suggested studying, as 
one possible feature in dreams distinguishing normal, 
enhanced normal, and supernormal functioning, the 
qualitative intensity of the dream. He conjectured that 
dreams which seemed particularly vivid or otherwise 
impressive to the dreamer -- and especially dreams that 
led the dreamer to take some action once he or she awoke 
-- might more often be those which later appear to have 
been supernormal (1892f, 366-367). 
Although dreams, by their very nature, are for the 
most part limited to being studied when they occur 
spontaneously, Myers nevertheless believed that they 
could occasionally be brought under some means of experi- 
mental control: 
I have long thought that we are too indolent in 
regard to our dreams; that we neglect precious occa- 
sions of experiment for want of a little resolute 
direction of the will .... [W]e ought to accustom our- 
selves to look on each dream, not only as a 
psychological observation, but as an observation 
which may be transformed into an experiment. We 
should constantly represent to ourselves what points 
we should like to notice and test in dreams; and 
then when going to sleep we should impress upon our 
minds that we are going to try an experiment; -- 
that we are going to carry into our dreams enough of 
our waking [supraliminal] self to tell us that they 
are dreams, and to prompt us to psychological 
inquiry. (1887b, 241) 
What he was proposing was the study of what we now call 
lucid dreams. He put himself to the task, even though he 
knew that he was both a poor dreamer (1887b, 241) and a 
poor visualizer (1892f, 370); and, perhaps predictably, 
he succeeded only three nights out of nearly 3,000 on 
which he tried (1887b, 241). Nevertheless, because, "as 
dreamers, we are very unequally gifted by nature" 
(ibid. ), he expected that others might be successful fre- 
quently enough to make such research useful; and research 
begun in recent years would seem to support that expecta- 
tion (Green, 1968; LaBerge, 1985). He also referred to a 
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"Chapter on Dreams" in which Robert Louis Stevenson 
described his own practice of self-suggestion before 
sleep, and its success in stimulating his creative 
processes. In calling attention to these "most success- 
ful dream-experiments thus far recorded, " Myers hoped to 
encourage others to undertake experiments in suggestion 
(or self-suggestion) in dreams (1892f, 371). 
Hysteria 
Hysteria was another phenomenon that could only be 
studied where and when it is found occurring 
spontaneously, but in which observations of spontaneously 
occurring symptoms could be extended somewhat by experi- 
mental manipulations. I have already explained in Chap- 
ter 6 why Myers believed the study of hysteria could make 
an important contribution, not just to clinical medicine, 
but also to theoretical psychology. Myers emphasized 
"how significant are the phenomena of hysteria in any 
psychological scheme which aims at including the hidden 
powers of man" (1903,1: 67). The hysteric, he said, pos- 
sesses no capacity that is not latent in all human 
beings, and studying the malfunctioning or disintegration 
of the hysteric personality could teach psychologists 
much about the functioning and integration of the normal 
personality (1886c, 655-656; 1889c, 200; 1903,1: 35). 
Hysteria, Myers believed, provided "a better dissecting 
agent than any other where delicate psychical dissocia- 
tions are concerned" (1903,1: 65) -- rivalled in this 
only by hypnosis. Moreover, studying not just the losses 
of function, but particularly the gains demonstrated by 
hysterics could reveal much about latent psychological 
capacities (1886c, 654-655; 1897,56; 1903,1: 66-69). In 
particular, hysterics could show increases as well as 
decreases in attention, in control over sensory and motor 
processes, and in memory (1903,1: 67). 
Myers thought that changes in sensation in hysterics 
would be a particularly important area of study. Janet, 
Binet, Fere, and_others had studied anaesthesia, hysteri- 
cal blindness, and other losses of sensation in hysterics 
(see, e. g., Binet, 1890; Binet & Fere, 1888 ; Janet, 
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1893/1901,1907/1920), and Myers (as I mentioned in Chap- 
ter 6) thought that the study of such phenomena would 
prove "one of the most fertile sources of new knowledge 
of body and mind" (1903,1: 43). Such phenomena were 
primarily intellectual or psychological in origin and 
character, not organic or anatomical (1893d, 5-6; 1897, 
53-55; 1903,1: 45-46). As such, therefore, they were not 
simply the losses of sensory capacity that they appeared 
to be. They were also -- and more importantly to 
psychologists -- evidence for a control over physiologi- 
cal processes, latent in the subliminal consciousness of 
the individual and beyond the evolved capacity of the 
supraliminal consciousness, which not only occurred 
spontaneously in hysterics, but could, it seemed, be 
manipulated experimentally to some extent. 
As one example of experimental manipulation of 
hysterical symptoms, Myers described some experiments of 
Babinski, Binet, and Fere, including some that he himself 
had observed and assisted in (1886h). In these experi- 
ments with hysterics at the Salpetriere, the experi- 
menters had succeeded in transferring hysterical symp- 
toms, including anaesthesias, from one part of the body 
to another, or even from one patient to another, by using 
magnets. The Salpetriere scientists assumed that the 
cause was a physical one. Binet and Fere, for example, 
"urge that the transferences effected are anatomically 
too exact to be effected by a mere suggestion working 
itself out in the patient's mind" (1886h, 446). Further- 
more, the Salpetriere scientists had assumed that a 
deeply hypnotized hysteric was unaware of anything going 
on around her. As a result, they had taken few precau- 
tions to rule out suggestion. Myers, in contrast, 
believed that hypnosis did not eradicate, but simply 
relocated, the subject's awareness, and that the sub- 
ject's subliminal consciousness could direct the nervous 
system to carry out the suggestion as completely as pos- 
sible. He suggested, therefore, that the Salpetriere 
experiments had demonstrated, not the physical effect of 
magnets on the body, but what he considered the much more 
significant phenomenon of latent mental control over 
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one's own physiological processes. 
In addition to providing information about the inter- 
action of psychological and physiological phenomena, 
hysteria could also, Myers thought, contribute to a 
theoretical understanding of the nature of mind. Myers's 
theory of mind suggested that waking consciousness was a 
segment of a larger consciousness that had emerged from 
that larger consciousness through the evolutionary 
process of adaptation to environmental demands. On this 
theory, hysteria was simply, in his theory, a more 
extreme example of the normal adaptive processes by which 
psychological elements are filtered out of supraliminal 
awareness but nonetheless remain latent in subliminal 
consciousness. Sensory processes were not destroyed in 
an hysteric, as they are when an organic injury occurs; 
they are submerged. Myers therefore predicted that expe- 
riments on hysterics would show that, at some level of 
consciousness, hysterics retained sensations and memories 
that they seemed to have lost -- as in fact experiments 
such as Binet, Pierre Janet, and Jules Janet were con- 
ducting were showing (Myers, 1889c, 201-204; 1889e, 217- 
219; 1893d, 16-22; 1903, Ch. 2). Myers called attention, 
for example, to Pierre Janet's observation of "how rare a 
thing it was that any accident or injury followed upon 
hysterical loss of feeling in the limbs" (1903,1: 47). 
Some deeper level of personality, it would seem, retained 
awareness and maintained some subliminal supervision over 
the individual's functioning. 3 Janet's experiments using 
a dynamometer showed that, although a hysteric might have 
lost the ability to carry out a motor task when her 
attention was directed to it, she actually retained the 
capacity at a subliminal level (1893d, 21-22). Myers 
encouraged all such experiments -- using not only sugges- 
tion and hypnotism but also automatisms such as automatic 
writing -- to determine how deep the hysterical losses of 
sensation and memory really go and to what extent sub- 
liminal awareness of "lost" areas of consciousness might 
still be influencing supraliminal functioning. Such 
experiments, if pursued far enough, would, he believed, 
demonstrate an underlying unity and continuity to the 
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hysteric's supraliminally dissociated personality. 
Stigmata 
There were other spontaneously occurring phenomena 
that Myers considered important for psychologists to 
study for an increased understanding of the relation 
between mental and physiological processes. The reli- 
gious literature was full of reports of saints and other 
persons on whom marks corresponding to the wounds of 
Christ appeared periodically or in states of meditation 
or prayer (Stevenson, in press; Thurston, 1952). 4 
Instead of being "either fraudulent or miraculous, " as it 
had long been assumed to be, stigmatization was, Myers 
thought, an instructive example of "subliminal responses 
to self-suggestion" (1903,1: 492). Regardless of whether 
the phenomena occurred in a saint or in an hysteric, and 
regardless of whether the suggestion was initiated by the 
subject or by someone else, the psychological mechanism 
was, he believed, the same. Such "suggested vesication" 
was a highly developed form of "vaso-motor plasticity" in 
which the subject showed a considerable (though usually 
latent and subliminal) capacity for mentally influencing 
physiological processes (1903,1: 188). These spontaneous 
psychophysiological phenomena were themselves important 
to study; but they also "suggested some experiments" that 
could be made with subjects who were found to be suffi- 
ciently responsive (1903,1: 188,492-499). In such expe- 
riments, for example, a particular physiological reaction 
to a benign stimulus could be suggested and the results 
observed and documented. 
Healing 
Closely related to cases of stigmatization were the 
claims for so-called faith healing and mesmeric healing 
(Gurney & Myers, 1885; Myers & Myers, 1893). In addition 
to the anaesthetizing power of mesmerism, reported by 
Esdaile, Elliotson, and others in the mid-19th century, 
there had also been reports that the mesmeric state could 
lead to spontaneous healing or recovery from disease. 
And "miraculous" cures had long been associated with par- 
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ticular objects (such as the relics of a saint), particu- 
lar persons (such as Jesus or Mary), or particular places 
(such as Lourdes). Gurney, Myers, and Myers's brother 
Dr. A. T. Myers were quick to point out the extremely 
poor quality of the evidence for most such claims, par- 
ticularly because of the disappointing lack of medical 
documentation and corroboration in the cases. Neverthe- 
less, they also believed that the lack of adequate evi- 
dence did not invalidate all the claims entirely, and 
they urged that certain standards of documentation and 
validation be adopted so that the claims could be ade- 
quately assessed and either accepted or discarded in the 
future (Gurney & Myers, 1885,405; Myers & Myers, 1893, 
166-167). Moreover, they believed that most genuine 
cases of healing could be attributed to self-suggestion 
rather than to any external agency, as was then popularly 
believed (1903,1: 213). This conclusion did not, 
however, lessen the interest of the cases: Like cases of 
physiological effects in hysteria or cases of stigmata, 
cases of "faith" healing seemed to provide evidence for 
an unrecognized but sometimes potent psychological 
influence on physiological processes. Furthermore, it 
was also important for scientists to study such 
phenomena, since, when they ignore the phenomena, "char- 
latans step in and occupy the empty field" (Myers & 
Myers, 1893,208). In contrast, if they will attend to 
them, 
the hope is that that second, or psychological, ele- 
ment in all therapeutics, which has thus far been 
left to chance and wonder, while the physiological 
element has fallen under settled law, may itself 
also be gradually recognised as an orderly part of 
Nature. (Myers & Myers, 1893,207) 
Maternal Impressions 
Myers also urged the study of a class of spontaneous 
cases that might be considered transitional between self- 
suggestion (or influence of one's own mind on one's own 
body) and external suggestion (or the influence of one 
person's mind on another person's body). These are the 
so-called maternal impression cases, or the apparent 
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effects of a mental state of a pregnant woman on the 
developing embryo. (For an extensive review of such 
cases, particularly those reported in the medical litera- 
ture, see Stevenson, in press. ) Myers believed that 
there is evidence enough... to show that isolated and 
momentary suggestions -- as the sight of a crushed 
ankle or missing finger -- may produce a definite 
localised effect on the embryo in much the same way 
as a hypnotic suggestion may produce a localised 
congestion or secretion. (1895h, 349; 1903,1: 455) 
As in stigmata cases, the mechanism causing such maternal 
impression cases remains totally unexplained, and Myers 
strongly urged that they be studied: "Few subjects stand 
more in need of statistical and experimental investiga- 
tion" (1892d, 335n). 
This latter statement indicated that Myers believed 
that the study of maternal impressions could be extended 
to include experimental conditions. Just as he had noted 
that stigmatization could be studied experimentally by 
suggesting, to appropriate subjects, harmless and pain- 
less marks on the skin (1903,1: 495-496), he called 
attention to Liebeault's proposal that scientists "sug- 
gest to pregnant women marks of a definite but harmless 
kind, with the view of obtaining direct experimental 
proof of a pre-natal influence" (1892d, 335n). 5 
Death-Bed Visions and Near-Death Experiences 
Other types of spontaneous phenomena that Myers 
thought important to study were the experiences that 
people sometimes have when they are seriously ill or even 
near death; and he identified two primary reasons why 
such experiences should be of interest to psychologists. 
First of all, although people have long been interested 
in the last words of the dying and the possibility that a 
dying person might reveal something of what lies before 
him or her, Myers thought that the altered state of con- 
sciousness of a dying person might be a conducive condi- 
tion for stimulating the person's subliminal capacity for 
supernormal perception of more mundane events: "Nothing, 
perhaps, has been so little looked for at death-beds as 
the special indications... not of a first perception of 
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another world, but of a last of this" (1886d, 304; see 
also 1889f, 24). He cited some examples, but suggested 
that the examples might improve both in quantity and 
quality if people's attention could be directed to the 
phenomenon. 
Myers also urged that the study of states of con- 
sciousness during periods of extreme illness or even coma 
might contribute to an understanding of mind-brain rela- 
tions. He pointed out that there was 
a small and imperfectly understood group of cases 
which seem to point to... the persistence... of con- 
sciousness under pathological conditions which would 
seem to negative its possibility. 
If consciousness be a mere epiphenomenon... 
accompanying, but in no way guiding, certain 
molecular changes in the brain, we shall of course 
expect... that consciousness is exclusively linked 
with the functional disintegration of central nerv- 
ous elements, and varies in its intensity with the 
rapidity or energy of that disintegration. And 
ordinary experience, at least within physiological 
limits, will support some view like this. Yet now 
and then we find a case where vivid consciousness 
has existed during a state of apparent 
coma... tranquilly and intelligently co-existing with 
an almost complete abeyance of ordinary vital func- 
tion. ... Until this new field has been more fully 
worked -- until the traces of memory which may sur- 
vive from comatose, ecstatic, syncopal conditions 
have been revived (by hypnotic suggestion or other- 
wise), and carefully compared, we have no right to 
make any absolute assertion as to the concomitant 
cerebral processes on which consciousness depends. 
(1891d, 116-117) 
The frequency with which supernormal processes seemed to 
occur while either the percipient or the agent was 
asleep, dying, or in a state of ill health, coupled with 
the emergence of subliminal functioning in general during 
altered states of consciousness such as hypnosis, 
hysteria, or even ordinary distraction, led Myers to pro- 
pose that, although supraliminal functioning usually 
reflects "the familiar parallelism between bodily and 
mental states", subliminal mental processes might vary 
"inversely, rather than directly, with the observable 
activity of the nervous system or of the conscious mind" 
(1890b, 320; 1891e, 638). 
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Hallucinations 
Among the most important phenomena for psychologists 
to study, Myers believed, were hallucinations. Hal- 
lucinations might prove to be particularly instructive 
because they vividly demonstrate the fact that all modes 
of perception fall somewhere on a continuum between the 
(hypothetically) purely objective phenomenon and the 
(hypothetically) purely subjective phenomenon. Even 
sensory perception is not an entirely objective represen- 
tation of external reality, but a mental construct; it 
"is in its own way highly symbolical" (1903,1: 277). 
Similarly, hallucinations -- especially the veridical 
variety that Myers, Gurney, and other psychical research- 
ers studied -- "further... confound our already doubtful 
contrast between objective and subjective,... between 
'real' and 'unreal' things" (1891d, 125). Hallucinations 
are an integral part of the general problem of the rela- 
tionship between perception and reality, objective and 
subjective, or matter and mind, and thus the study of 
them, in conjunction with the study of perception in gen- 
eral, might ultimately lead to an understanding of 
psychological phenomena beyond the highly polarized posi- 
tions of physicalism and dualism (1903,1: 276-277). 
The study of hallucinations, then, had to be 
accompanied by attempts to understand the relationship of 
hallucinations to other modes of perception and imagery. 
Beginning with the assumption that all mental processes 
have developed from a primitive, indefinite, general 
sensitivity, Myers suggested that perception has 
developed along a continuum in two directions: toward 
externally generated percepts that are peripheral (or 
sensory) in origin, and toward internally generated per- 
cepts that are central (or cerebral) in origin. Taking 
visual perception as the primary example, Myers attempted 
to situate optical vision, after-images, memory, dreams, 
imagery, hallucinations, synaesthesia, and other percep- 
tual phenomena on this continuum (1903,1: 224-231). 
Myers argued that psychologists ordinarily distinguish 
and segregate external and internal modes of perception 
by assuming that the external, peripheral, or sensory 
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modes are the only modes for receiving new information, 
whereas the internal, cerebral, or "mental" modes consist 
solely of the "recall and rearrangement" of old material 
(1892g, 439-440). Myers, however, believed that there 
was no such clear dividing line between external and 
internal percepts. Thus, some apparently internally gen- 
erated percepts -- such as hallucinations or dreams -- 
might contain objective and new information that was 
nonetheless not optical (or sensory) in origin (1892g, 
440). 
Myers and Gurney had first suggested this scheme of 
perception in an 1884 paper on "A Theory of Apparitions" 
(Barrett, Massey, Moses, et al., 1884c). In an attempt 
to show that not all hallucinations are morbid ones (as 
psychologists assumed), but that morbid hallucinations 
were "merely a species in a larger genus" of hallucina- 
tions, Myers and Gurney attempted to fit hallucinations 
into a general scheme of perception (Barrett, Massey, 
Moses, et al., 1884c, 167-172). They acknowledged that 
their ideas were derived from then-current ideas about 
localization of brain functions, but they also thought 
that the general features of their scheme could remain 
valid even if the details of the theory of brain 
localization were later modified (Barrett, Massey, Moses, 
et al., 1884c, 168). According to Gurney and Myers, 
there were three main areas of the nervous system 
involved in, say, visual perception: the retina (A); the 
visual center of the brain (B), where all sensations of 
sight are generated; and cortical areas (C), where "men- 
tal" visualization such as memory or imagery occurs. A 
and B are connected by nerve fibers, and B and C are 
likewise connected. Any stimulation of B will result in 
the sensation of sight. According to Myers and Gurney, B 
can be stimulated either from the direction of A (result- 
ing in optical vision) or from the direction of C 
(resulting in hallucination). Moreover, depending on the 
strength of the stimulus at either A or C, the response 
at B may be the same regardless of the nature of the 
stimulus. The stimulus at C is in essence an idea, but 
it can arise in a number of ways, whether voluntarily in 
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volitional attempts at visualization or involuntarily in 
dreams, hypnagogic or hypnopompic hallucinations, or 
spontaneous waking hallucinations. Moreoever, C can also 
be stimulated by pathological, physiological conditions 
such as drugs or disease. 
In short, the psychological mechanism for sensory 
perception and for hallucination is the same: a stimula- 
tion of the relevant brain center (B). What differs is 
the source of the stimulation; it can come either from a 
peripheral sensory receptor (A) or from a central, 
cerebral area (C). 
In a similar fashion, Myers and Gurney differentiated 
purely morbid hallucinations, other subjective hallucina- 
tions, and veridical hallucinations. All arose from a 
nervous impulse from C to B. In morbid hallucinations, 
however, the nervous impulse originating at C was caused 
by some pathological physiological condition, such as 
drugs or disease. Other subjective hallucinations (such 
as hypnotically suggested ones) could occur when an idea 
became sufficiently intense to generate a nervous impulse 
to B; such subjective hallucinations were themselves of 
immense interest because they addressed again the problem 
of the relation of volition or other ideational processes 
and physiological processes. Finally, according to Myers 
and Gurney, there were also veridical hallucinations. 
These were not purely subjective because they cor- 
responded to an external event; but they were also not 
optically originated, since the nervous impulse began at 
C, not at A. Myers conjectured, therefore, that veridi- 
cal hallucinations arose from a mode of perception that 
was objective in some sense but not optical (1892g, 440- 
441). They were evidence for a mode of perception, 
developing out of the general sensitivity (panaesthesia) 
of the organism (as had optical perception), but a mode 
of perception that resulted in the stimulation of the 
cortical centers at C and not the retinal apparatus at A. 
On this point, Myers thus carried his definition of 
hallucinations somewhat further than Gurney had. 
Gurney's definition had simply been that hallucinations 
are percepts lacking an objective basis (Gurney, Myers, & 
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Podmore, 1886,1: 459) -- a definition Myers considered 
"mainly... negative" (1892g, 441). Myers, in contrast, 
defined hallucinations as "phenomena of central or 
cerebral hyperaesthesia" (1903,1: 227), that is, percep- 
tion with an objective basis but beginning in the per- 
ceiver not at the sensory receptors but in the cortex. 
His definition included "something more of positive" in 
it 
if for hallucination we substitute 'sensory 
automatism'; thus implying not so much that the pic- 
ture fails truly to represent the objects present to 
supraliminal vision [Gurney's definition], as that 
it aims at representing objects present to sub- 
liminal perception in some unknown way. (1892g, 
441) 
Most psychologists assumed that hallucinations were 
morbid, or pathological. Some psychologists were 
beginning also to recognize a non-morbid variety, but 
they assumed that these were purely subjective in origin, 
since they lacked any sensory source. Myers and Gurney 
further believed that even the non-morbid variety also 
took more than one form: Just as one had to distinguish 
morbid and non-morbid hallucinations, one had also to 
distinguish subjective and veridical ones. 
In particular, throughout recorded history appari- 
tions of deceased persons or living persons undergoing 
some crisis have been reported. Gurney and Myers quoted 
Samuel Johnson as saying that, "after five thousand 
years, " the problem of the nature of such apparitions "is 
still undecided, " even though it is "one of the most 
important [questions] that can come before the human 
understanding" (Barrett, Massey, Moses, et al., 1884b, 
109). Even before the founding of the SPR, Myers had 
urged the importance of collecting and studying "the 
widely-spread accounts of apparitions seen at the moment 
of death, or even soon after death" (1881,99); and a few 
years later the SPR, under Gurney's leadership, undertook 
just such a study. 
In keeping with their general "tertium quid" approach 
to all questions, Gurney and Myers particularly hoped 
that this study would lead to some understanding of 
veridical hallucinations more satisfactory than "the two 
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equally crude views between which we steer -- that 
phantoms are all morbid nonsense, or that they are all 
'spirits of the dead"' (Barrett, Massey, Moses, et al., 
1884c, 164). To learn whether -- or to what extent -- 
hallucinations might be non-morbid as well as morbid, or 
objectively veridical as well as subjective, Gurney and 
Myers recognized that an empirical study was necessary. 
Specifically, the problem first had to be attacked "in 
the market-place, by the Method of Averages and by tables 
of statistics" -- in short, by a survey of hallucinations 
(Barrett, Massey, Moses, et al., 1884b, 113). Most 
scientists assumed that hallucinations are pathological 
in origin and that any coincidence between an hallucina- 
tion and a real event was purely chance. To confirm or 
disprove these assumptions required "laborious quantita- 
tive work" to learn how frequently hallucinations of both 
the veridical variety and the subjective, non-coincident, 
or pathological variety occur (Barrett, Massey, Moses, et 
al., 1884a, 48-51; 1884b, 112-117). Comparing positive 
and negative responses in a large survey would, the 
psychical researchers believed, begin to answer questions 
about the kinds of hallucinations that occur, to whom 
they occur and how often, the conditions under which they 
occur, and whether or not chance coincidence is a 
reasonable explanation for the apparently veridical cases 
reported. 6 
In addition to research on the incidence and kind of 
hallucinations, Myers suggested other lines of research 
on hallucinations that he believed would contribute to an 
understanding of the nature of hallucinations and the 
psychophysiological processes involved in their gener- 
ation. To understand further the extent to which an hal- 
lucination might be objective or subjective, it was 
important to learn more about the influence of the per- 
cipient's own mental processes on the hallucination. 
Even if an external event was the original, primary 
stimulus for the hallucination, an hallucination was 
presumably not different from any other perceptual 
process, in that the percipient's mind modifies the 
original stimulus such that the perception takes sym- 
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bolic, expected, or familiar forms (Barrett, Massey, 
Moses, et al., 1884c, 171-173). Hallucinations "are not 
mere crude externalisations.... They are in most cases 
elaborate products -- complex images which must have 
needed intelligence to fashion them" (1903,1: 234). The 
question of how closely an hallucination or apparition 
corresponds with the percipient's prior beliefs or 
expectations is also important, especially since many of 
them seem not to do so, at least in certain respects. 
This finding would suggest some degree of objectivity for 
the hallucination's causal stimulus (1889f, 16). The 
sensory modality that the hallucination took was also an 
important feature to study (1884-1885), since it was 
likely that it (like other subliminal phenomena) would 
take the percipient's "readiest path of externalisation, " 
or dominant mode of functioning. 
Myers and his colleagues were particularly interested 
in whether hallucinations provided evidence for some mode 
of perception different from the sensory mode. Hal- 
lucinations fall on a continuum ranging from dreams to 
vague waking impressions to full-blown sensory hallucina- 
tions, and from the highly symbolic to the highly "objec- 
tive, " but in general they are all evidence for an 
unusual degree of visualization (or other imagery) 
(1892c, 314-317). To learn more about the extent to 
which this visualization derives from external -- that 
is, "objective" -- sources, Myers and his colleagues were 
particularly interestested in hallucinations in which the 
content corresponded with a more or less contemporaneous 
external event. Such hallucinations, they found, fre- 
quently corresponded with the process of dying or some 
other crisis in the life of another person (1886b, 
lxiii). The first problem, of course, was to establish 
the actual veridicality of the hallucination: Did the 
events occur as reported? The next step was to determine 
the likelihood of the coincidence being a chance one. 
Dreams, for example, were "the most assailable part of 
our evidence, " since they are the commonest form of hal- 
lucination. To qualify for classification as veridical, 
therefore, a dream had to have been written down or com- 
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municated to another person befor the dreamer learned 
about the external event, and the dream must have cor- 
responded with an unusual or unexpected event (Barrett, 
Massey, Moses, et al., 1883,143). Likewise, another 
important question to address was how frequently a per- 
cipient experienced hallucinations -- whether the veridi- 
cal one was a unique event in the percipient's experi- 
ence, or whether hallucinations were a frequent occur- 
rence (1884-1885,116). 
Another important source for learning about the gen- 
eration of an hallucination was to examine, in veridical 
hallucinations, the relative contributions of both the 
percipient and the person who was the apparent subject of 
the hallucination (the so-called agent). Myers warned 
against "the error of attributing too much importance to 
the person who sees the phantom, because his account of 
the matter is the only one which we can [or do] get" 
(1886d, 301). 7 Myers thought that the state of con- 
sciousness at the time of the experience, of both the 
percipient and the agent, would be important for learning 
about the psychophysiological conditions in which a 
sensory automatism (or subliminal communication) might 
occur. In particular, he tried to classify cases on the 
basis of whether the percipient or the agent was awake, 
asleep, in an altered or trance state, ill, or dying 
(Barrett, Massey, Moses, et al., 1883; Myers, 1884-1885). 
Another important question was the prior relationship 
between the two people (1884-1885). This question 
derived from Myers's belief (which I described in Chapter 
6) that supernormal modes of communication derived from 
some kind of psychological link, or "rapport, " between 
individuals, a link that seemed to be more complex, more 
subtle, or otherwise different from ostensible links of 
affection or intimacy (1884-1885,100,122). 
Another area to examine was the difference in fea- 
tures of morbid (or subjective) and veridical hallucina- 
tions, by making a "complete record" of the phenomena 
associated with them (1890b, 331). Although the 
sporadic, sudden, and so far unpredictable occurrence of 
veridical hallucinations made them difficult to study 
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(Barrett, Massey, Moses, et al., 1883,151), this charac- 
teristic might also prove an important one for distin- 
guishing pathological and veridical hallucinations. 
Pathological hallucinations, Myers noted, seemed more 
persistent than veridical ones did (1884-1885,161). 
They were also more durable and repetitious (Barrett, 
Massey, Moses, et al., 1884c, 175). Furthermore, in 
pathological hallucinations, the figure seen was usually 
a stranger or other unrecognized figure8, whereas in 
veridical cases the apparition was most often recognized 
(Barrett, Massey, Moses, et al., 1884c, 176). 
The hallucinations that Myers believed to be the most 
important to study were undoubtedly the collective ones, 
in which more than one person claimed to have perceived 
the apparition simultaneously. These cases raised in 
particularly acute form the problem of the subjectivity 
versus the objectivity of the hallucination (1890a). 
They also complicated the task of finding an adequate 
explanation for the generation and nature of hallucina- 
tions (see especially 1886d; 1886f; 1890b; 1898a). It 
was over the interpretaton of collective hallucinations 
that Myers parted company somewhat with his colleagues 
Gurney and Frank Podmore, who believed that all veridical 
hallucinations should provisionally be explained as the 
result of a telepathic impression from the agent to the 
percipient. On this hypothesis, collective hallucina- 
tions, had to be the result of a further telepathic 
transfer from the primary percipient to bystanders. 
Myers disagreed and believed that collective hallucina- 
tions suggested that the mechanism was some more general 
mode of perceptivity of which telepathy was only one 
kind. 
Myers's hypothesis of veridical hallucinations, which 
he called a hypothesis of "phantasmogenetic efficacy, " 
contained two major elements. First, he believed that 
veridical cases could be explained better, not as a one- 
way transfer of information from one person to another, 
but as a reciprocal interaction set in motion by the 
"rapport" or psychological link9 between the two people. 
Second, his hypothesis was not solely a "mental" one, but 
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was a psychophysical one in that it was also spatial. 
Myers hypothesized that the psychological "rapport" 
between two people somehow drew subliminal elements of 
the agent's personality to the spatial location of the 
(or one of the) percipients, where those subliminal ele- 
ments then somehow "modif[ied]... an actual point in 
space" -- not in a material way perceptible to ordinary 
senses, but nonetheless in some manner sufficient to 
stimulate perception by subliminal elements of the per- 
cipients' minds (1898a, 323-324). His hypothesis was, in 
short, a spatial one without being a sensory one: "The 
conception of a phantasmogenetic centre, then, involves 
something which transcends the special forms of the 
senses, but which does not transcend or nullify space" 
(1898a, 325). Because there are many natural phenomena 
that our senses cannot directly detect, there may also be 
"some intermediate view" reconciling the objective and 
the subjective ways of conceiving apparitions (1886d, 
290,314). The study of hallucinations, and particularly 
collective ones, was important because it inescapably 
confronted psychologists with "this perplexing problem of 
the relation of psychical operations to space, " and 
Myers's hypothesis of phantasmogenetic agency was an 
effort toward that intermediate view (1886d, 314,302). 
Experimental Studies 
The ultimate goal of every science is to predict or 
even produce relevant phenomena. As I mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, Myers emphasized that the development of 
experimental methods suitable to its own special problems 
was the main task facing scientific psychology. 10 
Psychology, he said, was just entering the early experi- 
mental stage, in which phenomena are produced empirically 
rather than scientifically -- that is, with little or no 
understanding of how they are produced and not yet with 
"real knowledge of the conditions on which they depend" 
(1892d, 333). He also emphasized that psychological 
experiment must extend our view beyond the limits of our 
conscious, or supraliminal, awareness if it is to do more 
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than further elaborate on "facts already roughly known" 
(1892g, 443). Since subliminal psychological processes, 
however, by definition occur outside our conscious aware- 
ness, bringing them under some sort of experimental 
observation or control presents a major challenge to 
psychologists. 
Myers identified three kinds of experimental methods 
that he thought would be of importance to psychologists 
if they wished to study in depth -- and experimentally -- 
the nature and extent of mental processes. These three 
classes of methods were hypnotism or mesmerism; experi- 
mental techniques for inducing sensory automatism, such 
as crystal-gazing and shell-hearingll; and experimental 
techniques for inducing motor automatisms, such as 
automatic writing, automatic speech (that is, trance or 
so-called mediumistic states), and table-tilting or other 
unconscious movement of objects. These were the kinds of 
methods uniquely suited to learning more about the nature 
and particularly the extent of mental functioning that 
Myers thought psychologists had to develop if their field 
were to become an autonomous and fully developed science. 
Unfortunately, they were also all methods whose back- 
ground lay in practices long associated with occultism or 
mysticism. Myers argued repeatedly that adopting and 
adapting these methods for scientific use did not neces- 
sarily entail adopting also the doctrines, beliefs, or 
interpretations that had previously accompanied them. As 
the history of hypnotism showed, however, most scientists 
found it difficult to accept the argument that the past 
uses to which an idea has been put should not limit the 
future uses to which it might be put. Thus, most 
psychologists rejected methods such as those suggested by 
Myers because they carried with them, not the blessing of 
the physical sciences, but the curse of occultism. 
Mesmerism/Hypnotism 
Gurney and Myers thought that it was a serious error, 
and "would be a grave retardation of science, " for 
psychologists to assume that hypnosis is simply a 
"curiosity" (Gurney & Myers, 1885,422). Myers believed 
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instead that, although "Mesmer himself was almost a char- 
latan" (1903,1: 157), the method that had developed from 
his discovery had been "the first really intimate, really 
penetrating method of psychological experiment" (1892g, 
444). Hypnotism, Myers thought, could provide a "corner- 
stone of a valid experimental psychology" (Gurney & 
Myers, 1885,422): "This view of hypnotism as above all 
things a method of psychological experiment (rather than 
as a mere physiological curiosity, or as a therapeutic 
agency), pervades all that Mr. Gurney and I have written 
on the subject" (1885d, 641n). The true psychological 
interest of hypnotism lies in its potential as "an expe- 
rimental method of reaching the subliminal self" (1891b, 
83). Since the goal of psychological science is, Myers 
thought, to extend our ordinary view of consciousness 
just as physical science extends our ordinary view of 
matter, the true value of hypnotism lies in its use as a 
"means of artificial displacements of the psycho-physical 
threshold": 
It lies in the fact that here is a psychical experi- 
ment on a larger scale than was ever possible 
before; that we have at length got hold of a handle 
which turns the mechanism of our being; that we have 
found a mode of shifting the threshold of conscious- 
ness...; that we have induced a change of per- 
sonality which is not per se either evolutive or 
dissolutive, but seems a mere allotropic modifica- 
tion of the very elements of man.... The hypnotic 
trance is an eclipse of the normal consciousness 
which can be repeated at will. (1886b, xlii-xliii) 
As a psychological method, however, hypnosis was in 
its infancy. Thus far it had been used primarily in 
clinical therapy, but the question of the 
psychophysiological processes involved remained "quite 
unsolved, " and its psychological (or theoretical) 
implications remained unexamined (1903,1: 22-23). The 
history of mesmerism and hypnotism had been a "confused 
and disjointed" one, with work not being adequately 
pursued or followed up on by successors (1903,1: 158). 
There had been no more than "a mere beginning in some few 
of the many directions" necessary to take to establish 
both the potential and the limits of suggestion; and "if 
some of [the] phenomena have seldom been repeated since 
320 
the burst of novel interest when they were first 
observed, this by no means proves that they may not again 
recur if sufficiently sought for" (1903,1: 159). All of 
this, Myers thought, could explain the paradoxical con- 
trast between the apparent potency of the hypnotic state 
and "the absurd ends" to which that power was so fre- 
quently put: The subliminal consciousness contained many 
latent abilities or capacities, only a very small frac- 
tion of which had begun to come under our supraliminal 
ability to elicit or control (1903,1: 158). 
Hypnosis had also, Myers believed, too often been 
regarded from the perspective of the psychological func- 
tions lost rather than of those gained: "The prime value 
of the hypnotic trance lies not in what it inhibits, but 
in what it reveals; not in the occlusion of the avenues 
of peripheral stimulus, but in the emergence of unnoted 
sensibilities" (1886b, xliii). Cases of spontaneous som- 
nambulism or personality changes had provided the first 
indications of such phenomena as hyperaesthesia or 
anaesthesia (although these first indications had long 
been ignored as "mere curiosities" -- an observation that 
led Myers to warn psychologists to take their spontaneous 
anomalies, or "residual phenomena, " more seriously 
[1892g, 444]). Hypnosis with hysterics and other sub- 
jects had provided similar examples of increased sub- 
liminal control over organic or psychophysical processes. 
And the older mesmeric literature suggested that hypnosis 
might occasionally induce supernormal modes of percep- 
tion. Finally, cases such as that of Ansel Bourne, in 
which William James and Richard Hodgson were able to 
resuscitate his secondary personality, A. J. Brown, with 
hypnosis (Hodgson, 1891), provided evidence of an 
underlying continuity to what otherwise appeared to be 
isolated, alternating selves. It was in directions such 
as these that Myers thought psychological experiments 
with hypnosis should go. 
The importance of hypnosis as a psychological method, 
in short, was that with hypnosis, Myers thought, an expe- 
rimenter could reproduce by artifice many abnormal 
spontaneous phenomena that provided evidence of the work- 
321 
ings of subliminal consciousness. The first step there- 
fore was to see the relationship between hypnosis and 
other psychological phenomena -- "to bring these isolated 
phenomena of hypnotism into line with a number of other 
facts of human life" (1893c, 98). The oft-noted 
similarities between hypnosis and sleep, and between hyp- 
nosis and hysteria, provided a hint as to this relation- 
ship (1898b). Psychologically speaking, all were dif- 
ferent forms of the abeyance of supraliminal functioning 
and the release of aspects of subliminal functioning. 
Like other types of subliminal functioning, hypnosis 
seemed important to Myers for two main reasons: First, 
it could provide new knowledge about latent capacities of 
subliminal consciousness. Second, it could provide new 
knowledge about the relationship of different aspects of 
consciousness to each other and, thus, lead to further 
insight on the problem of whether mind is a unity or a 
multiplicity. In much of the rest of this section, I 
will describe how Myers believed the study of hypnosis 
might increase knowledge both about the extent of mental 
functioning and about the nature of 
mind. 
Hypnosis and Latent Capacities of Mind: As Myers often 
noted, hypnosis (like sleep and hysteria) was not simply 
the inhibition of certain processes, but it was also the 
stimulus for others (1903,1: 173). Perhaps one of the 
most striking characteristics of hypnosis was the sub- 
liminal control over certain physiological and 
psychophysiological processes that could be elicited in 
good hypnotic subjects. Localized or general anaesthesia 
had been observed in numerous hysterical patients, and 
French physicians at the Salpetriere in particular had 
found that hypnotic suggestion could remove these 
hysterical anaesthesias. In contrast, Esdaile, Elliot- 
son, and others had used hypnosis to induce anaesthesia. 
They had reported (e. g., Esdaile, 1853) numerous serious 
surgical procedures on patients who had been hypnotized 
and who, to all appearances, had felt no pain whatever. 
The discovery of chemical anaesthetics soon made the 
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surgical use of hypnosis unnecessary, but the effect 
remained totally unexplained: As Myers put it, the hyp- 
notist's "command, 'Feel pain no more! ' is no more a 
scientific instruction how not to feel pain than the 
prophet's 'Wash in Jordan and be clean! ' was a 
pharmacopoeal prescription for leprosy" (1892d, 331-332). 
Myers, Gurney, and their colleagues on the SPR's Com- 
mittee on Mesmerism recognized the importance of these 
phenomena not only for therapeutics but also for an 
understanding of the interaction of physical and mental 
processes; and so they urged -- and conducted -- experi- 
ments on producing both analgesia and anaesthesia in hyp- 
notized subjects. They found that they could produce 
both generalized anaesthesia (over the whole body) or 
anaesthesia confined to a specific part of the body 
(chosen by the experimenters), such that "pinching, 
pricking, burning, or strong electric shocks might be 
applied without producing the slightest protest or sign 
of pain" (Barrett, Gurney, Myers, et al., 1883a, 227)12. 
They also found that occasionally analgesia would be pro- 
duced, while the sense of touch remained (Barrett, 
Gurney, Myers, et al., 1883a, 228), and this phenomenon 
suggested to Myers the operation, not just of physiologi- 
cal processes, but of a subliminal intelligence or mind 
that could separate the sense of pain and the sense of 
touch: Just as the subliminal consciousness could dif- 
ferentiate and then control the specific nerves of 
physiological processes controlling sensation in, say, a 
localized patch on the arm, so the subliminal conscious- 
ness could differentiate the physiological elements 
involved in the sense of touch from those involved in the 
sense of pain (1891a, 170). 
Some hypnotized subjects seemed able to exercise sub- 
liminal control over other physiological processes as 
well: "It is a striking characteristic of the hypnotic 
self that it can exercise over the nervous, the vaso- 
motor, the circulatory systems a degree of control 
unparalleled in waking life" (1892c, 308). Suggested 
anaesthesia of a limb was often accompanied by rigidity 
of the limb (reminiscent of the contracture of limbs 
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observed in many hysteric patients). Yet the rigid limb 
could often be held "for an indefinite time in a state of 
painless contracture, and with no disturbance of pulse or 
respiration" (ibid. ). Myers, Gurney, and their col- 
leagues reported the case of one subject whose eyes could 
be made less sensitive to light, such that when a lighted 
candle was brought close to them, there was little blink- 
ing reflex and lessened contraction of the pupils (Bar- 
rett, Gurney, Myers, et al., 1883a, 228). Myers briefly 
reviewed experiments of French and other researchers who 
had been successful with hypnotic suggestion in increas- 
ing and decreasing body temperature, slowing the pulse, 
arresting and restoring secretions, and inducing edema 
and swelling (1892d, 336-337). Perhaps recalling cases 
in which people had dreams that suggested they may have 
been subliminally aware of their own internal organic 
condition (see, e. g., 1895i, 427-429), Myers also sug- 
gested hypnotic experiments "to see how far the viscera 
could take up, so to say, a suggestion to feel the action 
of a drug of whose nature the subject himself was not 
aware" (1887c, 538). 
Other, more subjective physiological effects could be 
produced, such as convincing a hypnotized subject to eat 
a candle, thinking it was cake; to eat salt, thinking it 
was sugar, and to reject sugar, thinking it was cayenne 
pepper; or to drink vinegar, thinking it was cream (Bar- 
rett, Gurney, Myers, et al., 1883a, 222-223). Rather 
more objective effects were produced when the experi- 
menters blew white pepper up the subject's nostrils, 
telling him that it was instead a flower; the subject did 
not sneeze, nor did his eyes water "to any appreciable 
extent" (ibid. ) In contrast, when he was given salt and 
told that it was snuff, he "sneezed violently, with the 
characteristic spasm" (ibid. ). Similarly, Liebeault and 
Liegeois convinced a subject that a bottle of ammonia was 
in fact cologne, and she smelled it with no adverse reac- 
tion (1888c, 384). 
Among the most interesting studies were those in 
which hypnotic suggestion resulted in effects similar to 
the spontaneous stigmata cases. By hypnotic suggestion 
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to the hysterical patient Louis V., French physicians had 
been successful in producing nose-bleeding and redness 
and bleeding along lines traced on his arm (1886e, 166- 
167). Beaunis and Liebeault had similarly produced marks 
on the skin of one hypnotized subject; Myers and Gurney 
observed some of these effects (1886e, 167n-168n). Char- 
cot, Bernheim, and other scientists had also reported the 
hypnotic production (or cessation) of redness, swelling, 
suppurating blisters, or bleeding of the skin and 
nosebleeding (1892d, 337-338; see also 1903,1: 187-188, 
490-499). Some researchers had produced even more 
specific effects, such as the marks of a cross on the 
skin (1892d, 339-344). 
Notwithstanding such reports, Maudsley for one 
apparently thought that there had been no reliable obser- 
vations of this sort (as reported by Myers, 1886e, 169n- 
170n). In contrast, only a few years later, Wundt did 
admit that such effects had occasionally been produced, 
but attributed them to "the purely physiological effect 
of suggestion,... in general easily explicable... by the 
known vaso-motor and secretory functions of the nerves" 
(translated and quoted by Myers, 1893c, 98). Myers, 
however, recognized that such psychophysiological effects 
had in no way been explained (much less "easily"). Like 
the hypnotic production of anaesthesia or analgesia, the 
hypnotic production of bleeding and blistering was no 
better understood than "the prophet's 'Wash in Jordan and 
be clean! "' Myers suggested that this subliminal control 
of physiological processes might be related to the 
regenerative capacities of some lower biological 
organisms (such as those that can reproduce lost parts). 
These capacities may have been lost in more highly 
evolved animals: "In man and the higher animals an 
increase in the power of modifying the action of the 
organism as a whole has apparently been purchased by a 
decrease in the power of modifying its internal parts or 
constituent elements" (1892d, 345-347). Nevertheless, 
the "comparative fixity of the organism of the higher 
mammalia ... [may be] more apparent 
than real, " and under 
conditions such as hypnosis the subliminal operation of 
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these processes may be revived to some extent (ibid. ). 
Whatever the explanation, however, clearly much more 
experimentation and research was mandatory before any 
real understanding of the phenomena could be claimed. 
Another psychophysiological phenomenon equally 
unexplained -- and of particular interest to Myers -- was 
the effect of hypnotic suggestion on perception, espe- 
cially the production of positive hallucinations (to per- 
ceive some object that was not there) and the so-called 
negative hallucinations (not to perceive some object that 
was present) (Barrett, Gurney, Hodgson, et al., 1883,22- 
23; Myers, 1888c, 383-385; Myers, 1892g, 445-449; 1903, 
1: 188-191). Myers considered this not only "one of the 
commonest phenomena of hypnotism, " but also "one of the 
most striking of all our indications of latent faculty" 
(1898b, 105). Although the phenomenon was commonly 
attributed to suggestion -- "a mere example of the sub- 
ject's obedience to the hypnotiser" -- it involved more 
than the subject's compliant use of a familiar faculty: 
"For under ordinary circumstances my subject simply can 
not see a tiger at will; nor can I affect the visual 
centres which might enable him to do so" (1903,1: 233). 
The study of experimentally induced hallucinations was 
clearly also, Myers believed, "an important prerequisite" 
for understanding the spontaneous veridical cases of 
apparitions (1892c, 319-320). 
Members of the SPR -- especially Gurney, Henry and 
Eleanor Sidgwick, and Myers himself -- thus conducted "a 
long series of experiments, " beginning in 1883, on the 
induction of hypnotic and post-hypnotic hallucinations, 
positive as well as negative (1892g, 445). In one series 
of experiments, for example, conducted in March 1891 and 
reported to the International Congress of Experimental 
Psychology in August 1892 (Myers, 1892g, 459-465; 
Sidgwick & Myers, 1892), Myers raised, and began to 
examine, several research questions. He gave suggestions 
to a hypnotized subject to see (when he awoke) a particu- 
lar object, but "without detail in order to see how his 
mind developed the idea" (1892g, 459-460). In one case, 
the hallucination seemed to have been "founded upon a 
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mental picture suggested by my words, rather than on the 
words themselves, " since Myers had suggested that the 
subject see a hippopotamus but the subject apparently saw 
instead a rhinoceros (1892g, 460). 13 
Myers also conducted some experiments to observe the 
interactions of two hypnotized subjects to whom he had 
suggested that, when awakened, they would see a scene in 
a glass of water "arranged as a speculum" -- but the 
scene suggested was different for each subject. The pur- 
pose was to see whether, while describing their different 
perceptions, either could "persuade the other to accept 
his version of what was going on" (which they did not) 
(1892g, 460-461). These experiments were pertinent to 
the question of collective hallucinations and the extent 
to which one person might influence others to see some- 
thing they otherwise would not or could not see. The 
question was particularly important when considering 
whether collective hallucinations could be explained as 
suggestion from the primary percipient to bystanders or 
whether they should be considered the result of some 
stimulus that had affected each of the percipients indi- 
vidually. 
Myers was also interested in the question of "the 
duration, intensity, and optical behaviour of the hal- 
lucinations thus induced" (1892g, 446). Hypnotists of 
the Nancy school thought that hallucinations were purely 
psychological and that the subject would see, for exam- 
ple, a magnified image when told that a plain glass was 
really a magnifying glass. According to Myers, this 
hypothesis was supported by some cases (1892g, 447). 
Researchers of the Salpetriere school, in contrast, 
thought that hallucinations were focused around a point 
de repere and that as a result the hallucination would 
follow normal optical laws, depending on how the point de 
repere was affected; and this hypothesis too had cases to 
support it. Lombroso claimed to have found an even more 
unususal effect: 
He holds that he has produced by suggestion hal- 
lucinatory images of the solar spectrum, which have 
then been modified correctly by looking through a 
glass of some given (hallucinatory) colour. The 
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images have thus, he thinks, followed optical laws 
unknown to the subject, and not suggested by the 
operator. (Myers, 1892g, 447) 
Myers's view was that all these hypotheses might be cor- 
rect, but that there was a more general psychological, or 
volitional, principle at work behind all the relevant 
phenomena: The hallucination could behave either opti- 
cally or psychologically, or both, using whatever means 
were necessary "to induce and maintain" the suggested 
idea. An hallucination was, he believed, "no simple, 
isolated phenomenon. Rather it is an intelligent adapta- 
tion of means to ends" (1892g, 448). Once again, Myers's 
hypothesis was an attempt to suggest a broader theoreti- 
cal understanding that could accommodate evidence 
apparently supporting two opposing hypotheses. 
The study of the enhancement of psychological 
processes under hypnosis also seemed a promising line of 
research. Experiments in post-hypnotic suggestion by 
Gurney, Delboeuf, and Bramwell showed that some level of 
subliminal consciousness could conduct complicated arith- 
metical calculations or keep track of a specific lapse of 
time (1903,1: 502-510). Such experiments promised fur- 
ther understanding of such spontaneous phenomena as 
arithmetical prodigies or claims of some people that they 
could awaken themselves at pre-determined times (1898b, 
104; Sidgwick & Myers, 1892,605-607). Another well- 
known effect of hypnosis was the subject's heightened 
powers of dramatization or mimicry, the study of which, 
Myers thought, could aid in the understanding of 
creativity and genius (Barrett, Gurney, Myers, et al., 
1883a, 223; Myers, 1898b, 104-105; Myers, 1903,1: 510- 
511). The ability to mimic another person's handwriting 
also seemed important to study. According to Myers, "a 
hypnotised subject can frequently imitate any known hand- 
writing far more closely than in his waking state" 
(1893e, 107; see also 1887b, 236,251-252). Such hyp- 
notic phenomena of mimicry were relevant to evaluating 
claims that an entranced medium or automatist had exhib- 
ited the character or even handwriting of a deceased per- 
son. 
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The study of the enhancement of perceptual function- 
ing in the hypnotic state was clearly, in Myers's view, 
the area of research with the most far-reaching potential 
for bringing new knowledge about psychophysiological 
processes. In Myers's view, normal sensory perception, 
hyperaesthesia, heteraesthesia, and telaesthesia or 
telepathy -- all developments from the primitive general 
panaesthesia -- were on a perceptual continuum with no 
fixed or rigid boundary separating the one from the 
other. One form shaded gradually into another, and 
attributing a perception to one of them required knowl- 
edge of the limits or possibility of the others. Hyp- 
notic hyperaesthesia, or the enhancement of the normal 
five senses, seemed particularly well established; Berg- 
son's case of a boy who could, while hypnotized, identify 
objects reflected in the corneas of the experimenter's 
eyes was just one example (Myers, 1887c; Myers, 1903, 
1: 477-479). Myers and his colleagues reported their own 
experiments in which a hypnotized subject could detect 
the hypnotist's whisper even when obscured by other, loud 
noises (Barrett, Gurney, Myers, et al., 1883b, 255-256; 
Myers, 1887c, 538). The line between hyperaesthesia and 
telepathy or telaesthesia, however, was a difficult one 
to draw, as illustrated by the case of a hypnotized girl 
who was given the suggestion to see, when she awakened, a 
portrait on the back of a playing card (the king of 
clubs). The girl could then pick out the king of clubs 
from the deck, presumably by the hyperaesthetic recogni- 
tion of a slight mark or other point de regere on the 
card. She also, however, recognized another king of 
clubs in a different deck, placed face downwards on the 
table. Whether she was able to see through the card 
hyperaesthetically, or whether her perception of it 
derived from some other, nonsensory perceptual capacity, 
was an unanswered question (1887c, 536-537). Myers espe- 
cially warned against letting the hypothesis of sensory 
hyperaesthesia become "almost magical14, " as in the sug- 
gestion that subjects hypnotized at a distance had 
actually heard "the changed sound accompanying the hyp- 
notiser's quickened circulation" (1887c, 535). 
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The phenomenon known as "transposition of senses" was 
also difficult to interpret and called, Myers thought, 
for further experimentation. The early mesmerists (and 
at least one researcher contemporary with Myers, Profes- 
sor Fontan) had claimed that some hypnotized subjects 
could detect with one sensory organ stimuli ordinarily 
detectable only by another. In so-called dermo-optic 
perception, for example, a subject might "read" with his 
fingers. Some people interpreted this phenomenon as a 
clairvoyant one; but the possibility of suggestion or of 
hyperaesthesia had not been eliminated, and Myers once 
again urged renewed experimentation (1888e; 1903,1: 500- 
502). 
A similar problem of distinguishing telepathy and 
hyperaesthesia arose in a series of experiments carried 
out by Gurney (and later by Eleanor Sidgwick). A hyp- 
notized subject was placed such that his hands were con- 
cealed from his sight; the hypnotist then attempted to 
induce rigidity and anaesthesia in two of the subject's 
fingers by pointing at them (Barrett, Gurney, Myers, et 
al., 1883b, 257-260). Attempts were made to rule out 
hyperaesthesia, such as by having another person (not the 
hypnotist) point to a "control finger" simultaneously, or 
by placing a plate of glass between the subject's and 
hypnotist's hands (for a summary, see 1903,1: 533-539); 
but the possibility of hyperaesthesia nevertheless 
remained as long as the hypnotist was physically near the 
subject, and Myers urged experiments in which the hyp- 
notist was some distance away (Myers, 1886e, 174-175). 
The transition from hyperaesthesia to heteraesthesia 
-- or sensory perception of an apparently novel kind, as 
in dowsing or the alleged detection of metals or magnetic 
fields -- was also not a clear one; nor was the transi- 
tion from heteraesthesia to telepathy, telaesthesia, or 
other supernormal perception (1903,1: 185-187). The 
early mesmerists had believed that their effects were 
produced by some novel kind of physical influence that 
the mesmerist had on the subjects. Esdaile reported 
exeriments in which he had "mesmerized" water, which, 
when given to a patient in such a way so as not "to 
330 
excite suspicion or expectation, " had put the patient 
into a mesmeric trance. To lessen the possibility of 
suggestion, Esdaile had counted only the results of the 
first such trials with each patient; nevertheless, "a 
very large proportion" of his subjects were entranced 
(Gurney & Myers, 1885,409). Assuming that the pos- 
sibility of suggestion had been adequately eliminated, 
one could conjecture that these effects could have 
derived from the subjects' perception of physical changes 
in the mesmerized water (or heteraesthesia), as Esdaile 
believed; or they could also have resulted from a 
telepathic, or "silent willing, " influence from Esdaile 
himself to the subjects (or some supernormal mode of per- 
ception), as Gurney and Myers alternatively suggested 
(Gurney & Myers, 1885,409n). 
Gurney, Myers, and their colleagues attempted an 
interesting variation on Esdaile's experiments. An 
object was "mesmerized"15 by one experimenter and placed 
among some other objects. (In the first two trials, the 
object -- a cardboard box or a pocket-book -- was placed 
among dissimilar objects; in the rest of the trials, a 
"mesmerized" book was placed among nine other identical 
volumes. ) The first experimenter then left the room, 
and the subject was brought in to attempt to pick out the 
"mesmerized" object. The chances of the subject's 
detecting temperature changes in the target object were 
reduced by using non-metallic objects and either by hand- 
ling all the objects or by not allowing the mesmerist to 
touch the mesmerized object. An additional precaution 
was not to allow anyone who knew the identity of the 
target object to be in the room while the subject was 
selecting the target. In these conditions, the subject 
succeeded in seven consecutive trials. The experimenters 
calculated that the odds of this being done by chance 
were ten million to one (Barrett, Gurney, Myers, et al., 
1883b, 260-262). 
Such experiments shaded into others in which the 
hypothesis of telepathy or some other supernormal mode of 
perception clearly had to be considered. Myers believed 
that hypnosis, as the experimental means of reaching sub- 
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liminal levels of consciousness, was thus also a means of 
occasionally eliciting latent subliminal faculties in the 
"ultraviolet" end of the spectrum of consciousness. 
There were several lines of research he thought particu- 
larly important to pursue. One of these was in "silent 
willing. " In these experiments, one person would try to 
influence the actions of another solely through silent 
commands. The psychical researchers had long recognized 
that most such reported instances involved nothing "more 
than an unconscious reading of slight muscular hints" 
(Gurney & Myers, 1885,416). 16 For this reason, experi- 
ments in "silent willing" should involve "neither contact 
nor movement" (Gurney & Myers, 1885,417n). The psychi- 
cal researchers reported numerous successful trials in 
silent willing (although the close proximity of the hyp- 
notist to the subject in most of these left open the pos- 
sibility that "contact" and "movement" in a broader sense 
had not yet been totally eliminated (Barrett, Gurney, 
Hodgson, et al., 1883; Barrett, Gurney, Myers, et al., 
1883b). 
Myers and his colleagues also attempted experiments 
in what they called "community of sensation. " In these 
experiments, a sensation (usually of touch or taste) 
would be given to the hypnotist, and the reactions of the 
hypnotized subject would be observed (or asked for). 
Such experiments had been conducted, apparently success- 
fully, by Esdaile, Elliotson, and other mesmerists (see, 
e. g., Barrett, Gurney, Hodgson, et al., 1883,20-23; 
Gurney, Myers, & Podmore, 1886,2: 324-329). Similarly, 
the SPR researchers seemed to obtain successful results 
(Barrett, Gurney, Hodgson, et al., 1883,17-19; Barrett, 
Gurney, Myers, et al., 1883a, 224-227). 
A variation on these community of sensation experi- 
ments were some experiments reported by the Salpetriere 
physician, Babinski, and repeated for Myers, Gurney, and 
A. T. Myers on one of their visits to Paris (Myers, 
1886h, 443-450). In these experiments Babinski hyp- 
notized two of his hysterical patients and attempted to 
transfer from one patient to the other, by the use of 
magnets, hysterical symptoms (including paralysis, con- 
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tracture, and mutism). Myers did not believe that sug- 
gestion had been adequately ruled out of Babinski's expe- 
riments, but he urged that they be repeated with some 
precautionary measures that he suggested to be added 
(1886h, 448-449; 1893e, 27). 
In 1889 Myers reported to the First International 
Congress of Experimental Psychology the results of some 
experiments that he and other members of the SPR had 
carried out. The subject was hypnotized and then 
(usually) separated from the experimenter by a screen. A 
two-digit number was randomly drawn from a bag, the expe- 
rimenter concentrated on it, and the subject was asked 
what it was. Over "a very long series of experiments, " 
the results were "vastly greater" than chance (A. T. 
Myers, 1889,181-182; Myers, 1903,1: 547-548). At the 
same meeting, Richet reported that he had succeeded in 
replicating the results; Delboeuf reported that he had 
not (A. T. Myers, 1889,182). 
Mesmerists and hypnotists had often reported apparent 
success in inducing supernormal perception in subjects 
(for examples, see 1903,1: 543-546,553-559). Myers and 
other members of the SPR therefore conducted some experi- 
ments in which the hypnotist would attempt to transfer to 
a hypnotized subject the vision of a scene, rather than a 
number. Many trials were successful (e. g., 1892g, 463- 
465; 1903,1: 550-553). In a series conducted by an expe- 
rimenter in Sweden, which Myers witnessed, the hypnotized 
subject was given a folded letter and asked to describe 
the impressions she received simply from handling it. 
Myers considered two out of four such attempts to be "at 
least partial successes, " although the results were 
necessarily less unambiguous than with simple targets 
(1892b). 
The effects of distance on the apparent supernormal 
transference of ideas from one person to another are of 
course crucial to take into account when evaluating pos- 
sible explanations -- normal and supernormal -- for the 
phenomena. Myers thus considered some experiments by 
Janet and his colleague Gibert to be among the most 
important kind yet attempted (Janet, 1886/1968a, 
333 
1886/1968b; Myers, 1886e, 127-137). (I briefly described 
these experiments in Chapter 4. ) In 25 trials (for some 
of which Myers and his brother Dr. A. T. Myers were pre- 
sent), Janet or Gibert attempted to put their subject 
Madame B. (Leonie) to sleep from a distance varying 
between one-quarter and one mile. (Occasionally an addi- 
tional action was also suggested. ) In 19 out of 25 tri- 
als, they succeeded, and their apparent success led Myers 
to urge not only that these experiments be continued, but 
also that experiments in the distant influence of a sub- 
ject's physiological state (such as vasomotor, cir- 
culatory, or respiratory systems) be attempted (1893e, 
31-32). 
To Myers, experiments at the Salpetriere such as 
these, and such as Babinski's transference of hysterical 
symptoms from one patient to another, were "a gain to our 
[telepathic] researches of a most important kind. " He 
added that "the physicians of the Salpetriere are not 
likely to drop the inquiry; and we may hope that the 
experiments... are but the first instalment of what they 
may yet achieve" (1886h, 450). Unfortunately, as I 
explained in Chapter 4, Janet and his colleagues did soon 
drop this line of research entirely. 
Hypnosis and the Nature of Mind: In addition to new 
knowledge about latent capacities of subliminal con- 
sciousness, Myers believed that the study of hypnosis 
would lead to new knowledge about the nature of mind. As 
I explained in the last chapter, Myers thought that, 
although the new scientific study of mind was leading to 
a view of it as an aggregate of parts that could be frag- 
mented, when pushed even further experimental psychology 
would show that there is an underlying unity to mind. 
Studies with hypnosis would, he hoped, contribute impor- 
tantly to this expanded view of mind. Recent psychologi- 
cal observations had reinforced dramatically the aware- 
ness that our supraliminal mind and memory are "imperfect 
and interrupted in a high degree, " but hypnotic experi- 
ments in particular were also beginning, he believed, to 
show that our subliminal memory and consciousness are 
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"actually in some sense more continuous than the primary 
[supraliminal]" (1892c, 303). I repeat his statement 
that 
We all know that the hypnotised subject as a rule 
remembers waking life, but that the awakened subject 
as a rule has wholly forgotten the events of his 
hypnotic trance. The full significance of this 
fact. . . has hardly yet, I think, been realised in any 
quarter. (1892c, 303) 
Hypnosis was to Myers primarily a means of eliciting 
subliminal psychological elements and levels of the indi- 
viduality. Once elicited, these subliminal elements 
began to form new memory chains -- that is, memories 
became grouped together in such a way as to form a new 
personality once the grouping became sufficiently com- 
plex, and the new personality or grouping of memories was 
what re-emerged when the state of hypnosis was re-evoked. 
Myers considered "this formation of a secondary chain of 
memory" to be even more fundamental to the nature of hyp- 
nosis "than the susceptibility to suggestion" emphasized 
by most of his contemporaries (1888c, 387). Furthermore, 
"the central indication of a change of hypnotic state 
will be a change of the scope of memory, " not somatic 
changes, as the Salpetriere scientists believed (1888c, 
388). The most important problem of hypnosis, therefore, 
was the relation of the different memory chains or per- 
sonalities (1888c, 376; 1888f, 368). And the first and 
(with Janet's) most important work in this area was that 
of Gurney, which remained little known or appreciated 
despite its having "practically opened up in England a 
whole department of experimental psychology" (1888f, 
368). By studying the content and persistence of 
memories in different hypnotic states, Gurney had begun 
to show not only that the hypnotic states have and main- 
tain distinct memory groupings, but also that they thus 
in some sense persist and continue to operate even when 
not overt (1888c, 377). 
Myers also thought that the study of memory in hyp- 
nosis was important for addressing the question of 
whether sensations or memories that disappear because of 
a hypnotic suggestion (or in hysteria) are in fact lost 
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or are simply submerged: 
The problem thus suggested is one of wide-ranging 
importance... [because it] ultimately involves the 
question of the relation of our assumed underlying 
individuality to the various personalities through 
which it finds partial and temporary expression. 
(1892c, 324) 
He hypothesized that such sensations or memories were not 
abolished, but were transferred to or registered by 
another strata of consciousness, from which they could 
potentially be re-evoked by changes of consciousness such 
as hypnosis (1888c, 385,393): 
Thus, in a word, nothing which my organism does or 
suffers is unconscious, but the consciousness of any 
given act or endurance may form a part of a chain of 
memories which never happens to obtrude itself into 
my waking life. (1888c, 388) 
A corollary of this -- suggested both by spontaneous mul- 
tiple personality cases and by experiments in hypnotic 
memory -- was that there may be a "state which includes 
the memories of other states, but is not included by 
them. " Myers thought that, because this state is the 
broadest or most inclusive one, it "has a prima facie 
claim to be considered as the profoundest state of the 
[person], though it may not be the state best suited for 
the ordinary business of life" (1888a). 
A related problem that needed to be addressed in 
research was the process by which separate memory chains 
-- and thus personalities -- were formed. Janet, Elliot- 
son, Gurney, and others had noted "how very different, in 
different cases, is the amount of personality which the 
hypnotised subject is able to manifest" (1888c, 390), 
ranging from simple states of mono-ideism to full-blown, 
fully functioning personalities. Myers suggested that 
"the time spent in the hypnotic trance, the experience 
gained therein, " was the crucial factor. Similarly, in 
spontaneous somnambulistic cases, the more time the sec- 
ondary state functioned, the more memories and experience 
it would accrue, and the more it would come to resemble 
the primary state in scope and capacity (1888c, 391-392). 
Again, however, this was a question toward which empiri- 
cal research could and should be directed. 
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The Nature of Hypnosis: One major motivation behind the 
work of Myers and Gurney on hypnosis was their hope of 
moving beyond the controversies over the essential nature 
of hypnosis and arriving at some better, more com- 
prehensive view. As I explained in Chapter 5, the pri- 
mary argument over the nature of hypnosis was whether, as 
the mesmerists argued, it was the result of an unknown 
physical force or effluence passing from the mesmerist to 
the subject; or whether it was, as most late-19th-century 
scientists had come to believe, a change in the subject's 
psychological state brought on by suggestion. Gurney and 
Myers believed strongly that both the mesmeric hypothesis 
and the hypnotic hypothesis had merit, since they both 
seemed to have observations backing them up. On the 
other hand, they also believed that the "effluence" -- 
whatever it was that seemingly emanated from the hyp- 
notist to cause an effect in the subject even when the 
subject was unaware of the attempt -- was probably not a 
new physical force but a psychological one. Likewise 
they thought the suggestion hypothesis was inadequate 
since (as I will discuss further below) suggestion itself 
was unexplained. They thus cautioned against a too- 
thorough abandonment of the old mesmeric hypothesis and 
the too-eager readiness to allow the hypnosis (that is, 
suggestion) hypothesis to become the new dogmatism (see, 
e. g., Gurney & Myers, 1883). They clearly saw the task 
of the SPR as that of attempting to reconcile the two 
positions by bringing data from both sides together 
within a broader perspective -- their usual "tertium 
quid" approach to controversies. As a result, much of 
the experimental work on hypnosis that they undertook -- 
such as the finger anaesthetization studies or the "mes- 
merizing" of target objects -- was intended to re-examine 
the mesmeric hypothesis that had by then fallen into dis- 
favor with most psychologists (e. g., Barrett, Gurney, 
Hodgson, et al., 1883; Barrett, Gurney, Myers, et al., 
1883a, 1883b). 
A point about hypnosis to which Myers returned most 
frequently, however, stemmed from his fear -- justified, 
in the light of what actually happened after the turn of 
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the century -- that the problem of hypnosis would not be 
adequately pursued because of the mistaken perception 
that it had been "explained" as the result of suggestion. 
Suggestion, it was said, produced the effects it did 
because in a "suggestible" person, it led to the suspen- 
sion of the volition or will, to the person's complete 
absorption in some idea, and to the "increased internal 
responsiveness of the organism" (Gurney & Myers, 1883, 
699; 1903, l: xxxv). The "suggestion hypothesis, " 
however, was simply a description of the subject's condi- 
tion, and "not in any way an explanation" of how the con- 
dition was brought about (Gurney & Myers, 1883,699). 
There is obviously a "profound nervous change, " but how 
is it effected? Many people 
use the word suggestion as though this were in 
itself an explanation of the way in which the 
phenomena are produced,... [but] they... seem hardly 
to think it needful or possible to inquire how it 
comes to pass that a sane man's psychical balance is 
capable of being thus suddenly disturbed 
-- and particularly by a method that would seem to have 
"little more efficacy than the mere utterance of a charm" 
(1892c, 300-301). In short, the words "suggestion, " 
"self-suggestion, " and "suggestibility" are "mere names 
which disquise our ignorance" (1903,1: 153). 
Myers believed that all the phenomena of suggestion 
or hypnosis were, in the final analysis, phenomena of 
self-suggestion, set in motion either by external or by 
internal events. Moreover, the phenomena of suggestion 
are fundamentally subliminal processes. In his view, 
therefore, suggestion is a process that activates the 
subliminal consciousness, or at least a portion of it 
(1891a, 170; 1892g, 446; 1903,1: 169). As Myers clearly 
recognized, this definition of suggestion was no more a 
true explanation of it than suggestion was an explanation 
of hypnosis. Nevertheless, he thought that it could help 
advance our understanding -- and direct our empirical 
research -- by clearly making hypnosis and suggestion 
part of a larger problem of psychology, namely, that of 
the activation of subliminal functioning in general 
(1903,1: 169). As both an experimental method for 
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psychology and as a theoretical problem, hypnotic sugges- 
tion should, he thought, be central to psychology: "Any 
psychology which neglects it is superannuated already" 
(1885d, 641). 
Sensory Automatisms 
In addition to hypnosis, the other major experimental 
method pertinent to psychology's problems was, in Myers's 
view, the study of automatisms. As I explained earlier, 
he defined automatisms generally as communication between 
subliminal and supraliminal segments of consciousness; 
and he divided automatisms into two general modes of 
manifestation -- the sensory and the motor. Sensory 
automatisms were those "messages which the subliminal 
self sends up to the supraliminal in sensory form, " espe- 
cially visual or auditory forms, "externalised into 
quasi-percepts" (1903,1: 23,222). Because the study of 
automatisms (both sensory and motor) might reveal much 
about "the extent of subliminal faculty" and thus about 
the nature of mind in general, Myers thought that such 
"sights projected outwards from within us are to the 
psychologist even more interesting than the sights pro- 
jected inwards from without" (1903,1: 24). Myers 
referred approvingly to an article by the psychologist G. 
T. W. Patrick (1898) in which he issued "a strong appeal 
to experimental psychologists to occupy themselves with 
the study of the phenomena of automatisms" (Myers, 1899b, 
382). Patrick had noted that experimental psychologists 
had been reluctant to pursue such topics in the past, 
believing that they would undermine "the dignity" of the 
field; but now, he said, experimental psychology was past 
its probationary period and may quite freely choose 
its subjects for research, and at present there is 
perhaps no other subject promising to throw more 
light upon certain dark chapters in mental science 
than that of automatism. (Patrick, 1898,557) 
As I mentioned in Chapter 6, Myers thought that the 
subliminal consciousness expressed itself in a language 
of its own, a primarily non-verbal language. Moreover, 
the images that emerge from subliminal levels of con- 
sciousness are "other than exact copies of the original 
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impressions, " but often take generalized or symbolic 
forms (1892g, 450,455). Subliminal consciousness may, 
for example, show "that incoherent or accidental associa- 
tion which is the basis of a 'play upon 
words'... frequently observable in dreams" (1892g, 455). 
The study of spontaneous automatisms could begin to 
familiarize psychologists with this subliminal language, 
but, to do so, what was particularly needed for this was 
a method "to systematise such insurgences;... some empiri- 
cal process which will enable us to get at subliminal 
pictures whenever we will" (1892g, 455). Hypnosis was 
one such experimental method; but it did have certain 
disadvantages: What was also wanted was a method that 
would leave the subject in his or her ordinary state of 
consciousness and that would allow the study of the sub- 
ject's mental processes "undisturbed" by suggestion from 
another person (1892g, 449). Myers pointed out that 
throughout history people had been inducing hallucina- 
tions, for divination purposes, with various forms of 
speculum (or crystal) gazing (1892g, 458). The method 
involved simply gazing into a crystal, dark mirror, glass 
of water, or any other clear surface having as little 
reflection as possible. For some people, images would 
eventually appear as vivid hallucinations externalized 
onto the surface. Although long associated with 
occultism and superstition, crystal-gazing was analogous 
to such phenomena of hypnosis as post-hypnotic hallucina- 
tions or the suggestion to see images on blank cards; and 
Myers believed that crystal-gazing, like these, could be 
appropriated from unscientific practices and developed as 
an experimental method in psychology (1892g, 459,465). 
Moreover, since spontaneous hallucinations take the form 
of different sensory modalities, there was no a priori 
reason why experimental ones should not as well, and so 
Myers called attention to the possibility of "shell- 
hearing" or some similar means of inducing auditory hal- 
lucinations (1892g, 492). 17 
The first question to be addressed was who would make 
a good subject. Janet and other physicians of the 
Salpetriere had argued that "automatism... cannot exist in 
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quite normal persons; it must in itself be a sign of 
abnormality, that is to say, of actual or latent dis- 
ease, " a view with which Myers disagreed, given his own 
observations of automatists and the growing evidence that 
a state of hypnosis could be produced in healthy people 
(1892g, 470; Wingfield, 1889). There was, however, a 
need to determine the proportion of normal to hysterical 
subjects susceptible to such hallucinations (1899a, 371), 
just as there was a need to determine the overall propor- 
tion of people who could succeed in crystal vision. 
Myers mentioned that 10 out of about 50 people he knew 
who had tried crystal-gazing had succeeded in inducing 
hallucinations, but he cautioned that that was far too 
few a number and limited a range of people to draw any 
conclusions about the actual incidence (1892g, 472); and 
he thought that the ability would probably not be a com- 
mon one (1903,1: 237). 
Another question, as pertinent to the study of crys- 
tal visions as to the study of hypnotic hallucinations, 
was the relation of such hallucinations to optical 
effects, as opposed to the effects of suggestion (1892g, 
446-449; 1903,1: 239-240); and Myers urged such a study, 
saying "I can imagine no fitter problem for research in a 
psychological laboratory" (1903,1: 240). 
The most important question, however, was the actual 
content of the hallucinations, or messages from the sub- 
liminal consciousness. In general, Myers thought, 
crystal-gazing and shell-hearing seemed more often to 
present subconscious rather than conscious material, and 
in early attempts at sensory automatism, the content 
would often be nothing more than "confused reminiscences" 
(1892g, 483). But as the phenomena developed, the con- 
tent then seemed to break down into three further 
classes. First, there was material that had once been 
known but was forgotten. Second, there was material that 
had been within one's sensory range but had never been 
consciously perceived. Finally (and most rarely), there 
was information about events that seemed never to have 
been within the automatist's sensory range of functioning 
(1892c, 318-319; 1892e, 348). 
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"Miss X. " (Ada Goodrich-Freer) had been the first 
person to report results of some attempts at crystal- 
gazing ([Goodrich-Freer], 1889). Myers followed this up 
with further reports from Miss X. and from some other 
persons known to him (1892g, 473-527; 1903,1: 575-598). 
Outside the SPR, however, there were few such experiments 
to report. Myers noted that Miss X. 's paper had inspired 
Janet to use crystal-gazing with some of his hysterical 
patients, as a means of trying to recover forgotten 
memories and dreams, and he apparently had some success 
with this (1892g, 482-484). Some years later, Myers 
called attention to a paper by Morton Prince, published 
in Brain, in which he reported his study of some hal- 
lucinatory visions of a patient of his who had induced 
these by gazing into an unconnected light bulb (Myers, 
1899a). Prince reported that his patient had become com- 
pletely absorbed in her visions and apparently oblivious 
to her surroundings, but that she seemed not to have 
entered a trance. He also reported that the content of 
her visions was usually of events of which she had never 
been consciously aware, including one attempt she made to 
locate a lost pin. Myers called this the "line of 
inquiry" he most hoped that Prince would pursue. Prince 
unfortunately had not reported whether the pin had 
actually been found at the place seen, nor did he say 
whether he had even made any attempt to verify this or 
any other of his patient's visions; and Myers pointed out 
the extreme importance of doing so (1899a, 370-371). 
In short, Myers believed that such methods as 
crystal-vision and shell-hearing "should become one of 
the habitual and recognised occupations for the 
psychological laboratory. " They would not, however, be 
adequately studied until psychologists had discarded the 
old notion of them as superstitious, occult practices and 
had adopted "the view which I have often suggested: -- 
namely, that these crystal-pictures are experiments in 
the extension and externalisation of inward or central 
[i. e., non-optical] vision. " When they did, he thought 
that the findings might eventually prove "even fuller of 
instruction" for theoretical psychology than external 
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modes of vision (1899a, 371-372). 
Motor Automatisms 
When a subliminal impulse or idea was expressed 
through motor functioning -- that is, "by movement of 
limbs or hand or tongue" (1903,1: 222) -- Myers clas- 
sified it as an active, or motor, automatism; and he con- 
sidered impulses which inhibited activity to be motor 
automatisms as well as those which impelled activity 
(1892c, 324). He identified numerous categories of 
activity as motor automatisms, including general motor 
impulses (such as to go -- or not to go -- somewhere), 
simple or specific impulses (gestures such as table- 
tilting), automatic (or trance) speech, and supernormal 
movements of objects or production of noises 
(telekinesis, now called psychokinesis) (1893e, 39-40). 
Like crystal-vision, most of these motor automatisms were 
ridiculed by scientists as occult or Spiritualistic non- 
sense. As with crystal-vision, however, Myers urged that 
these old associations be dismissed, that the basic meth- 
ods involved be adopted and adapted by psychologists, and 
that the results be viewed not "as authoritative revela- 
tions from the spirit-world, but rather as indications of 
what is going on in ourselves beneath the threshold of 
our ordinary consciousness" (1895c, 30). Myers himself 
was primarily interested in the question of whether the 
content of automatisms ever derived from a source outside 
the automatist's own mind, but most of his early papers 
on automatic writing and other automatisms were devoted 
to demonstrating that "the great majority of such com- 
munications represent the subliminal workings of the 
automatist's mind alone" (1893e, 41). Moreover, "the 
messages thus given do not generally rise above the level 
of an incoherent dream, " although sometimes they would 
provide veridical information (that is, factual and 
verifiable information unknown to the automatist) (1903, 
1: 27). But whatever their source and content, he 
believed that the study of them could yield much knowl- 
edge about the extent and capacities of mental function- 
ing (1893e, 42). 
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Myers believed that automatic writing -- executed 
while the automatist was (usually) in a normal state of 
consciousness, but while his or her attention was con- 
centrated elsewhere than on the writing -- was one of the 
most important methods available to psychologists for 
"throwing light upon the workings of the subconscious 
strata of the mind" (1890d, 671). As a result, he 
devoted several of his earliest papers to this topic 
(1884,1885a, 1885b, 1887b). As I have mentioned ear- 
lier, he believed that all automatisms took the specific 
forms that they did, in particular individuals or on par- 
ticular occasions, because they followed habitual "paths 
of externalisation" in that individual. One would expect 
therefore that automatisms might frequently take the form 
of writing, since for most people writing is a "deep- 
seated thing": 
It is... well known that in moments of vivid emotion 
the surplus nervous energy escapes in involuntary 
channels, which often bear some traceable connection 
with the habitual modes of thought or action of the 
person concerned.... Now the act of writing being one 
of the commonest of the more complex acquired acts, 
we shall naturally expect that many half-conscious 
or unconscious tricks will be connected with it. 
(1884,222) 
In certain persons, if the attention is sufficiently 
diverted from the writing, the automatic writing may 
develop into more than the simple doodling common to many 
people and attain "a degree of complexity hitherto little 
suspected" (1885a, 248). Because of this degree of com- 
plexity, together with the conviction of the automatist 
that the writing had not been the product of his or her 
own (conscious) mind, many people had come to interpret 
the phenomenon as the product of some external agency 
(usually, deceased persons). A major thesis of Myers's 
papers on automatic writing was that such an interpreta- 
tion was (in most cases) unnecessary, and he also argued 
that much "mischief... is being done to the minds of men 
and women.. . by the unquestioning reception of 
those 
spurious self-generated revelations" as "spirit revela- 
tions" (1885b, 33). 
On the other hand, automatic writing was also not 
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necessarily evidence of psychopathology. As I explained 
in Chapter 6, Myers believed that automatisms could take 
evolutive and dissolutive forms, as well as neutral (or 
"normal") ones. Some automatic writing was pathological 
in origin, but automatic writing was by no means there- 
fore pathological per se: "We must not ticket them as 
hysterical any more than we must ticket them as 
Spiritualistic" (1887b, 216). Myers insisted that the 
psychological mechanism was the same -- that is, that 
automatic writing was the product of the subliminal con- 
sciousness operating during abeyance of operation by the 
supraliminal -- even if the initiating cause of the 
supraliminal's abeyance of operation was different. He 
thus suggested that a comparison of induced automatic 
writing and the writing of neurologically damaged persons 
might increase our knowledge of the role of mental as 
well as physiological states as primary causal factors 
(1885b). 
It was important therefore to distinguish the 
abnormal, normal, and supernormal manifestations of 
automatic writing and not to assume that all instances 
could be subsumed under one category. Abnormal 
manifestations could often be distinguished by the con- 
text in which they occurred, that is, whether the 
automatist's overall physical or mental ill health seemed 
to have been primarily responsible for the phenomena. 
Supernormal manifestations, however, could only be 
determined by the content of the automatisms, that is, 
whether the information conveyed had originated outside 
the automatist's sensory range of functioning (1887b, 
258). For Myers, "the attractiveness of automatic writ- 
ing as a subject for inquiry... largely derived from its 
direct bearing on the relation of consciousness to 
telepathy" (1885b, 28): He believed that telepathy was a 
function of the subliminal consciousness (1885b, 30); 
that automatic writing was a means of revealing contents 
of the subliminal consciousness in a directly verbal (as 
opposed to merely behavioral) manner; and that it thus 
provided a particularly good means of evaluating the con- 
tent of subliminal mentation for any telepathic (or other 
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supernormal) features. 
Myers described the Newnham case of automatic (plan- 
chette) writing as an important example of the kind of 
supernormal results that could be obtained in experiments 
with automatic writing (1885b, 6-23)18. Automatic writ- 
ing could also, however, provide insight into other 
important subliminal processes. Both Janet and Binet had 
successfully used automatic writing with their hysterical 
patients as a means of revealing subconscious memories or 
other mental processes (Myers, 1887b, 239-241; 1889c, 
202-203). The study of automatic writing could also aid 
in examining the process of personality formation and the 
development of secondary personalities. Myers believed 
that any altered state of consciousness could potentially 
lead to the formation of another personality, since there 
seemed to be continuity of memory in the altered state 
between one occasion and the next: 
I believe that whenever there is any habitual 
alteration... of the threshold of consciousness we 
shall find an incipient formation of a secondary 
chain of memories, linking together those periods of 
altered consciousness into a series of their own. 
And when once a second mnemonic chain is woven, the 
emergence of a secondary personality is only a mat- 
ter of degree. For any difference in memory 
involves a certain difference in character. (1887b, 
225) 
The study of automatic writing could also aid in 
understanding the relationship between the primary and 
secondary personalities. Because automatic writing often 
occurred while the subject's waking mind was involved in 
some other task (say, conversing or reading aloud), both 
the waking and the subliminal consciousness seemed to be 
functioning simultaneously, not alternately. In the 
Clelia case (1884,226-231) of Myers's friend Mr. A., for 
example, Mr. A. remained wholly conscious while his hand 
wrote independently of his conscious mind. Mr. A. would 
direct questions to the writing consciousness and receive 
written replies that were, for the most part, coherent, 
but were ultimately nonsensical. This case, therefore, 
was not just "a good instance of the capricious half- 
nonsense which believers in Spiritualism often 
unhesitatingly refer to the agency of spirits" (1884, 
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226); it was, much more importantly, evidence that "the 
unconscious mentation flowed on intercurrently with the 
conscious, " and thus it was evidence of a "kind of active 
duality of mentation -- ... [of a] kind of colloquy 
between a conscious and an unconscious self" (1885b, 25). 
With these hints of what the study of automatic writ- 
ing might do, Myers particularly urged that sustained 
research be undertaken. What was needed, he said, was 
not "fleeting instances" but "a series of experiments of 
a more solid and prolonged order" (1885b, 6). The 
Newnham experiments, he thought, were especially impor- 
tant ones to replicate (1893e, 61). In 1887 some money 
left to the University of Pennsylvania for an investiga- 
tion of Spiritualism had been used to study some profes- 
sional mediums; Myers lamented that this had been a waste 
of resources, since it was already well known that most 
such mediums were easily detectable in fraud and "should 
be given a wide berth. " Instead, he suggested, there 
should be research that could "yield important 
psychological lessons, " namely, sustained studies of 
automatic writing such as the Newnham series, designed to 
examine "the mechanism and the content of automatic mes- 
sages" and how they may differ from (or resemble) the 
mechanisms and content of supraliminal processes (1888d, 
262). 
Although praising their willingness to undertake a 
psychological study of automatic writing, Myers nonethe- 
less also chided Leon Solomons and Gertrude Stein for 
what he considered their truncated (and hence insuffi- 
ciently penetrating) study of automatic writing (1896b, 
318). Because, in their brief attempts at automatic 
writing, they had succeeded in inducing only relatively 
simple phenomena and not complex psychological phenomena 
such as memory or creative processes, they had concluded 
that the secondary personality shows no complex or 
unusual psychological abilities. Myers, however, thought 
that neither a secondary personality nor complex mental 
phenomena would be produced unless the subliminal state 
of consciousness associated with the automatic writing 
had been able to function repeatedly and over an ade- 
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quately long period of time (how long, being a question 
still to be determined by research). Solomons and Stein, 
he pointed out, had produced nothing more than "isolated 
automatisms, " not a secondary personality (1896b). 
In sum, automatic writing was not the source of 
inspired revelation that many Spiritualists had credited 
it with being, but it also, in Myers's opinion, deserved 
far more serious attention than the sneering derision 
with which most savants dismissed it: "I do not wish to 
exaggerate [its] importance.... Automatic writing is not a 
key to all the recesses of our being. But it is a key to 
something" (1887b, 260-261). 
Automatic speech -- such as glossolalia or the so- 
called mediumistic trance utterances -- was a form of 
motor automatism Myers considered comparable to automatic 
writing in potential importance. Like automatic writing, 
vocal automatism provided a means for verbally expressing 
subliminal mentation, although (again like automatic 
writing) much of it, especially in the early stages, was 
gibberish (1885b, 46). Moreover, like automatic writing, 
automatic speech had its pathological counterpart, in 
neurologically caused aphasia (1885a, 238). Automatic 
speech was also primarily associated with occult or 
superstitious practices, such as the speaking in tongues 
of certain religious groups or the trance utterances of 
Spiritualistic mediums-19 Again, however, the only way 
to judge the source of the utterances was to examine 
closely their content for veridical information unknown 
to the automatist; and most of them were, when so evalu- 
ated, "eminently barren of fact" (1889a, 534). One case 
that Myers did not find barren, however, was that of Mrs. 
Piper, the trance automatist studied extensively by Wil- 
liam James and Richard Hodgson. Like James and Hodgson, 
Myers considered some of Mrs. Piper's trance utterances 
to be definitely supernormal, and he thought that the 
development and study of automatists such as Mrs. Piper 
was of paramount importance to psychology (1890c). 
Automatic writing and automatic speech were the most 
useful modes of motor automatism with which to study sub- 
liminal mentation, since they were verbal; but motor 
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automatisms did not always take the most scientifically 
useful form. As Myers said, "it is to writing and speech 
that we look with most interest among the communications 
of the unconscious self. But it does not follow that the 
unconscious self will always have such complex methods at 
its command" (1889a, 529). Sometimes, instead, mere es- 
tures may be all that emerges. Such gestures necessarily 
provided less content for analysis than verbal 
automatisms did, but they could still be of interest to 
psychologists. Muscle-reading, for example, provided 
"another avenue into the unconscious mind" (1885b, 4). 
It had long been recognized that in many presumed 
instances of "mind-reading" (especially whenever there 
had been tactile contact between the two people), the 
percipient had in fact unconsciously "read" minute muscle 
tremors and movements of the agent. This muscle-reading 
was the usual explanation for the then-popular practice 
of one person attempting to locate an object hidden by 
another person (1903,2: 88-89). Even though this 
phenomenon was not an instance of supernormal perception 
such as telepathy or clairvoyance, it was nonetheless of 
potential interest to psychologists as an indication of 
how one person can convey an idea to another person 
without either one of them being conscious of the 
process. 
A somewhat similar phenomenon was that of dowsing. 
For centuries dowsers have claimed to be able to locate 
concealed water, minerals, or objects, simply by the 
movement of a rod or twig that they held. These move- 
ments seemed to be attributable to unconscious muscular 
movements of the dowser; but this phenomenon differed 
significantly from muscle-reading in that the dowser was 
obtaining the information directly from the hidden object 
rather than from another person. Dowsing may be the 
result of hyperaesthesia (heightened normal sensory 
detection of, say, water); of heteraesthesia (an 
unrecognized sensory ability to detect water); or 
telaesthesia (supernormal perception). But whatever the 
mechanism in individual instances, Myers believed that 
the study of dowsing -- including the number and 
kind of 
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successes and failures, as well as the psychophysiologi- 
cal mechanisms associated with them -- could contribute 
to knowledge about subliminal capacities and processes 
(1903,1: 480-481). 
Myers called attention to a more complex, but com- 
pletely non-verbal form of motor automatism that also 
might prove of interest to psychologists. This was the 
phenomenon of automatic drawing or painting, in which the 
automatist executed drawings or paintings with a facil- 
ity, talent, or speed surpassing their ordinary abilities 
(1889a, 533). Again, such motor automatisms, being non- 
verbal, were less readily interpretable as subliminal 
mentation; but, if Myers was correct in conjecturing that 
subliminal communication is primarily non-verbal, then 
the mental processes behind automatic drawing might 
become more apparent as psychologists became more famil- 
iar with the "language" of the subliminal mind. 
Myers also suggested that his model of motor 
automatisms provided "perhaps for the first time... a con- 
ception of the mysterious and much derided phenomenon of 
'table-tilting"' (1889a, 530). In table-tilting "cir- 
cles, " a lightly touched table often began to move, and 
codes for letters of the alphabet were devised so that on 
some occasions messages were spelled out. Such ver- 
balization was obviously more laborious and time- 
consuming than automatic writing or trance speech, but it 
was an example of the same basic phenomenon. As with the 
other forms of motor automatism, witnesses had usually 
attributed these "messages" to "spirits"; and, as with 
other forms of automatism, Myers emphasized that the 
source could only be determined by the content of the 
message -- and seemed usually to be the automatist's own 
subliminal mind. But, again, whether the source seemed 
to be the automatist or some other mind, the phenomena 
produced by table-tilting provided "a curious inlet" into 
subliminal processes (1887a, 130). 
The phenomena of table-tilting seemed to range from 
simple unconscious muscular movements to the genuinely 
supernormal movement of the table. The latter kind of 
phenomena apparently belonged to another category of 
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motor automatisms, namely, telekinetic phenomena. For 
years even before the SPR was founded (in 1882), Myers 
had had hundreds of sittings with persons, often profes- 
sional "mediums, " claiming to be able to produce super- 
normal movement of objects (1895e, 61); and this experi- 
ence had convinced him -- up until about 1890 -- that the 
phenomena produced by most professional mediums could be 
attributed to fraud (1886b, lix; 1888d, 262; 1890d; 
1891c, 146-147; 1895f). In 1891, however, Myers pub- 
lished two papers describing some cases, investigated by 
members of the SPR, in which there seemed to have been 
some supernormal movement of objects in connection with 
persons other than a professional medium (1891c). He 
also began to publish papers expressing his conviction 
that a few rare individuals who were professional mediums 
had in fact on occasion produced genuine telekinetic 
phenomena. One such person was D. D. Home (Barrett & 
Myers, 1889). Another (although he was not a "profes- 
sional" medium in the same sense) was Stainton Moses 
(1893a; 1894b). 
Probably the most controversial such medium, however, 
was Eusapia Palladino. In 1894 Myers had visited his 
friend the French physiologist Charles Richet, at 
Richet's private island (Ile Roubaud), where they (along 
with the physicist Oliver Lodge, the psychologist Julian 
Ochorowicz, and later Henry and Eleanor Sidgwick) had 
conducted a series of sittings with Palladino. Myers was 
convinced that he had witnessed genuinely supernormal 
physical phenomena (1894a; 1895e). In the summer of 
1895, however, Palladino came to Cambridge (where she 
stayed with Myers and his family for 7 weeks) for another 
series of sittings, and this time Myers was equally con- 
vinced that the phenomena on this occasion had been 
fraudulent (1895b; 1895f). Nevertheless, this experience 
also suggested to him that a medium who resorted to fraud 
on one occasion might not be doing so on another occa- 
sion. He remained firm in his judgment that some of the 
"far more striking phenomena which I witnessed in 1894 at 
the Ile Roubaud... [were] inexplicable by the tricks 
observed in Cambridge" (1895b); and in 1898 he partici- 
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pated in another series of sittings with Palladino and 
came away believing that he had again witnessed some 
supernormal phenomena (1899c). 
Even if supernormal, however, no physical phenomenon 
by itself could support the Spiritualistic hypothesis 
that the agency was a deceased spirit. Even if some 
unknown Force X producing the phenomenon "does not pro- 
ceed from the muscles of the sitters, it still by no 
means follows that X proceeds from disembodied spirits"; 
it might instead be some latent capacity of the sitters' 
subliminal minds (1887d, 91). From his earliest papers 
to his posthumous book, Myers emphasized repeatedly that 
it was solely the content, and not the mechanism or mode 
of production, of an automatism that could determine 
whether the source of the automatism was the automatist's 
own subconscious mind or some external agency such as a 
deceased person. If the content of the automatism 
included objective, factual, verified information unknown 
to the automatist, some external agency could be conjec- 
tured; if the content was subjective in nature or lay 
within the probable range of the automatist's knowledge, 
then there was no need to suggest any agency other than 
the automatist's mind (conscious or subconscious). 
Much of Myers's work therefore consisted of 
demonstrating that motor automatisms could usually be 
attributed to the automatist alone and that evidence 
embraced by many Spiritualists as proving survival after 
death was wholly inadequate for that purpose. On 
numerous occasions he expressed his disappointment at the 
paucity of cases presented by Spiritualists containing 
veridical, verified content (e. g., 1889a, 546; 1889g, 
189n-190n); and likewise on numerous occasions he pleaded 
for more and better evidence from Spiritualists (e. g., 
1887b, 261). 
Nonetheless, as I explained in Chapter 5, Myers's 
overwhelming interest, concern, and motivation lay in his 
desire to find adequate evidence to support the idea that 
individual personality survives bodily death. Yet he 
also recognized, and readily admitted, that evidence for 
survival was "inferential" or indirect and likely to 
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remain so (1890b, 339). His general argument was that 
evidence supporting the theory of the causal efficacy of 
mental processes undermined the theory that mental 
processes are wholly dependent on or derived from one 
particular biological configuration. No evidence could 
prove the hypothesis of survival; but the accumulation of 
information pertinent to the question of mental efficacy 
might contribute to making the hypothesis seem more or 
less likely. 20 
I repeat that my purpose in this chapter has not been 
to evaluate the various studies and lines of research 
that Myers described and suggested, but to show the kinds 
of research that he thought would be most useful in 
attacking psychology's major problems. He himself recog- 
nized that his ideas and theories were far-reaching and 
possibly premature; but these conjectures and specula- 
tions were part of a deliberate attempt to encourage 
empirical research: 
My excuse for the bold and comprehensive way in 
which I have set forth [my] hypotheses... [is that 
if] there is to be widespread effort there must be 
widespread interest; and such interest can only be 
evoked by an understanding of the vast importance of 
the discovery to which these small and scattered 
inquiries do manifestly, although remotely, tend. 
(1892g, 534) 
However valid or invalid his ideas may be, they cannot be 
dismissed (as they too often are) as "mystical, " because 
they were derived from -- and must be confirmed or dis- 
proved by -- empirical observations. As he argued, 
so soon as [it] is understood... that the existence 
and nature of subliminal capacities in the self is 
to be inferred only from actual phenomena observed 
and interpreted by that empirical self by whose aid 
science does her work -- so soon does my theory lose 
its air of mysticism, and ranges itself among 
hypotheses which may be erroneous, but are not 




1 Myers's definition implied that an automatism could be 
an exchange of information from the subliminal to the 
supraliminal, from the supraliminal to the subliminal, or 
between different parts of the subliminal (say, from one 
secondary personality to another). For practical pur- 
poses, however, an automatism necessarily involved the 
transfer of information from the subliminal to the 
supraliminal, waking consciousness, since we can only 
become aware of the contents of consciousness that are 
presented (directly or indirectly) to the supraliminal. 
2 Claims that a saint or mystic needed little or no sleep 
have occasionally been made for Catholic mystics (Thur- 
ston, 1952,315) and for Sufis (Attar, 1966,253). Most 
such persons spend extended periods of their time in 
meditation or trance states, which (as some of the 
mystics themselves have suggested) might have been simply 
another form of sleep (Thurston, 1952,315). In Myers's 
view, trance or deep meditative states are, like sleep, 
another form of submergence of the supraliminal con- 
sciousness and emergence of a subliminal state, and as 
such they may therefore fulfill some of the functions of 
sleep while also allowing a level of awareness greater 
than that of sleep. 
3 Hilgard's later hypothesis of a "Hidden Observer" (Hil- 
gard, 1977) is similar to Myers's conception of a deeper 
level of consciousness that is aware of submerged sensa- 
tions and memories. Like Myers, Hilgard was not propos- 
ing a second, separate self -- "a kind of homunculus 
lurking in the shadows of the conscious person" (188) -- 
but a deeper level of one personality. In other 
respects, however, Hilgard rejects a theory such as 
Myers's that proposes "unrealized human potential" 
(209). 
Hilgard dismisses such ideas as "mystical, " but I think 
he and many other psychologists err 
in dismissing an idea 
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because by nature it seems "mystical" to them. The 
important consideration is not the nature of an idea, but 
the nature of the approach one takes to either confirming 
or disproving an idea. 
4 Phenomena comparable to stigmata among Catholic mystics 
seem also to occur occasionally among Sufis. There are 
secondhand reports that some Muslim saints, while 
absorbed in prayer, have developed stigmata-like wounds 
corresponding to the wounds suffered by Muhammed in 
battle (New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1967,713), but I have 
not yet been able to trace the source for this claim. 
5 Among the Druses of Lebanon and Syria, pregnant women 
sometimes conduct an analogous experiment on themselves. 
They believe that if they have a pregnancy craving but 
deny themselves the particular food craved and then touch 
some place on their body, the baby will be born with a 
birthmark at that location. I have talked to some Druse 
women who claim to have produced a birthmark on their 
baby in this way. 
6 The original goal in the SPR survey of hallucinations 
was to collect 50,000 responses (Barrett, Massey, Moses, 
et al., 1884a, 51). In 1886 Gurney reported the results 
from 5705 replies (Gurney, Myers, & Podmore, 1886, Ch. 
XIII). After Gurney's death, the survey was re-initiated 
at the 1889 Congress of Experimental Psychology and 
expanded to include surveys in France and America as well 
as England (A. T. Myers, 1889,173; Myers, 1891e, 638- 
639). In 1894 the results of a survey of 17,000 persons 
were reported (H. Sidgwick et al., 1894). In both the 
1886 Gurney and the 1894 Sidgwick report, the authors 
concluded from their surveys that non-pathological, 
veridical hallucinations do occur and that a cor- 
respondence in time between the occurrence of the appari- 
tion and the death of the person seen happened too fre- 
quently to be attributable to chance. 
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7 Stevenson (1987,106-107) has since had to repeat this 
warning. 
8 An apparition of a stranger or unrecognized figure -- 
whether in pathological or in apparently normal circum- 
stances -- may or may not be veridical, but the 
veridicality cannot of course be determined. Differences 
in the features of pathological and known veridical cases 
may therefore only be distinguishing apparitions occur- 
ring in pathological conditions from those occurring in 
healthy states, and not veridical from non-veridical 
ones. Nevertheless, for the practical purpose of 
identifying and studying cases that can be shown to be 
veridical, it seems safe to assume provisionally that 
hallucinations of an unrecognized figure are not veridi- 
cal. As I pointed out earlier in this chapter, however, 
Myers cautioned his readers to remember that a theoreti- 
cal model of -- in this instance --apparitions had to 
allow for the possibility that some non-veridical (or 
"weak") cases may in fact have a supernormal origin. 
9I remind readers of a point I noted in Chapter 6: 
Myers believed that the nature of this psychological link 
would be more subtle than kinship, apparent affection, or 
even acquaintance between the people involved, since 
there were cases involving people who were not emo- 
tionally close, were only slightly acquainted, or were 
even complete strangers (1884-1885,100,122). 
10 As I also explained earlier (in footnote 21 of Chapter 
6), Myers's conception of "experimental psychology" was 
far broader than it has since become. 
11 As I will explain further below, Myers's experimental 
methods for inducing sensory automatisms have their 
modern counterparts in sensory reduction techniques such 
as the Ganzfeld. 
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12 In mentioning in this chapter specific experiments 
that Myers or others carried out, my intent is only to 
show the kinds of experiments that Myers believed should 
be conducted and why he believed that kind of experiment 
might be important. My intent here is not either to 
defend or to criticize the validity of that particular 
experiment, and hence not to try to describe the experi- 
ment in any detail. 
13 The pictorial rather than verbal nature of the 
apparent stimulus for this hallucination might support 
Myers's idea (described in Chapter 6) that the right 
hemisphere is involved primarily in such subliminal 
processes. 
14 I remind readers here that for Myers the word "magi- 
cal" -- which refers to supernatural agency -- was in a 
sense a pejorative one, since he believed that no 
phenomena (including, and even especially, those super- 
normal phenomena that the psychical researchers were 
trying to demonstrate) are supernatural. Here, by 
"almost magical, " Myers meant to criticize those who 
would cursorily extend the hypothesis of sensory hyper- 
aesthesia to explain any perception beyond normal sensory 
capacity. 
15 The "mesmerizing" was done by "passes and occasional 
light touches" (Barrett, Gurney, Myers, et al., 1883b, 
261). 
16 Even such detection of unconscious muscular action, 
however, should be of interest to psychologists, both for 
shedding light on subtle influences on human behavior and 
also for drawing more carefully lines between normal per- 
ception, hyperaesthesia, and supernormal perception. 
17 The Ganzfeld method now widely used in parapsychology 
is essentially a modern version of the crystal-gazing and 
shell-hearing techniques that Myers advocated for 
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psychological research, in that a uniform visual and 
auditory field is used to heighten internal imagery and 
focus the subject's attention on it. Attempts to induce 
externalized hallucinations among subjects in the 
Ganzfeld, however, might prove to be particularly inter- 
esting, as Myers had thought they might. 
18 In these experiments, Mr. Newnham would write down 
questions while his wife, seated with her back to him, 
would write automatically. In 76 instances, the question 
was made known normally to Mrs. Newnham. In 309 ques- 
tions, however, Mrs. Newnham was not made aware of the 
question or even its general nature, and yet in most 
instances (Myers does not give an exact figure) the ans- 
wers were pertinent to the question asked. As Myers 
pointed out, the specific details of the content of the 
replies is of interest, particularly for allowing one to 
compare the replies automatically written with Mrs. 
Newnham's conscious thoughts. Yet "the leading and 
important fact... [is) that Mrs. Newnham's hand wrote 
replies clearly and repeatedly answering questions which 
she neither heard nor saw" (1903,2: 148; see also 1885b, 
6-23). 
19 Myers disliked the word "medium" and its derivatives. 
He dismissed it as an "intolerable" and "question- 
begging" term, since it involved the assumption that the 
person was "an intermediary" between two worlds, which 
was of course "just the question in dispute" (1890d, 
669). Instead, he preferred the word "automatist, " since 
it implied only that the phenomena were not conscious in 
origin (1890d, 669). 
20 Myers himself came to believe strongly in the 
hypothesis of survival, for reasons that, I must confess, 
remain a mystery to me. Two papers in particular are 
puzzling because he seems to accept as evidence for sur- 
vival precisely the kinds of phenomena that he had 
previously argued were wholly inadequate for that 
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hypothesis and implied nothing more than the automatist's 
own subliminal capacities (1893e; 1894b). On these occa- 
sions he thus seemed to violate his own often-expressed 
standards and criteria for judging phenomena; but his 
personal beliefs are, it seems to me, irrelevant in the 
present context. He may have concluded prematurely that 
he had found evidence sufficient to justify a belief in 
survival, but the problems and methods and criteria for 
judging explanations of phenomena which he outlined for 
psychology are still, in my view, valid and useful for 
addressing the general problem of the place of mind in 
the universe, as well as the related but more specific 
question of the survival of individual consciousness 
after death. Myers may, in other words, have prematurely 
concluded that he had arrived at his destination; but the 
correctness or incorrectness of that belief is irrelevant 
to the question of whether he pointed psychology in the 




THE PLACE OF PARAPSYCHOLOGY IN MODERN SCIENCE 
Objections to Parapsychology 
Modern parapsychology, like Myers's work, is firmly 
rooted in the empirical method of observation. It would 
seem, therefore, even if those observations may be 
incomplete, inadequately made, or even wrong, that nei- 
ther Myers's work nor modern parapsychology should be 
considered unscientific. What then are the roots of the 
antagonism -- often intense and even emotional -- with 
which many modern scientists react to parapsychology? 
The fundamental criticism of psychical research since its 
inception has been that, if psychical research is valid, 
then it would undermine all, or much, of Western science: 
If the views of some of these men of the Psychical 
Research Society are true, we must give up doctrines 
which are the necessary resultant of the inductive 
study of mind of the past hundred years. If Mr. 
Myers is right, we have learned nothing from the 
method of concomitant variations or the clinico- 
pathologic method based on the modern doctrine of 
cerebral localization. (Hurd, 1898,353) 
Lange stated that "Were it possible for a single cerebral 
atom to be moved by 'thought' so much as the millionth of 
a millimeter out of the path due to it by the laws of 
mechanics, the whole 'formula of the universe' would 
become inapplicable and senseless" (cited in Prince, 
1928,7). In a comparable vein, Wundt (1879,591) asked: 
"Whence is the scientific investigator to get courage and 
perseverance for his work, if the laws of nature.. . are 
approaching a point where they shall be done away with? " 
More recent scientists continue to echo this basic 
theme: 
The scientific status of extrasensory perception 
depends not on its factual status so much as on its 
status in a whole coherent body of science from 
psychology to physics. Scientists are not skeptical 
about extrasensory perception so much because they 
think the data are poor in ESP experiments, as 
because they are loath to give up an enormous com- 
plex of theory and data that would be challenged by 
uncritical acceptance of ESP as fact .... The exist- 
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ence of mental phenomena totally independent of an 
underlying physical basis would upset not only cur- 
rent psychological notions but traditional physical 
notions as well. It would, for example, deny the 
universal validity of one of the greatest triumphs 
of nineteenth-century science, the laws of 
thermodynamics. (Deese, 1972,72,115) 
Closely related to -- in fact, the obverse of -- the 
criticism that parapsychology would undermine Western 
science has been the accusation that it is a reversion to 
(and an attempt to revitalize) primitive, anti- 
scientific, dualistic supernaturalism, characterized by 
belief in miraculous, capricious events that interrupt 
and temporarily suspend the natural, law-abiding order. 
Huxley (1892,3-4) contrasting naturalism and super- 
naturalism, described supernaturalism as the "infantile 
and untutored" belief in an "intangible and mysterious 
world" above the "orderly world of Nature" and character- 
ized by "intermittent and capricious events. " He then 
contemptuously dismissed "the primitive dualism of a nat- 
ural world 'fixed in fate' and a supernatural, left to 
the free play of volition. " Similarly, critics today 
(e. g., Zusne, 1985) repeatedly contrast the "irrational", 
"superstitious", "primitive", "non-natural" or scientifi- 
cally naive, "magical" thinking of those sympathetic to 
parapsychology with the scientific thinking of those who 
understand that "scientifically acceptable" processes 
must "be anchored in physical reality" and that causal 
relationships involve the "transfer of [physical] energy 
between two systems" (686-87). Huxley was ultimately 
forced to construct his own "primitive dualism" of Nature 
and society -- the former characterized by law, the lat- 
ter by volition (e. g., Huxley, 1888/1898). And Zusne 
admits that "informational [i. e., subjective, mental] 
processes, although they are not energetic themselves, 
can trigger energetic events" (686; my italics) -- 
apparently not noticing that in this important sentence 
he has restated (and bypassed) the interaction problem of 
classical dualism (that is, how non-energetic processes 
can trigger energetic ones), has contradicted his own 
assertion that causality involves transfer of physical 
energy, and has begged the entire question that gave rise 
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to psychical research, namely, what does this causal 
relationship between informational (mental) and energetic 
(physical) processes imply about the adequacy of the 
"scientific" (that is, physicalistic) world view? 
For Huxley, Zusne, and countless others, however, the 
important issue has been to leave no room for doubts 
about which are the forces of good and which the forces 
of evil in the battle for people's minds. Any deviation 
(real or ascribed) from the accepted world view of 
science is intolerable -- even if it might contain some 
grain of truth. Wundt (1879), for example, arguing 
(erroneously) that the phenomena studied by psychical 
researchl require "that natural Science shall abandon the 
presupposition of a universal causality" (583), concluded 
that, whether or not the phenomena are real, they should 
be suppressed because they awaken "the corrupting effects 
of superstition" (592), that is, the irrational belief in 
supernatural forces or events contravening the natural 
order. Patrick (1898) likewise argued that, although 
scientists may someday affirm the hypothesis of survival 
after death, "the advancing of such hypotheses by 
psychologists can only serve to further the cause of 
superstition" (577). Jastrow (1889) insisted that the 
possibility that there could be "a true but small 
foundation-stone hidden beneath this rubbish-heap [of 
Spiritualism]" (732) was outweighed by the necessity to 
educate the public about the extent of the rubbish-heap. 
Knowledge, in short, took a back seat to destroying the 
enemy, superstition. 
The belief that psychical research constitutes a 
reversion to supernaturalism and, if valid, would 
undermine and invalidate the rest of Western science is 
based on the belief that the essence of science is the 
particular world view with which it is identified -- that 
world view being that only physical, not mental, 
phenomena are primary causes. As Mackenzie and Mackenzie 
(1980) have so eloquently argued, critics of psychical 
research object to it, not because it attacks specific 
current scientific theories but because it (supposedly) 
attacks the principles of determinism and rationality on 
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which the very existence of science is assumed to depend: 
The scientific revolution required an a priori con- 
ception of the world as a self-contained 
mathematico-physical system... [as] a condition of the intelligibility of nature. (Mackenzie and Mack- 
enzie, 1980,140) 
Psychical research, on the other hand, was and is 
a direct and continuing reaction against the exclu- 
sion of uniquely mental or otherwise physically 
irreducible qualities from the "real" world... (and 
seeks] to demonstrate more or less publicly the 
existence and causal efficacy of some kind of 
irreducible nonmathematico-physical elements in the 
world. (Mackenzie and Mackenzie, 1980,148) 
If, in fact, science is equivalent to the current 
world view of most scientists, then psychical research 
would, as feared, undermine Western science. But psychi- 
cal researchers such as Myers saw the situation dif- 
ferently: "We wish distinctly to say that so far from 
aiming at any paradoxical reversion of established 
scientific conclusions, we conceive ourselves to be work- 
ing (however imperfectly) in the main track of discovery" 
(Myers, 1886b, l: xxxvi). To them, the objection that 
psychical research would undermine western science was 
fully comparable to the Lord Chancellor's response to a 
1902 speech by Earl Russell introducing a reform to the 
British divorce laws: Although Russell's speech was "a 
model of temperate, rational discourse, " the Lord Chan- 
cellor vehemently denounced it as "an attempt to abolish 
the institution of marriage" (Hynes, 1968,189). Like 
the divorce reform laws, psychical research was intended 
to improve and strengthen -- not abolish -- the institu- 
tion it was said to threaten. Behind psychical research 
was an undeniably major question for modern science: 
Have scientists examined the phenomenon of volition, or 
mental causality, closely enough and thoroughly enough to 
conclude that mind is fundamentally a dependent, emergent 
property of matter, or should they keep open the alter- 
nate possibility that both mind and matter are fundamen- 
tal properties of nature, interacting in ways more com- 
plex than, on the basis of ordinary experience, we now 
perceive? Such major questions are not a threat to 
science, but, in contrast, its lifeblood. Myers believed 
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that, if mental phenomena are primary causal phenomena, 
acknowledging their causal efficacy would not undermine 
anything that has been learned about physical processes, 
but it would be a first step toward learning the circum- 
stances under which mental processes operate, toward 
specifying more exactly the circumstances under which 
physical ones operate, and toward learning how the vari- 
ous processes interact. Describing the limits to the 
range and applicability of a particular law or principle 
of science is not the same thing as invalidating it; one 
has instead gone beyond more or less vague assertions 
about the "universality" of a law to demonstrate more 
explicitly the parameters within which it is in fact 
universal. A ball dropped in space and floating aim- 
lessly does not invalidate the principle that a ball 
dropped on earth falls to the ground; it defines some of 
the limits of the conditions of gravity. 
Myers's work was therefore based on three major 
premises: that most psychological phenomena fall within 
well-recognized parameters of sensorimotor functioning, 
not because these are the only forms psychophysical 
functioning can take, but because they are the ones best 
adapted to meeting the needs of the organism; that there 
nevertheless are numerous psychological phenomena, both 
normal and unusual, suggesting that there are principles 
related to mental functioning that scientists have yet to 
discern and describe; and that the framework of science 
can be expanded to accommodate principles even radically 
different in kind from those now recognized, without 
thereby destroying the present framework. 
As Mackenzie and Mackenzie (1980,132) point out, 
however, this line of argument 
has had little effect. There are few recorded 
instances of critics snapping their fingers in vexa- 
tion, saying, "of course, we don't know all the laws 
of nature! Why didn't I think of that? " and chang- 
ing their attitudes to parapsychology accordingly. 
There is clearly more behind [critics' objections] 
than a momentary forgetting of the incompleteness of 
our knowledge. 
According to Mackenzie and Mackenzie, what is behind the 
objections is the belief that psychical research violates 
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the principles of determinism and rationality from which 
science takes its being, that it "constitutes an 
attack... on the conviction of the accessibility of the 
world to human reason" (1980,134). Such an accusation, 
however, is again reminiscent of the Lord Chancellor's 
remarks. Psychical researchers such as Myers could not be 
accused of promoting ideas undermining rationality 
because they -- in distinct contrast to their opponents 
-- assumed that the phenomena they studied, the circum- 
stances in which they occur, and the laws or principles 
by which they operate could ultimately be described and 
understood. Moreover, they were not so much attacking 
determinism per se as they were a particular conception 
of determinism that limited primary causal factors to 
physical processes. As a scientifically oriented 
thinker, Myers assumed that, if mental phenomena are 
causal phenomena, they operate with enough regularity to 
allow scientists to discern the conditions under which 
they are causal and to identify laws or principles des- 
cribing those conditions. 
G. R. Price (1955) illustrated the objections of many 
scientists to psychical research by contrasting a 
"scientific" phenomenon and a "magical" (or parapsycholo- 
gical) phenomenon in two hypothetical scenarios. In the 
former, a physical apparatus activated by the sound waves 
of a person's voice causes a table to rise in the air; in 
the latter, a person's mental desire that the table rise 
causes it to do so. According to Price, "in the 
scientific process, each successive detail is provided 
for. In the magic process, there are just the wish and 
the result, and all the intermediate steps are omitted" 
(1955,361). In fact, however, the difference between 
the two situations may be only that Price's "scientific" 
event has been more fully described than the "magical" 
event. All the phenomenal steps in the "scientific" 
event have been described -- the sound waves, the speech 
apparatus, the switch, the electromagnet, the iron plate. 
As empiricist philosophers and scientists since Hume have 
pointed out, however, any such causal sequence is simply 
a descriptive one, an observation that X is followed by 
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Y. At some basic level, we cannot say how or why X is 
followed by Y, only that one is followed by the other. 
In Price's "magical" event, there may yet be many circum- 
stantial details -- "all the intermediate steps" -- still 
to be identified before we can describe the event in as 
much detail as we can the first event; but, at some basic 
level, a mental process occurring under the appropriate 
conditions may be just as much a primary "cause" for the 
table to rise as a physical process occurring under the 
appropriate conditions. 
It is clear from Price's account, therefore, that his 
objection to psychical research, like that of most 
scientists, is ultimately not that it undermines either 
determinism or rationality -- a charge completely at 
variance with the intentions and beliefs of most psychi- 
cal researchers -- but that it undermines the assumption 
that all causes are fundamentally physical ones: 
Parapsychologists have. . . put themselves 
in a double 
bind. If they look hard for a causal mechanism, 
they might find one and be disappointed. If they 
fail to look at all, they cannot view themselves as 
scientists. (Neher, 1980,294-295) 
For most scientists, the only "causal" explanation is a 
physical one. The idea that mental phenomena might also 
be primary causal mechanisms is for them an inherently 
"unscientific" one, and thus parapsychology is inherently 
unscientific. 
The incompatibility of its [psychical research's] 
theoretical orientation with that of the natural 
sciences is as basic as the incompatibility of mind 
and matter -- not surprisingly, as they have the 
same source. (Mackenzie and Mackenzie, 1980,151) 
All scientists are clearly aware of "the incompleteness 
of our knowledge, " and many, like Price, readily agree 
that "new forces can be fitted into a scientific scheme 
of things" (Price, 1955,361). Nevertheless, there is 
still the assumption behind resistance to psychical 
research that qualitatively speaking, as it were, 
scientists do know all there is to know. The assumption 
is that future information, principles, and laws discov- 
ered will not differ in kind from those derived from the 
basic principles of modern science: that all phenomena 
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derive from the action, interaction, and evolving com- 
plexity of physical processes. Both psychological and 
parapsychological phenomena suggest that mental factors, 
especially volitional, purposeful ones, may be primary 
causal factors. What scientists mean, therefore, when 
they say that psychical research undermines science is 
that psychical research undermines the physicalist 
assumptions of modern science. 
For psychical researchers such as Myers, however, the 
method of science is the sacrosanct aspect of it; as 
Mackenzie and Mackenzie (1980,162n) insisted, "the meth- 
ods of science are objects of confidence in themselves. 
The world view which supports them is still influential, 
but not, we think, omnipotent. " One of the most impor- 
tant beliefs on which psychical research was founded -- 
belying the accusation that it is an attempt to undermine 
science and rationality -- is that, by continually 
questioning the assumptions and principles accepted by 
most scientists and subjecting them to new phenomena and 
new perspectives, the body of knowledge called science 
can only be strengthened. If the assumptions, princi- 
ples, and world view associated with current science are 
accurate and complete, the method will confirm this; but 
if they are in some sense incomplete -- or even wrong -- 
defining science in terms of them will ultimately weaken 
science by limiting it and its ability to right itself. 
Definition of Parapsychology 
Another major and frequently expressed objection to 
parapsychology has been that it is a field defined nega- 
tively (e. g., Blackmore, 1988; Boring, 1966; Flew, 1985). 
Most parapsychologists agree that the field is the study 
of phenomena that appear to violate the Basic Limiting 
Principles, as outlined by Broad (1953). 
2 By studying 
phenomena that seem not to fit these principles, parapsy- 
chologists are said to be interested only in the 
"unexplained" or the "mysterious. " As one critic 
explained, "the current upsurge in interest in the 
paranormal is, in part, motivated by curiosity about 
the 
unknown" (Alcock, 1981,35). One might well ask what 
it 
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is that motivates any science if not curiosity about the 
unknown; but a more serious complaint is that, because 
parapsychology is defined negatively, then , parapsychol- 
ogy is an ever-shrinking field" (Blackmore, 1985,440; 
see also Jastrow, 1900,47-77). As soon as a phenomenon 
is "explained, " or shown to conform to Broad's Basic 
Limiting Principles, it is said to be no longer of inter- 
est to parapsychologists: 
As soon as knowledge accumulates concerning a 
previously inexplicable experience, parapsycholo- 
gists seem to lose interest -- evidently because the 
mystery has waned. For example, as our knowledge 
accumulated concerning the processes involved in 
hypnosis, the interest of paranormal researchers 
faded away. (Neher, 1980,294) 
Palmer (1986) has tried to move parapsychology toward 
a positive definition by distinguishing between the 
primarily negative task of studying anomalous experiences 
for which there is as yet no explanation and the positive 
task of studying "a theory or model built around a 
hypothetical paranormal process or principle" (116). 
Nevertheless, many modern parapsychologists as well as 
critics continue to define the field negatively as the 
study of particular types of phenomena that seem opposed 
to Broad's Basic Limiting Principles. As a result, some 
parapsychologists have begun to suggest that the field be 
defined primarily in terms of anomalous phenomena, that 
is, as the study of phenomena that appear to violate 
Broad's Basic Limiting Principles, regardless of whether 
there is ultimately some "paranormal" explanation or not 
(e. g., Blackmore, 1985,1988; Irwin, 1989). This 
approach reflects a general tendency among many modern 
parapsychologists, noted by Mackenzie and Mackenzie 
(1980,157-163), "tacitly to drop the theme of opposition 
to other sciences" (159). Like their colleagues in 19th- 
century (and later) psychology, such parapsychologists 
reflect a tendency to be more concerned with acceptance 
by the scientific community than with basic theoretical 
questions that gave rise to the field in the first place. 
Like psychologists, in their eagerness to be accepted by 
the larger scientific community, parapsychologists who 
define the field primarily as the study of certain 
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anomalies seem to be backing off from the unique position 
of the psychological sciences to question the adequacy of 
assumptions inherited from the physical sciences. In 
losing sight of the larger questions and issues, they 
seem to be contenting themselves with ever smaller ques- 
tions, ever more limited and fragmented subject matter, 
and ever more trivial research. In short, parapsychol- 
ogy, like psychology, seems in danger of becoming a mere 
descriptive endeavor, not a theoretical science. 
If parapsychology is "an ever-shrinking field, " it 
would seem to be because parapsychologists themselves 
have lost sight of the larger questions that define and 
give coherence to the field, not because phenomena once 
considered a part of psychical research have been 
"explained. " Hypnosis is a frequent example cited by 
those who think that parapsychology shrinks as science 
advances; the above quotation from Neher (1980,294-295) 
is just one instance (see also, e. g., Blackmore, 1985, 
440). Yet, as I explained in the previous chapter, Myers 
understood clearly that "suggestion" was only a further 
description of the phenomena of hypnotism and in no way 
an explanation of them. Claims such as Neher's (1980, 
295) that "we can now understand hypnosis, in part, as a 
conditioning phenomenon" similarly disguise scientists' 
ignorance about the essential mechanism underlying hyp- 
nosis. I repeat Andrew Lang's cautionary remark that "to 
'explain the explanation' is the task for the future" 
(Lang, 1911,546). 
Myers, however, understood psychical research to be a 
much broader undertaking than the study of anomalous 
phenomena that needed explaining. The phenomena were 
interesting for a particular reason: The field was con- 
ceived as the study of a particular problem and not as 
the study of a particular body of unexplained phenomena, 
and that problem was the fundamental one of whether men- 
tal processes are derivative, and hence secondary to 
physical ones, or whether they are primary causal proper- 
ties. Particular anomalous phenomena were interesting 
because they suggested that mental phenomena can be pri- 
mary causal processes. The emphasis was thus clearly on 
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the examination of "a hypothetical paranormal process or 
principle" -- that "paranormal" principle being, in 
essence, mental causality. 
The definition of psychical research was therefore, 
broadly, the empirical study of the causal relationship 
between mental and physical phenomena. Myers saw no 
categorical distinction between psychology and psychical 
research because the latter was simply that branch of 
psychology that sought to maintain and promote the study 
of one of psychology's fundamental questions, when 
psychologists themselves renounced it. By this defini- 
tion, such problems as psychosomatic medicine, hypnosis 
and suggestion, and hysteria and multiple personality are 
well within the domain of psychical research; such 
"anomalous" phenomena as UFOs, numerology, or cryptozool- 
ogy are not. The exclusion of the latter topics from the 
field is based on an explicit definition of the field; 
they are not excluded "essentially from political 
motives" designed to improve parapsychology's "tenuous 
status as a science" (Irwin, 1989,5). Anomalous 
phenomena violating Broad's Basic Limiting Principles 
figure prominently in psychical research because, as 
Myers pointed out, they are phenomena in which the 
ordinary functioning of mind and matter appears to be 
altered, and as such they have the most potential for 
providing new insights into the problem. Nevertheless, 
despite the attempts of psychologists to ignore it, the 
problem of the nature of mind lurks behind all 
psychological phenomena, normal as well as anomalous. 
Myers thus had a clear sense of the close relationship 
between psychology and psychical research, because he 
understood that psychical research was attacking, not 
just the problem of certain anomalous and unexplained 
phenomena, but the much more general and important prob- 
lem of the nature of mind and its relationship to matter. 
Other scientists and psychologists, however, have had 
less than a clear sense of the relationship between para- 
psychology and psychology or the rest of science, because 
most of them have assumed that the problem of the rela- 
tionship of mind and matter has, in essence, been 
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solved. 3 Even among those increasing numbers of 
psychologists today who reject both dualism and reduc- 
tionist materialism or physicalism for a new "mentalism" 
that acknowledges the irreducibility and functional role 
of mental events, there remains the unquestioned assump- 
tion that mind is a derivative of matter and thus 
ultimately dependent on it. They are, in other words, 
materialists as Maudsley defined materialists: "those 
who maintain that mind is an outcome and function of mat- 
ter in a certain state of organization" (Maudsley, 1879, 
667). Neisser, for example, a leader in the new cogni- 
tive psychology, probably speaks for most psychologists: 
"I do not doubt that human behavior and consciousness 
depend entirely on the activity of the brain, in interac- 
tion with other physical systems. Most readers of this 
book will probably have the same prejudice" (Neisser, 
1967,5). Hebb considers the belief that "mind and 
thought and consciousness are physical activities, func- 
tions of the brain", to be "a good working assumption" 
for psychologists; it is, he says, "correct scientific 
procedure" to assume that "the idea that there are two 
totally different kinds of existence, mind and mat- 
ter,... is wrong" (Hebb, 1980,7,15,3). Sperry, arguing 
for the idea that mind is an active, causal agent, 
nevertheless assumes that mind is an emergent property of 
matter and that it is no longer "a question of whether 
conscious experience is tied to the living brain, but 
rather to what particular parts of the brain, or to which 
neural systems and under what physiological conditions" 
(Sperry, 1977,241). Even the editors of a book on the 
relations between psychology and the neurosciences con- 
cluded ("after several months of reading"! ) that the 
theoretical problem of the relation of mind and brain 
"had few if any implications for practicing experi- 
mentalists" (LeDoux & Hirst, 1986, ix). 
In sum, in accordance with the scientific principle 
of continuity and uniformity in nature, most modern 
scientists have rejected the old dualism that supposedly 
segregates mind and matter as two independent substances 
and have adopted what seems to be the only alternative, 
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namely, a view of mind-body as a single, unitary 
phenomenon with mind as the function of matter in a 
certain state of organization. As a result, most 
psychologists and other scientists who consider the prob- 
lem of mind have increasingly taken a rationalist, rather 
than an empirical, approach to psychology. They have, in 
other words, taken a major theoretical position, derived 
from the physical sciences, as an assumption upon which 
psychology is to be built. But is this, in fact, as Hebb 
thinks, "correct scientific procedure"? As Beloff and 
other psychologists have noted, "the numerous false 
starts, the frequent lack of direction, the morass of 
undigested facts" suggest that scientific psychology has 
had inadequate theoretical guidance (1962,16; see also, 
e. g., Deese, 1972,63-64; Kline, 1988): 
To note that the nineteenth century produced an 
experimental psychology is not the same as asserting 
that it produced a scientific psychology.... [W]hile 
it [experimentation] is, perhaps, a necessary corol- 
lary of science, it is not sufficient to establish 
an enterprise as scientific.... [A]ny number of 
clever experiments may be conducted without ever 
summing to a scientific system, 
if the field in question remains only a "purely descrip- 
tive, atheoretical program" (Robinson, 1978,105). The 
theory that "mind, mental entities, and mental phenomena 
exist as ultimate constituents of the world" may have 
been too readily discarded (Beloff, 1962,11). 
A more adequate -- and ultimately productive -- 
approach to the problem of mind might be, instead, to 
examine psychophysiological phenomena empirically in the 
light of both general competing theories, with the goal 
of moving beyond the perhaps too-limited perspective of 
each and toward some more comprehensive view, or tertium 
quid. Myers repeatedly argued that "something is gained 
if, having started with the preconception that 'all which 
is not A is B, ' we have come to the conclusion that our 
own subject matter is neither A nor B, but X" (Myers, 
1890a, 248). A view of mind and matter as in some sense 
functionally unitary does not necessarily imply that mind 
is a secondary, derivative property of matter. Con- 
versely, a view of mind as a primary causal phenomenon 
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does not necessarily imply that mind is independent of 
and exists apart from matter. As Myers understood, 
psychologists' growing knowledge that mind is not what it 
appears to "common sense" to be, together with 
physicists' growing knowledge that matter is also not 
what it appears to "common sense" to be, suggest that 
mind and matter may interact in ways more complex that 
they now appear from our normal, "common-sense" perspec- 
tive to do. Myers cautioned that "our notions of mind 
and matter must pass through many a phase as yet 
unimagined" (1886e, 179). A contemporary philosopher 
similarly suggested that "it seems to me... likely... that 
mental-physical relations will eventually be expressed in 
a theory whose fundamental terms cannot be placed clearly 
in either category" (Nagel, 1974,450). 
The importance of parapsychology, or psychical 
research, to science is therefore two-fold. First, it 
recalls psychology to its fundamental questions about the 
status of mind and mental causality in the physical 
world. And, second, it recalls to psychology and to all 
science that science is -- or should be -- empirical 
rather than rationalist, in the sense that it is most 
fundamentally a method rather than a world view. The 
temptation to maintain a world view at all costs derives 
from the natural function of all perception, which is to 
systematize and order experience; but it is a temptation 
that must be resisted if science is not to degenerate 
into dogma: 
In spite of the continued hints which nature gives 
us to enlarge our conceptions in all kinds of 
unlooked-for ways, the instinct of system, of a 
rounded and completed doctrine, is apt to be too 
strong for us, and a determined protest against 
premature synthesis is as much needed now as ever. 
(Myers, 1889j, 392) 
If parapsychology does nothing more than continually 
shake complacent assumptions about fundamental questions 
concerning mind, consciousness, volition, that alone 
is 
not an insignificant contribution to science. Ironi- 
cally, if modern science is in danger of being 
undermined, it is not by parapsychologists who assume 
that the essence of science lies in its methods, 
but by 
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those scientists who assume that the essence of science 




1 In 1879, when Wundt wrote this article, psychical 
research had not yet been institutionally organized -- an 
event that did not take place until 1882, when the SPR 
was founded. Nonetheless, Wundt was here referring to 
the study, by scientists, of alleged mediumistic 
phenomena, and such phenomena were among those that 
psychical researchers studied. 
2 These Basic Limiting Principles fall into four 
categories: (1) the General Principles of Causation, 
which state that there is a linear sequence of causes and 
effects; (2) the Limitations on the Action of Mind on 
Matter, or the assumption that a mind can produce changes 
only in its associated brain; (3) the Dependence of Mind 
on Brain; and (4) Limitations on Ways of Acquiring Knowl- 
edge, or the assumption that knowledge can come only from 
sensory experience or inferences based on sensory experi- 
ence (Broad, 1953,9-12). 
3 At least one parapsychologist must be included in this 
statement as well. Blackmore (1988) has decided that 
"materialism, in one form or another, is here to stay.... 
[W]e need courage to accept what has been learned in 
other sciences, that probably conscious experience is 
totally dependent on our brains" (56,58). But "courage" 
does not seem to be the appropriate word to characterize 
evasion or abandonment of a major theoretical problem 
that has never been attacked empirically to the extent 
required for a problem so complex as the relationship of 
mental and physical phenomena. 
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